Exploring South Korea’s Network-Based, Multifaceted Diplomatic Strategy in an Era of U.S.-China Strategic Competition— Stable Management of South Korea-China Relations Based on the U.S.-ROK Alliance —Sang-man LeeVisiting ProfessorInstitute of Far Eastern Studies, Kyungnam University Institute of International Studies, Shandong UniversityIntroduction: The Moolenaar Letter and Misconceptions About South Korean DiplomacyIn a recent letter to Secretary of State Marco Rubio, John Moolenaar, Chairman of the U.S. House of Representatives Select Committee on Strategic Competition between the United States and the Chinese Communist Party (China Select Committee), expressed concerns about South Korea’s expanding relations with China and the future of the ROK-U.S. alliance. The letter addressed a broad range of issues, including increased exchanges between the South Korean and Chinese leaders, South Korean companies’ semiconductor production in China, South Korea’s regulations affecting U.S. companies, South Korea’s potential response in the event of a crisis in the Taiwan Strait, intelligence sharing between South Korea and the United States, and the transfer of wartime operational control. Taken together, these concerns reflect questions about whether South Korea’s strategic direction may be shifting.Chairman Moolenaar’s concerns are noteworthy in that they underscore the importance of the ROK-U.S. alliance. However, the various examples cited in the letter and the logic connecting them reflect factual misunderstandings or overinterpretations of South Korea’s diplomatic, security, and economic policies.Above all, interpreting expanded exchanges between South Korean and Chinese leaders as evidence of an immediate “closer alignment with China” or a broader strategic shift does not adequately reflect the realities facing South Korean diplomacy. South Korea must maintain the ROK-U.S. alliance as the central pillar of its security in responding to North Korea’s nuclear and missile threats while simultaneously managing stable relations with China, a geographically adjacent country with which South Korea maintains deep economic ties.South Korea’s diplomacy toward China is not intended to replace the ROK-U.S. alliance. Rather, as U.S.-China strategic competition intensifies, it is increasingly characterized by pragmatic relationship management aimed at preventing unnecessary miscalculation and conflict on the Korean Peninsula and in the broader region, while protecting South Korea’s national interests through continued communication with China.Therefore, South Korea’s response to the Moolenaar letter should not be framed as a choice between China and the United States. It is important to explain accurately that South Korea’s actual foreign policy reflects a complex structure in which the ROK-U.S. alliance remains the central pillar of its security, while relations with China are managed in a stable and pragmatic manner.Expanding South Korea-China Summit Exchanges Does Not Weaken the ROK-U.S. AllianceIt is true that South Korea-China summit diplomacy has recently been rapidly restored. President Lee Jae-myung paid a state visit to China in January 2026 and held a summit with Chinese President Xi Jinping; the two countries signed 15 cooperation agreements across a range of areas, including science and technology, digital affairs, the environment, transportation, small and medium-sized enterprises, industrial complexes, and food safety. At the time, President Lee expressed his determination to make 2026 the first year of a full restoration of South Korea-China relations.Chairman Moolenaar viewed this expansion of summit-level exchanges as evidence of strategic rapprochement between China and South Korea. In particular, he interpreted President Xi Jinping’s emphasis on their shared history of resistance to Japanese imperialism as an attempt by China to drive a wedge between the United States, South Korea, and Japan.However, viewing summit-level exchanges in themselves as evidence of strategic alignment constitutes an overinterpretation. Since the establishment of diplomatic relations, South Korea and China have shared overlapping interests across a broad range of areas, including economic and trade relations, people-to-people exchanges, the North Korean nuclear issue, peace on the Korean Peninsula, and disputes in the Yellow Sea and other maritime areas. Particularly as North Korea’s nuclear and missile capabilities continue to advance and U.S.-China strategic competition persists, maintaining high-level communication with China does not constrain South Korea’s diplomatic and security options; rather, it can expand the space available for crisis management.If summits between South Korean and Chinese leaders were to weaken the ROK-U.S. alliance, South Korea would effectively find itself in a situation in which its relationship with the United States deteriorated every time it held a summit with China. Such an interpretation is overly binary and does not reflect the realities of international relations. South Korea is an ally of the United States and maintains a strategic cooperative partnership with China. Although an alliance and a strategic cooperative partnership differ in nature, they are not inherently mutually exclusive.In fact, from South Korea’s perspective, stable management of relations with China can also help reduce the burden on the ROK-U.S. alliance. As the risk of direct confrontation between the United States and China increases, South Korea’s ability to maintain communication channels with China can play an important role in managing inadvertent escalation and potential crises on the Korean Peninsula and in Northeast Asia.South Korea’s Economic Relations with China Reflect the Reality of Global Supply Chains, Not “Integration into China”The Moolenaar letter cited Samsung Electronics’ Xi’an plant and SK hynix’s Wuxi and Dalian production facilities, expressing concern that China could leverage the production networks of South Korean companies to influence supply chains serving the United States and its allies. However, interpreting South Korean companies’ production facilities in China solely as evidence of strategic dependence on China fails to adequately account for the historical development of South Korea’s global production structure.The decisions by Samsung Electronics and SK hynix to establish production facilities in China were part of global business strategies developed well before the intensification of U.S.-China strategic competition. China has long been one of the world’s largest manufacturing and consumer markets, and South Korean companies have used China as a major production and sales hub to serve global markets.Of course, South Korea recognizes that production facilities in China could have implications for economic security, particularly in advanced semiconductors and other critical technologies. However, it would be a significant analytical leap to conclude from this that South Korea is being drawn into China’s supply-chain strategy. South Korean companies are already expanding large-scale investments in major markets, including the United States. Increased investment in the United States and the development of production capacity there are important pillars of ROK-U.S. economic and security cooperation. Accordingly, the continued operation of existing production facilities in China and the expansion of investment in the United States are not mutually exclusive policies.The reality for South Korea is not a choice between “China or the United States,” but rather that it is simultaneously connected to multiple markets and supply chains, including those of the United States, China, Europe, ASEAN, and India. Given this complex economic structure, assessing South Korean companies’ production facilities in China solely as a risk to the ROK-U.S. alliance could result in viewing the global competitive environment facing South Korean companies through an excessively security-centric lens.Claims of Discrimination Against U.S. Companies and Actual Regulatory CasesAnother key issue raised by Chairman Moolenaar is the claim that South Korea’s platform regulations are more stringent for the U.S. company Coupang but relatively lenient for Chinese companies such as AliExpress and Tmall. However, a review of actual regulatory cases in South Korea indicates that this characterization does not fully reflect the facts.In 2024, the Personal Information Protection Commission imposed a fine of 1.978 billion won and an administrative penalty of 7.8 million won on AliExpress for violations of the law, including violations involving the cross-border transfer of personal information, and issued a corrective order and recommendations for improvement. It also imposed a fine of 1.369 billion won and an administrative penalty of 17.6 million won on Temu in 2025 for violations of the Personal Information Protection Act.Conversely, South Korean regulatory authorities have also imposed substantial sanctions on Coupang. In 2026, the Personal Information Protection Commission imposed a fine of 624.681 billion won and an administrative penalty of 16.8 million won on Coupang for violations including failures to implement required security measures and the collection of personal information without a legal basis, and issued corrective orders. At the time, this represented the largest-ever fine imposed in connection with personal information protection.Therefore, when the regulatory actions involving AliExpress, Tmall, and Coupang are considered together, it is difficult to conclude that the South Korean government systematically applies lenient standards to Chinese companies while imposing stricter standards on U.S. companies. The key principle that the South Korean government should make clear is straightforward: any company operating in South Korea, regardless of nationality, is subject to South Korean law and must comply with the same legal standards governing personal information protection, consumer protection, fair trade, and product safety.South Korean regulatory authorities have also maintained the principle that they investigate and impose penalties for personal data breaches without distinguishing between public- and private-sector entities. Of course, foreign companies, including U.S. firms, may raise concerns regarding the procedures and enforcement of specific regulations. South Korea should also be prepared to listen carefully to procedural concerns raised by foreign companies. However, the existence of sanctions against particular companies and the characterization of those sanctions as discriminatory policies targeting a specific country are two distinct issues.In particular, given that sanctions have been imposed on both Coupang and Chinese-owned platforms, characterizing South Korea’s entire platform regulatory framework as “discrimination against U.S. companies” does not adequately reflect the nature of South Korea’s domestic regulatory system.South Korea-China Supply Chain Consultations Are Not Intended to Exclude the United StatesChairman Moolenaar also raised concerns that export-control and supply-chain consultations between South Korea and China could provide China with insight into the policies of U.S. allies. However, the fact that South Korea consults with China on supply-chain issues cannot reasonably be viewed as incompatible with economic-security cooperation between South Korea and the United States. South Korea conducts substantial trade with China, and China remains an important supply-chain partner. Given existing economic linkages with China in critical minerals, materials and components, logistics, and trade, refraining from consultations with China altogether could actually create greater uncertainty for the South Korean economy.South Korea’s discussions with China on supply-chain stability are not intended to align with China’s strategic objectives, but rather to manage potential supply-chain disruptions that could affect South Korean companies and the national economy. At the same time, South Korea is strengthening cooperation with the United States in economic security, advanced technologies, and supply chains. Accordingly, South Korea-China supply-chain consultations and ROK-U.S. economic-security cooperation are not mutually exclusive.In fact, South Korea’s diplomacy operates within a structure in which multiple networks function simultaneously. The ROK-U.S. alliance serves as the central pillar of security; economic relations with China constitute a sphere of practical interdependence; and cooperation with Japan, Europe, ASEAN, India, and Central Asia provides a foundation for diversifying supply chains and markets.South Korea’s Position on the Taiwan Strait Is Not One of “Excluding a Joint Response”Chairman Moolenaar assessed, based on President Lee Jae-myung’s remarks regarding the Taiwan Strait, that South Korea had effectively ruled out the possibility of supporting a regional joint response in the event of a Chinese attack on Taiwan. However, South Korea’s position on the Taiwan Strait does not amount to unconditionally accepting China’s demands or denying the United States’ role in the region.South Korea fundamentally maintains that peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait are important and emphasizes the principle that cross-strait differences should be resolved through peaceful means. The fact that South Korea emphasizes peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait does not automatically require it to commit in advance to participation in specific military contingencies. Conversely, it would also be inappropriate to conclude that South Korea rejects the regional role of the ROK-U.S. alliance simply because it has not publicly committed to a military response to a particular scenario.The primary focus of South Korea’s security policy remains maintaining peace on the Korean Peninsula and addressing North Korea’s nuclear and missile threats. It is also clear that a military conflict in the Taiwan Strait could have significant implications for South Korea’s security and economy. Therefore, South Korea’s cautious approach to the Taiwan Strait should be understood not as a concession to China, but as a pragmatic approach that takes into account both the security environment on the Korean Peninsula and the broader regional strategic context.In particular, should tensions in the Taiwan Strait escalate, South Korea’s maritime trade routes, semiconductor supply chains, energy supplies, and financial markets could all be affected, as could the possibility of military action by North Korea. South Korea’s emphasis on peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait stems precisely from its assessment of these interconnected risks.The Transfer of Wartime Operational Control Is Not a Weakening of the ROK-U.S. Alliance, but a Process of Its EvolutionThe transfer of wartime operational control was also addressed in the Moolenaar letter in the context of trust and security cooperation between South Korea and the United States.However, South Korea’s pursuit of the transfer of wartime operational control is not intended to distance the country from the ROK-U.S. alliance. As the South Korean Ministry of National Defense has explicitly stated, the transfer of wartime operational control is a process of strengthening the South Korean military’s capacity to lead combined defense operations on the foundation of a strong ROK-U.S. alliance. The South Korean government’s current policy agenda also calls for pursuing a conditions-based OPCON transfer while securing “comprehensive deterrence capabilities based on the ROK-U.S. alliance.” During their May 2026 meeting, the defense ministers of the two countries discussed key alliance issues, including the OPCON transfer and alliance modernization, and agreed to strengthen future cooperation.Therefore, viewing the OPCON transfer as a process through which South Korea is drifting away from the United States in security terms fails to accurately characterize the evolution of the alliance, which is being pursued through mutual agreement between the two countries. The ROK-U.S. combined defense posture will continue, and military cooperation between the two countries will remain in place following the OPCON transfer. The Ministry of National Defense has also separately clarified that the current ROK-U.S. Combined Forces Command structure will remain in place following the transfer.Ultimately, the OPCON transfer being pursued by South Korea should not be viewed as a choice between the “ROK-U.S. alliance” and “independent national defense,” but rather as a process of expanding South Korea’s military responsibilities and capabilities within the alliance.Regarding Intelligence Sharing, It Is Necessary to Distinguish Between Specific Incidents and the Alliance as a WholeChairman Moolenaar raised the issue of trust between South Korea and the United States, citing controversy surrounding the disclosure of U.S. classified information involving Unification Minister Jeong Dong-young and the possibility that U.S. intelligence authorities could restrict information sharing as a result. There can be no disagreement that protecting classified information and maintaining confidentiality within the alliance are critical. Because the ROK-U.S. alliance relies on a high degree of intelligence sharing and an integrated combined defense posture, information-security issues must be managed with the utmost rigor.However, remarks by a particular individual or media reports concerning isolated incidents should not be equated with the overall intelligence-sharing framework of the ROK-U.S. alliance. Given that the scope, substance, and circumstances surrounding any actual restrictions on intelligence sharing have not been sufficiently established publicly, caution is warranted before concluding that South Korea is withdrawing from its intelligence partnership with the United States based on such speculation.The foundation of ROK-U.S. intelligence sharing is the sustained maintenance of institutional trust and robust security procedures, rather than political debates surrounding individual incidents. South Korea fully recognizes the security value of intelligence shared by the United States and does not dispute the importance of ROK-U.S. cooperation in intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance to the security of the Korean Peninsula.Major security issues, including the nuclear-powered submarine program and the transfer of operational control, are also being pursued through consultations between South Korea and the United States. Rather than interpreting these efforts as an attempt by South Korea to diminish the United States’ security role, it is more accurate to understand them as part of a broader process of strengthening South Korea’s own defense capabilities while enhancing the roles and functions of the ROK-U.S. alliance.South Korea’s Foreign Policy Is Neither “Pro-China” Nor “Anti-U.S.”Taking into account the various examples raised in the Moolenaar letter, the central U.S. concern appears to be the possibility that South Korea could gradually diverge from the strategic direction of the ROK-U.S. alliance as it strengthens its relationship with China. However, when South Korea’s actual policies are examined individually, it is difficult to identify a consistent strategic shift that would substantiate such an assessment.South Korea-China summit diplomacy is aimed at restoring bilateral relations and managing outstanding issues. The production facilities of South Korean companies in China are part of global supply chains that have developed over an extended period. Regulations affecting Chinese platforms are being enforced on the basis of violations of domestic law, while similarly stringent regulatory standards are also applied to U.S. companies. South Korea’s position on the Taiwan Strait emphasizes the principles of peace and stability. The transfer of wartime operational control is likewise being pursued on the basis of the ROK-U.S. alliance.Above all, South Korea and the United States continue to maintain a combined defense posture to address North Korea’s nuclear and missile threats. In May 2026, the defense ministers of South Korea and the United States reaffirmed their commitment to modernizing the alliance and strengthening the combined defense posture, while agreeing to continue cooperation on key alliance issues, including the transfer of operational control.Given these realities, interpreting South Korea’s improved relations with China as evidence of a weakening ROK-U.S. alliance is overly simplistic. South Korea’s foreign policy does not operate on a “choose one over the other” basis between the United States and China. For South Korea, the United States is the core partner in its security alliance, while China is a geographically adjacent country with which South Korea maintains important economic, trade, and Korean Peninsula-related ties. Managing these relationships according to their respective characteristics is a central feature of South Korean diplomacy.ConclusionChairman Moolenaar’s letter once again demonstrates the importance of the ROK-U.S. alliance to both the United States and South Korea. The growing attention in the U.S. Congress to South Korea’s foreign policy and its relations with China is also an issue that South Korea cannot afford to dismiss. However, accurately assessing South Korea’s policies requires examining the objectives and contexts in which individual policies are pursued, rather than linking separate cases to a single overarching narrative.South Korea’s expansion of summit-level exchanges with China is not intended to weaken the ROK-U.S. alliance. Amid intensifying U.S.-China strategic competition, it is better understood as diplomatic relationship management aimed at maintaining regional stability and managing issues on the Korean Peninsula through continued communication with China. South Korean companies’ production facilities in China likewise do not represent a mechanism for expanding China’s strategic influence, but rather form part of global production networks that have developed over many years. At the same time, South Korea is diversifying its supply chains by expanding investment in major markets, including the United States.Regulatory actions involving U.S. companies should also be examined alongside those involving Chinese companies. South Korea’s Personal Information Protection Commission has imposed sanctions on AliExpress and Temu, while also imposing substantial penalties on Coupang. These cases demonstrate why it is difficult to characterize South Korea’s regulatory policies simply as “discrimination against U.S. companies.”Regarding the Taiwan Strait, South Korea places considerable importance on peace and stability in the Strait and on the peaceful resolution of cross-strait issues. This does not mean unconditionally accepting China’s position, nor does it imply a predetermined commitment to any specific military response. The transfer of wartime operational control is not a weakening of the ROK-U.S. alliance, but rather a process of strengthening the ROK military’s capacity to lead combined defense operations on the foundation of that alliance. ROK and U.S. defense authorities are discussing both alliance modernization and the transfer of operational control on the premise of maintaining and strengthening the ROK-U.S. combined defense posture.Therefore, characterizing South Korea’s current diplomacy simply as “South Korea tilting toward China” fails to capture the complexity of the diplomatic, security, and economic policies South Korea is actually pursuing. South Korea’s position is clear. The ROK-U.S. alliance remains the core foundation of South Korea’s diplomatic and security policy, while relations with China constitute an important bilateral relationship that must be managed in a stable manner, taking into account security and stability on the Korean Peninsula and in the broader region, as well as economic interdependence.These two relationships are not inherently in conflict. On the contrary, as U.S.-China strategic competition intensifies, South Korea must continue to strengthen the ROK-U.S. alliance while maintaining communication and managing its relationship with China. Rather than evaluating South Korean diplomacy through a binary framework of “pro-U.S. or pro-China,” it should be understood as a network-based, multifaceted diplomatic strategy that stabilizes relations with China while simultaneously developing economic, technological, and supply-chain networks with a broad range of partners, all anchored by the ROK-U.S. alliance as the central pillar of security.South Korea cannot alter the reality that it is both a U.S. ally and a country that shares a border with China. Precisely because of this reality, managing relations with China without weakening the ROK-U.S. alliance is a critical task for South Korean diplomacy. Ultimately, the expansion of South Korea’s relations with China should not be viewed as evidence of a weakening ROK-U.S. alliance, but rather understood as an expression of South Korean diplomatic realism—an approach aimed at managing regional uncertainty on the foundation of a strong and enduring ROK-U.S. alliance.

The Positive Impact of South Korean Investment Projects in the U.S. on U.S.-South Korea RelationsWon-mok ChoiProfessorEwha Womans University Law SchoolThe U.S.-South Korea alliance stands at a new turning point. Established in 1953 on the basis of the U.S.-Korea Mutual Defense Treaty, the alliance has long been centered on military and security cooperation. As trade and investment expanded, it evolved into an economic alliance, and the scope of cooperation is now broadening to encompass strategic industries directly linked to the future competitiveness of both countries—including semiconductors, batteries, AI, nuclear power, shipbuilding, critical minerals, and energy. At the heart of this transformation are South Korea’s large-scale investment projects in the United States.Through the Strategic Investment Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) signed last year, South Korea and the United States established a framework under which South Korea would pursue investments in the United States totaling $350 billion. Of this amount, $150 billion is earmarked for shipbuilding cooperation aimed at rebuilding and modernizing the U.S. shipbuilding industry, while $200 billion is designated for investment in strategic sectors such as shipbuilding, energy, semiconductors, pharmaceuticals, critical minerals, artificial intelligence (AI), and quantum computing. The White House has also stated that the two countries have agreed to advance their shared economic and national security interests through these investments.In June 2026, the Korea-U.S. Strategic Investment Corporation, dedicated to overseeing this cooperation, was officially launched. The South Korean government established the legal framework for managing these investments pursuant to the Korea-U.S. Strategic Investment Special Act, which was passed by the National Assembly in March, and began systematically managing strategic investments in the United States through the corporation.This goes beyond simply investing large sums of money in the United States. Rather, the key lies in connecting the industrial ecosystems of South Korea and the United States into integrated value chains and creating a structure in which the two countries complement each other’s industrial strengths and address their respective vulnerabilities to jointly enhance future competitiveness.Investment in the U.S. is both an “investment in the United States” and an “investment in the U.S.-Korea alliance.”The reason U.S. President Donald Trump emphasizes South Korea’s investment in the United States is clear. At the core of the economic policies pursued by the Trump administration are the goals of strengthening the U.S. manufacturing base, expanding energy production, establishing critical supply chains within the United States, rebuilding the shipbuilding industry, and maintaining competitiveness in advanced technologies. The United States views the revitalization of its shipbuilding industry, in particular, as a matter of national security. In a 2025 executive order, President Trump emphasized that U.S. commercial shipbuilding capacity and maritime industrial infrastructure had been weakened over the long term and that restoring them was necessary not only for economic competitiveness but also for national security. The U.S. government noted at the time that the United States accounted for less than 1% of global commercial ship production, while China accounted for approximately half.In August 2026, President Trump also issued a presidential memorandum aimed at rebuilding the U.S. Navy and strengthening the U.S. shipbuilding industrial base. The core focus was on restoring the production capacity, workforce, and supply chains of U.S. shipyards. It is precisely in this area that South Korea’s role becomes critical.South Korea possesses world-class capabilities in commercial shipbuilding, as well as expertise in shipbuilding equipment, ship finance, production management, and automation technologies. While the United States has a vast market, substantial financial and technological capabilities, and significant maritime security requirements, it faces structural challenges in its shipbuilding production base and workforce. Combining South Korea’s shipbuilding capabilities with U.S. market access and national security requirements could therefore create new opportunities for both countries.In fact, in the 2025 agreement between the South Korean and U.S. leaders, the White House welcomed South Korea’s expanded investment in U.S. shipyards and the U.S. workforce, while explicitly outlining bilateral cooperation in areas such as shipyard modernization, maintenance, repair, and overhaul (MRO), workforce development, and supply chain resilience. This demonstrates that investment in the United States goes beyond factory construction or financial investment alone; it is part of a broader process of building the substantive foundation of a South Korea-U.S. industrial alliance.New U.S.-Korea Economic Security Cooperation Begins in TexasThe first strategic investment project announced by the South Korean and U.S. governments on October 1, 2026, demonstrates that this shift is already becoming a reality. The two countries agreed to pursue “Project Star” as the first South Korea-U.S. strategic investment project, involving the construction and operation of a gas-fired combined-cycle power plant with a total capacity of 6,472 MW and a total investment of $22.3 billion in the Encinitas area of Texas. The power plant will supply electricity directly to nearby AI data centers, with commercial operation of Phase 1 scheduled to begin in 2029 and full-scale operations targeted for 2032.What is noteworthy is that this project is not merely a power plant construction project. As the AI industry expands, electricity demand from data centers is increasing rapidly. Ultimately, competitiveness in AI depends not only on GPUs and algorithms but also on the ability to secure a stable and sufficient power supply. South Korea has extensive experience operating large-scale manufacturing facilities in industries such as semiconductors, batteries, automobiles, and electronics, as well as competitive capabilities in power-generation equipment and electrical materials. The United States, meanwhile, possesses the world’s largest AI industry and a massive data center market.The Texas project is an example of combining the strengths of both countries. The South Korean government stated that, in reviewing the project’s feasibility, it comprehensively considered factors such as increased electricity demand resulting from expanded data center investment in Texas, projected electricity prices, and the business capabilities of participating companies. It also completed the deliberation and approval processes of the Project Management Committee and the Operations Committee, as well as the reporting procedures to the National Assembly, in accordance with domestic law.Even more important are the opportunities for South Korean companies to participate. The plan aims to expand the participation of Korean companies throughout the entire project lifecycle—including power-generation equipment, engineering and construction, and long-term operation and maintenance—and the U.S. side has expressed its intention to provide opportunities for Korean-made equipment, including turbines, to be supplied to other projects in the United States in the future. Therefore, South Korea’s investment in the United States is not merely a matter of committing capital and stopping there; it has the potential to serve as a platform for Korean companies to expand their presence in the U.S. market.Nuclear Power Cooperation Could Become a New Symbol of the South Korea-U.S. Technology AllianceCooperation in the nuclear power sector is also a key example illustrating the qualitative transformation in U.S.-Korea relations. South Korea and the United States have agreed on a “U.S.-Korea Nuclear Power Framework” that would utilize up to $120 billion from the U.S.-Korea Strategic Investment Fund to support the construction of eight large-scale nuclear power plants in the United States and establish a framework for nuclear cooperation between companies from both countries. This includes two units of the Korean APR1400 and six units of Westinghouse’s AP1000. However, the South Korean government maintains that final decisions on individual nuclear power projects will be made only after specific details—including site selection, project structure, and construction schedules—have been finalized, commercial viability has been assessed, and domestic procedures have been completed.This cooperation holds significant symbolic value. Korea’s first nuclear power plant, Kori Unit 1, was built in 1978 using Westinghouse technology. Now, some 50 years later, a framework has been established for South Korean companies to build nuclear power plants in the United States alongside Westinghouse. Furthermore, the participation of the Korean-designed APR1400 in U.S. nuclear power projects could provide an opportunity to enhance the international standing of South Korea’s nuclear power industry. Successful execution of projects in the U.S. market could also provide a foundation for South Korean and U.S. companies to jointly enter third-country markets, including Europe and the Middle East. The South Korean government also anticipates these potential benefits.In particular, U.S. electricity demand is likely to increase as AI data centers and advanced manufacturing expand.As the role of nuclear power in ensuring a stable and reliable electricity supply grows, combining South Korea’s experience in nuclear power plant construction and operation with U.S. technology and market access could contribute to the development of an integrated supply chain for the nuclear power industries of both countries. This goes beyond conventional energy cooperation.The nuclear power industry is a comprehensive sector that connects numerous industries, including key equipment, engineering and design, construction, operations, fuel, safety management, and finance. Therefore, as nuclear power cooperation expands, industrial, technological, and human capital exchanges between South Korea and the United States are also likely to expand.Alaska LNG: New Possibilities for Energy Security CooperationThe Alaska LNG project is another example of the potential for South Korea-U.S. economic security cooperation. However, it is important to clarify the facts surrounding this matter. On September 30, 2026, President Trump announced a project package worth approximately $200 billion at the White House in connection with South Korea’s strategic investments in the United States, which included the Alaska LNG pipeline project. President Trump mentioned eight large-scale nuclear power plants, a gas-fired power plant in Texas, and the Alaska LNG project.However, the South Korean government made clear that investment in the Alaska LNG project had not been finalized at that time and that its feasibility and legal requirements remained subject to review. President Lee Jae-myung also stated that LNG and nuclear power projects could proceed only after their commercial viability had been confirmed. These differences should be viewed not as a problem in U.S.-South Korea relations but rather as part of the normal negotiation and due-diligence process for large-scale international projects.In fact, in the plan announced by the South Korean government on October 1, the Alaska LNG project was designated as “Project North” and remains under review. A decision on whether to proceed with the project will be made only after it satisfies the commercial viability requirements of the U.S.-South Korea Strategic Investment MOU and complies with applicable domestic legal requirements.More important, however, are the mutual benefits that could be realized if the project moves forward. The U.S. side has agreed to improve conditions for the participation of South Korean equipment manufacturers and suppliers, secure long-term LNG purchase contracts on economically viable terms, and provide South Korea with priority access to LNG produced in Alaska. From South Korea’s perspective, this presents an opportunity to strengthen energy security by diversifying its LNG supply sources.The United States can also secure South Korea as a stable long-term energy market. Ultimately, LNG cooperation represents the convergence of two objectives: expanding U.S. energy exports and diversifying South Korea’s energy supply chain.Why “Investment” Leads to a “Supply Chain Alliance”One of the most significant long-term impacts of South Korean investment in the United States on U.S.-South Korea relations is the deepening of supply chain interdependence. In the past, economic relations between countries were primarily shaped by the exchange of goods. However, strategic competition between the United States and China, supply chain disruptions following the COVID-19 pandemic, the Russia-Ukraine war, competition for critical minerals, and competition in semiconductor and AI technologies have rapidly blurred the lines between economics and national security. National security is no longer determined by military power alone.Whether a country can secure a stable supply of semiconductors, obtain the critical minerals required for batteries, operate its power grid and energy infrastructure reliably, ensure sufficient electricity to support AI data centers, and maintain stable production of ships and defense-related materials—all of these capabilities have become integral to national security.If the United States and South Korea connect their respective production bases and technological capabilities in these areas, they can establish supply chain structures in which each country can help compensate for vulnerabilities or disruptions affecting the other.In the 2025 agreement between the South Korean and U.S. leaders, both countries confirmed that strengthening the link between economic security and national security and maintaining resilient supply chains are critical to their respective competitiveness. The expansion of cooperation beyond shipbuilding and energy to include semiconductors, pharmaceuticals, critical minerals, AI, and quantum computing also reflects this shift.An Opportunity for Korean Companies to Move Beyond the U.S. Market into the “Global Market”Another positive effect of investment in the United States is that it strengthens the foothold of Korean companies in the U.S. market. When Korean companies operate production facilities in the United States, hire local workers, and undertake joint projects with U.S. firms, the ties between Korean companies and U.S. industries become deeper and more durable. This creates a more sustainable economic relationship than trade based solely on exports.For example, when a Korean shipbuilding company invests in a U.S. shipyard, the expertise of the U.S. shipbuilding workforce can be combined with Korean shipbuilding technology. When a Korean power-generation equipment company participates in a U.S. power-generation project, the U.S. electricity market becomes linked to Korea’s manufacturing supply chain. When a Korean nuclear power company participates in a U.S. nuclear power project, the technological, equipment, human capital, and financial ecosystems of both countries can operate in tandem. Furthermore, these experiences can facilitate entry into third-country markets.Korean technologies and companies that establish a successful track record in the United States may find it easier to compete in other markets, including Europe, the Middle East, and Southeast Asia. In particular, nuclear power, shipbuilding, and energy infrastructure are industries characterized by large-scale projects in which international credibility is critical. Therefore, when Korean and U.S. companies jointly establish successful projects in the U.S. market, those achievements can function as a new export platform for Korean companies.In the AI Era, “Semiconductors + Power + Data Centers” Collaboration Is KeyWhen discussing the future of U.S.-Korea economic cooperation, AI cannot be overlooked. The United States possesses global competitiveness in AI models, software, semiconductor design, and platforms. South Korea possesses large-scale advanced manufacturing capabilities in areas such as memory semiconductors, manufacturing, power electronics, displays, and batteries. Cooperation between companies in both countries is already expanding, particularly in AI semiconductors and data centers.If Korean companies’ investments in the United States connect AI data centers, power infrastructure, and semiconductor manufacturing facilities, Korea-U.S. technology cooperation can advance to a new level. The recent Texas project is a prime example. The fact that the power plant is designed to supply electricity directly to AI data centers demonstrates that the AI and energy sectors can no longer be treated as separate industries. The South Korean government has also characterized this project as a new model of economic security cooperation linking AI and energy infrastructure.Going forward, cooperation between South Korea and the United States needs to evolve beyond a simple combination of “the United States, which develops AI technologies,” and “South Korea, which possesses advanced manufacturing capabilities,” toward an integrated ecosystem connecting AI computing, semiconductors, power, data centers, and communications networks. If the two countries expand the scope of cooperation to include joint research and development (R&D), personnel exchanges, AI safety, 6G, quantum technologies, biotechnology, and space, the quality and strategic value of their economic cooperation could be elevated to a new level.Shipbuilding Cooperation: The Link Between Economic and Security AlliancesAmong investments in the United States, shipbuilding cooperation is particularly important when considering the future of the U.S.-Korea alliance. This is because the shipbuilding industry connects the commercial and military sectors. Strengthening the foundation of the U.S. shipbuilding industry would affect both U.S. commercial shipbuilding capacity and naval ship production. U.S. maritime transportation capabilities and naval power are directly linked to the Indo-Pacific Strategy. South Korea already possesses world-class shipbuilding capabilities, while the United States is seeking to strengthen its maritime security capabilities.For this reason, ROK-U.S. shipbuilding cooperation goes beyond simply building ships together. Jointly advancing the modernization, automation, and digitization of U.S. shipyards, as well as MRO, workforce development, and supply chain resilience, can strengthen the U.S. industrial base while expanding South Korean shipbuilding companies’ access to the U.S. market. In fact, when the Trump administration announced South Korean companies’ investment plans for the U.S. shipbuilding industry in 2025, it highlighted a $5 billion shipyard modernization program involving HD Hyundai and U.S. firms, MRO cooperation between Samsung Heavy Industries and U.S. companies, and Hanwha Ocean’s investment plan for a shipyard in Philadelphia.This has the potential to become a leading area in which economic and military security converge within the future U.S.-South Korea alliance.The Key to Investment in the U.S. Is Not “How Much” but “How” to InvestLarge-scale investments always entail risks. In particular, projects requiring significant upfront investment and rigorous profitability assessments—such as the Alaska LNG project—or projects with long construction periods and potential fluctuations in permitting and construction costs—such as nuclear power plants—require rigorous feasibility assessments. This is why the South Korean government emphasizes “commercial rationality.”The Korea-U.S. Strategic Investment Special Act is based on the principle that investments in the United States must be pursued in a manner consistent with the national interest—including the development of the national economy and the strengthening of industrial competitiveness—and establishes an annual investment limit of $20 billion. Furthermore, it includes safeguards requiring certain parliamentary oversight procedures even under unavoidable circumstances, such as national security concerns or supply chain disruptions. These principles are being fully applied to the follow-up projects announced on October 1.South Korea and the United States will manage all strategic investment projects through an umbrella Investment Special Purpose Vehicle (I-SPV) and project-specific P-SPVs, and have established a risk-sharing mechanism that maintains a 50-50 profit-sharing ratio between the two countries until South Korea recovers the principal and interest on its total investment. Furthermore, the annual strategic investment cap of $20 billion, totaling $200 billion, is specified in a legally binding operating agreement, and provisions allow for renegotiation of the business plan, budget, and profit-sharing ratio if a project’s viability is materially compromised. The South Korean side has also been guaranteed the right to receive project-related information and approve major matters.This demonstrates that investment in the United States is not designed as an unconditional provision of capital, but rather as an investment framework that takes both commercial viability and national interests into account.The Intersection of Trump’s “America First” Policy and South Korea’s “National Interest-Centered Pragmatic Diplomacy”The Trump administration’s foreign economic policy has distinct characteristics. It is an approach that prioritizes U.S. economic interests, including expanding domestic manufacturing, creating jobs, increasing energy production, localizing supply chains, and rebuilding the shipbuilding industry. Conversely, the South Korean government is also cooperating with the United States while prioritizing national interests and economic benefits. The policy objectives of the two countries do not need to be identical. Rather, the key to strengthening the economic sustainability of the alliance lies in two countries with different priorities identifying areas where mutual benefits can be realized.The United States needs South Korea’s capital, technology, and manufacturing capabilities. South Korea needs the U.S. market, core technologies, energy and critical resources, as well as U.S. financial and global networks.It is precisely this interdependence that lies at the heart of U.S.-South Korea economic cooperation. This is why President Trump emphasizes investment in the United States as a means of strengthening U.S. competitiveness in manufacturing, energy, and technology. The White House has consistently explained that economic cooperation with South Korea helps strengthen U.S. employment, manufacturing, energy, and technological competitiveness.From South Korea’s perspective, as Korean companies’ production and investment in the U.S. market increase, local networks are strengthened, and the foundation for representing the interests of South Korean companies and industries in U.S. policymaking processes is broadened. The deeper the economic interdependence becomes, the greater the incentive for both countries to recognize each other as strategic partners.Investment in the U.S. Builds “Relational Assets” for the ROK-U.S. AllianceAn alliance is not sustained by treaties alone. What underpins an alliance is not only military trust but also economic interests, industrial ties, people-to-people exchanges, technological cooperation, and shared strategic objectives. When Korean companies operate production facilities across the United States and employ American workers, new ties of mutual interest are forged between local communities and Korea. U.S. companies, in turn, gain deeper access to the Korean market and technology ecosystem through collaboration with Korean firms. As these relationships accumulate, the ROK-U.S. alliance can evolve beyond diplomacy between central governments into a multilayered network involving businesses, state governments, local governments, universities, research institutions, and local communities.Korean companies’ local corporate social responsibility initiatives, workforce development programs, joint research with universities and research institutions, and cooperation with local governments will also serve as important factors in strengthening these relationships. Ultimately, investment in the United States can become a process of accumulating not only economic capital but also the social and political relational capital of the U.S.-Korea alliance.The U.S.-Korea Alliance: From a “Security Alliance” to a “Technology, Industry, and Security Alliance”In today’s strategic competition among nations, military power, economic power, and technological capability are inseparable. Semiconductors are a matter of national security, AI is a matter of national security, and critical minerals and energy supply chains have become matters of national security.The shipbuilding industry is also an economic sector that is directly linked to maritime security. In this environment, the ROK-U.S. alliance must also evolve. South Korea’s investment in the United States can serve as a concrete means of facilitating this transformation. In the shipbuilding sector, it is possible to restore the U.S. industrial base while expanding the presence of South Korean shipbuilding technology and companies in the U.S. market.In the energy sector, it is possible to connect U.S. LNG and power infrastructure with South Korea’s equipment, engineering, construction, and operational capabilities. In the nuclear power sector, U.S. technology and market access can be combined with South Korea’s construction and supply chain capabilities.In the AI sector, U.S. core technologies and platform capabilities can be linked with South Korea’s semiconductor and manufacturing capabilities. In the critical minerals sector, both countries can reduce excessive dependence on individual countries, including China, and establish more resilient supply chains. Accordingly, investment in the United States holds greater strategic significance when these projects are interconnected rather than pursued independently.Three Conditions for a Sustainable U.S.-Korea AllianceHowever, for investment in the United States to have a positive impact on U.S.-Korea relations, three principles are crucial.First, both commercial rationality and national interests must be secured. A project is not necessarily a sound investment simply because it is large-scale. A comprehensive review must be conducted, taking into account the project’s profitability, risks, potential return on investment, the degree of participation by Korean companies, and its broader effects on domestic industries.Second, the substantive participation of Korean companies must be guaranteed. The benefits of investment in the United States should not be limited to the accumulation of assets in the United States alone. Korean companies must be able to participate in areas such as equipment supply, engineering and construction, operations and maintenance, finance, and technology development in order to secure new business opportunities in the U.S. market.Third, investment must be linked to diplomacy and technological cooperation. If investments in the United States are used to expand joint R&D, personnel exchanges, standards cooperation, joint development of critical minerals, supply chain early-warning systems, and cooperation in AI and quantum technologies, the impact of these investments could be significantly greater. If these three conditions are met, what will matter more than the $350 billion figure itself is the long-term industrial ecosystem between South Korea and the United States that will be created through these investments.Conclusion: From an “Alliance That Invests Money” to an “Alliance That Builds the Future Together”Over the past 70-plus years, the U.S.-Korea alliance has evolved from a security alliance to an economic alliance and then to a comprehensive strategic alliance. Now, a new phase is beginning. South Korea’s strategic investment in the United States strengthens American manufacturing, energy, shipbuilding, nuclear power, and AI infrastructure, while simultaneously providing opportunities for Korean companies to enter the U.S. market and expand their global competitiveness. What the United States needs is not simply South Korean capital. South Korea’s manufacturing capabilities and supply chain management expertise—accumulated in sectors such as shipbuilding, nuclear power, semiconductors, batteries, and power equipment—are also critical assets.What South Korea needs, too, is not simply access to the U.S. market. Integrating with U.S. cutting-edge technologies, energy and critical resources, global financial markets, and the R&D ecosystem is crucial to the next stage of growth for South Korean industries. If this mutual complementarity takes effect, investment in the United States can evolve into a structure that benefits both countries. As the Trump administration seeks to rebuild U.S. manufacturing and strengthen the energy and shipbuilding industries, if South Korea provides large-scale investment and industrial cooperation, and if the South Korean government manages these projects on the basis of commercial rationality and investor protection, the policy objectives of both countries can find significant common ground.In particular, the Texas AI power project announced on October 1, the U.S.-Korea nuclear power framework, and the review of the Alaska LNG project demonstrate that these changes are moving beyond declarations toward concrete projects. Of course, it cannot be assumed that all projects will achieve the same level of success. Some projects, such as the Alaska LNG project, require further review of their commercial viability, while others, such as nuclear power, must undergo lengthy feasibility assessments and legal procedures. However, if both countries faithfully follow these procedures while connecting the industrial capabilities each country needs from the other, investment in the United States can serve as a foundation for making the U.S.-Korea relationship more stable and structurally integrated.The future of the U.S.-Korea alliance can no longer be defined by military power alone.It must evolve into a relationship in which the two countries jointly develop technologies, build resilient supply chains, secure energy, and shape the future of industry together.In that sense, South Korea’s strategic investment in the United States is not merely an overseas investment. It has the potential to become a new economic, technological, and security platform that transforms the ROK-U.S. alliance from an “alliance that defends” into an “alliance that grows together,” and ultimately into an “alliance that shapes the future together.”

The Resumption of U.S.-North Korea Summit Talks and the Three Principles of Peaceful CoexistenceHee-soo YoonInstitute for Unification and Peace StudiesSeoul National UniversityThe Window of Opportunity for Summit Diplomacy and the Lessons from HanoiThe possibility of resuming U.S.-North Korea summit diplomacy is once again being discussed. Discussions about scaling back U.S.-South Korea joint military exercises are being interpreted as a signal of openness to dialogue with North Korea, and with major diplomatic events such as a U.S.-China summit and the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Leaders’ Meeting on the horizon, expectations are growing that a meeting between the U.S. and North Korean leaders could materialize. Given the prolonged breakdown in U.S.-North Korea and inter-Korean relations, the need to resume U.S.-North Korea summit diplomacy is clear, as only direct engagement at the highest level can create a meaningful diplomatic breakthrough.However, holding such a summit does not, in itself, guarantee peace. While the 2018 Singapore Joint Statement pledged to establish a new U.S.-North Korea relationship and build a lasting peace regime on the Korean Peninsula, that momentum quickly dissipated after the 2019 Hanoi summit broke down. Differences over denuclearization and corresponding measures were the immediate cause. However, we cannot overlook the fact that an adequate framework for translating leaders’ agreements into institutional changes in inter-Korean relations and the broader order on the Korean Peninsula had not been established. If summit diplomacy serves as a “catalyst,” a durable “framework” is needed to seize that opportunity and translate it into a sustainable regional order.If U.S.-North Korea summit talks resume, they must not be limited to agreements between leaders, as was the case in the past. The objectives of the talks should also extend beyond simply restarting denuclearization negotiations to include reducing military tensions on the Korean Peninsula and establishing an institutional foundation for peaceful coexistence.In this regard, what is needed now is not to focus first on the ultimate form of unification, but to establish a structure for sustainable peaceful coexistence while managing the current division and confrontation in a stable manner. I argue that the most realistic principle South Korea can advance in the context of resuming U.S.-North Korea summit talks is precisely “peaceful coexistence.”Why “Peaceful Coexistence” Now?North Korea has strengthened the foundations of regime survival by advancing its de facto nuclear capabilities and establishing a comprehensive strategic partnership with Russia. In late 2023, North Korea defined inter-Korean relations as a “hostile relationship between two states” and effectively abandoned its previous approach to unification.Domestic public opinion in South Korea has also shifted significantly. According to the “2026 Survey on Perceptions of Unification,” conducted by Seoul National University’s Institute for Unification and Peace Studies, the percentage of respondents who said unification was “necessary” fell from 63.8% in 2007, when the survey began, to 39.0% in 2026. Conversely, the percentage of respondents who said “the status quo is fine”—meaning that the Korean Peninsula remains effectively divided into two states—rose from 11.8% to 31.5% over the same period, reaching its highest level since the survey began.Regarding the most important objective of the government’s policy toward North Korea, “peaceful coexistence and the establishment of peace” (61.6%) significantly outpaced “inter-Korean unification” (15.3%). Therefore, while maintaining the overall direction of South Korea’s Korean Peninsula peace policy, it is time to redesign its pathways and priorities to reflect current realities. The possibility of resuming U.S.-North Korea summit talks provides a catalyst that makes further postponement of this policy recalibration increasingly difficult.Given this reality, it is difficult to manage the current security crisis by focusing solely on assumptions about the ultimate form of inter-Korean relations. What is needed now is a pragmatic approach that recognizes that the two Koreas operate under different political systems and institutions while working to prevent military conflict, restore dialogue, and gradually expand economic and social exchanges.Therefore, peaceful coexistence should be understood not as a concept intended to abandon unification, but as a pragmatic starting point for managing the current structure of confrontation and creating conditions for future changes in inter-Korean relations.Three Principles of Peaceful CoexistenceIn the context of resuming U.S.-North Korea summit diplomacy, peaceful coexistence—which underpins South Korea’s policy toward the Korean Peninsula—needs to be translated into concrete policy through three principles.The first is the principle of mutual respect and the cessation of hostile acts.The most fundamental condition for peaceful coexistence is to refrain from denying the other side’s political system or right to exist. Unless confidence can be established that neither side will seek to forcibly change or absorb the other, it will be difficult to sustain economic cooperation or other forms of exchange.Particularly in light of North Korea’s advancing nuclear and missile capabilities and recurring military tensions between the two Koreas, preventing inadvertent military clashes is of paramount importance. Practical risk-reduction measures are needed, including preventing accidental clashes along the Military Demarcation Line, restoring military hotlines, establishing mutual notification mechanisms, and maintaining communication regarding military exercises and activities. This principle does not imply acceptance of North Korea’s nuclear weapons program. Rather, it means that—even as we work to resolve the nuclear issue—we must reduce the risk of military conflict and create conditions in which sustained dialogue remains possible.The second is the principle of easing tensions through dialogue and exchange.If dialogue between North Korea and the United States resumes, South Korea must also restore channels of communication in inter-Korean relations. We must not repeat a pattern in which U.S.-North Korea dialogue takes the lead on issues affecting the Korean Peninsula while South Korea merely accepts the outcome afterward.Inter-Korean contacts can be expanded not only through political and military dialogue but also through areas of relatively low political sensitivity, including humanitarian assistance, disaster response, public health, separated families, forestry, agriculture, culture, and sports.In particular, if military tensions ease, it will be important to gradually expand the scope of inter-Korean exchanges and cooperation. Peaceful coexistence is not achieved through declarations alone; rather, it is a process of increasing predictability and reducing uncertainty through repeated contact, communication, and practical cooperation.The third is the principle of phased and parallel progress toward denuclearization and a peace regime.North Korea’s denuclearization remains a core objective for achieving lasting peace on the Korean Peninsula. However, there is no need to frame denuclearization and peaceful coexistence as mutually exclusive objectives. Rather, a phased approach that links the suspension and reduction of nuclear and missile activities with the easing of military tensions, the addressing of regime-security concerns, and economic and humanitarian cooperation may be more realistic.Given that North Korea is unlikely to completely dismantle its nuclear arsenal in the short term, emphasizing only the ultimate objective of denuclearization without recognizing intermediate steps could result in a prolonged suspension of dialogue. Conversely, it would also be inappropriate to provide economic benefits while effectively accepting North Korea as a permanent nuclear-weapon state. Therefore, it is necessary to pursue a phased denuclearization process—suspension of nuclear and missile activities → reduction of capabilities → verifiable dismantlement—in parallel with the establishment of a peace regime.These three principles are not independent of one another. Mutual respect and the cessation of hostile acts create a stable environment; dialogue and exchanges build confidence; and the phased and parallel pursuit of denuclearization and a peace regime institutionalizes that confidence.A U.S.-North Korea Summit Could Serve as a Starting Point for Peaceful CoexistenceIf a U.S.-North Korea summit is held again, the most important task is not simply to replicate past summits, but to connect agreements between the leaders to a process of sustainable peaceful coexistence. The 2018 Singapore summit established the broad direction of building a new U.S.-North Korea relationship and a peace regime. However, at the Hanoi summit, the two sides failed to bridge their differences over the scope and sequencing of denuclearization measures and sanctions relief.If the summit process resumes this time, a realistic approach beginning with smaller, achievable agreements is needed. This would involve first agreeing on measures that can strengthen mutual confidence—such as suspending nuclear and missile tests and activities associated with the production of fissile material, reducing military tensions, restoring communication channels, and expanding humanitarian cooperation—and then building on those measures in stages. In particular, any summit agreement should include not only denuclearization but also measures to reduce military tensions and strengthen crisis-management mechanisms. This is essential because political commitments made by leaders must be linked to follow-up consultations and implementation at the military and diplomatic working levels.South Korea’s role is also critical. Even if a U.S.-North Korea summit proceeds as a bilateral negotiation between Washington and Pyongyang, South Korea—as a direct stakeholder in peace and security on the Korean Peninsula—must actively facilitate follow-up measures aimed at reducing inter-Korean tensions and advancing peaceful coexistence.The ROK-U.S. Alliance and Peaceful Coexistence Are Compatible Emphasizing peaceful coexistence does not mean weakening the ROK-U.S. alliance or extended deterrence. On the contrary, sustainable peaceful coexistence requires a credible security foundation capable of deterring war on the Korean Peninsula. For South Korea, the ROK-U.S. alliance remains a core pillar of national security and a critical component of the response to North Korea’s nuclear and missile threats. At the same time, credible deterrence creates the strategic space necessary for diplomacy and dialogue.Therefore, deterrence and dialogue are not mutually exclusive policies. Maintaining credible military deterrence while keeping channels for dialogue open is a realistic approach to building sustainable peace on the Korean Peninsula. Even if U.S.-North Korea dialogue resumes, policy coordination between South Korea and the United States must remain firm. It is essential that the two countries closely coordinate their messages to North Korea and their negotiating strategies, and that any necessary military adjustments be subject to prior consultation within the alliance. Peaceful coexistence must not come at the expense of security; rather, it should enable dialogue and negotiation from a position of credible deterrence.Institutional Foundations for Peaceful CoexistenceTo ensure that the three principles of peaceful coexistence do not remain merely declaratory commitments, institutional mechanisms are needed to support and implement them.First, inter-Korean military hotlines and communication channels must be restored. The primary objective is to manage accidental clashes that could occur along the Military Demarcation Line and in the West Sea. Second, military confidence-building measures should be expanded in stages. Mutual notification of military exercises and the movement of troops and equipment, agreements to prevent accidental clashes, and regular meetings between military authorities can provide a practical starting point.Third, humanitarian cooperation should be insulated, to the greatest extent possible, from political and military disputes. Areas such as separated families, public health and medical care, and disaster response are areas of cooperation that can continue regardless of the broader political environment. Fourth, institutional mechanisms should be established to connect agreements between the United States and North Korea with agreements between the two Koreas. A peace regime on the Korean Peninsula cannot be achieved through a U.S.-North Korea agreement alone, nor through an inter-Korean agreement alone.A Virtuous Cycle of Denuclearization and Peaceful CoexistencePeaceful coexistence should not be viewed as an alternative to denuclearization. Achieving sustainable peace on the Korean Peninsula ultimately requires addressing North Korea’s nuclear and missile threats. However, suspending all dialogue and exchanges solely on the premise of denuclearization is also unlikely to provide a realistic path forward. Given the extent to which North Korea’s nuclear capabilities have already advanced, the ultimate objective of denuclearization must be pursued alongside interim measures to reduce risks.A halt to nuclear and missile activities can lead to verifiable reductions in nuclear and missile capabilities, while this process can facilitate the easing of military tensions and the expansion of economic and humanitarian cooperation. In turn, expanded cooperation can increase the tangible benefits North Korea can derive from the denuclearization process, ultimately strengthening the prospects for sustained negotiations. In other words, we must establish a virtuous cycle: peaceful coexistence → easing of tensions → building confidence → progress toward denuclearization → institutionalization of a peace regime. This approach does not entail trading denuclearization for peace; rather, it links the two objectives through a phased and mutually reinforcing process.What Happens After the U.S.-North Korea Summit Is More ImportantThe mere occurrence of a U.S.-North Korea summit should not be regarded as a diplomatic achievement in itself. What happens after the summit is more consequential. Agreements reached by the leaders must lead to working-level negotiations, which must in turn produce concrete military and diplomatic measures; those measures must then contribute to reducing tensions in inter-Korean relations. In particular, a permanent consultative mechanism is needed to implement and monitor summit agreements. Separate channels could be established: one between the United States and North Korea to address denuclearization, sanctions, and regime-security guarantees, and another between the two Koreas to address military tension reduction and inter-Korean exchanges and cooperation.Furthermore, the roles of neighboring countries, including China and Russia, should not be overlooked. A peace regime on the Korean Peninsula is also linked to the security interests of these neighboring states. For North Korea’s denuclearization and peaceful coexistence to advance in a sustained manner, neighboring countries should contribute to a multilateral environment conducive to reducing tensions on the Korean Peninsula and establishing a durable peace regime.The possibility of resuming U.S.-North Korea summit talks could provide a new opportunity for diplomacy on the Korean Peninsula. However, as past experience demonstrates, summit meetings alone do not produce peace. Concrete principles and institutional mechanisms are necessary to transform the diplomatic space created by summit diplomacy into a durable framework for peace.The starting point for this effort is peaceful coexistence. Peaceful coexistence does not mean recognizing North Korea as a legitimate nuclear-weapon state or abandoning the goal of unification. Rather, it is a pragmatic approach that begins with the reality that the two Koreas currently operate under different political systems and institutions, with the aim of preventing war and conflict, restoring dialogue and exchanges, and ultimately achieving denuclearization and a peace regime through a phased process.The three principles of peaceful coexistence neither unconditionally accept North Korea’s demands nor weaken the ROK-U.S. alliance. Rather, they constitute a pragmatic peace strategy that creates space for dialogue on the basis of credible security and deterrence, reduces military tensions through sustained communication, and links these efforts to progress toward denuclearization and a peace regime.If a U.S.-North Korea summit is held again, South Korea must not stop at simply welcoming the summit itself. It must work to translate and institutionalize the leaders’ agreement so that it produces meaningful reductions in tensions and advances peaceful coexistence on the Korean Peninsula.Ultimately, what the Korean Peninsula needs now is not a debate over the ultimate form of unification decades into the future, but immediate efforts to reduce the risk of war and institutionalize peace. Only when peace is institutionalized can dialogue be sustained, and only when dialogue is sustained can meaningful progress toward denuclearization become possible. And only when the experience of peaceful coexistence accumulates can a broader range of options for the future of the Korean Peninsula emerge.If the resumption of U.S.-North Korea summit diplomacy can provide a new opportunity, the most realistic way to seize that opportunity is to establish the three principles of peaceful coexistence as practical guidelines for South Korea’s policy toward the Korean Peninsula.

A Map and Compass for Peace: From Confrontation to CoexistenceByeong-gil JeonAdjunct Professor, Kookmin UniversityCEO, Yes InnovationA New Direction for the Korean Peninsula from the UN PodiumOn September 22, President Lee Jae-myung outlined South Korea’s role in promoting peace on the Korean Peninsula and advancing cooperation within the international community in his address to the General Debate of the 81st United Nations General Assembly in New York City. In his approximately 17-minute speech, President Lee assessed the complex crises confronting the international community while clearly conveying the message that the Korean Peninsula must move beyond confrontation and conflict toward an order based on peaceful coexistence.A notable feature of the speech was that it did not approach peace on the Korean Peninsula solely through the narrow lens of improving inter-Korean relations. President Lee emphasized the principle that the international community must work together to address shared challenges and articulated South Korea’s commitment to contributing to global peace and stability as a responsible middle power.With respect to the Korean Peninsula, in particular, he stressed the need for North and South Korea to respect each other, prevent military confrontation, and work toward a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula over the long term. This is particularly significant given the current security environment. The Korean Peninsula remains under an armistice, while North Korea continues to advance its nuclear and missile capabilities. Inter-Korean dialogue and exchanges have been largely suspended for an extended period, and military tensions remain unresolved.Under these circumstances, simply invoking peace as an ideal is insufficient. Moving toward peace requires a clear roadmap and a compass. The significance of President Lee’s UN address lies in part in its effort to articulate such a framework.The Starting Point for Peace on the Korean Peninsula Is “Peaceful Coexistence”At the core of President Lee’s vision for peace on the Korean Peninsula is the concept of peaceful coexistence. It recognizes the reality that North and South Korea have different political systems and institutions while seeking to prevent military conflict and expand the space for coexistence through dialogue and cooperation. This does not mean abandoning the goal of reunification. Rather, peaceful coexistence can be understood as a process of creating the minimum stable conditions necessary for meaningful discussions about reunification.It is important to maintain reunification as the ultimate objective of inter-Korean relations. At the same time, given current realities, if competition over the means and timing of reunification intensifies confrontation between the two Koreas, the path toward reunification itself could become even more difficult. What is needed now, therefore, is not to rush toward reunification, but to reduce the risk of war and institutionalize peace.Once peace is firmly established, opportunities for contact and exchange between the peoples of North and South Korea can expand. As cooperation in the economic, social, and cultural spheres increases, the foundation for mutual understanding can also deepen. Only through the sustained development of such interactions can discussions of reunification eventually take place on a more realistic foundation. In this sense, peaceful coexistence is not a substitute for reunification, but a pragmatic intermediate stage on the path toward it.The most pressing issue in any discussion of peaceful coexistence on the Korean Peninsula is North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs. North Korea’s advancing nuclear capabilities are transforming not only inter-Korean relations but also the broader security environment in Northeast Asia. As long as North Korea continues to expand its nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programs, it will be difficult to establish sustainable peace through confidence-building measures or economic cooperation alone. Peaceful coexistence and denuclearization, therefore, cannot be treated as separate policy challenges.The phased approach advanced by the Lee Jae-myung administration—first halting the further advancement of North Korea’s nuclear and missile capabilities, followed by reducing those capabilities, and ultimately moving toward their elimination—can be understood as an approach that seeks to reconcile present realities with long-term objectives.What is essential is that this phased approach must not undermine the ultimate objective of denuclearization. A halt to nuclear activities should not be interpreted as permanent recognition of North Korea as a nuclear-armed state. Rather, it should constitute an initial step toward denuclearization. This would involve preventing further production of fissile material and the development of additional nuclear weapons and delivery systems, while progressively reducing existing capabilities through a series of verifiable measures.In this process, verification by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), together with sustained cooperation from the international community, can play a critical role.Ultimately, the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula cannot be achieved through a single summit or political declaration. It requires a sustained process in which incremental agreements are reached, their implementation is verified, and the parties proceed to the next stage based on the results of that verification.For peaceful coexistence on the Korean Peninsula, managing military tensions and establishing a durable peace regime must proceed in parallel. The 1953 Armistice Agreement brought an end to active hostilities on the peninsula. An armistice, however, is not the same as a peace agreement. This distinction helps explain why military tensions and crises have repeatedly emerged on the Korean Peninsula over the past seven decades.The first condition for peaceful coexistence, therefore, is the establishment of a stable military management system capable of preventing renewed conflict. To this end, military communication channels between North and South Korea should be restored, along with mechanisms designed to prevent unintended military clashes. It is also important to establish effective crisis-management procedures for incidents in and around the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) so that military misunderstandings do not escalate into armed conflict.The recent landmine explosion in the western sector of the DMZ further demonstrates the fragility of peace on the Korean Peninsula. This underscores why practical safeguards to prevent military conflict must accompany diplomatic efforts to establish peace. Peaceful coexistence does not require weakening military deterrence. Rather, maintaining a credible defense posture while simultaneously pursuing dialogue and building military confidence can constitute a realistic approach to promoting peace. Deterrence and dialogue are not mutually exclusive. Deterrence is necessary to prevent war, while dialogue is necessary to address the underlying sources of conflict.Lessons from Past AgreementsThere is already a substantial body of inter-Korean agreements concerning peace and relations on the Korean Peninsula. Beginning with the July 4 North-South Joint Statement of 1972 and continuing through the 1991 Agreement on Reconciliation, Nonaggression, and Exchanges and Cooperation, the June 15 Joint Declaration of 2000, the October 4 Declaration of 2007, and the 2018 Panmunjom Declaration and Pyongyang Joint Declaration, the two Koreas have repeatedly committed themselves to improving relations and reducing military tensions.The central problem has not been the absence of agreements. Rather, it has been the lack of sufficiently durable institutional mechanisms to ensure their consistent implementation. With changes in government, the policy direction toward inter-Korean relations has frequently shifted, weakening the continuity of previous agreements. Because inter-Korean relations have been heavily influenced by changes in domestic politics and the international environment, establishing a sustained, long-term peace process has proven difficult.One of the most important tasks for future peace policy, therefore, is to ensure policy continuity. A minimum set of principles governing inter-Korean relations that can be sustained across changes in government should be established through broad social consensus. Institutional mechanisms should also be developed to ensure that inter-Korean agreements are not easily discarded based solely on the policy preferences of a particular administration, but instead receive sufficient legislative and public support to remain effective over time.North Korea currently defines its relationship with South Korea as one between two hostile states. Restoring inter-Korean relations according to the model of previous periods will therefore be difficult. This is precisely why a new approach centered on peaceful coexistence is necessary. Rather than seeking to transform North Korea’s political system or pursue reunification through absorption, such an approach would acknowledge the reality of the North Korean system, reduce mutually hostile actions, and gradually expand the space for dialogue and cooperation.One possible starting point is to pursue cooperation in areas that are relatively less vulnerable to political and military tensions, including public health and medicine, disaster response, climate change, forestry, and environmental protection. Limited forms of cooperation can help build confidence, and greater confidence can create opportunities for broader cooperation. This does not, of course, mean responding to North Korean provocations or its continued development of nuclear and missile capabilities without a clear strategy. A balanced approach is necessary—one that maintains credible deterrence grounded in the ROK-U.S. alliance while keeping channels for dialogue open.Peaceful Coexistence Must Be a Long-Term National StrategyPresident Lee’s address to the United Nations is significant because it presented the Korean Peninsula not merely as a matter of inter-Korean relations, but as a broader peace and security issue closely linked to the international order. Peace on the Korean Peninsula cannot be achieved through South Korea’s efforts alone. Cooperation with neighboring countries—including the United States, China, Japan, and Russia—is also necessary. In particular, addressing North Korea’s nuclear issue requires a framework in which U.S.-North Korea engagement and inter-Korean dialogue can reinforce and complement each other.At the same time, South Korea cannot simply wait for support from the international community. It must maintain a coherent and consistent national strategy for peace. The core elements of that strategy should be clear: maintaining strong national security while keeping the door to dialogue open; halting the further advancement of North Korea’s nuclear and missile capabilities; pursuing phased denuclearization; preventing military clashes between North and South Korea; and establishing durable institutions for peaceful coexistence.Ultimately, the objective is to create a Korean Peninsula free of the threats posed by nuclear weapons and war. This process cannot be completed in the short term, nor is it likely to be achieved within the tenure of a single administration. That is precisely why a long-term national strategy is necessary. Peace is not achieved through a single summit. Rather, it becomes sustainable only when a succession of smaller agreements and concrete actions accumulates over time.We Must Chart the Course, and Peace Must Be Our CompassHistory offers an important lesson. The Korean Peninsula has seen numerous declarations and agreements intended to promote peace. Yet peace cannot be secured through declarations alone. It requires institutions capable of sustaining agreements, building mutual trust, and ensuring policy continuity. President Lee Jae-myung’s recent UN address is significant in part because it seeks to chart a new direction for the Korean Peninsula in light of these historical experiences.What is needed now is not another set of broad declarations. The priority should be to prevent war, reduce tensions, restore dialogue, mitigate nuclear risks, and gradually establish institutions for peaceful coexistence. Peaceful coexistence is neither a concession to North Korea nor a renunciation of reunification. Rather, it can serve as a pragmatic national strategy through which the two Koreas acknowledge existing realities, reduce the risk of war, and prepare for the future. Advancing peace on the Korean Peninsula requires both a map to chart the course and a compass to keep us on the path toward peace.The direction of that compass should be clear: a Korean Peninsula defined by peace rather than war, coexistence rather than confrontation, and denuclearization rather than nuclear armament. If President Lee’s address to the United Nations articulated this direction, the task now is to translate that vision into sustained policy and concrete action. Only when the principle of peaceful coexistence is consistently reflected in domestic politics, inter-Korean relations, the ROK-U.S. alliance, and engagement with the international community can peace on the Korean Peninsula move beyond declarations and become a durable reality.

The U.S.-South Korea Industrial and Technological Alliance in the Era of Economic SecurityIn-gyo CheongProfessor Emeritus, Inha UniversityFormer Director-General, Ministry of Commerce, Industry and EnergyThe Era of the Economic Security NexusSince the mid-2020s, the international order has entered an era of the “Economic Security Nexus,” in which the boundaries between military, economic, and technological domains are rapidly converging. Whereas security once served primarily as an outer framework for protecting economic prosperity, control over frontier technologies, access to critical resources, resilient supply networks, and production capacity in strategic industries have increasingly become integral components of national security. This is an environment in which export controls on a single piece of semiconductor manufacturing equipment, disruptions in the supply of critical battery materials, or insufficient maintenance, repair, and overhaul (MRO) capacity for naval vessels can translate directly into national security vulnerabilities.Against this backdrop, the U.S.-South Korea relationship is also entering a new phase. The tariff and trade agreement reached last year, together with the roadmap for South Korean companies to invest a total of $350 billion in the United States, illustrates this transformation. The plan—which includes $150 billion in shipbuilding cooperation and $200 billion in investments in strategic industries—goes beyond the narrow objectives of addressing trade imbalances or mitigating tariff burdens. It carries wider strategic significance because it positions South Korea as a key manufacturing partner in the global supply chains that the United States is seeking to restructure and creates an opportunity to expand the existing military-security alliance into a broader partnership encompassing industrial, technological, and economic security.However, large-scale flows of capital and technology do not automatically guarantee shared prosperity. Risks arising from protectionist trade policies, geopolitical fragmentation of supply chains, and the erosion of domestic manufacturing capacity are also increasing. Ultimately, the central question is not how much South Korea invests, but whether those investments are structured so as to strengthen the industrial competitiveness of both countries.From the Era of Efficiency to the Era of Economic SecuritySince the end of the Cold War, the global economy has been structured largely around the principles of cost minimization and efficiency maximization. Global value chains (GVCs), which dispersed production to lower-cost locations while sourcing components and raw materials from around the world, became a major engine of global economic growth. “Just-in-Time” production emerged as a defining feature of an increasingly integrated and efficiency-oriented global division of labor.However, U.S.-China strategic competition, the COVID-19 pandemic, the war in Ukraine, and geopolitical instability in the Middle East have exposed the vulnerabilities embedded in this model. Heavy reliance on geographically concentrated supply chains reduced production costs, but it also increased exposure to national security risks.In response, the United States has increasingly treated advanced technologies as strategic national security assets and strengthened technology controls directed at China. The so-called “Small Yard, High Fence” approach initially focused on a limited number of critical technologies, but its application has expanded across a broader range of strategic industries, including semiconductors, artificial intelligence, biotechnology, batteries, critical minerals, and advanced manufacturing. Particularly significant is the evolution of this approach from unilateral U.S. export controls toward coordinated efforts with allies, including Japan and European partners, to manage strategic supply-chain chokepoints.The MATCH Act, introduced on a bipartisan basis in the U.S. Congress in 2026, illustrates this trend. The legislation proposes coordinating restrictions on semiconductor manufacturing equipment with U.S. allies rather than relying exclusively on unilateral U.S. measures. While the United States, Japan, and the Netherlands are already restricting exports of certain advanced semiconductor equipment to China, the United States has also expanded its measures to encompass certain products manufactured in third countries that incorporate U.S. technology, including through mechanisms such as the Foreign Direct Product Rule (FDPR).The same strategic logic applies to the battery industry. The Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) provides a framework for restructuring supply chains for critical minerals and components used in electric vehicles and batteries around the United States and its allies. The Foreign Entities of Concern (FEOC) provisions, which have significant implications for Chinese participation, likewise encourage companies to develop supply chains that are less dependent on China.This extends beyond a temporary trade dispute. It represents a structural transformation in which the organization of global production and the geographic configuration of supply chains are being fundamentally reconsidered.South Korea: Navigating Crisis and Strategic OpportunityThis realignment presents South Korea with both risks and opportunities. The most immediate risk is that the strategic space South Korea has sought to maintain between the United States and China is narrowing. South Korean semiconductor companies operating production facilities in China could be directly affected by U.S. export controls and evolving supply-chain regulations. Industries that remain highly dependent on China for critical minerals, materials, components, and equipment will likewise face increasing pressure to diversify their supply chains.At the same time, the opportunities are substantial. As the United States seeks reliable manufacturing partners to reduce strategic dependence on China, the strategic value of South Korea’s industrial capabilities is increasing. South Korean companies possess extensive experience in large-scale manufacturing, mass production, and sophisticated supply-chain management—areas in which the United States faces significant capacity constraints.South Korea’s challenge, therefore, is not simply to participate passively in U.S.-led supply-chain restructuring. Rather, it is to establish a new framework of cooperation that combines U.S. technology, markets, and capital with South Korea’s manufacturing, mass-production, and supply-chain capabilities in ways that enhance the competitiveness of both economies.The U.S.-South Korea Alliance Is Evolving into an Industrial and Technological PartnershipFor more than seven decades, military security has been the central pillar of the U.S.-South Korea alliance. In an era in which technological capabilities increasingly shape national security, however, the foundation of the alliance will need to expand to encompass industrial and technological cooperation.In the semiconductor and AI sectors, U.S. strengths in chip design, software, and platforms can be combined with South Korea’s capabilities in memory, manufacturing, and high-volume production. In batteries, the United States’ large domestic market and policy support can be integrated with South Korea’s production technologies and supply-chain management capabilities. In shipbuilding, South Korea’s shipbuilding and MRO capabilities can complement U.S. market demand and national security requirements. Defense, nuclear energy, and broader energy security are likewise strategic sectors in which industrial capacity and national security are closely interconnected.Institutional mechanisms are particularly important to ensure that large-scale investment in the United States does not amount merely to a transfer of capital. A framework is needed that provides Korean companies with meaningful opportunities to participate in U.S. projects and ensures that their technological and industrial competitiveness is taken into account in the selection of operators and suppliers. Market access, commercial rights, and supply-chain participation commensurate with the scale of investment must also be secured.Ultimately, the policy perspective should shift from “South Korea building factories in the United States” to “South Korea and the United States jointly developing an integrated industrial ecosystem.”Key Areas for Sector-Specific CooperationSemiconductors and AI are core pillars of a U.S.-South Korea industrial and technological alliance. As cooperation between U.S. technology companies and South Korean firms expands, this creates significant potential to combine U.S. strengths in AI, semiconductor design, and digital platforms with South Korea’s capabilities in memory and advanced manufacturing. As AI adoption accelerates, the strategic importance of areas in which South Korea has established competitive capabilities—including high-bandwidth memory (HBM) and advanced packaging—is likely to increase further. At the same time, important challenges remain, including managing the effects of U.S. export controls on China on Korean-operated production facilities in China and ensuring access to technologies and markets commensurate with the scale of South Korea’s investment in the United States.In the battery sector, developing supply chains that reduce excessive dependence on China is central. For South Korean companies to maintain stable production in the United States, they will need to diversify their sources of critical minerals and develop supply networks centered on the United States and its allies. At the same time, predictable regulatory conditions are necessary to ensure that tax incentives and other forms of policy support for U.S.-based production remain stable over the long term.Shipbuilding provides a particularly clear example of how U.S.-South Korea economic and security cooperation can translate into tangible industrial collaboration. The participation of South Korean shipbuilders in efforts to strengthen U.S. shipbuilding capacity, together with their expansion into the MRO market, represents an area of closely aligned interests between the two countries. The United States needs partners capable of helping address aging shipbuilding infrastructure and production constraints, while South Korea can gain access to new markets by leveraging its advanced shipbuilding and maritime equipment capabilities. At the same time, active support from the governments and legislatures of both countries will be necessary to ensure that regulatory or legislative delays do not create undue investment risks for companies.Defense, nuclear energy, and broader energy security also offer significant potential for long-term cooperation. If nuclear power, small modular reactors (SMRs), liquefied natural gas (LNG), maritime security, shipbuilding, and MRO are integrated into a broader industrial ecosystem, the benefits of such cooperation could extend well beyond individual projects. The key is to ensure that South Korean capital investment in the United States goes beyond job creation to generate commercial opportunities for South Korean companies, facilitate their participation in supply chains, and support sustained technological cooperation.From a “Contributing Alliance” to a “Growing Together Alliance”For the $350 billion investment in the United States to achieve its strategic objectives, the principle of mutual benefit must be clearly established. A sustainable alliance cannot rest on the perception that South Korean investment constitutes a one-sided cost undertaken primarily to support U.S. industrial policy.First is the need to balance contribution and return. South Korean investment should be matched by meaningful access to the U.S. market, technology, and commercial opportunities. Specific supply chains and projects in which South Korean companies can participate should be identified and secured, with these commitments supported by institutional mechanisms rather than one-time assurances.Second is the joint management of risk. It would be undesirable for U.S. regulatory changes or delays in congressional action to undermine the investment schedules or profitability of South Korean companies. The two governments should establish a standing consultative mechanism and appropriate dispute-resolution procedures to monitor project implementation and address emerging issues. Safeguards should also be developed to minimize the potential effects of large-scale capital flows on South Korea’s foreign-exchange and financial markets.Third is the joint development of industrial ecosystems. Cooperation should extend beyond individual corporate contracts to encompass broader ecosystems involving research and development, workforce development, materials, components and equipment, finance, and infrastructure. In addition, the two countries should pursue opportunities to enter third-country markets jointly with products and services that combine U.S. technology and software with South Korean manufacturing capabilities. The economic security partnership can evolve into a broader platform for global growth only if U.S.-South Korea cooperation extends beyond the bilateral relationship to markets in the Middle East, Southeast Asia, Latin America, and other regions.South Korea Must Shape This Realignment, Not Merely Participate in ItThe strategic challenge facing South Korea is not simply a binary choice between the United States and China. The central task is to strengthen the competitiveness of South Korean industry while preserving strategic autonomy and supply-chain resilience in a changing international environment.To achieve this, South Korea must protect its domestic manufacturing base while creating a virtuous cycle between overseas production hubs and domestic R&D and core manufacturing capabilities. To prevent investment in the United States from contributing to the erosion of domestic industrial capacity, South Korea must continue strengthening its capabilities in advanced manufacturing, critical materials and equipment, and R&D at home. This is why a “balanced industrial strategy”—one that simultaneously expands access to overseas markets and upgrades domestic industrial capabilities—is necessary.The role of government must also evolve. Rather than focusing primarily on supporting individual companies in investment negotiations, the government should integrate sector-specific supply-chain strategies with trade, diplomatic, and financial policies as part of a coherent national strategy. A system should also be established to continuously monitor the outcomes of U.S.-South Korea cooperation and assess whether South Korean companies are actually gaining access to commercial opportunities, technology, and markets.Conclusion: Mutual Respect and Trust Will Determine the Future of the AllianceFor more than seven decades, the U.S.-South Korea alliance has been grounded in shared commitments to liberal democracy and a market-oriented economy, with military security serving as its central pillar. Over the next seven decades, a new pillar—industrial and technological cooperation—will need to be added to this foundation. In an era of accelerating geopolitical fragmentation and supply-chain restructuring, cooperation in semiconductors, AI, batteries, shipbuilding, defense, nuclear energy, and broader energy security will extend beyond conventional economic cooperation to become an increasingly important component of the alliance’s strategic foundation.The $350 billion investment in the United States should not be viewed as a one-sided concession by South Korea, but as a strategic investment aimed at jointly shaping the future of both countries’ industrial capabilities. The United States should recognize South Korea’s manufacturing capacity and technological expertise as strategic assets that can strengthen the alliance, while South Korea should leverage the U.S. market and technology ecosystem to enhance the competitiveness and modernization of its industries. Cooperation based on sacrifice by either side will not be sustainable. Only when mutual benefit, commercial rationality, and institutional predictability are secured can large-scale investment become a durable asset for the shared prosperity of both countries.The future of the U.S.-South Korea alliance will depend not on “who contributes more,” but on “how we grow together.”The two countries must build trust in industry and technology on the foundation of the military trust that has sustained the alliance and develop a partnership that combines their respective strengths to compete in global markets. When South Korea becomes a key partner in shaping the U.S.-led restructuring of global supply chains—rather than merely participating in that restructuring—the U.S.-South Korea alliance can evolve into a durable economic security and technology partnership, one that extends beyond maintaining stability in Northeast Asia and contributes to the development of new norms, capabilities, and opportunities in the global economy.

The Significance and Necessity of Halting North Korea’s Nuclear Program        Yong-hwan Choi Institute for National Security Strategy   The Current Status of the North Korean Nuclear Issue and the Need to Halt North Korea’s Nuclear Program   North Korea’s development of strategic weapons, including nuclear weapons and missiles, is accelerating. Since the Eighth Party Congress, North Korea has pursued the full-scale development of tactical nuclear weapons designed to target the Korean Peninsula and surrounding regions, alongside strategic nuclear weapons capable of reaching the U.S. mainland. In 2022, it enacted the Nuclear Forces Policy Act, which institutionalized an offensive nuclear doctrine, and in 2023, it amended its constitution to explicitly codify its status as a nuclear-armed state. Furthermore, North Korea has demonstrated both its determination and its capacity to expand its nuclear arsenal, most recently by unveiling a newly established nuclear-material production facility in June 2026.   Despite the continued expansion of North Korea’s nuclear capabilities and its ongoing violations of UN Security Council resolutions, no additional UN sanctions have been imposed on North Korea. In 2019, China and Russia jointly submitted a draft resolution to the UN Security Council calling for the easing of sanctions against North Korea. In 2024, Russia vetoed a resolution to extend the mandate of the Security Council’s Panel of Experts, effectively bringing its operations to an end in April of that year. China and Russia have also repeatedly expressed opposition to the imposition of additional sanctions against North Korea at their respective summit meetings in 2025 and 2026.   Not only has it become increasingly difficult to impose additional sanctions on North Korea, but the effectiveness of existing sanctions is also difficult to ensure without meaningful cooperation from China and Russia. Russia, which has faced extensive Western sanctions since the outbreak of the Russia-Ukraine war, has continued to expand its cooperation with North Korea despite the existing international sanctions regime. China, too, has taken steps to improve relations with North Korea, as demonstrated by President Xi Jinping’s visit to Pyongyang—the first visit by a Chinese president to North Korea in seven years, since 2019. Although China has not openly or systematically violated international sanctions against North Korea, its enforcement of those sanctions may nevertheless be insufficient to prevent North Korea from deriving indirect economic benefits.   In June 2024, North Korea and Russia signed the Treaty on Comprehensive and Strategic Partnership (hereinafter, the “New North Korea-Russia Treaty”), which includes provisions for mutual military assistance in the event of war and has been widely characterized as having alliance-like features. North Korea’s subsequent decision to participate in the Russia-Ukraine war provided further evidence that the North Korea-Russia relationship had evolved into an increasingly close military partnership. Following the signing of the New North Korea-Russia Treaty, the security architecture of the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia has increasingly reflected an interlocking structure involving the U.S.-South Korea alliance and North Korea’s relationships with China and Russia. Amid intensifying great-power competition, particularly the strategic rivalry between the United States and China, the Korean Peninsula has become a point of intersection among the security relationships of the three major nuclear powers—the United States, Russia, and China. Consequently, while the international dimensions of the Korean Peninsula issue have become increasingly pronounced, the space for international cooperation in addressing the North Korean nuclear issue has narrowed further.   North Korea is now openly declaring that it will no longer engage in negotiations aimed at nuclear disarmament and that it has no intention of halting the development of strategic weapons, including nuclear weapons and missiles. The North Korean nuclear issue has therefore entered a fundamentally different phase. Yet there are currently few effective external mechanisms capable of constraining the continued expansion of North Korea’s nuclear capabilities. If this trajectory continues, the North Korean nuclear issue could pose a serious threat not only to the security of the Korean Peninsula and East Asia but also to the integrity of the global nuclear nonproliferation regime.   The deepening of the North Korean nuclear problem is also likely to reinforce Japan’s military buildup, which has already accelerated in recent years. If South Korea and Japan, both of which continue to rely on U.S. extended deterrence, further deepen their security dependence on the United States, a more pronounced Cold War–like security dynamic could emerge around the Korean Peninsula. Moreover, if declining confidence in U.S. extended deterrence coincides with further advances in North Korea’s nuclear capabilities, neighboring countries could face growing domestic pressure to consider developing their own nuclear capabilities.   From this perspective, it is critically important to halt North Korea’s nuclear program at its current stage and prevent further deterioration of the situation. The argument that prioritizing a halt to North Korea’s nuclear program amounts to accepting or legitimizing its status as a nuclear-armed state is disconnected from the realities of the current situation. Even if the ultimate objective remains the complete dismantlement of North Korea’s nuclear program, any realistic process toward that goal would necessarily have to begin by suspending further nuclear development. Past experience also demonstrates that subsequent steps toward nuclear reduction and dismantlement would be exceptionally difficult. Nevertheless, if meaningful progress is to be made on the North Korean nuclear issue, the immediate priority must be to prevent further expansion of North Korea’s nuclear capabilities and contain the deterioration of the nuclear threat.   The Prospects for a U.S.-North Korea Summit and Key Issues   North Korea has repeatedly declared that it has no intention of engaging in negotiations over its nuclear program and has shown strong resistance to inter-Korean dialogue. At the same time, U.S. President Donald Trump has repeatedly expressed his willingness to meet with North Korean leader Kim Jong Un and has referred to North Korea as a “nuclear power” since shortly after taking office. For its part, North Korea has left open the possibility of dialogue with the United States, indicating that relations between the leaders of the two countries are not necessarily hostile. Nevertheless, Pyongyang has remained cautious about resuming negotiations, while Washington has yet to take concrete steps to bring North Korea back to the negotiating table. In August, however, President Trump ordered a reduction in the scale of previously scheduled U.S.-South Korea joint military exercises, renewing attention to the possibility of a U.S.-North Korea summit.   While some have interpreted the U.S. decision to scale back the joint exercises as a retaliatory measure in response to South Korea’s refusal to deploy troops to the Middle East, recent developments nevertheless suggest subtle changes in the U.S.-North Korea relationship. In particular, unlike previous calls for dialogue, the latest move represents a tangible policy step initiated by Washington. Other developments may also indicate the possibility of renewed U.S.-North Korea dialogue. Among them is the recent announcement by the U.S. Department of Defense’s Defense POW/MIA Accounting Agency (DPAA) that it is prepared to resume efforts to recover the remains of U.S. service members in North Korea.   In a statement issued by Kim Yo-jong, North Korea claimed that it attached no particular significance to the scaling back of the U.S.-South Korea joint military exercises. Nevertheless, the timing and content of the statement are noteworthy. Issued shortly after the decision was announced, the statement specifically emphasized that relations between the leaders of the two countries were not hostile and rejected Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s claim that North Korean troops had been deployed to the Russia-Ukraine war. Taken together, these elements may suggest that North Korea interpreted Washington’s decision to scale back the exercises as a potential signal of its willingness to resume U.S.-North Korea dialogue.   That said, while President Trump, with the U.S. midterm elections approaching, appears relatively eager to advance diplomacy, North Korea seems to be keeping the door open to dialogue with the United States without rushing to resume negotiations. Given the experience of the “no deal” outcome at the Hanoi Summit, Pyongyang may be waiting for concrete reciprocal measures from Washington before reengaging in talks. In particular, compared with the circumstances of 2018–19, North Korea may perceive its bargaining position as having strengthened significantly. Rather than returning to the negotiating table immediately, therefore, Pyongyang appears to be carefully assessing the situation while awaiting further steps from Washington.   Nevertheless, given that a future U.S. president may be less inclined to pursue direct engagement with North Korea at the same level as President Trump, Pyongyang is unlikely to allow the remainder of his term to pass without exploring potential diplomatic opportunities. Although China and Russia remain important supporters of North Korea, Pyongyang cannot completely disregard the continuing effects of U.S.-led international sanctions. North Korea therefore has incentives to make use of the strategic space created by its closer relations with China and Russia, where U.S. influence is relatively constrained, while also seeking to improve relations with the United States in pursuit of sustained economic and diplomatic opportunities and greater international normalization. Accordingly, although the timing of renewed U.S.-North Korea talks remains difficult to predict, current circumstances leave open the possibility of renewed dialogue in the foreseeable future.   Of course, even if U.S.-North Korea talks take place, significant challenges will remain. There is a possibility that the leaders of both countries, influenced by their respective political considerations, could reduce a summit to a one-time political event. In other words, even if a summit is held, it remains uncertain whether fundamental issues, including North Korea’s nuclear program, would be addressed in a substantive manner. Nevertheless, U.S.-North Korea dialogue remains important because it offers one of the most plausible avenues for breaking the current diplomatic impasse. As in previous instances, a U.S.-North Korea summit is more likely to serve as a forum for identifying potential breakthroughs and generating momentum for subsequent negotiations than as a venue for simply formalizing the results of discussions accumulated beforehand.   Challenges to Halting North Korea’s Nuclear ProgramGiven North Korea’s resistance to nuclear disarmament, President Trump would ultimately need to place the nuclear issue on the negotiating agenda. From his perspective, simply creating an opportunity to discuss the nuclear issue directly with Chairman Kim Jong-un could itself represent a significant diplomatic achievement. Moreover, if he were able to secure an agreement to halt the further expansion of North Korea’s nuclear capabilities, such an outcome could provide an opportunity to demonstrate a contribution to strengthening the international nonproliferation regime and reducing instability in Northeast Asia.   The challenge is that it will likely be difficult to negotiate the North Korean nuclear issue as the sole item on the agenda. The starting point, therefore, should be a comprehensive agenda linking the “establishment of a new U.S.-North Korea relationship,” as pledged by the leaders of the two countries in Singapore, with the “reduction of military risks” on the Korean Peninsula. What distinguishes this approach from previous efforts is its greater emphasis on establishing a peace regime and using progress toward that goal as a catalyst for addressing the North Korean nuclear issue. In other words, rather than seeking to resolve the nuclear issue first, this approach would prioritize the establishment of a peace regime while simultaneously pursuing a gradual reduction of nuclear risks.   To create a more favorable environment for dialogue on the Korean Peninsula, it is also important to pursue a parallel diplomatic effort through South Korea’s relations with China and Russia. If North Korea’s key partners, China and Russia, demonstrate a shared commitment to peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula, as well as to the long-term goal of a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula, North Korea may face greater incentives to engage more seriously with the nuclear issue.   Given the fluid international political environment and the numerous obstacles to progress on the North Korean nuclear issue, the role of the South Korean government is particularly important. As a key stakeholder in Korean Peninsula affairs, South Korea should play an active role in shaping the agenda, developing policy options, and devising strategies for their implementation. North Korea’s rejection of inter-Korean negotiations, as well as the possibility of direct U.S.-North Korea talks, does not diminish the need for South Korean engagement, including through behind-the-scenes diplomacy. Each country has different interests, threat perceptions, and strategic calculations regarding the North Korean nuclear issue. If South Korea is to shape developments in ways consistent with its interests and achieve meaningful outcomes, it must actively consult with the United States, engage and persuade China and Russia, and encourage changes in North Korea’s strategic calculations.   It is widely recognized that the current environment makes it extremely difficult to address the North Korean nuclear issue or for South Korea to take the lead in shaping the broader strategic environment. However, simply waiting for circumstances to improve is likely to allow the situation to deteriorate further. Historical opportunities rarely arise under favorable conditions; they often emerge only through narrow openings, and meaningful outcomes can be achieved only when those openings are seized. If a more favorable environment cannot be expected to emerge on its own, proactive efforts to overcome the current impasse and create greater diplomatic space are essential.   

Conditions for the Success of the Lee Administration’s Vision for Peaceful Coexistence on the Korean Peninsula         J.R. KimPresidentKorea Council for Peace and Cooperation (KCPC)   1. Introduction   The 1953 Armistice Agreement has prevented renewed full-scale war on the Korean Peninsula for more than seven decades, but it has never been transformed into a permanent peace regime. Instead, the peninsula has remained characterized by military confrontation and mutual distrust. North Korea’s advancing nuclear and missile capabilities, intensifying strategic competition between the United States and China, and shifts in Russia’s foreign policy have further complicated the security environment surrounding the peninsula. Peace on the Korean Peninsula is therefore no longer an issue confined to inter-Korean relations. Stability on the peninsula has direct implications for strategic stability in Northeast Asia and for the effectiveness of the international nonproliferation regime.   Against this backdrop, peace policy on the Korean Peninsula cannot be limited to preventing war. It must combine credible military deterrence with effective tension management and the restoration of channels for dialogue and communication. At the same time, it must prevent further advances in North Korea’s nuclear and missile capabilities while creating a pathway toward denuclearization and a durable peace regime over the long term. Peace, however, cannot be secured through a single declaration or summit. Sustainable peace requires the cumulative and sustained reduction of tensions, confidence-building measures, the implementation and verification of agreements, and institutional mechanisms capable of preserving these gains. From this perspective, the Lee Jae-myung administration’s vision of peaceful coexistence on the Korean Peninsula should be understood not simply as a continuation of previous approaches to North Korea, but as an effort to integrate lessons from past policy experience into a coherent peace process suited to the current security environment. Its core elements can be summarized in five areas. First, it seeks to move from the stable management of the armistice toward the institutionalization of peace. Second, it aims to transform inter-Korean relations from competition over unification into a framework for peaceful coexistence. Third, on the North Korean nuclear issue, it pursues the long-term objective of denuclearization while managing immediate nuclear risks. Fourth, it regards inter-Korean exchanges and economic cooperation not merely as outcomes of peace, but as foundations for sustaining it. Fifth, recognizing that some issues cannot be resolved through inter-Korean efforts alone, it seeks to promote the normalization of North Korea’s relations with the United States and Japan while strengthening cooperation with neighboring countries.   These principles were reflected in the E.N.D. Initiative presented at the 2025 United Nations General Assembly. The initiative envisions comprehensive dialogue centered on exchange, normalization, and denuclearization as a means of reducing hostility and confrontation on the Korean Peninsula and opening an era of “peaceful coexistence and shared growth.” The Lee Jae-myung administration has identified respect for North Korea’s political system, rejection of absorption-style unification, and the non-pursuit of hostile acts as core principles of its North Korea policy. On denuclearization, it has proposed a phased and pragmatic approach centered on the “suspension–reduction–elimination” of North Korea’s nuclear and missile capabilities.   The Ministry of Unification’s Fifth Basic Plan for the Development of Inter-Korean Relations (2026–2030), adopted in 2026, institutionalized this policy direction. The government identified “peaceful coexistence and shared growth on the Korean Peninsula” as its overarching vision and established three major objectives: institutionalizing peaceful coexistence between North and South Korea, laying the foundation for shared growth on the Korean Peninsula, and realizing a Korean Peninsula free from war and nuclear weapons.   The Lee Jae-myung administration’s vision for peace, however, should not be viewed as a policy wholly detached from those of previous administrations. Rather, it represents an effort to adapt the accumulated experience of the Kim Dae-jung administration’s policy of reconciliation and cooperation, the Roh Moo-hyun administration’s policy of peace and prosperity, and the Lee Myung-bak administration’s policy of mutual benefit and co-prosperity to the current security environment. The objective, therefore, should not simply be to replicate past policies, but to draw on their lessons and limitations in developing a more sustainable approach to peaceful coexistence.   Instead, it is necessary to examine why previous efforts at dialogue and cooperation did not produce lasting peace and to develop a new peace process that links the resumption of dialogue and cooperation with the implementation, verification, and institutionalization of agreements.   2. From Managing the Armistice to Institutionalizing Peace   The first task in building peace on the Korean Peninsula is to move from managing the armistice to institutionalizing peace. The 1953 Armistice Agreement halted active hostilities and established a measure of military stability, but it did not resolve the underlying political and military disputes between North and South Korea or establish a permanent peace regime. As a result, the Korean Peninsula has remained in a state of precarious stability, in which the risk of war is contained in large part through the deterrence provided by the ROK-U.S. alliance, while tensions periodically escalate in response to political and military developments.   Peace policy should not treat deterrence and dialogue as mutually exclusive. Credible deterrence is essential to preventing war, but deterrence alone cannot address the underlying sources of conflict. Institutional mechanisms for managing tensions and preventing crises are also necessary. These should include reliable communication channels between military authorities, mechanisms for preventing accidental clashes, military confidence-building measures, and the restoration and implementation of existing inter-Korean agreements.   Institutionalizing peace does not mean repeatedly issuing new declarations. Rather, it requires restoring and strengthening the institutional mechanisms for peace that have been developed over time and ensuring that they remain functional despite changes in governments and political circumstances. Through numerous summits and high-level meetings, the two Koreas have accumulated agreements aimed at reducing military tensions and promoting exchanges and cooperation. The central challenge has not been simply the absence of agreements, but the lack of sufficiently robust institutions to ensure their consistent implementation, monitoring, and verification.   Accordingly, rather than repeatedly negotiating new agreements, a new peace initiative should place greater emphasis on restoring existing arrangements and ensuring their implementation, verification, and institutionalization. The Lee Jae-myung administration’s decision to identify “the institutionalization of peaceful coexistence between North and South Korea” as a goal of the Fifth Basic Plan for the Development of Inter-Korean Relations, and to identify the restoration of communication channels, the reduction of military tensions, and confidence-building as key tasks, reflects this approach.   Yet institutions alone cannot sustain peace. For these mechanisms to function effectively, the underlying framework through which inter-Korean relations are understood must also evolve. This constitutes the second major challenge in moving from management of the armistice toward a durable peace framework.   3. From Competition for Unification to Peaceful Coexistence   The stable institutionalization of inter-Korean relations requires a shift in the basic framework through which those relations are understood. For decades, both North and South Korea have regarded unification as a national objective. Against this backdrop, the 1991 Inter-Korean Basic Agreement defined inter-Korean relations as a special relationship arising from the process of pursuing unification.   Yet a shared aspiration for unification did not guarantee peaceful relations. Despite maintaining fundamentally different political and economic systems, the two Koreas competed to shape the terms of unification, drawing on their respective political, economic, and strategic advantages. This competition reinforced the tendency on each side to view the other’s political system and intentions primarily through a security lens.   This dynamic became even more pronounced during the Kim Jong-un era, as North Korea increasingly characterized inter-Korean relations as relations between two hostile states. Under these circumstances, South Korea cannot realistically expect to stabilize inter-Korean relations or restore dialogue simply by reiterating the unification-centered framework of the past. The Lee Jae-myung administration’s principles of respecting North Korea’s political system, rejecting absorption-style unification, and refraining from hostile acts can be understood as a policy response to this changed environment.   Peaceful coexistence, however, does not necessarily mean abandoning the long-term objective of unification. Rather, under current inter-Korean conditions, it prioritizes recognizing the reality of two distinct political systems and preventing conflict arising from competition to impose a particular model of unification. Establishing peaceful coexistence would create greater political space and stability for the two Koreas to address, over the longer term, questions concerning the methods and conditions of unification.   This approach also reflects continuity with the Kim Dae-jung administration’s policy of reconciliation and cooperation. That policy similarly sought to transform inter-Korean relations through mutual recognition, dialogue, and exchanges, rather than seeking to absorb North Korea or alter its political system. The Lee Jae-myung administration’s approach can therefore be understood as a more explicit adaptation of the Sunshine Policy to the current realities and challenges of inter-Korean relations.   Unification and peaceful coexistence need not be treated as mutually exclusive objectives. By reducing conflict and building trust, the two Koreas can expand exchanges and cooperation, strengthen the institutional foundations of a peace regime, and, over time, create the conditions for discussing the future of inter-Korean relations, including questions related to unification. Peaceful coexistence should thus be understood not as an alternative to unification, but as a framework for creating a stable environment in which the future direction of inter-Korean relations can be addressed.   Changing the basic framework of inter-Korean relations alone, however, cannot secure peace on the Korean Peninsula. The security challenge posed by North Korea’s advancing nuclear and missile capabilities remains. A realistic approach to the nuclear issue must therefore proceed in parallel with efforts to establish peaceful coexistence.   4. Pursuing Denuclearization While Managing Nuclear Threats   The challenge posed by North Korea’s nuclear weapons program is one of the key factors distinguishing the current security environment from that of previous peace initiatives. Given the advanced state of North Korea’s nuclear and missile capabilities, an approach focused exclusively on the long-term objective of denuclearization is insufficient to address immediate security risks. At the same time, de facto acceptance of North Korea as a permanent nuclear-weapon state would raise serious concerns about stability on the Korean Peninsula and the integrity of the international nonproliferation regime.   The policy objective, therefore, should be to distinguish between the long-term goal of denuclearization and the immediate task of managing nuclear risks, while pursuing both objectives in parallel. A realistic strategy need not require complete dismantlement as a precondition for opening negotiations. Instead, it should seek, through a phased process, to secure measures that prevent further advances in North Korea’s nuclear and missile capabilities, reduce immediate security risks, and establish a pathway toward eventual denuclearization.   Initial measures could include halting or freezing the production of additional fissile material; preventing the transfer and proliferation of nuclear and missile technologies and weapons; constraining further development of strategic systems, including ICBMs; and establishing an effective international verification regime. In return, corresponding measures—including diplomatic normalization, calibrated sanctions relief, economic cooperation, and security assurances—could be provided incrementally in response to specific and verifiable actions by North Korea.   The E.N.D. Initiative presented by President Lee Jae-myung at the 2025 United Nations General Assembly embodies this phased approach. It envisions a pragmatic sequence beginning with the “suspension” of further advances in North Korea’s nuclear and missile capabilities, followed by “reduction” and, ultimately, “elimination.” The initiative seeks to integrate exchanges, diplomatic normalization, and denuclearization within a broader framework for sustained dialogue and gradual risk reduction.   This approach also draws lessons from the experience of the Six-Party Talks. The September 19 Joint Statement and the February 13 Agreement sought to establish a phased process in which North Korea’s denuclearization measures were matched by corresponding political and economic measures from the international community. Their failure to achieve sustained implementation, however, demonstrates that reciprocity alone is insufficient. Effective mechanisms for verification, compliance, and implementation are equally essential to ensure that commitments are translated into concrete and sustained actions.   Future denuclearization negotiations should therefore move beyond the binary sequencing of “denuclearization first, compensation later” or “compensation first, denuclearization later.” Instead, they should establish a framework in which specific and verifiable actions by North Korea are matched by corresponding measures from the international community on a phased basis. The process should also include mechanisms for addressing violations, noncompliance, and delays in implementation. The central objective should be to link measurable reductions in nuclear risks to concrete political and economic incentives.   Ultimately, the phased management of the nuclear issue will be effective only if it contributes to improved inter-Korean relations and the normalization of North Korea’s relations with the international community. The nuclear issue should therefore be understood not simply as an arms-control problem, but as an integral component of the broader process of establishing a durable peace regime on the Korean Peninsula.   5. From Reconciliation and Cooperation to Shared Growth   A peace regime cannot be sustained by political and security institutions alone. It also requires an economic and social foundation capable of reinforcing peace over time. In this respect, economic cooperation represents another important link between the Lee Jae-myung administration’s vision for peace and the approaches pursued by previous administrations.   Although the Kim Dae-jung administration’s policy of reconciliation and cooperation, the Roh Moo-hyun administration’s policy of peace and prosperity, and the Lee Myung-bak administration’s policy of mutual benefit and co-prosperity were pursued under different circumstances, they shared a common premise: that inter-Korean exchanges and economic cooperation could help improve inter-Korean relations and provide a foundation for peace.   The Lee Jae-myung administration’s concept of “shared growth” can likewise be understood as an effort to adapt this policy tradition to the current environment.   The Fifth Basic Plan for the Development of Inter-Korean Relations identifies “establishing a foundation for shared growth on the Korean Peninsula” as a major objective. It calls for mutually beneficial inter-Korean exchanges and cooperation while also promoting preparations for a future peace economy and shared growth across the Korean Peninsula.   Shared growth is distinct from providing assistance to North Korea. Sustainable economic cooperation must generate tangible benefits and incentives for both sides rather than rely primarily on unilateral transfers or political concessions. This requires identifying areas of mutual interest—including transportation and logistics, energy, agriculture, environmental protection, health care, tourism, and industrial cooperation—and developing them incrementally in accordance with the prevailing political and security environment and applicable international constraints.   Economic cooperation can be both a product of peace and a mechanism for reinforcing it. As economic and social interaction expands, shared interests and constituencies can develop, creating greater incentives to manage disputes and avoid escalation. At the same time, past experience demonstrates that economic cooperation is difficult to sustain when it remains overly vulnerable to political and military fluctuations. Shared growth therefore requires attention not only to the economic viability of individual projects, but also to political sustainability, legal predictability, and applicable international constraints.   Ultimately, the evolution from reconciliation and cooperation to peace and prosperity, mutual benefit and shared prosperity, and finally to shared growth can be understood as a process through which inter-Korean economic cooperation moves beyond improving bilateral relations toward creating shared interests and greater interdependence. The value of shared growth lies not simply in expanding economic activity on both sides, but in creating a virtuous cycle in which peace generates economic benefits, while greater economic interdependence, in turn, creates stronger incentives for peace.   Yet such a virtuous cycle cannot be established through inter-Korean efforts alone. The broader strategic environment in Northeast Asia—including the North Korean nuclear issue, international sanctions, and U.S.-China strategic competition—directly affects the conditions under which economic cooperation can proceed. The vision of peace on the Korean Peninsula therefore necessarily extends to creating an international environment conducive to peace.   6. Fostering an International Environment and a Domestic Foundation for Peace   Peace on the Korean Peninsula cannot be secured through inter-Korean efforts alone. The strategic interests of the United States, China, Japan, and Russia intersect on the peninsula, while the North Korean nuclear issue is closely linked to the international nonproliferation regime. A sustainable peace process therefore requires a multilayered strategy that advances inter-Korean relations while also engaging neighboring countries and the broader international community.   Most importantly, the ROK-U.S. alliance and peace policy should not be viewed as competing objectives. The credible deterrence provided by the ROK-U.S. alliance serves as an essential security foundation for preventing conflict. At the same time, a stable deterrence posture can create the strategic space necessary for diplomacy and dialogue. Peace policy should therefore seek to ensure that deterrence and diplomacy reinforce rather than undermine one another.   China’s role is also important. Preventing military conflict on the Korean Peninsula and managing nuclear risks cannot be separated from the broader dynamics of U.S.-China strategic competition. South Korea should therefore maintain sufficient diplomatic space for China to play a constructive role in maintaining stability on the Korean Peninsula and addressing nuclear risks. Japan and Russia also have significant interests in the North Korean nuclear issue and the broader Northeast Asian security environment. Their roles need not be excluded; rather, they can be engaged selectively where cooperation is feasible and consistent with South Korea’s interests.   The concept of “cross-recognition,” which developed during the Cold War and post-Cold War periods, may offer useful lessons. In the early 1970s, proposals emerged to reduce tensions on the Korean Peninsula through the normalization of relations among the two Koreas and the major powers surrounding the peninsula. Following the end of the Cold War, South Korea established diplomatic relations with China and Russia under the Roh Tae-woo administration’s “Northern Diplomacy.” A comprehensive form of cross-recognition, however—including the normalization of relations between North Korea and the United States and Japan—was never fully realized.   The Kim Dae-jung administration supported efforts to expand North Korea’s relations with Western countries. While diplomatic normalization could broaden North Korea’s access to the international community and expand the institutional space for dialogue, it did not lead to sustained normalization of North Korea’s relations with the United States and Japan as tensions surrounding the nuclear issue re-emerged. This experience demonstrates that diplomatic normalization can create additional channels for crisis management and negotiation, but cannot by itself guarantee peace.   Accordingly, a new peace initiative should treat the normalization of inter-Korean relations and the normalization of North Korea’s relations with the United States and Japan as mutually reinforcing processes rather than separate tracks. One possible approach would be to expand diplomatic space for North Korea to establish normal relations with the international community while pursuing separate negotiations and verification mechanisms to address specific issues, including the nuclear issue, human rights, and the abduction of foreign nationals.   An enabling international environment, however, is not sufficient to ensure the continuity of peace policy. If the fundamental direction of North Korea policy changes substantially with every change of government, trust painstakingly built between the two Koreas can quickly erode. Similarly, a long-term peace process is difficult to maintain when international and inter-Korean agreements are readily revised in response to shifts in domestic politics.   A durable peace process therefore requires a domestic political and social foundation alongside international cooperation. Political parties, civil society, academia, and other stakeholders should engage in sustained discussion of the basic principles and long-term objectives of North Korea policy and seek to establish a minimum level of national consensus. This does not require consensus on every specific policy adopted by a particular administration in Washington, Seoul, or elsewhere. Rather, it requires establishing a durable framework for national policy toward peace on the Korean Peninsula that can withstand changes in government and shifting political circumstances.   7. Conclusion   The Lee Jae-myung administration’s vision for peace on the Korean Peninsula should be understood not as an entirely new policy, but as an effort to adapt the accumulated experience of previous administrations to a substantially changed security environment. Although the Kim Dae-jung administration’s policy of reconciliation and cooperation, the Roh Moo-hyun administration’s policy of peace and prosperity, and the Lee Myung-bak administration’s policy of mutual benefit and co-prosperity were pursued under different circumstances, they shared a common commitment to reducing tensions through dialogue, exchanges, economic cooperation, and the pursuit of a peace regime. The Lee Jae-myung administration’s vision builds on this policy legacy while addressing a more challenging environment shaped by North Korea’s advancing nuclear and missile capabilities and intensifying U.S.-China strategic competition.   The main challenge is not to select a single policy instrument, but to integrate multiple instruments into a coherent and sustainable strategy. Military deterrence must provide the security foundation for preventing war, while dialogue and confidence-building measures can reduce tensions and create space for diplomacy. On the nuclear issue, a phased approach is needed to constrain further advances while establishing a pathway toward long-term denuclearization. Inter-Korean exchanges and shared growth can broaden the economic and social foundations of peace, while the normalization of North Korea’s relations with the United States and Japan, together with cooperation among neighboring countries, can expand the diplomatic space needed to sustain the peace process.   Ultimately, the central task is to connect these policy instruments within a single, mutually reinforcing peace process. Peaceful coexistence provides the political basis for transforming the basic framework of inter-Korean relations, while phased management of nuclear threats provides an initial mechanism for reducing immediate security risks. Exchanges and shared growth can strengthen the economic and social foundations of peace, while diplomatic normalization can broaden the international space in which the peace process can advance. The institutionalization of peace, in turn, can help ensure that these gains endure through changes in government and shifting political circumstances.   Peaceful coexistence does not necessarily require abandoning the long-term objective of unification. Rather, under current inter-Korean conditions, it offers a pragmatic framework for preventing conflict and establishing stable relations. Denuclearization should not be viewed as a separate objective disconnected from the peace regime; rather, it is a central component of sustainable peace on the Korean Peninsula. Similarly, shared growth should not be viewed merely as a byproduct of peace, but as an economic foundation for sustaining it.   For these policies to endure, however, one additional condition is essential: domestic political consensus. Peace policy on the Korean Peninsula is unlikely to produce results in the short term. Building trust between North and South Korea, implementing agreements, and developing sustained international cooperation require time. If the fundamental direction of North Korea policy changes substantially with each change of government, it becomes difficult to establish credibility with North Korea or maintain consistency in long-term policy.   What South Korean society needs to establish, therefore, is not consensus on every specific North Korea policy pursued by an individual administration. Rather, it needs durable agreement on the basic principles of responding firmly to North Korean provocations while managing tensions through dialogue and exchanges and gradually creating the conditions for peaceful coexistence. Political parties, civil society, academia, and other stakeholders should have sustained opportunities to debate and build agreement around these principles. Such an approach would help reduce the structural volatility of North Korea policy associated with changes in government and domestic political conflict.   Ultimately, peace on the Korean Peninsula is not a goal that any single administration can achieve on its own. It is a long-term national undertaking that requires integrating security and diplomacy, denuclearization and exchanges, inter-Korean relations and international cooperation within a coherent policy framework, while building the domestic consensus necessary to sustain that approach over time. What is required for durable peace, therefore, is not simply another peace initiative, but a broad societal consensus capable of carrying that initiative beyond changes in government and periods of political conflict.    

President Lee’s Keynote Address to the UN General Assembly and the Feasibility of Halting North Korea’s Nuclear Program      Ki-young YoonAdjunct ProfessorHankuk University of Foreign Studies       1. Introduction:   In his keynote address to the 81st United Nations General Assembly, held at UN Headquarters in New York on September 22 (local time), South Korean President Lee Jae-myung presented the international community with a phased approach to peace on the Korean Peninsula and the North Korean nuclear issue. At the core of this approach is the prompt resumption of the long-stalled U.S.–North Korea dialogue, with an immediate focus on halting further advances in North Korea’s nuclear and missile capabilities, followed by their reduction over the medium term and, ultimately, the pursuit of a “nuclear-free Korean Peninsula.” President Lee stated, “The Republic of Korea will lay the groundwork for the prompt resumption of U.S.-North Korea dialogue—which has been stalled for a long time—and for its evolution into dialogue among the parties concerned aimed at ending the war on the Korean Peninsula and transitioning to a peace regime.” He noted that U.S. President Donald Trump’s recent decision has created an opportunity for renewed engagement with North Korea and emphasized South Korea’s determination, as a key stakeholder and “pace-setter” for peace on the Korean Peninsula, to open and sustain a path to dialogue. A particularly noteworthy aspect of the speech is that it did not stop at reaffirming the ultimate goal of “denuclearization,” but instead outlined a phased pathway: “halting the advancement of nuclear and missile capabilities → medium-term reduction → a long-term nuclear-free Korean Peninsula.” Given the extent to which North Korea’s nuclear capabilities have already advanced, this approach can be understood as an effort to first prevent further expansion of those capabilities and then address the broader nuclear issue in stages, rather than seeking to achieve complete denuclearization in the short term. This approach has practical value. Given the difficulty of resolving the North Korean nuclear issue in a single step, a phased approach can broaden the space for dialogue and help sustain momentum in negotiations. However, “suspension” must not become a substitute for the ultimate objective of denuclearization. It is therefore essential to make clear that preventing further advances in North Korea’s nuclear capabilities is not the endpoint of the denuclearization process, but rather the first step toward achieving that objective. On August 16, 2026 (local time), U.S. President Donald Trump posted on social media that he intended to significantly scale back the U.S.-South Korea joint military exercise “Ulchi Freedom Shield (UFS).” He cited three reasons for the decision. First, he stated that his relationship with Chairman Kim Jong-un was very good. Second, he argued that the exercises were costly. Third, he said that he had asked President Lee Jae-myung whether South Korea was willing to participate in “Iran’s denuclearization,” but had received a “No, thanks” response. In citing the third reason, Trump acknowledged that it might be “somewhat unrelated” and did not disclose precisely what he had asked South Korea to do. A single social media post thus combined conciliatory signals toward North Korea, financial considerations, and dissatisfaction with an alliance partner. Although the exercises began as scheduled the following day, South Korean and U.S. military authorities decided on August 19 to shorten the exercise from the originally planned 11 days (August 17–27) to five days (August 17–21). Part 2 of the exercise, which was designed to rehearse counteroffensive operations, was canceled, while only Part 1, focused on defensive operations, was conducted; related field training exercises were also scaled back. It was unprecedented for a theater-level combined exercise that had already commenced to be curtailed midway through. Reports subsequently indicated that South Korean authorities had not been informed of Trump’s directive in advance, and that Canadian and New Zealand forces participating in the exercise had likewise not received prior notice. Nevertheless, on the evening of August 19, President Lee posted on social media that he welcomed Trump’s decision and said he would fulfill his role as a “pace-maker” in support of Trump, the “peacemaker.”North Korea’s response was muted. Kim Yo-jong, Director of the General Affairs Department of the Workers’ Party of Korea, sought to downplay the significance of the decision in a statement issued on the evening of August 19, arguing that reducing the scale or duration of the exercises would not change their fundamental nature. The following day, August 20, North Korea launched approximately 10 short-range ballistic missiles from the Pyongyang area toward the East Sea. A month later, while in New York to attend the UN General Assembly, President Lee reiterated, in written interviews with the Associated Press and The New York Times released ahead of his keynote address, his proposal to address the North Korean nuclear issue through a phased and pragmatic approach of “suspension → reduction → dismantlement.” He also argued that persuading North Korea to halt the development of additional nuclear weapons and intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) capabilities in exchange for lifting sanctions that had proven largely ineffective would constitute a deal of considerable strategic value. The framework for this phased approach was first outlined by President Lee in an August 2025 interview with the Yomiuri Shimbun as a three-step plan of “freeze → reduction → dismantlement.” He formally presented the proposal to the international community in his keynote address to the UN General Assembly that September, changing the first step from “freeze” to “suspension.”The United States wants to engage North Korea in dialogue, but its motivations are multifaceted, and coordination with South Korea does not always appear to be the overriding consideration. The South Korean government has even supported scaling back alliance exercises in an effort to create space for dialogue, while North Korea continues to refuse to engage directly with South Korea.If the central question in 2018 was, “Will North Korea give up its nuclear weapons?”, the question in 2026 is different: What leverage can South Korea use to shape an agreement between the United States and North Korea, each of which is pursuing its own distinct strategic interests?No one can predict with certainty where the next phase of North Korea’s nuclear negotiations will lead. It is possible, however, to map out alternative pathways and prepare for each of them. This article examines, in sequence, the reasons behind North Korea’s changed posture, South Korea’s current position, four scenarios based on specific criteria, and South Korea’s possible responses. The factual information is based on verified data; the interpretations and projections presented here reflect the author’s judgment, and I wish to make this distinction explicit.Why Has North Korea Changed?North Korea’s changed posture can be explained by five factors.A New Patron and Weakened Sanctions: In June 2024, North Korea signed a “Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Treaty” with Russia that includes a provision for mutual military assistance in the event of an emergency, and subsequently provided artillery shells, missiles, and troops to support Russia. South Korean and U.S. intelligence agencies, as well as outside experts, assess that North Korea received economic assistance, including oil and food, as well as military technology in return. However, the precise terms and scope of this exchange have not been officially confirmed. In March 2024, the UN Security Council’s Panel of Experts on sanctions against North Korea ceased operations at the end of April after Russia vetoed an extension of its mandate. In September 2026, the Tumen River Automobile Bridge—the first road bridge connecting Rason and Khasan in North Korea and Russia, respectively—opened. On the Chinese side, construction of the North Korean customs facility for the New Yalu River Bridge—which was completed in 2014 but remained closed for 12 years because of the lack of connecting roads and supporting infrastructure on the North Korean side—has reached its final stages.Trade with China has also increased. According to statistics from the General Administration of Customs of China, North Korea-China trade reached approximately $2.73 billion in 2025, a 25 percent increase from the previous year. During the first half of 2026, bilateral trade reached approximately $1.51 billion, roughly 20 percent higher than during the same period in the previous year. These figures, however, should not be interpreted as evidence that “China has abandoned sanctions.” The 2025 trade volume merely returned to approximately the level recorded in 2019, when UN Security Council sanctions were already in place, and remained only about 40 percent of the approximately $6.9 billion recorded in 2014, before the major sanctions regime was imposed. Judging from trade statistics alone, China appears to be providing North Korea with some economic breathing room while remaining broadly within the existing sanctions framework rather than openly violating it.What has more directly weakened the impact of sanctions is North Korea’s growing reliance on transactions with Russia and the theft of virtual assets through cyber operations. On February 21, 2025, approximately $1.5 billion worth of virtual assets were stolen from the cryptocurrency exchange Bybit, and the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) attributed the attack to North Korea. The value of that single cyber theft exceeded half of North Korea’s annual trade volume with China in 2025. With Russia, China, and cyber-enabled cryptocurrency theft providing multiple sources of external support, North Korea has developed greater resilience in the face of sanctions. Having found ways to sustain itself without relying on South Korea, Pyongyang has little incentive to rush into negotiations at this time.Deep-Seated Distrust of the United States Based on Past Experience: North Korea has witnessed, in succession, the collapse of Muammar Qaddafi’s regime in Libya in 2011—which had abandoned its weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs, including its nuclear weapons development program, in 2003—the U.S. withdrawal from the Iran nuclear deal in 2018, and the breakdown of the Hanoi U.S.-North Korea summit in 2019.Although Libya did not possess nuclear weapons at the time, North Korea has repeatedly invoked the Libyan experience as evidence that “giving up nuclear weapons leads to disaster.” The Iran nuclear deal was a 2015 agreement under which the international community agreed to provide sanctions relief in exchange for limits on Iran’s nuclear program. This history was compounded by the 2026 war involving Iran. On February 28—just two days after the third round of U.S.-Iran nuclear talks, mediated by Oman, was held in Geneva on February 26—the United States and Israel launched attacks against Iran. This marked the second instance in which military action occurred while negotiations were underway, following Israel’s June 2025 airstrikes on Iran, in which the United States subsequently joined, while U.S.-Iran talks were ongoing. In his policy address to the First Session of the 15th Supreme People’s Assembly on March 23, Kim Jong-un condemned the United States for engaging in “state-sponsored terrorism and acts of aggression” around the world and argued that North Korea’s policy of firmly establishing its status as a nuclear-armed state was justified. Although he did not explicitly mention Iran, his assertion that North Korea enjoys a higher level of security than other regions because of its nuclear arsenal was widely interpreted as a reference to developments surrounding Iran.Nuclear Weapons as a Pillar of the State System: Nuclear weapons serve not only as a deterrent against external attack but also as a pillar of domestic political legitimacy. In September 2022, North Korea enacted the Nuclear Forces Policy Law, which establishes conditions for the use of nuclear weapons, and in September 2023, it enshrined the strengthening of its nuclear forces in the Constitution. In his report on the work of the Ninth Congress of the Workers’ Party of Korea (February 19–25) this past February, Kim Jong-un declared that North Korea’s status as a nuclear-weapon state was “irreversible and permanent.” He stated that abandoning nuclear weapons was categorically out of the question and that North Korea would devote all necessary resources to increasing its nuclear arsenal, expanding its delivery capabilities, and broadening their operational scope. Now that nuclear capabilities have been successively embedded in law, the Constitution, and the Party’s strategic line, relinquishing them would amount to the leadership undermining a central pillar of its own legitimacy. The National Intelligence Service has assessed that Kim’s daughter, Kim Ju-ae, is being positioned as a potential successor, and if such a succession were to occur, her legitimacy would likewise be difficult to separate from the nuclear program. Some analysts argue that North Korea’s nuclear arsenal serves not only as a means of deterring the United States but also as an instrument for preserving strategic autonomy vis-à-vis China and Russia.Maturation of Nuclear Capabilities and Signs of De Facto U.S. Acceptance: On August 19, at the White House, Trump stated that Kim Jong-un possessed 57 “very powerful nuclear weapons.” This was the first time a U.S. president had publicly disclosed the number of North Korean nuclear weapons in such specific terms. The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) estimates that, as of January 2026, North Korea may have assembled approximately 60 nuclear warheads and possesses sufficient fissile material to produce at least 30 additional warheads. Defense Minister Ahn Kyu-baek stated in the National Assembly on August 20 that the number was “generally estimated to be around 80 to 120,” but later clarified that the figure was based on an assessment by a domestic research institute and that it would be difficult to disclose the military’s own estimate.While estimates vary across institutions, North Korea’s declared strategic direction remains consistent. At the Party Congress, it declared that it would continue expanding its nuclear arsenal and that its status as a nuclear-weapon state was irreversible; in his State of the Nation address, Kim vowed to make that status “absolutely unshakable.” Against this backdrop, it is increasingly likely that the negotiations North Korea seeks would focus not on denuclearization but on arms control conducted on the basis of its status as a nuclear-armed state. The U.S. president has publicly acknowledged North Korea’s nuclear arsenal and decided to scale back joint military exercises before Pyongyang offered anything in return. Although the decision was motivated by factors beyond North Korea, Pyongyang could reasonably interpret it as a signal that Washington may take unilateral steps even if North Korea simply waits.A Policy Toward the South That Seeks to Erase South Korea: At the December 2023 plenary meeting of the Workers’ Party, North Korea redefined inter-Korean relations as “hostile relations between two states.” In his January 2024 policy address to the Supreme People’s Assembly, Kim Jong-un called for South Korea to be constitutionally designated as the “number one hostile state” and dismantled inter-Korean organizations such as the Committee for the Peaceful Reunification of the Fatherland. On October 15 of that year, North Korea destroyed sections of the inter-Korean roads connecting the Gyeongui and Donghae lines. Even amid the subsequent reduction in the scale of U.S.-South Korea military exercises, North Korea responded with derision rather than reciprocating the South Korean government’s outreach. In a statement on August 20, Kim Yo-jong dismissed President Lee’s message as “hypocritical words and deeds,” while emphasizing that relations between Trump and Kim Jong-un remained favorable. North Korea’s position is that it will engage with the United States while refusing to deal directly with South Korea. This remains the central obstacle to Seoul’s policy toward Pyongyang.Why Is the United States Taking Such an Active Stance?For Trump, North Korea may also represent a source of political leverage. With the November 3 midterm elections approaching, it may be difficult for the administration to portray the conflict involving Iran as an unambiguous diplomatic achievement. Against this backdrop, some analysts have pointed to the possibility that diplomatic engagement with North Korea could provide a political achievement, particularly following Trump’s August 19 announcement that he would meet with Kim Jong-un before the end of the year. However, U.S. activism does not necessarily guarantee sustained engagement. Washington’s attention and resources remain divided between the Middle East and efforts to manage strategic competition with China, while concerns about the potential neglect of U.S. allies have been raised both in Japan and within Congress. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) framework presents another constraint. The NPT is the principal international treaty designed to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons beyond the five recognized nuclear-weapon states, and North Korea announced its withdrawal from the treaty in 2003. Taking these factors together, U.S. engagement is likely to be active but potentially short-lived. Summit-level diplomacy could therefore take precedence over the prolonged working-level negotiations required to address the details of denuclearization, arms control, and verification.Where Does South Korea Stand?South Korea faces three major constraints in negotiations involving North Korea.First, North Korea does not recognize South Korea as a legitimate negotiating partner. Whether the issue involves climate cooperation or humanitarian assistance, direct proposals from Seoul are unlikely to receive a meaningful response in the near term. Washington therefore remains the practical channel through which South Korea can influence the substance and sequencing of negotiations.Second, South Korea’s influence in Washington is increasingly shaped by a transactional dimension of the alliance. Trump’s decision to cite South Korea’s refusal regarding the Iran issue while simultaneously ordering a reduction in military exercises may have been intended to signal that Seoul’s unwillingness to support U.S. requests outside the Korean Peninsula could carry consequences for issues directly affecting the peninsula. Even where South Korea believes that a refusal is justified, it must assess in advance the potential costs and develop a strategy for managing them.Third, South Korea’s own policy choices shape the negotiating environment. The government publicly welcomed the reduction in military exercises, despite the decision having been made without prior consultation. While this may have been intended to preserve momentum toward dialogue, accepting a unilateral reduction without securing a corresponding commitment from North Korea could establish a precedent in which alliance assets become bargaining instruments without reciprocal concessions. If Seoul seeks to serve as a “pace-maker,” it must first define clearly what it supports and where it is prepared to draw a line.South Korea also possesses meaningful leverage. Investment in the United States, as well as cooperation in shipbuilding and defense, are among the priorities of the Trump administration. Whatever agreement may ultimately be reached, South Korea is among the countries best positioned to help bear the implementation costs—including financial contributions and infrastructure cooperation—and to monitor compliance with any agreement.In the November 2025 U.S.-South Korea joint fact sheet, the United States agreed to support South Korea’s construction of nuclear-powered submarines and to support consultations regarding uranium enrichment and spent nuclear fuel reprocessing for peaceful purposes, consistent with the U.S.-South Korea Nuclear Agreement and applicable U.S. legal requirements. The fact that South Korea can potentially expand or adjust its strategic options depending on the outcome of negotiations is a variable that both Washington and Beijing are likely to take into account. Yet no comprehensive strategy has been developed for integrating these instruments into negotiations over the North Korean nuclear issue.Four ScenariosThese four scenarios are not predictions about what will happen. Rather, they are conditional pathways intended to support strategic preparation. The scenarios are organized around two questions. First, will North Korea and the United States reach a nuclear-related agreement? Second, if they do, will the agreement be limited to ICBMs capable of threatening the U.S. homeland, or will it also address North Korea’s nuclear capabilities directed against South Korea—including the production of fissile material and short-range delivery systems—and establish a pathway for subsequent negotiations?Even if the agreement includes a “suspension of ICBM development,” a deal that ends there would amount to tacit acceptance of North Korea’s broader nuclear program. By contrast, an agreement that includes a freeze on fissile-material production and a timetable for subsequent reduction negotiations would represent an initial step toward phased denuclearization. Even the Lee Jae-myung administration’s “suspension → reduction → dismantlement” framework could be characterized as a “small deal” if only the first stage were implemented. The critical distinction is whether the agreement establishes a credible pathway toward the second stage. If no agreement is reached, or if the outcome is merely a political declaration without substantive nuclear provisions, the result would be a continuation of the status quo. If tensions escalate into military confrontation in the absence of an agreement, the situation would instead move toward a crisis scenario.Nuclear Tolerance Deal Scenario: This scenario envisions the United States effectively accepting the existence of North Korea’s nuclear arsenal while seeking to constrain or eliminate only its ICBM capabilities. ICBMs are generally defined as ground-launched ballistic missiles with ranges exceeding 5,500 kilometers; systems launched from North Korea could therefore threaten the U.S. mainland. Under this scenario, North Korean nuclear capabilities capable of threatening South Korea, Japan, and China would remain largely intact. The scenario can be divided into two pathways depending on the scale of U.S. concessions. If the concessions are limited—such as partial sanctions relief and further reductions in military exercises—it would constitute a “small deal.” If the agreement included more substantial concessions, such as a reduction in U.S. Forces Korea, suspension of major joint exercises, or even a peace treaty, it would amount to a “big deal.” The possibility of pursuing a “big deal” without meaningful South Korean participation is not merely hypothetical. Reports that the reduction of this year’s military exercises was decided without prior consultation with South Korean authorities illustrate the possibility.This scenario, however, is more difficult to implement than it might initially appear. The central challenge is verification. Mobile, solid-fuel ICBMs can be dispersed and concealed, while their launch preparation times are relatively short. Verifying a commitment not to “develop” such systems would therefore require intrusive inspections that North Korea is unlikely to accept. A more realistic outcome might be a moratorium on ICBM launches and nuclear testing rather than a verifiable prohibition on development. Under the NPT framework, Washington would also face significant political and legal difficulties in formally recognizing North Korea as a nuclear-weapon state. The result would therefore amount to de facto, rather than formal, acceptance of North Korea’s nuclear status. Moreover, as the value of sanctions relief declines, Pyongyang is likely to demand greater security concessions in return. The greater those demands become, the more a limited arrangement could evolve into a “big deal.”A Status Quo Scenario Lacking Substantive Progress: This scenario involves either the absence of dialogue or dialogue that fails to resolve the nuclear issue. One possibility is prolonged stalemate. It is unlikely that the current U.S. administration would maintain a maximalist commitment to complete denuclearization indefinitely if Pyongyang refuses to engage. Negotiations could instead stall over verification, sequencing, or the status of U.S. forces in South Korea. Given North Korea’s strengthened relationship with Russia and the economic and military benefits it has derived from the Russia-Ukraine war, Pyongyang has limited incentives to rush into negotiations. Another possibility is a largely symbolic summit. As in the 2018 Singapore summit, the two leaders could issue broad statements on “improved relations” and “peace” without reaching substantive agreement on the nuclear issue. Trump could claim a diplomatic achievement, while Kim Jong-un would gain international visibility and political legitimacy. Meanwhile, North Korea’s nuclear arsenal could continue to expand. Both pathways are already plausible and could become reality.The Scenario of Phased Disarmament and Risk Reduction: This pathway would involve an exchange of measures such as a freeze on fissile-material production, advance notification of missile tests, establishment of a military hotline, and the opening of a liaison office in return for phased economic and diplomatic benefits. Crucially, the agreement would also include a timetable for subsequent negotiations on nuclear reductions. Denuclearization would remain the long-term objective, while immediate risks would be reduced first. This is the outcome most consistent with South Korea’s security interests and would require substantial diplomatic effort from Seoul, but it is also the most difficult scenario to achieve.The difficulty arises not only from verification and the lack of mutual trust but also from the declining value of sanctions relief. The same factor that complicates a nuclear-tolerance arrangement also constrains a phased-disarmament approach. Limited sanctions relief alone provides North Korea with insufficient incentive to make the more consequential concession of freezing fissile-material production. For this scenario to become viable, China and Russia may need to provide forms of compensation that Western sanctions relief cannot replicate. The specific nature of such incentives requires separate consideration.The end of the Russia-Ukraine war is often cited as a potential catalyst for negotiations, but it should not be treated as a guarantee. The North Korea-Russia treaty remains in effect regardless of the outcome of the war. After the conflict ends, Russia may continue to require North Korean military production as it rebuilds its defense industrial base. A reduced wartime burden could even increase Moscow’s capacity to provide certain forms of technology or economic assistance to Pyongyang. The end of the war should therefore be viewed as an opportunity to reassess the negotiating environment rather than as an automatic trigger for renewed diplomacy.Crisis Escalation Scenario: This is a hypothetical sequence in which negotiations collapse, North Korea conducts a seventh nuclear test, Russia transfers additional nuclear-submarine or satellite-related technology, and accidental military clashes occur in the Yellow Sea. If such developments coincided with a crisis involving Taiwan, the Korean Peninsula could become a major theater in a broader confrontation among the great powers. Although the probability of this scenario may be relatively low, its potential consequences would be the most severe.Leading Indicators by ScenarioTo make these scenarios useful for strategic planning, policymakers need indicators that can reveal which trajectory is emerging. The table below summarizes the definition, leading indicators, and implications for South Korea associated with each scenario.In practice, events rarely follow a single scenario in a linear fashion. A process could begin with a symbolic summit and evolve into a tacit nuclear-tolerance arrangement, or negotiations could reach an impasse and subsequently spiral into a crisis. South Korea’s task is therefore to identify shifts in trajectory as early as possible and, at those critical moments, use its available leverage to move the process in a more favorable direction.Major Trends Shaping the ScenariosAll four scenarios will be influenced by broader developments beyond the Korean Peninsula. Three trends are particularly important.Multipolarization and Sanctions Evasion: Political support from major powers and economic channels that circumvent sanctions increasingly reinforce one another. The most direct channels available to North Korea include the Russia-related transactions discussed above, trade with China conducted within or at the margins of the sanctions framework, and cyber-enabled theft. The BRICS payment-network initiative remains at an early stage. On September 11, 2026, the Russian Direct Investment Fund (RDIF) announced that it had reached an understanding with BRICS Pay to explore ways of linking BRICS Pay with India’s payment infrastructure and preparing for a potential pilot project, although no specific timetable was provided. India, which holds the BRICS chair this year, has promoted discussion of linking central bank digital currencies (CBDCs) and high-speed payment systems among member states, while drawing a distinction between payment interoperability and the creation of a common currency. India has also remained cautious about allowing BRICS to be perceived as an explicitly anti-dollar bloc. Sanjay Malhotra, Governor of the Reserve Bank of India, stated on August 11 that various proposals, including the interconnection of CBDCs and high-speed payment systems, remained under discussion. These developments are unlikely to generate immediate benefits for North Korea. Over the longer term, however, the institutionalization of payment mechanisms outside Western financial networks could reduce the effectiveness of sanctions enforcement.This trend changes the relative value of bargaining instruments. As the value of sanctions relief declines, the value of concessions that cannot easily be replicated through alternative economic channels increases. These include normalization of relations with the United States, access to international financial institutions, written security assurances, and mechanisms for coordinating military activities. This dynamic could push nuclear-tolerance arrangements toward broader “big deals” and require a fundamental reassessment of the incentives offered in a phased-disarmament framework.Climate Change: North Korea’s extensive deforestation leaves the country highly vulnerable to flooding and drought. The massive Yalu River flooding that affected the Sinuiju and Uiju areas in late July 2024 demonstrated how climate-related disasters can aggravate food insecurity and increase the regime’s vulnerability. Early-warning systems, forest restoration, and management of shared waterways such as the Imjin River represent among the least politically sensitive areas for potential cooperation. Yet North Korea’s designation of South Korea as an enemy state makes even these issues difficult to address through direct inter-Korean channels. International organizations and multilateral frameworks therefore provide a more realistic avenue. Under a phased-disarmament framework, such cooperation could form part of a broader package of incentives. The proposal to import Russian energy through North Korea cannot be pursued while sanctions on Russia remain in place and South Korea continues to participate in those sanctions; it therefore remains a distant, long-term possibility. Under the crisis-escalation scenario, climate-related disasters could further compound internal instability in North Korea.Demographic Change: South Korea’s total fertility rate in 2025 was 0.80 on a preliminary basis, an increase of 0.05 from the previous year and the second consecutive annual increase. Nevertheless, the decline in the pool of military-age men is largely predetermined by birth cohorts from two decades earlier. According to analyses by the Korea Institute for Defense Analyses (KIDA) and others based on future population projections from Statistics Korea, the population of 20-year-old men declined from approximately 330,000 in 2020 to about 230,000 in 2025 and is projected to fall into the 120,000 range by the early 2040s. First and foremost, maintaining deterrence primarily through troop numbers will become increasingly difficult.At the same time, demographic pressures could make conventional arms control more attractive to South Korea. A state facing a shrinking military has less to lose from mutually agreed limitations on force levels and forward deployments. This creates an incentive to combine phased nuclear risk reduction with conventional confidence-building measures similar to those contained in the September 19, 2018 inter-Korean military agreement. As fiscal pressures increase with population aging, debates over the costs of cooperation with North Korea and the potential costs of future unification will also become more consequential.What Should South Korea Do?If South Korea is to influence this trajectory, it needs both usable leverage and a strategy for connecting that leverage to the terms of negotiations. Seoul cannot determine which scenario will ultimately unfold. It can, however, do two things: establish a robust foundation capable of protecting national security under any scenario, and then use that foundation to steer developments toward a more favorable outcome.Policies Necessary Under Any ScenarioFirst, South Korea needs a deterrence strategy that does not depend primarily on troop numbers and an alliance grounded in enduring shared interests. The military should continue shifting toward advanced technologies, unmanned systems, and highly capable specialized units, while the reserve-force system should be reformed. The principle that U.S. Forces Korea, extended deterrence, and the U.S.-ROK Nuclear Consultative Group (NCG) should not become bargaining chips in U.S.-North Korea negotiations should also be formally documented between the two governments. Extended deterrence refers to the U.S. commitment to defend its allies using the full range of available capabilities, including nuclear capabilities. The NCG, established in July 2023 following the April 2023 Washington Declaration, provides a bilateral mechanism for consultations on nuclear deterrence and related strategic issues. Yet this year’s reduction in a major combined exercise after a single presidential social-media post demonstrated that written understandings alone may not be sufficient. South Korea should therefore broaden the U.S. domestic constituency supporting the alliance, including Congress, the Department of Defense, and industries and states that benefit from shipbuilding and defense cooperation with South Korea. Seoul should also maintain close engagement with Congress to preserve domestic legislative mechanisms—including provisions of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) that place restrictions on reductions in U.S. Forces Korea—that reinforce alliance stability.South Korea should not avoid debate over nuclear armament, but it should assess such options through a rigorous cost-benefit framework. Unlike North Korea, which has external partners capable of mitigating some sanctions pressure, South Korea is deeply integrated into the dollar-based international financial system and would bear substantial costs from any major sanctions regime. There is also a middle ground between nuclear armament and simply maintaining the status quo: continuing the development of nuclear-powered submarines under the pathway opened by the 2025 U.S.-ROK Joint Fact Sheet, while pursuing any future enrichment and spent-fuel-reprocessing activities strictly within the framework of the NPT, the U.S.-ROK Nuclear Agreement, and IAEA safeguards. Such capabilities could provide both strategic options and a potential hedge, but if transparency were compromised, they could be interpreted as contributing to a regional nuclear domino effect. Strict compliance with IAEA safeguards would therefore be indispensable.Second, South Korea needs principles and standards governing alliance contributions that remain consistent across administrations. In an increasingly multipolar environment, Washington, Beijing, and Moscow all pay close attention to Seoul’s decisions. Inconsistent commitments are of limited value as bargaining instruments. The National Assembly should work toward bipartisan agreement on basic principles for North Korea policy and initiate a broader public debate over how South Korea should define its relationship with North Korea. Given the fiscal pressures associated with population aging, South Korea should also establish clear parameters for the maximum resources it is prepared to commit to inter-Korean cooperation. As in the case of Iran, Seoul should establish in advance criteria governing the extent to which it will respond to U.S. requests concerning issues outside the Korean Peninsula. Clear criteria would make even a refusal more predictable and could reduce the likelihood that disagreements over unrelated issues spill over into alliance management on the Korean Peninsula.Third, South Korea should preserve open channels of communication. While maintaining the alliance as its strategic foundation, Seoul should avoid becoming confined to a rigid South Korea-U.S.-Japan versus North Korea-China-Russia framework. Relations with China should be managed in a stable manner, minimum channels of communication with Russia should be preserved, and coordination with Japan should continue given shared security concerns. With respect to North Korea, Seoul should advance low-politics initiatives—such as advance notification of dam releases, disaster early-warning systems, and forest restoration—through international organizations and multilateral mechanisms. Even if an immediate response is unlikely, South Korea should continue making proposals that are low-cost and carry little downside if rejected. During periods of strategic stalemate, such channels may provide one of the few remaining points of contact; during crises, they can help mitigate escalation.Policies That Can Help Shape a Desirable FutureFor South Korea, a desirable outcome would involve phased denuclearization accompanied by risk reduction. Although this pathway is difficult to achieve, Seoul can take steps to improve its prospects. Four approaches are particularly important.First, attach conditions to support. Because North Korea is currently unwilling to engage directly with South Korea, Seoul should first communicate its position to Washington. While continuing to support U.S.-North Korea dialogue, South Korea should provide Washington with a written statement of the minimum conditions for an agreement that Seoul could support. South Korea should not support an arrangement limited to a suspension of ICBM launches. The agreement should also include a freeze on fissile-material production and a timetable for subsequent negotiations on nuclear reductions. U.S. Forces Korea and extended deterrence should remain outside the negotiating agenda. If President Trump seeks a summit-level event, Seoul should work with Washington to ensure that any joint declaration includes at least a military hotline, advance notification of missile tests, and a schedule for follow-on working-level negotiations. These conditions will carry leverage only if they are tied to South Korea’s own contributions. The logic is straightforward: if South Korea will inevitably bear a substantial share of the implementation costs of an agreement, it has a legitimate interest in ensuring that the agreement reflects its core security requirements. Only under those conditions can a symbolic summit or limited “small deal” become the first stage of a credible phased process.Second, design incentives that North Korea cannot readily obtain elsewhere. North Korea cannot be persuaded by benefits that China and Russia can provide relatively easily, such as oil, food, trade, or certain forms of military technology. The incentive structure should therefore focus on benefits that cannot be readily substituted. These could include calibrated adjustments to U.S. unilateral and secondary sanctions that permit third-country companies to engage in lawful trade with North Korea; pathways toward membership in or support from international financial institutions; the establishment of a U.S.-North Korea liaison office and eventual normalization of diplomatic relations; written security assurances; and adjustments to military activities based on the scope and sequencing agreed upon by South Korea and the United States. These incentives should be tied to clearly defined implementation benchmarks so that each concession is matched by a verifiable North Korean step.

Xi Jinping’s Visit to the United States Should Put “Halting North Korea’s Nuclear Program” on the AgendaProfessor. Choi Jae dukSeoul School of Integrated Science and TechnologyChinese President Xi Jinping is scheduled to visit the United States on September 24 for a summit with President Donald Trump. This will be their first meeting in four months, following their summit in Beijing in May. Issues expected to be on the negotiating table include Chinese purchases of U.S. agricultural products and aircraft, tariffs, artificial intelligence (AI) and semiconductors, rare earth elements, and Taiwan. Given President Trump’s stated intention to meet with North Korean leader Kim Jong-un before the end of the year, the North Korean nuclear issue could also feature in their discussions.However, the number of issues on the agenda does not necessarily mean that the summit will produce a major agreement. U.S.-China competition has evolved into a long-term strategic rivalry that extends beyond trade and advanced technology to encompass supply chains, military and security affairs, and global influence. The summit is therefore more likely to focus on reviewing existing agreements and managing outstanding issues that require adjustment than on reaching a grand compromise that would fundamentally alter the course of bilateral relations.Ahead of the November midterm elections, the Trump administration needs short-term achievements it can present to voters, including increased Chinese purchases of U.S. products, the creation of manufacturing jobs, and an improvement in the trade balance. China, meanwhile, is likely to use purchases of U.S. products and the supply of rare earth elements as bargaining chips in seeking tariff reductions and an easing of technology restrictions. While Washington is seeking tangible results in the near term, Beijing is placing relatively greater emphasis on limiting additional pressure and buying time to respond.The United States is likely to demand additional Chinese purchases of agricultural and livestock products, including soybeans, corn, and beef, as well as Boeing aircraft. In May, China agreed to purchase 200 Boeing aircraft and at least $17 billion worth of U.S. agricultural products annually. At the upcoming summit, implementation of these existing commitments and improved access to the Chinese market are likely to be key issues. Although there may be limited room for negotiation on AI, semiconductors, and rare earth elements, the two countries’ fundamental strategic objectives—maintaining U.S. technological leadership and advancing China’s technological self-reliance—are unlikely to change.The Taiwan issue offers less room for negotiation than economic and technological matters. China may seek to persuade the United States to scale back arms sales to Taiwan and limit high-level exchanges, but Washington would find it difficult to alter its existing policy, which is closely linked to Indo-Pacific security and advanced semiconductor supply chains. Ultimately, the outcome of the summit will depend more on the substance of any agreements than on the number of issues discussed. Even if the two countries reach economic agreements, it would be difficult to interpret them as evidence of an overall improvement in U.S.-China relations if their fundamental positions on advanced technology and Taiwan remain unchanged.The same applies to the North Korean nuclear issue. Reaffirming the principle of denuclearization at a summit is fundamentally different from establishing substantive U.S.-China cooperation on North Korea. Washington may seek Beijing’s cooperation in deterring further North Korean provocations and facilitating the resumption of U.S.-North Korea dialogue. Beijing, for its part, is likely to emphasize the need for a political resolution to the Korean Peninsula issue and the importance of dialogue. This reflects China’s strategic dilemma: while concerned about the advancement of North Korea’s nuclear capabilities, Beijing remains wary of instability within the North Korean regime and of an expansion of U.S. military influence on the Korean Peninsula.Furthermore, North Korea has expanded its diplomatic options and sources of external support through growing military and economic cooperation with Russia. As China’s influence over North Korea has become more limited than in the past, even a reaffirmation of the principle of denuclearization by the U.S. and Chinese leaders would not necessarily lead to agreement on the level of pressure to be applied to Pyongyang or on specific measures to address North Korea’s nuclear program.That said, the North Korean nuclear issue should not be treated as a secondary item on the summit agenda. With North Korea’s possession of nuclear weapons now an established reality, efforts to achieve denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula have reached a critical juncture requiring new strategic choices. North Korea has declared its intention to continue expanding its nuclear arsenal and has rejected denuclearization negotiations altogether. While the United States continues to adhere to the principle of complete denuclearization, it has yet to establish a concrete negotiating pathway toward that objective. As international coordination on pressure against North Korea also weakens, existing approaches alone are unlikely to produce a breakthrough.Against this backdrop, Xi Jinping’s visit to the United States could provide an important opportunity to pursue a diplomatic breakthrough on the North Korean nuclear issue.The United States and China, both of which possess significant leverage that could help curb North Korea’s nuclear development, should make the issue a central component of their summit-level dialogue. In particular, they should move beyond merely reaffirming the long-term goal of complete denuclearization and establish “Halting North Korea’s Nuclear Program” as a concrete joint agenda item, prioritizing measures to prevent further expansion of North Korea’s nuclear capabilities.Maintain the Principle of Denuclearization, but First Halt the Expansion of North Korea’s Nuclear CapabilitiesThe starting point for U.S.-China cooperation should be the establishment of an immediate and achievable common objective without abandoning the ultimate goal of denuclearization. A situation in which North Korea’s nuclear capabilities expand to a level that becomes increasingly difficult to manage would impose significant costs on both countries. For the United States, it would intensify direct nuclear and missile threats. For China, it would exacerbate the regional arms race and heighten military tensions in Northeast Asia.Building on these shared interests, the two countries could prioritize efforts to halt the further expansion of North Korea’s nuclear capabilities. One practical approach would be to establish the following as initial negotiating objectives: halting the production of additional nuclear materials, prohibiting the export of nuclear materials abroad, and halting the development of intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) technology. This approach would seek to prevent the existing nuclear threat from growing further without recognizing North Korea’s possession of nuclear weapons as legitimate.“Stopping North Korea’s nuclear program” does not represent a retreat from the principle of denuclearization. Rather, it is a phased approach that seeks to halt the further expansion of North Korea’s nuclear capabilities while preserving the ultimate objective of denuclearization and establishing a pathway toward their subsequent reduction and dismantlement. It is an effort to create realistic conditions for resuming negotiations at a time when North Korea rejects denuclearization talks altogether.The United States could take the lead in defining the agenda for renewed dialogue with North Korea, while China could play a role in encouraging Pyongyang to engage in negotiations. If both countries use their respective influence to halt the expansion of North Korea’s nuclear capabilities, they could take an initial step toward substantially reducing the nuclear threat and moving beyond the prolonged stalemate over the principle of denuclearization.This approach is also consistent with the phased and pragmatic approach to the North Korean nuclear issue proposed by the South Korean government. In its Fifth Basic Plan for the Development of Inter-Korean Relations (2026–2030), South Korea’s Ministry of Unification identified “substantial progress on the North Korean nuclear issue through a phased and pragmatic approach” as a key policy priority. The objective is to create conditions conducive to inter-Korean and U.S.-North Korea dialogue while pursuing meaningful progress toward resolving the nuclear issue.In practical terms, this approach consists of three phases: “Stopping, Reduction, and Dismantlement” of North Korea’s nuclear program. The process would begin by halting North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs, proceed to reducing its nuclear capabilities, and ultimately lead to their dismantlement. It is a realistic strategy that prioritizes halting the further expansion of North Korea’s nuclear capabilities while maintaining the ultimate objective of denuclearization.For South Korea’s plan to be effective, it must be supported by cooperation between the United States and China. Seoul should actively encourage Washington and Beijing to make halting North Korea’s nuclear program a joint agenda item. It should emphasize to the United States that, while the principle of complete denuclearization must be maintained, realistic interim objectives are necessary to facilitate negotiations. At the same time, South Korea should persuade China that halting the expansion of North Korea’s nuclear capabilities is consistent with maintaining stability on the Korean Peninsula and safeguarding regional security.We Must Be Wary of North Korea’s Strategy to Consolidate Its Status as a Nuclear-Weapon StateOf course, there is no guarantee that North Korea will accept a proposal to halt its nuclear program. In the results of the Workers’ Party Plenary Meeting released on June 23, Kim Jong-un emphasized the continued expansion and strengthening of North Korea’s nuclear forces and the consolidation and exercise of its status as a nuclear-weapon state. He identified U.S.-South Korea military exercises and reconnaissance activities as factors contributing to the worsening situation on the Korean Peninsula, while defining nuclear forces as the foundation of military sovereignty and war deterrence.This indicates that North Korea is treating its status as a nuclear-armed state not as a subject for negotiation, but as a precondition for negotiations. Rather than accepting South Korea’s “Stop, Reduction, and Denuclearization” framework, Pyongyang is likely to seek to redefine the negotiating framework itself around nuclear disarmament or arms control.This is also why China’s role is becoming increasingly important. The fact that the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula was not publicly emphasized during Xi Jinping’s visit to Pyongyang in June suggests a shift in China’s approach. While Beijing remains concerned about the advancement of North Korea’s nuclear capabilities, it appears to be managing the Korean Peninsula issue within a broader strategic context that includes the restoration of North Korea-China relations, U.S.-China strategic competition, growing North Korea-Russia cooperation, and expanding security cooperation among South Korea, the United States, and Japan.It is unrealistic to expect cooperation to emerge solely from increased Chinese pressure on North Korea. Any viable approach must take into account China’s concerns about instability in the North Korean regime and the escalation of military tensions on the Korean Peninsula. U.S.-China cooperation should not be aimed at bringing about the collapse of the North Korean regime. Rather, it should focus on halting the further expansion of North Korea’s nuclear capabilities and reducing military risks on the Korean Peninsula.“Stopping North Korea’s nuclear program” could provide a realistic basis for Chinese participation. An approach that seeks to reduce the nuclear threat through dialogue and negotiations, without recognizing North Korea as a nuclear-weapon state, could align the U.S. objective of preventing further nuclear proliferation with China’s interest in maintaining stability on the Korean Peninsula.South Korea must pay close attention not only to whether the North Korean nuclear issue is included on the U.S.-China summit agenda, but also to the substance and scope of the discussions. The talks may be limited to reaffirming the principles of denuclearization and regional stability. However, they could also address China’s potential role in facilitating the resumption of U.S.-North Korea dialogue. If the discussions lead to follow-up negotiations on North Korea’s nuclear program, the South Korean government should consult closely with the United States to ensure that South Korea’s interests, policy objectives, and role are adequately reflected.Even if the North Korean nuclear issue is discussed during Xi Jinping’s visit to the United States, Washington and Beijing are unlikely to reach an immediate agreement on a common policy toward North Korea. The United States will continue to call for complete denuclearization, while China is likely to emphasize a political resolution and stability on the Korean Peninsula. North Korea, for its part, is likely to maintain its claim to nuclear-weapon-state status and continue expanding its nuclear capabilities.These differences, however, do not diminish the need for U.S.-China cooperation. On the contrary, as international coordination on the North Korean nuclear issue weakens and North Korea’s nuclear capabilities continue to advance, identifying realistic areas for cooperation between the two countries has become increasingly important.If the United States and China establish stopping North Korea’s nuclear program as a joint agenda item at the summit and lay the groundwork for substantive cooperation, this could provide new momentum for the denuclearization process on the Korean Peninsula. South Korea should actively facilitate U.S.-China cooperation while working to define the scope of the proposed halt, verification mechanisms, and phased reciprocal measures. These arrangements must ensure that South Korea’s security interests are not sidelined in the negotiating process.Ultimately, the priority should not be to repeat a declaratory standoff over whether North Korea’s possession of nuclear weapons should be recognized. Instead, the focus should be on establishing substantive measures to halt the further expansion of North Korea’s nuclear capabilities and creating a negotiating framework that links these measures to verification, reduction, and eventual dismantlement.Stopping North Korea’s nuclear program is not a departure from denuclearization. Rather, it is a necessary step toward achieving that objective under current conditions. Xi’s visit to the United States should serve as a starting point for substantive U.S.-China cooperation on the North Korean nuclear issue, moving beyond a mere reaffirmation of principles.

Why We Must Proactively Restore the September 19 Military AgreementYong-geun ChoFormer Director of North Korea PolicyMinistry of National DefenseThe Demilitarized Zone (DMZ), a critical buffer zone underpinning security on the Korean Peninsula, is once again experiencing heightened tensions. At the Ninth Plenary Meeting of the Eighth Central Committee of the Workers’ Party of Korea, held in late December 2023, Kim Jong-un defined inter-Korean relations as “relations between two hostile states, not between fellow Koreans.” He explicitly designated South Korea as the “number one hostile country” and the “unchanging principal enemy,” calling for the abandonment of the existing concepts of peaceful reunification and “fellow Koreans” and directing that this policy shift be reflected in the Constitution.Subsequently, at the Ninth Party Congress in February 2026, Kim emphasized the need to “fortify the southern border adjacent to South Korea as soon as possible and reinforce the border defense and firepower systems.” North Korea’s amended Constitution has since incorporated territorial provisions consistent with this policy. In fact, since 2024, the North Korean military has been constructing a new “border line” along the Military Demarcation Line (MDL) within the DMZ. South Korea’s Joint Chiefs of Staff estimates that the construction will be completed within two to three years.The central concern with North Korea’s designation of the MDL as a border is that, once its military border patrols become fully operational, the risk of armed clashes between the two Koreas could become structural and recurring. This is largely because the two militaries have different understandings of the MDL’s precise location within the DMZ.When the 1953 Armistice Agreement was signed, the two sides agreed to mark and manage the MDL using 1,292 boundary markers. However, following the inter-Korean armed clashes of the 1970s, these markers were neglected, damaged, or lost, and only approximately 180 remain today. Even those that remain have been displaced by natural disasters and other factors, making it difficult to determine the MDL’s precise location. In some cases, the reference lines used by the North and South Korean militaries differ by tens of meters. The possibility that such relatively minor discrepancies could escalate into armed clashes has therefore become a persistent concern.In particular, once North Korea completes its border construction, the two-kilometer-wide northern half of the DMZ—the buffer zone established under the Armistice Agreement—will effectively cease to function. Regardless of the legal validity of North Korea’s actions under international law, this would mean that the DMZ, which has served as the Korean Peninsula’s minimum security safeguard for more than 70 years, would lose much of its practical effectiveness.This situation did not emerge overnight. As the Yoon Suk-yeol administration adopted a more confrontational approach toward North Korea, the two Koreas ultimately suspended and effectively dismantled the September 19 Military Agreement. Since then, guard posts (GPs) that had been withdrawn from the DMZ have been reestablished, and North Korea has erected a barrier near the MDL. Both militaries have resumed artillery fire in areas surrounding the Northern Limit Line (NLL) in the West Sea, while North Korea has demolished the inter-Korean connecting roads along the Donghae and Gyeongui lines.Drone incursions into each other’s airspace over the respective capitals, South Korea’s distribution of leaflets targeting North Korea, and North Korea’s release of balloons carrying waste have further compounded tensions. Military tensions along the border have consequently risen to exceptionally high levels.Against this backdrop, North Korea’s current efforts to fortify the MDL can be understood as an attempt to undermine the existing armistice system. The breakdown of the September 19 Military Agreement was a critical turning point in the deterioration of the security environment.Preventing the Normalization of Structural Military ConflictIn addressing the current crisis on the Korean Peninsula, our foremost concern should be the “normalization of structural military conflict.” If South Korea’s military consistently adopts a hard-line response and treats North Korea’s construction of a border line solely as a military provocation, there is a significant risk that an unintended or accidental armed clash could escalate into a full-scale local conflict. This risk is particularly acute as North Korea intensifies its hostility toward the South under its “two hostile states” doctrine. Any military confrontation between the two Koreas could therefore escalate to a level unprecedented in previous inter-Korean crises.The South Korean government must consequently develop a precise and comprehensive response strategy. Its most urgent responsibility is to fill the void left by the erosion of the existing armistice system—not with the prospect of armed conflict, but with an institutionalized framework for peace.This ultimately requires the proactive restoration of the September 19 Military Agreement. South Korean President Lee Jae-myung has already expressed his commitment to restoring the agreement in phases, both in his August 15, 2025, commemorative address and at a press conference earlier this year. Accordingly, the government should pursue a two-track approach to proactively restoring the agreement: flexibly applying the South Korean military’s warning-fire criteria to routine North Korean border patrol activities in order to reduce the risk of accidental clashes, while responding firmly and proportionately to deliberate provocations.What the September 19 Military Agreement DemonstratedThe September 19 Military Agreement, signed in 2018, represents a significant example of arms control on the Korean Peninsula and was the first agreement of its kind to be implemented by the South and North Korean militaries. In practical terms, it was also the only agreement between the two military authorities that remained operational until its suspension and subsequent breakdown.The agreement did not emerge in isolation. It carried forward the principles of ending hostilities and pursuing a peaceful resolution established in the 1953 Armistice Agreement. It also represented the culmination of decades of inter-Korean engagement and arms-control efforts under successive South Korean administrations—from the Inter-Korean Basic Agreement and the Non-Aggression Supplementary Agreement under the Roh Tae-woo and Kim Young-sam administrations, to the June 15 Joint Declaration and the October 4 Declaration under the Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun administrations, as well as arms-control initiatives pursued under the Lee Myung-bak and Park Geun-hye administrations.The agreement’s achievements were substantial. On land, it established a 10-kilometer-wide buffer zone extending five kilometers on either side of the MDL, bringing an end to artillery fire and field exercises involving units at the regimental level or above. In the maritime areas surrounding the NLL in the West and East Seas, it established buffer zones that halted naval and coastal artillery firing. It also designated no-fly zones for specified types of aircraft over the MDL, effectively prohibiting flights that had not been notified in advance.In particular, at the Joint Security Area (JSA) in Panmunjom, South Korea, North Korea, and the United Nations Command (UNC) conducted a joint on-site verification—the first of its kind since the signing of the Armistice Agreement—and completed the demilitarization of the area. This helped create the conditions for a summit among the leaders of South Korea, North Korea, and the United States to take place at Panmunjom just over 30 hours after President Donald Trump unexpectedly proposed a meeting with Kim Jong-un in June 2019.The pilot withdrawal of 22 GPs in areas where the risk of mutual confrontation was particularly high was recognized by the United Nations as a notable example of conventional arms control. The joint inter-Korean recovery of remains at Arrowhead Hill and White Horse Hill also represented a symbolic effort to address the enduring human and historical costs of the Korean War. The fact that only a very limited number of violations were confirmed following the agreement’s implementation demonstrates its effectiveness as a mechanism for reducing military tensions. In particular, the agreement established verification procedures for monitoring implementation, creating a historical precedent in which South and North Korean military personnel crossed the MDL into each other’s territory to directly inspect military facilities.A Core Element of the Korean Peninsula’s Peace Regime and a Framework That Must EvolveThe significance of the September 19 Military Agreement extends beyond its immediate contribution to reducing military tensions. It also provides a starting point for establishing the core elements of a peace regime on the Korean Peninsula. If the concept of a peace regime seems abstract, it becomes more tangible when considered in terms of the provisions that a future peace treaty would need to contain. Such a treaty should establish a vision for future political relations between North and South Korea, rules and norms governing economic and social exchanges, a framework for achieving the complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, and, above all, a military order designed to ensure that war never occurs again.An examination of these elements reveals that considerable groundwork has already been laid between the two Koreas. The 1991 Inter-Korean Basic Agreement encompasses fundamental principles governing political and economic relations, while detailed norms and practices for economic and social exchanges have been developed over the years. The vision for denuclearization is also clearly articulated in the 1992 Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.Military affairs, however, remain insufficiently developed. Although the Inter-Korean Basic Agreement and subsequent declarations established important principles, their provisions were too general to effectively regulate actual military activities. Moreover, the Inter-Korean Joint Military Committee envisaged in the Basic Agreement never advanced to substantive discussions of specific military issues. Subsequent initiatives, including the October 4 Declaration, likewise failed to produce the intended results.Against this backdrop, the September 19 Military Agreement is particularly significant because, building on the Armistice Agreement and the Inter-Korean Basic Agreement, it established substantive and operational arms-control provisions for the first time. These provisions included concrete confidence-building measures such as the joint recovery of war remains, the withdrawal of GPs, the demilitarization of the JSA, and the removal of loudspeakers.It is important to recognize, however, that the agreement was not intended to constitute a final settlement. Rather, it established a framework designed to evolve over time, with the Inter-Korean Joint Military Committee serving as the institutional mechanism for advancing that process. The committee’s establishment would not resolve every outstanding issue immediately. It would, however, provide an opportunity for the military authorities of both Koreas to place their respective concerns on the table and begin substantive dialogue through frank and open exchanges.Assessments of the September 19 Military Agreement remain divided between those who evaluate it in terms of its overall benefits and those who focus on the distribution of relative gains. Both perspectives have merit. Although the distribution of relative gains is undoubtedly important in international politics, an excessive focus on scrutinizing every aspect of how the benefits of a negotiated agreement are distributed can provoke the other party and undermine the very outcome the negotiations were intended to achieve.What is clear is that the agreement reduced military tensions in border areas and helped create conditions that enabled the two Koreas and the United States to focus on negotiations toward a peace regime on the Korean Peninsula. The September 19 Military Agreement was not the culmination of inter-Korean arms control, but its first substantive step. We must now pursue the longer and more difficult process of building on the framework it established.This approach is consistent with the vision President Lee Jae-myung outlined in his August 15 commemorative address this year. Referring to “stable peaceful coexistence without the need for conflict,” President Lee expressed his commitment to establishing mechanisms for managing tensions and conflicts, developing multiple safeguards to prevent crises from escalating, and taking proactive and sustained measures to reduce military tensions in border areas. He also outlined a path toward transforming the unstable armistice regime into a peace regime and called on both Koreas to set aside their intentions to threaten one another and begin direct dialogue.For this policy direction to produce tangible results, the September 19 Military Agreement must ultimately be restored and further developed. Beginning with this agreement, South and North Korea share the responsibility of steadily building the institutional foundations for lasting peace on the Korean Peninsula.Conclusion: The Starting Point of a Bold JourneyWith the breakdown of the September 19 Military Agreement, military tensions in border areas have once again reached exceptionally high levels, creating conditions in which an accidental armed clash could occur at any time. Paradoxically, this situation underscores how effectively the agreement had served as a safeguard against military confrontation and how it opened a new chapter in arms control on the Korean Peninsula. It also highlights the agreement’s role in creating conditions conducive to denuclearization and establishing a core element of a future peace regime.North Korea’s efforts to turn the MDL into a border line and thereby undermine the practical effectiveness of the armistice system further demonstrate the need to establish a new peace regime. Rather than simply returning to the status quo ante, we should use the restoration of the September 19 Military Agreement as a springboard for a bold and sustained effort to conclude a peace treaty on the Korean Peninsula, advance phased denuclearization, and establish an enduring arms-control regime.In particular, amid rapidly evolving international dynamics, including the U.S.-China summit, the parallel use of more ambitious and substantive diplomatic incentives will be essential to bringing North Korea back to the negotiating table for a U.S.-North Korea summit.Throughout this process, the role of the military authorities on both sides will become increasingly important, alongside decisions by their respective leaders and negotiations conducted through diplomatic channels. Above all, public support and trust, together with the backing of the international community, will be essential for enabling the South Korean military to restore and further develop the September 19 Military Agreement.The establishment of lasting peace between the two Koreas ultimately depends on whether military tensions in border areas can be reduced. The resumption of the Korean Peninsula peace process, including renewed inter-Korean and U.S.-North Korea engagement, must begin here. What is needed now is not another new vision, but the political will and courage of South Korea and the international community to restore agreements whose practical value has already been demonstrated.

The Upcoming UN General Assembly:Pursuing Stability on the Korean PeninsulaAmid Multilateral Non-Proliferation Sanctions on North Korea Eunsook ChungEmeritus Senior Fellow, The Sejong InstituteThis September, the 81st session of the UN General Assembly will convene at UN Headquarters in New York. Founded in 1945 with 51 member states, the United Nations has grown over the past 81 years into a global organization comprising 193 member states. The General Assembly serves as a diplomatic forum in which all member states participate on the principles of universality and equality to deliberate on vital international issues. It also serves as a decision-making body that adopts resolutions on the basis of one state, one vote. Although General Assembly resolutions adopted by a two-thirds majority or by consensus are not, in principle, legally binding on member states, they carry significant political, diplomatic, and moral authority as expressions of the collective will of the international community.This stands in contrast to resolutions of the UN Security Council, which is composed of five permanent members with veto power and ten non-permanent members and bears primary responsibility for maintaining international peace and security. Under the UN Charter, Security Council resolutions adopted under its Chapter VII authority are legally binding on all UN member states.At the beginning of each session in September, the General Assembly traditionally devotes approximately six days in late September to the “General Debate,” during which world leaders present their countries’ positions on major global challenges, typically in speeches of around 15 minutes. The General Debate provides an opportunity for all member states to articulate their views regardless of their region, size, wealth, or level of development. This year’s General Debate is scheduled to begin on September 22.President Trump’s Critique of Multilateralism and the Need for UN ReformAt last year’s General Debate, held to mark the UN’s 80th anniversary, U.S. President Donald Trump drew considerable attention by openly expressing skepticism about UN multilateralism and arguing that the organization has handled issues such as immigration, climate change, and conflict management poorly. Indeed, the United States—which has historically been the largest contributor to the UN budget since the organization’s inception—has been reluctant to make timely contributions for 2025–2026 and has decided to withdraw from or defund roughly 30 UN-affiliated bodies. The White House stated in January 2026 that these measures were prompted by concerns over activities contrary to U.S. interests, a lack of capacity to implement policies effectively, and institutional inefficiency.This approach contrasted with that of other major world leaders, who acknowledged the UN’s achievements over the past 80 years, despite periods of turbulence, and called for more effective multilateralism amid growing uncertainties in the international order. Under pressure from the Trump administration, UN Secretary-General António Guterres launched the UN 80 Initiative in March 2025, focusing on institutional restructuring and maximizing the Organization’s impact with limited financial resources.Against this backdrop, the theme of this year’s 81st General Assembly General Debate is “Restoring Trust, Managing Transformation: A United Nations that delivers for all.” For 2026, the General Assembly approved a regular budget of $3.45 billion, representing a sharp reduction from previous years, including a 15 percent cut in financial resources and an approximately 19 percent reduction in staffing levels.Twenty Years of the UN North Korea Sanctions Regime: Progress and Current StatusNorth Korea is the only country to have announced its withdrawal from the NPT and the only country to have conducted nuclear tests in the 21st century. It has repeatedly issued nuclear and missile threats, both rhetorically and through actions, against South Korea, Japan, and the United States. Following North Korea’s first nuclear test in 2006, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1718 (2006), establishing the first UN sanctions regime against North Korea under Chapter VII of the UN Charter (“Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression”). All 193 UN Member States are obligated to implement the measures stipulated in the resolution. This was made possible by the ability of the five permanent members of the Security Council to reach a consensus that North Korea’s nuclear and missile activities constituted a threat to international peace and security.The objective of the sanctions regime is to compel North Korea to abandon its nuclear weapons program and return to compliance with the NPT and its IAEA safeguards obligations. To this end, the Security Council introduced measures restricting military trade and luxury goods, as well as targeted sanctions—including asset freezes and travel bans—against individuals and entities involved in proliferation-related activities.After 2006, North Korea conducted five additional nuclear tests and numerous launches of long-range ballistic missiles, prompting the Security Council to adopt a total of 10 sanctions resolutions on North Korea over an 11-year period through 2017. As the scope and depth of the sanctions expanded with each successive resolution, the North Korea sanctions regime became one of the most comprehensive and stringent sanctions regimes administered by the Security Council.During this 11-year period, none of the five permanent members exercised its veto. All 10 resolutions were adopted unanimously, providing the foundation for the sanctions regime that remains in place today. Despite the compromises and concessions required along the way, the five permanent members, each possessing veto power, were able to come together around a shared commitment to nuclear non-proliferation.Member States are required to submit Implementation Reports to the Sanctions Committee (the Committee Established Pursuant to Resolution 1718) within specified timeframes, as required by each relevant resolution. They are also expected to submit Non-compliance Reports when they identify cases of North Korean non-compliance with or violations of UN sanctions. Since 2009, a Panel of Experts, initially composed of seven and later eight experts specializing in areas such as nuclear issues, missiles, law, and finance, has supported the Sanctions Committee in fulfilling its mandate by providing guidance, gathering information, conducting analysis, and making recommendations to strengthen the effectiveness of the sanctions regime.Nevertheless, rather than abandoning its nuclear weapons program, North Korea has continued to expand its nuclear and missile capabilities while routinely evading or violating sanctions, as repeatedly documented in the Panel of Experts’ reports. In other words, the sanctions regime has not fully achieved its intended objectives. However, a close examination of the Panel’s reports suggests that the costs of non-compliance imposed on the North Korean leadership have increased over time, making it difficult to conclude that sanctions have had no practical impact.At the same time, military cooperation between North Korea and Russia since 2022 has involved numerous activities that violate or circumvent UN sanctions against North Korea, posing a major challenge to the international community and raising difficult questions about how it should respond. Furthermore, the dissolution of the Panel of Experts in April 2024 following Russia’s veto dealt a serious blow not only to the effectiveness and credibility of the sanctions regime but also to confidence in the UN’s ability to monitor and enforce its own sanctions measures as the organization enters its 81st year.According to its final report, issued in March 2024 shortly before the Panel’s mandate expired, the Panel was investigating evidence concerning North Korea’s arms transfers to Russia in connection with the war in Ukraine.“North Korea Fatigue”During last year’s UN General Assembly General Debate, substantive remarks concerning North Korea’s nuclear program came primarily from the leaders of South Korea and Japan, underscoring the fact that these two countries are directly exposed to the North Korean threat. Then-Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba stated that North Korea’s nuclear and missile development posed a grave threat to international peace and security and called for the full implementation of the Security Council’s sanctions resolutions aimed at the “complete denuclearization” of North Korea.President Lee Jae-myung introduced the idea that the denuclearization process should begin by halting the further development of North Korea’s nuclear and missile capabilities, followed by their reduction and, ultimately, their dismantlement, recognizing that “denuclearization is difficult to achieve in the short term.”On the final day of the General Debate, Kim Son-gyong, Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs of North Korea, stated that demands for denuclearization were tantamount to demanding the surrender of North Korea’s sovereignty and its right to survival.Against the backdrop of recent messages from President Trump signaling a possible resumption of dialogue with Kim Jong-un, attention is now focused on what messages will be delivered from the General Debate stage at this year’s UN General Assembly.At least during last year’s General Debate, among the leaders of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council—the United States, China, Russia, the United Kingdom, and France—the North Korean nuclear issue was overshadowed by other issues regarded as more urgent. In recent years, a range of pressing global challenges has taken center stage, including the war in Ukraine, instability in the Middle East, conflicts in Africa, climate change, the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), AI governance, and reform of the UN Security Council.Furthermore, intensified “great-power strategic competition” in recent years has made consensus within the Security Council increasingly difficult to achieve. The internal dynamics of the Council now reflect a widening strategic divide between the P2 (China and Russia) and the P3 (the United States, the United Kingdom, and France), compared with the situation in 2006, when the North Korea sanctions regime was established, or in 2017, when the most recent sanctions resolution was adopted. This shift was symbolically demonstrated in September 2025, when Kim Jong-un attended China’s Victory Day commemorations and appeared alongside Chinese President Xi Jinping and Russian President Vladimir Putin.Future ROK Policies on International Non-Proliferation Sanctions against North Korea■ South Korea now faces two fundamental challenges in addressing the North Korean nuclear issue. First, the UN Security Council is deeply divided, and the veto power of its permanent members has increasingly paralyzed the Council’s ability to act. Despite evidence that military cooperation between Russia and North Korea involves activities that violate Security Council sanctions resolutions, the issue has not been meaningfully addressed within the Council.Second, North Korea’s nuclear capabilities continue to expand. According to the Arms Control Association, North Korea was estimated to have assembled approximately 50 nuclear warheads as of January 2024.■ Considering the challenges outlined above, several suggestions can be made regarding the international sanctions regime and efforts to maintain peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula.First, following the dissolution of the UN Panel of Experts in April 2024, the Multilateral Sanctions Monitoring Team (MSMT) was established outside the UN framework to assume some of the monitoring functions previously performed by the Panel. Eleven like-minded countries have joined the MSMT: Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, New Zealand, South Korea, the United Kingdom, and the United States. South Korea should actively participate in the MSMT, working alongside its member states to encourage all 193 UN member states to faithfully implement the Security Council’s sanctions measures.At the same time, given the current deadlock within the Security Council, South Korea could work with MSMT member states to disseminate the findings of the MSMT’s reports to UN member states and seek the adoption of a UN General Assembly resolution. Although such a resolution would not be legally binding, it could serve as a significant political, moral, and normative statement reaffirming the international community’s commitment to implementing the existing sanctions regime.Second, while continuing to signal that the door to dialogue remains open, South Korea should maintain the principle of participating in international efforts to uphold sanctions against North Korea through the UN and other relevant institutions unless and until Pyongyang resolves the issues underlying the sanctions regime.Third, denuclearization presupposes highly detailed agreements specifying what is to be dismantled, when and how the process is to be carried out, and how compliance is to be verified. Hastily accepting North Korea’s stated intention to denuclearize—or, worse, offering guarantees of such an outcome to third countries—could lead to another diplomatic impasse.Fourth, South Korea must maintain a constant crisis-management posture to prevent and respond to accidental military clashes or localized armed conflict. Given that North Korea has become a de facto nuclear-armed state and has repeatedly issued threats against South Korea, a more robust deterrence posture must incorporate the nuclear dimension of the ROK–U.S. alliance. In this regard, South Korea should ensure that it receives credible extended deterrence commitments from the United States, including the U.S. nuclear umbrella. Because this approach is broadly consistent with Japan’s deterrence posture, South Korea should maintain close communication with Japan and draw on its experience and preparations in this area.Fifth, regarding China and Russia, South Korea and Japan could argue that they need to maintain nuclear latency if North Korean denuclearization cannot be achieved through the UN sanctions regime. Furthermore, they should be capable of gathering information on violations and instances of non-compliance arising from China’s and Russia’s dealings with North Korea, and of demanding explanations and corrective measures through both bilateral channels and multilateral platforms such as the UN General Assembly and the 2027 NPT Review Conference.Sixth, regarding North Korea’s human rights issues, the 80th UN General Assembly adopted a resolution on the issue last year, marking 21 consecutive years of unanimous international solidarity in calling for improvements in the human rights situation in North Korea. The South Korean government participated as a co-sponsor alongside multiple member states, a role it should continue to undertake and actively pursue in future international forums. The resolution’s condemnatory provisions include criticism that North Korea allocates excessive resources to military buildup, including nuclear and missile development, rather than to public welfare.

South Korea’s Digital Regulation and the U.S.–South Korea Digital Alliance: Facts and Lessons from the Coupang IncidentSeong-yeob LeeProfessor, Graduate School of Technology Management Korea UniversityPresident, Korean Association of Information and Communications Law1. Background—The Shift in Digital Regulation Toward Trade and Security IssuesAs global platforms provide services simultaneously across multiple countries, digital regulations adopted by one country can directly affect foreign companies’ market access and cross-border data flows. As a result, national regulations governing personal information, platform competition, cross-border data transfers, cloud computing, and artificial intelligence (AI) are no longer merely matters of domestic law; they are increasingly becoming issues of trade and national security.In particular, the United States, home to many of the world’s leading global platform companies, increasingly views discriminatory digital-service regulations and data-localization requirements as emerging forms of non-tariff barriers to trade. For example, the U.S. Trade Representative’s (USTR) 2026 National Trade Estimate (NTE) identifies several South Korean digital regulations—including network access fees, restrictions on the cross-border transfer of location data and personal information, public-sector cloud security certification, and online platform regulation—as significant trade-related concerns.These developments also present new challenges for the U.S.–South Korea relationship. Although the U.S.–South Korea alliance was initially established as a military alliance under the 1953 Mutual Defense Treaty, its economic dimension expanded significantly following the entry into force of the 2012 U.S.–South Korea Free Trade Agreement (FTA). More recently, the alliance has evolved into a broader digital and technology partnership encompassing advanced technologies—including semiconductors, batteries, AI, quantum computing, 6G, cybersecurity, and space—as well as resilient supply chains. Accordingly, if the two countries continue to emphasize their strategic partnership in security and advanced technology while repeatedly encountering regulatory disputes in the digital marketplace, questions could arise regarding the long-term sustainability of the alliance.2. Current Status and Characteristics of South Korea’s Digital RegulationsSouth Korea’s digital regulatory framework can broadly be divided into several categories, including personal information and data governance, platform competition, network access fees, location information, and cloud services. First, the Personal Information Protection Act establishes certain requirements governing the cross-border transfer of personal information and authorizes the Personal Information Protection Commission to order the suspension of such transfers under specified circumstances. While the system is intended to protect individuals’ rights over their personal information, the United States has raised concerns that it could impose substantial compliance costs on companies operating global data-center networks. The 2026 NTE likewise notes that restrictions on cross-border transfers of personal information could create barriers to cross-border services that depend on international data storage and processing.Second is the regulation of online platforms. In South Korea, various legislative proposals and enforcement measures under the Fair Trade Act have been discussed to address practices by dominant platforms, including self-preferencing, tying and bundling, restrictions on multi-homing, and most-favored-nation (MFN) provisions. The stated purpose of these measures is to prevent dominant platforms from abusing their market power and to protect merchants and consumers. In the United States, however, concerns have been raised that applying quantitative criteria, such as revenue and user numbers, could bring a disproportionately large number of U.S.-based global platforms within the scope of these regulations.Third, network access fees, location-data regulations, and cloud-service requirements have also emerged as areas of contention. The United States is concerned that South Korea’s approach to network access fees could increase costs for U.S. content providers while providing a competitive advantage to domestic telecommunications and content companies. The United States has also argued that South Korea’s requirement for authorization to export high-precision maps and location-based data could place companies providing global mapping and cloud services at a competitive disadvantage. In addition, the public-sector Cloud Security Assurance Program (CSAP) has drawn criticism on the grounds that requirements such as domestic data storage and the use of locally based operational personnel could create barriers to entry for foreign cloud-service providers.Ultimately, U.S. concerns regarding South Korea’s digital regulatory framework can broadly be grouped into three areas. The first concerns the substance of the regulations themselves, particularly whether they are consistent with international standards and trade commitments. The United States has traditionally relied primarily on ex post enforcement mechanisms, including antitrust litigation and judicial proceedings, to address concerns related to dominant technology companies. By contrast, some of the platform regulations pursued by South Korea adopt a more ex ante regulatory model similar to the European Union’s (EU) Digital Markets Act (DMA), raising concerns in the United States regarding their compatibility with international trade norms.A related concern is whether such regulations could have a disproportionate impact on U.S. companies. The issue is not simply whether Korean and foreign companies are formally subject to the same rules. Rather, if regulatory thresholds are structured around particular business models or company size in ways that place a heavier burden on U.S. platforms, the resulting impact could constitute de facto discrimination. In other words, even if the statutory language does not distinguish between domestic and foreign companies, high quantitative thresholds based on factors such as revenue or user numbers could, in practice, place a disproportionate burden on major U.S. technology companies such as Google, Apple, and Meta. Concerns have also been raised about the proportionality of regulatory measures to their objectives, as well as the fairness, transparency, and predictability of regulatory enforcement.3. Recent Coupang Regulations and Bilateral TensionsThe Coupang incident illustrates how digital regulation, trade policy, and bilateral relations can intersect. Although Coupang conducts the vast majority of its business in South Korea, its parent company, Coupang, Inc., is a U.S. corporation incorporated in Delaware and listed on the New York Stock Exchange. This creates a distinctive legal and regulatory structure: in South Korea, Coupang is subject to Korean law as a major distribution and platform operator, while in the United States, regulatory actions against the company may be viewed through the lens of the interests of U.S. companies and investors.In August 2024, the Korea Fair Trade Commission (KFTC) determined that Coupang had engaged in unfair customer solicitation practices by manipulating search rankings for products sold directly by the company and its private-label (PB) products, while also mobilizing employees to post reviews of PB products. The KFTC subsequently imposed a fine of approximately KRW 162.8 billion and referred the case to prosecutors for criminal prosecution. Separately, in connection with a personal-data breach that occurred in late 2025, the Personal Information Protection Commission confirmed the exposure of personal information belonging to approximately 37.55 million individuals and the unlawful collection of online activity records involving approximately 11.17 million individuals. The commission imposed total penalties of KRW 624.681 billion, reportedly the largest such sanction in South Korean history.The issue subsequently escalated into a broader trade dispute when U.S. investors argued that measures taken by the South Korean government amounted to “discriminatory” regulation. In January 2026, Greenoaks and Altimeter, investors in Coupang, filed a petition with the U.S. Trade Representative requesting an investigation under Section 301 of the U.S. Trade Act. The petition argued that the investigations and sanctions imposed on Coupang by multiple South Korean government agencies went beyond legitimate regulatory enforcement and constituted discriminatory treatment of a U.S. company. The investors subsequently withdrew the petition on March 9, 2026.The withdrawal of the petition, however, did not resolve the underlying policy dispute. In July 2026, the U.S. House Judiciary Committee sharply criticized South Korea’s treatment of U.S.-owned companies in a report titled “Closed for Competition: South Korea’s Discriminatory Attacks on American-owned Businesses.” The report characterized simultaneous investigations by more than 10 South Korean government agencies in the aftermath of Coupang’s data breach as a “whole-of-government assault.” It further argued that South Korea’s regulatory practices could undermine the competitiveness of innovative U.S. companies and favor domestic firms rather than promote a level playing field. The report also raised concerns about South Korean regulatory procedures, including administrative investigations conducted without warrants and limitations on attorney-client privilege.From the U.S. perspective, Coupang is a U.S. company under U.S. corporate law because Coupang, Inc. is incorporated in Delaware. Accordingly, some U.S. policymakers have characterized the broad range of sanctions imposed by South Korean authorities not simply as domestic regulatory enforcement, but as raising concerns under international trade norms, particularly with respect to potential structural discrimination against U.S. companies and investors and questions of due process. At the core of the dispute, therefore, is not whether South Korea has the authority to regulate companies operating in its market, but whether the objectives of regulation are legitimate, whether enforcement procedures and intensity are objective and proportionate, and whether the same standards are applied consistently to similarly situated domestic and foreign companies.4. The Evolution from the U.S.-Korea Security Alliance to a Digital AllianceThe U.S.–South Korea alliance has evolved through four broad stages: a military and security alliance, an economic alliance, an advanced technology and economic security partnership, and, increasingly, a digital alliance. A major turning point came with the entry into force of the U.S.–South Korea FTA in 2012. The agreement established an institutional foundation for economic cooperation covering goods, services, investment, and intellectual property rights. Following the 2022 summit meeting, the scope of cooperation expanded into what can be described as an “economic and technology alliance,” encompassing semiconductor and battery supply chains as well as critical and emerging technologies such as AI, quantum computing, biotechnology, 5G, and 6G. In 2023, this cooperation was further expanded to include trusted cross-border data flows, standards and norms for digital technologies, and strategic cooperation on cybersecurity.In 2025, the institutional foundations of the Digital Alliance were further developed. In October, the two countries signed the “U.S.–ROK Technology Prosperity Deal,” establishing a framework for cooperation in strategic science and technology sectors. Subsequently, in a joint fact sheet issued by the U.S. and South Korean leaders in November 2025, the two sides agreed not to discriminate against U.S. companies or impose unnecessary barriers in laws and policies governing digital services; to consult on digital issues, including network access fees and online platform regulation; and to facilitate cross-border data transfers involving location data, reinsurance, and personal information. They also agreed to strengthen procedural fairness in the enforcement of competition laws. These commitments indicate that the U.S.–South Korea Digital Alliance has moved beyond cooperation on AI and semiconductor development toward greater coordination on regulatory principles and rules governing digital markets.5. Future Challenges—Harmonizing Regulatory Sovereignty and the Digital AllianceFirst, South Korea should establish non-discriminatory regulatory principles consistent with international standards. This does not necessarily require abolishing or weakening existing regulations. Rather, the proposed regulatory framework should undergo rigorous ex ante review to ensure that its design is consistent with international trade rules and commitments. In particular, given the growing international debate over the legitimacy and effectiveness of the EU-style ex ante regulatory model, South Korea should exercise caution before adopting such a framework without fully assessing its potential implications.Second, South Korea should substantially strengthen the non-discriminatory character, transparency, and procedural legitimacy of regulatory enforcement. Whether a company is domestic or foreign, the same criteria for determining violations, investigative procedures, and standards for calculating penalties should apply and should be clearly disclosed. The more consequential the sanctions—including exceptionally large fines or business suspensions that could threaten a company’s continued operations—the more robust the procedural safeguards should be. These safeguards should include proportionality, appropriate judicial or legal oversight, and meaningful access to legal counsel. This is not simply a matter of accommodating foreign demands; it is essential for strengthening the credibility, predictability, and legitimacy of South Korea’s domestic regulatory system.Third, South Korea should institutionalize “trade impact assessments” when developing digital regulations. Even when a regulation is justified on grounds such as consumer protection or the promotion of fair competition, it can have significant effects on market access for global companies and on cross-border data flows. Accordingly, institutional mechanisms should be established to conduct comprehensive assessments at the legislative and regulatory drafting stages. Such assessments should examine whether proposed measures could result in de facto discrimination against foreign companies, whether they are consistent with international standards, and whether they could create conflicts with international trade obligations, including those under the U.S.–South Korea FTA.Finally, the most important lesson from the Coupang incident is that alliances in the digital era cannot be sustained through security cooperation alone. If South Korea and the United States are to become strategic partners in AI, semiconductors, cloud computing, data, and cybersecurity, they must build mutual confidence that companies from each country can operate in the other’s market under predictable, transparent, and fair regulatory conditions.This, however, should not be interpreted as a call for regulatory exemptions for U.S. companies. South Korea must retain its regulatory authority to protect personal information, consumers, and competitive markets while ensuring that its regulations are legitimate, non-discriminatory, proportionate, transparent, and procedurally fair. The United States, for its part, should not automatically characterize legitimate South Korean public-interest regulations as trade barriers and should recognize that South Korea has a distinct sociocultural context and a legal framework that differs in important respects from that of the United States.South Korea does not formally discriminate against companies on the basis of nationality or country of incorporation and applies the same laws and regulatory principles to foreign companies, including U.S. firms. South Korea’s relevant policies and regulations are not directed at particular countries or companies. Rather, they are intended to promote fair competition in the domestic market, protect consumers, and ensure the consistent application of laws and regulations. These policies also provide U.S. firms with the opportunity to compete in the Korean market on an equal footing with their Korean counterparts.Ultimately, the foundation of the U.S.–South Korea Digital Alliance is not simply deregulation, but the development of shared digital norms and mutual trust. As the U.S.–South Korea alliance evolves from its origins in military security through economic, technological, and cybersecurity cooperation toward a broader partnership grounded in digital rules and norms, the two countries have an opportunity to emerge as among the most reliable strategic partners in an increasingly competitive technological and digital trade environment shaped by the AI era.

Why the IAEA General Conference Should Launch an International Debate on “Halting” North Korea’s Nuclear ProgramBong-geun JeonVisiting Research Fellow, Sejong Institute President, Korean Society for Nuclear Policy Studies“How can we resolve the issues on the Korean Peninsula? They can never be fully resolved. We can only manage them.” This is the central question posed by Tim Marshall in Prisoners of Geography (2016). Throughout the post-Cold War era, we have sought to “solve” the problems of the Korean Peninsula. Yet, because of the entrenched geopolitics of Northeast Asia and the division of the Korean Peninsula, we have remained fixated on a “complete solution”—a goal that cannot realistically be achieved in the short term—and, in doing so, have missed opportunities even to “manage” the situation.The Lee Jae-myung administration’s proposal to prioritize “halting” North Korea’s nuclear program represents a pragmatic diplomatic strategy that acknowledges the uncomfortable reality of North Korea’s nuclear arsenal and seeks, above all, to prevent the situation from deteriorating further. With the possibility of resuming U.S.–North Korea summit diplomacy now being discussed, debate over the potential risks and limitations of such summits is intensifying. While a U.S.–North Korea summit in itself would not constitute a solution, it is almost certain that the North Korean nuclear issue and South Korea’s security environment will continue to deteriorate if the current trajectory persists in the absence of dialogue. At this juncture, a U.S.–North Korea summit may offer the most realistic opportunity to halt the expansion of North Korea’s nuclear arsenal and improve the security environment on the Korean Peninsula.Why the “Status Quo” on North Korea’s Nuclear Program Is DangerousRecently, when President Trump expressed his intention to hold a summit with Chairman Kim Jong-un before the end of the year, concerns and criticism outweighed expectations in both South Korea and the United States. Critics have argued that “bypassing Seoul” could weaken the ROK–U.S. alliance; that negotiations could shift from denuclearization to nuclear arms control; that a “small deal” could effectively amount to recognizing North Korea as a nuclear-armed state; and that, if a “big deal” cannot be achieved, it would be preferable to have “no deal” rather than accept a bad agreement. Ultimately, the argument is that if a “big deal” involving the “Complete, Verifiable, and Irreversible Dismantlement (CVID)” of North Korea’s nuclear program is unattainable, maintaining the status quo would be preferable to accepting a “small deal” or an unfavorable agreement.There is no disagreement that CVID remains the preferred end state for addressing the North Korean nuclear issue. However, despite the extensive use of incentives, sanctions, and pressure throughout the post-Cold War era, the South Korean and U.S. governments have been unable to achieve CVID. Following its sixth nuclear test and ICBM test launch in 2017, North Korea declared the “completion of its national nuclear forces,“ effectively establishing itself as a nuclear-armed state.Under these circumstances, we can no longer afford to allow the “status quo” of North Korea’s nuclear program to persist. As time passes, North Korea’s nuclear capabilities continue to expand, while the political, economic, and security costs of denuclearization continue to rise. As the saying goes, “The cost of denuclearization is always lower today than it will be tomorrow.”This is the conclusion I have reached after observing the North Korean nuclear issue over an extended period. Through the U.S.–North Korea Geneva Agreed Framework and the Six-Party Talks, we missed opportunities when North Korea’s nuclear program might still have been stopped with a mere hoe. Today, the North Korean nuclear issue is difficult to stop even with a shovel. Even if a U.S.–North Korea summit is held, it remains uncertain whether a new opportunity for denuclearization will emerge. However, if this opportunity is missed, the North Korean nuclear crisis will only worsen, and the cost of denuclearization will continue to rise, making the problem increasingly difficult to address—even with tools far larger than a shovel.The “uncomfortable truth” we must confront is that North Korea has already acquired nuclear weapons and that complete denuclearization is virtually unattainable in the foreseeable future. In a survey conducted by Seoul National University’s Institute for Unification and Peace in October 2025, 89.7 percent of respondents said that “North Korea will not abandon its nuclear weapons.” This finding also reflects growing public recognition of the changed reality surrounding North Korea’s nuclear program. “North Korean denuclearization” is no longer viewed as the immediate objective of our North Korea policy, but is increasingly regarded as a long-term goal, much like “unification.” Ultimately, we have entered an era of “coexisting with North Korea’s nuclear weapons”—a situation we have long sought to avoid.The problem lies in the risks associated with “coexisting with North Korea’s nuclear weapons.” This is because the “status quo” of North Korea’s nuclear program is not a static condition; it does not mean that North Korea will freeze its nuclear capabilities at their current level.President Trump has stated that North Korea possesses “57 very powerful nuclear weapons.” President Lee Jae-myung also warned at a press conference in January 2026 that “North Korea’s nuclear armament is an undeniable reality” and that North Korea is producing enough nuclear material annually for approximately 10 to 20 nuclear warheads. If this trend continues, North Korea’s nuclear arsenal could be significantly larger a decade from now than it is today.If North Korea’s nuclear buildup continues over the long term, international opposition to recognizing North Korea as a nuclear-weapon state under the NPT could gradually weaken. Over the next 10 to 20 years, North Korea could increasingly come to be treated as a “de facto nuclear-weapon state,” much as India and Pakistan are today. Such an outcome would further weaken the international nuclear nonproliferation regime centered on the NPT and increase the risk that North Korea could transfer nuclear weapons, technologies, or materials abroad. In South Korea and Japan, calls for developing indigenous nuclear capabilities or redeploying U.S. tactical nuclear weapons could also become increasingly prominent. At the same time, amid an intensifying inter-Korean arms race and persistent military confrontation, the risk of escalation, miscalculation, or even inadvertent nuclear use would increase.Given North Korea’s continued opposition to denuclearization, CVID is virtually unattainable under current conditions, and we should not accept the “status quo.” The most realistic course of action is therefore to pursue a phased denuclearization strategy that initially prioritizes achieving a “halt” to North Korea’s nuclear program.From CVID to a Phased Denuclearization Strategy Prioritizing a “Halt” to North Korea’s Nuclear ProgramThere are two broad approaches to the North Korean nuclear issue: the “clear-cut” solution and the “uncomfortable” solution. The former seeks to resolve the North Korean nuclear issue comprehensively through maximum sanctions and pressure, a “big deal” aimed at CVID, rejection of “small deals,” and, potentially, military options. If successful, this approach could resolve both the North Korean nuclear issue and the broader security challenges on the Korean Peninsula in a single decisive step. In practice, however, its feasibility is extremely limited, while the risk of military conflict is high. Under this approach, CVID and the principle of “denuclearization first, followed by the establishment of a peace regime” have often amounted to little more than aspirational slogans because the necessary means and mechanisms to achieve these objectives have been lacking. As this approach has been pursued, confrontation with North Korea has continued, while Pyongyang has used the resulting time and strategic space to further advance its nuclear capabilities.By contrast, the “uncomfortable” solution begins with the recognition that existing denuclearization strategies have failed and that some form of coexistence with North Korea’s nuclear capabilities is likely to be unavoidable for the foreseeable future. While retaining complete denuclearization as the long-term objective, this approach places immediate emphasis on urgent security priorities, including “halting” North Korea’s nuclear program to prevent further expansion, reducing the likelihood of military conflict, and mitigating nuclear risks. In other words, this approach does not abandon CVID; rather, it temporarily prioritizes preventing further expansion of North Korea’s nuclear capabilities and reducing the possibility of nuclear use.This approach acknowledges South Korea’s limitations and places significant reliance on the United States. However, this does not make it a conciliatory policy toward North Korea. Rather, it maintains that economic sanctions should remain in place as long as North Korea continues to advance its nuclear program, while South Korea must strengthen its own defense capabilities and the ROK–U.S. alliance in response to the North Korean nuclear threat.The Lee Jae-myung administration has adopted this “uncomfortable” solution as part of its pragmatic diplomatic approach. The “E.N.D. (Exchange, Normalization of Relations, Denuclearization) Initiative,” announced in September 2025, also reflects this pragmatic orientation. The initiative calls for its three pillars to be pursued flexibly, beginning with what is feasible rather than assigning priority to any single pillar.Furthermore, the Lee administration has proposed a “three-step” approach to North Korea’s denuclearization: suspension–reduction–abandonment. This represents a realistic effort to focus first on “suspending” North Korea’s nuclear program—thereby preventing further expansion of its nuclear capabilities—rather than repeatedly invoking the goal of “complete denuclearization,” which has thus far produced limited results.Here, “suspension” of North Korea’s nuclear program includes halting the production of weapons-usable nuclear material, suspending the weaponization of nuclear capabilities, and refraining from nuclear tests and ICBM test launches.Above all, the Lee Jae-myung administration seeks to create a breakthrough in the denuclearization process through a U.S.–North Korea summit. To this end, at the South Korea–U.S. summit in August 2025, President Lee asked President Trump to serve as a “peacemaker” on the Korean Peninsula and offered to play the role of a “pace-maker” in support of that effort. This represented a departure from the Moon Jae-in administration’s concept of South Korea as the primary “driver” of inter-Korean diplomacy, giving the United States greater latitude in shaping its approach to North Korea.The Possibility and Expectations for a U.S.-North Korea SummitTo create a new opportunity to advance North Korea’s denuclearization, a U.S.–North Korea summit is needed to break the current diplomatic deadlock. Nevertheless, many experts believe that despite President Trump’s interest in holding such a summit, the initiative is likely to fail because Kim Jong-un may choose not to respond. There are several legitimate reasons for this pessimistic assessment. Kim clearly remembers the so-called “Hanoi humiliation” of February 2019 and is unlikely to want to repeat that experience. Moreover, unlike in the past, North Korea has substantially expanded its nuclear arsenal and deepened its security and economic cooperation with Russia and China. As a result, Pyongyang has less immediate incentive to engage in dialogue with the United States or seek sanctions relief.At the same time, recent developments in South Korea–U.S. relations suggest that the possibility of a U.S.–North Korea summit remains open. President Trump has repeatedly stated in recent years that he maintains a good personal relationship with Kim Jong-un. Notably, while President Trump has emphasized that he helped prevent a nuclear war on the Korean Peninsula, he has recently placed less emphasis on the objective of North Korean denuclearization. In mid-August, President Trump announced on social media a significant reduction in ongoing U.S.–South Korea joint military exercises, describing the exercises as “totally inappropriate and hostile.” This appeared to be an effort to create conditions conducive to dialogue, taking into account North Korea’s longstanding demand for an end to what it characterizes as U.S. “hostile policy” as a precondition for talks. Subsequently, on August 19, 2026, President Trump publicly announced that he would meet with Kim before the end of the year.Kim has also not categorically ruled out the possibility of a U.S.–North Korea summit. In September 2025, he stated that there would be no reason not to meet with the United States unless Washington made denuclearization a precondition for talks. More recently, while Kim Yo-jong has sharply criticized the South Korean and U.S. governments, she has been notably restrained in her comments about President Trump, emphasizing that her brother retains positive memories of and favorable feelings toward him.From Kim Jong-un’s perspective, there is little reason to categorically reject dialogue with the United States unless such dialogue is explicitly framed as negotiations over denuclearization. In particular, a meeting with the leader of the United States—the world’s most powerful country and a key pillar of the ROK–U.S. alliance—could offer significant strategic and diplomatic benefits, both in terms of North Korea’s approach to South Korea and Kim’s efforts to enhance his international standing. Kim Jong-un attracted considerable international attention when he appeared alongside President Xi Jinping and President Vladimir Putin at the Victory Day celebrations in Beijing in 2025. It is therefore difficult to rule out the possibility that he could travel to China for the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Summit in Shenzhen this November, where he could meet with Trump bilaterally or participate in a trilateral meeting with Xi Jinping.If Xi were to invite Kim Jong-un to the APEC Summit and facilitate high-level meetings—including a U.S.–North Korea summit or a U.S.–North Korea–China trilateral summit—it would provide Beijing with an opportunity to demonstrate China’s diplomatic influence and Xi’s ability to shape the regional security environment. In particular, President Trump could ask Xi to help facilitate a U.S.–North Korea summit during his visit to the United States in late September. Trump had sought to meet with Kim Jong-un during his visit to Gyeongju in October 2025 and again during his visit to Beijing in May 2026, but neither effort materialized because Kim Jong-un declined to meet with him.Trump is expected to make a concerted effort to hold a U.S.–North Korea summit before the end of this year, potentially using the Shenzhen APEC Summit as an opportunity.While Trump is unlikely to formally recognize North Korea as a nuclear-armed state, he may also refrain from making denuclearization an explicit public precondition for talks. Even such a shift would represent a significant and welcome development from North Korea’s perspective compared with previous U.S. positions. Pyongyang could nevertheless attempt to portray such a development as amounting to de facto U.S. recognition of its nuclear status. Taking these factors into account, the possibility of a U.S.–North Korea summit in November may be greater than at any point since 2019.The evolving positions of the South Korean and U.S. governments have therefore expanded the space for North Korea to consider renewed dialogue. Although Pyongyang claims that its economy has recently improved, North Korea remains subject to extensive international sanctions and largely excluded from the global economic system, with significant economic cooperation concentrated primarily among a limited number of friendly states. Its international standing also remains far removed from that of a normal, internationally recognized state. North Korea may therefore find it difficult to simply dismiss the possibility of a U.S.–North Korea summit, particularly if such a meeting could provide an avenue for addressing sanctions relief, expanding economic exchanges, normalizing bilateral relations, and improving North Korea’s international standing.If South Korea and the United States were to present in advance a political, diplomatic, and economic package commensurate with North Korea’s participation in a summit and its concrete measures to “halt its nuclear program,” Kim Jong-un’s strategic calculations could change. Ultimately, the key to making a U.S.–North Korea summit possible is to convince North Korea that “engaging in dialogue is more advantageous than refusing to do so.” Given the potential importance of such a summit as a catalyst for restarting the denuclearization and peace process on the Korean Peninsula, which has remained stalled for years, the South Korean and U.S. governments should adopt a more proactive approach to creating the conditions necessary for such a summit to take place.

The Korean Peninsula at a Crossroads for Peace: Halting North Korea’s Nuclear Program as a Path to PeaceSeong-won Kim Chairman of the board of the Tongil Korea CoopThe Korean Peninsula once again stands at a crossroads for peace. Whether it takes a new path toward peace or moves toward prolonged confrontation will depend in large part on whether a U.S.–North Korea summit takes place and, if so, what it yields. Some argue that a summit should not be held without meaningful progress toward North Korea’s denuclearization, while others welcome such a meeting, maintaining that direct engagement between the leaders could itself send an important signal in support of peace on the Korean Peninsula.Until 2019, when the last U.S.–North Korea summit took place, the central agenda focused on the denuclearization of North Korea and, more broadly, the Korean Peninsula. Key issues included the lifting of sanctions against North Korea and the normalization of U.S.–North Korea relations, both of which were premised on progress toward denuclearization. However, the strategic landscape has changed considerably over the past seven years, during which there have been no summits between the United States and North Korea and no meaningful high-level engagement between the two Koreas. North Korea has strengthened its ties with China and Russia, while its relations with South Korea and the United States have deteriorated. Despite international sanctions, North Korea has continued to advance its nuclear capabilities while pursuing economic development. It has also institutionalized a “hostile two-state” doctrine—the notion that maintaining ties with South Korea is no longer necessary and may, in fact, be dangerous—and has increasingly embraced the view that it can pursue development without relying on the United States.Furthermore, North Korea is closely observing—through the historical example of Libya and the current situation in Iran—how states without nuclear weapons can become vulnerable and face severe pressure during negotiations. Under these circumstances, denuclearization can no longer realistically serve as the immediate basis for U.S.–North Korea talks. North Korea is unlikely to accept dialogue that is explicitly premised on, or intended to achieve, denuclearization. Does this mean that North Korea will never again engage with South Korea or the United States? Not necessarily. From Kim Jong-un’s perspective, as he seeks to consolidate North Korea as a more normalized state, the most advantageous course may be to secure support from the United States while maintaining China and Russia as strategic backstops and preserving stable relations with South Korea. If so, what approach is required?Understanding “Nuclear Moratorium” and “Peace RegimeIn his speech commemorating the 81st anniversary of Liberation Day on August 15, President Lee Jae-myung outlined his approach to North Korea policy, stating, “I intend to present a blueprint for moving beyond principles to action,” and adding, “We will embark on a journey to end the war and transform the unstable armistice regime on the Korean Peninsula into a peace regime.” President Lee went on to say, “Let us set aside our mutual threats and begin discussions among the parties involved to end this long-standing war,” adding, “Through this, we can also discuss effective measures to halt the advancement of North Korea’s nuclear capabilities.”The discussions among the parties aimed at transforming the armistice regime into a peace regime refer to four-party talks involving South Korea, North Korea, the United States, and China—the principal parties to the Korean War Armistice Agreement. If a peace treaty were eventually concluded, the framework could naturally be expanded into six-party talks involving Japan and Russia to address broader security and peace issues in Northeast Asia. This approach would entail moving from bilateral U.S.–North Korea talks to four-party talks and ultimately to six-party talks.What is particularly noteworthy is that President Lee referred to halting the advancement of North Korea’s nuclear capabilities rather than using the term “denuclearization.” This formulation could provide a more practical basis for engaging North Korea, which has consistently rejected talks premised on denuclearization. Equally important, President Lee framed the North Korean nuclear issue as part of the broader peace-regime agenda on the Korean Peninsula, a point that should not be overlooked.This reflects the view that North Korea’s nuclear development is, to a significant extent, a product of a longstanding security environment characterized by mutual distrust, hostility, and confrontation. In other words, if the Korean Peninsula were to move toward a durable reduction in confrontation, the strategic rationale that Pyongyang invokes to justify developing and maintaining nuclear weapons could gradually weaken. Ultimately, this is what genuine peace on the Korean Peninsula and in Northeast Asia should mean.Of course, realizing such an outcome would require the current phase of confrontation to give way to sustained dialogue and reconciliation—not only on the Korean Peninsula and in Northeast Asia, but also within the broader international system. International organizations such as the United Nations must also be able to play a meaningful role as impartial mediators and facilitators of dialogue.A few hours after Lee’s commemorative address, President Trump posted a photograph from his 2019 meeting with Kim Jong-un at Panmunjom on social media, writing, “Kim Jong-un and I get along well.” The following day, on August 16, Trump stated on social media that he had instructed Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth to significantly scale back the upcoming U.S.–South Korea joint military exercises. Trump stated, “Given the very good relationship between Kim Jong-un and me, I am not pleased that the U.S. agreed long ago to participate in joint military exercises with South Korea,” adding that he had ordered a significant reduction because it was too late to cancel them. In fact, the Ulchi Freedom Shield (UFS) exercise, which had been scheduled to take place from August 17 to 27, was terminated early on August 21—just five days after it began.Trump went further on August 19, when he told reporters at the White House that “North Korea possesses 57 nuclear weapons,” drawing significant attention. Although Trump had previously referred to North Korea as a “nuclear power” and stated that “Kim Jong-un has many nuclear weapons,” this was the first time he had publicly cited a specific number. As a result, both concern and expectations emerged that U.S. policy toward North Korea could be undergoing a fundamental shift.Trump’s repeated expressions of goodwill toward Kim and the scaling back of U.S.–South Korea joint military exercises closely align with North Korea’s longstanding demands that the United States end what Pyongyang describes as its hostile policy toward North Korea and halt joint military exercises. By publicly citing a specific estimate of North Korea’s nuclear arsenal, Trump may also have created the perception in Pyongyang that Washington could be moving toward acknowledging North Korea as a nuclear-armed state. For Kim, the prospect of another summit with Trump may therefore increasingly appear to be an opportunity in which the potential gains outweigh the risks.Scenarios for a U.S.-North Korea SummitGiven the current circumstances, the following scenarios for a U.S.–North Korea summit can be anticipated.The first scenario is that North Korea remains silent, sets various conditions, and ultimately declines to participate in the summit. The U.S.–North Korea summit held in Hanoi on February 28, 2019, ended without an agreement after the United States walked away from the negotiations, leaving Kim Jong-un, who had invested considerable political capital in the meeting, with deepened mistrust toward Washington and a significant setback to his leadership. Kim subsequently resolved to pursue a “new path” centered on greater self-reliance, reduced dependence on the United States, and closer relations with China and Russia. Now that North Korea has further advanced its nuclear weapons program and achieved a certain degree of economic development, Pyongyang may conclude that it no longer needs to rely on an “untrustworthy” United States. The leaders of North Korea and the United States could continue to cultivate a cordial atmosphere, suggesting that a meeting might take place at any time, only for the summit ultimately not to materialize. In such a case, not only would the nuclear issue remain off the negotiating table, but opportunities for broader discussions on peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula could also be lost.The second scenario involves holding a summit in October—before the U.S. midterm elections—taking into account Trump’s political considerations. To make such a meeting possible, Trump would likely have to offer Kim a substantial package of concessions.This could involve the easing or lifting of sanctions against North Korea and the establishment of a liaison office, conditioned not on the dismantlement of North Korea’s nuclear program but on a verifiable freeze of its nuclear activities. For Trump, such an arrangement could provide a diplomatic achievement ahead of the midterm elections, while Kim could effectively gain greater international recognition of North Korea’s nuclear status and secure the implementation of previously negotiated commitments, potentially creating a mutually beneficial outcome. Furthermore, if Trump were to visit Pyongyang or Wonsan-Kalma, North Korea would once again attract substantial international attention, while Trump could gain significant diplomatic and political capital from a highly visible diplomatic initiative.The third scenario, as reported by various media outlets, is that the two leaders meet again around the time of the APEC summit in November, either in Shenzhen, China—the host city—or at Panmunjom in South Korea. In this case, the U.S.–North Korea summit would be highly likely to remain a one-time event. This is because the U.S. midterm elections would have concluded, leaving Washington with less immediate political incentive to prepare a substantial package of concessions. The same would apply if the leaders were to meet after November, following prolonged negotiations over the terms of engagement. Such a meeting could amount to little more than a symbolic encounter. While Kim would have relatively little to lose by attending, from Trump’s perspective, the strategic and political rationale for another meeting could be considerably weaker. The nuclear issue might either not be addressed at all or be confined to broad and largely theoretical discussions.Of course, these three scenarios are merely analytical projections. There remains a possibility that Trump and Kim—both leaders known for their willingness to take unconventional risks—could make a surprise move that defies conventional expectations. This was demonstrated by their June 30, 2019, meeting at the Joint Security Area at Panmunjom, during which Trump made a historic crossing into North Korean territory at Kim’s invitation. The two leaders may once again seek to create a dramatic moment capable of capturing global attention. While all possibilities must remain open, I believe the time has come to make a concerted effort to make another meeting between the two leaders possible.From a Nuclear Freeze to Normalization, a Peace Regime, and Ultimately DenuclearizationThe key question is where the two leaders will begin their dialogue when they meet. While there are reports that preparations for informal working-level discussions have already begun, reaching agreement on the agenda will by no means be easy. This is because the “denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula” has been a consistent element of previous U.S.–North Korea summit agreements. Of course, at the core of the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula lies the denuclearization of North Korea.Typically, summit meetings culminate in a joint statement or communiqué that builds upon, reaffirms, and further develops previous agreements. The preamble to the June 12, 2018, U.S.–North Korea Singapore Summit Joint Statement states: “Chairman Kim Jong-un reaffirmed his firm and unwavering commitment to complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.” Furthermore, Article 1 of the joint statement commits the two sides to establishing new U.S.–DPRK relations, while Article 2 calls for joint efforts to build a lasting and stable peace regime on the Korean Peninsula.In the Agreed Framework between North Korea and the United States—the first major agreement between the two countries, signed in Geneva on October 21, 1994—the goal of achieving peace and security on a “nuclear-free Korean peninsula” also featured prominently. To this end, the agreement provided for the replacement of North Korea’s graphite-moderated reactors and related facilities with light-water reactor power plants, supported by international cooperation to facilitate the process.The Six-Party Talks, which began on August 27, 2003, and were held in six rounds through September 2007, also centered on the North Korean nuclear issue. The February 13, 2007, agreement provided for energy, economic, and humanitarian assistance in exchange for North Korea’s implementation of measures to shut down and disable its nuclear facilities and the return of IAEA personnel to conduct monitoring and verification. North Korea subsequently took visible steps, including the demolition of the cooling tower at Yongbyon in June 2008. However, the Six-Party Talks did not resume after 2008, as the parties failed to reach agreement on key verification measures, including the scope of inspections and procedures for obtaining samples.The more complex an issue is, the simpler it becomes once its underlying logic is understood. The fundamental question is this: Why does North Korea continue to devote substantial resources to developing its nuclear capabilities? North Korea has consistently justified its nuclear program by pointing to what it describes as the United States’ longstanding hostile policy toward Pyongyang. In other words, if the United States were to fundamentally move away from a hostile policy toward North Korea, the strategic rationale that Pyongyang invokes to justify its nuclear development could begin to erode.The October 1994 Agreed Framework between the United States and North Korea included the goal of “full normalization of political and economic relations,” while the June 2018 U.S.–North Korea Singapore Summit Joint Statement identified “establishing new U.S.–DPRK relations” (normalization of relations) and “building a lasting and stable peace regime on the Korean Peninsula” as key objectives. The normalization of relations and the establishment of a peace regime on the Korean Peninsula have repeatedly featured in negotiations over the nuclear issue. This demonstrates how closely intertwined the nuclear issue and the question of a peace regime are. At the heart of the complex nuclear issue lies the hostile relationship between the two countries. Transforming that relationship—through normalization and the establishment of a peace regime—is therefore central to creating the conditions necessary for resolving the nuclear issue.Normalizing relations is more complex and time-consuming than one might assume. It is likely to involve a cycle of agreements, implementation, setbacks, and renewed negotiations. Moreover, North Korea and the United States fought a war roughly seven decades ago and have remained locked in confrontation ever since. Consequently, the process of normalization is bound to be long and arduous. The starting point for this process can only be a temporary freeze of North Korea’s nuclear program. Over the course of this extended process, the lifting of sanctions against North Korea, the establishment of diplomatic relations, and the creation of a peace regime would need to proceed in parallel, while the ultimate endpoint would be the creation of a security environment in which nuclear weapons are no longer considered necessary—that is, denuclearization.Now is the time for Trump and Kim Jong-un. From our perspective—as those who seek peace rather than continued confrontation on the Korean Peninsula—we sincerely hope that the two leaders will meet and that their meeting will take place under the full attention of the international community. We hope that the geopolitical fault lines of Northeast Asia, hardened by decades of confrontation, will begin to shift decisively toward peace. If that happens, the Korean Peninsula could become an epicenter of peace with global implications. May such a historic moment finally come to pass.

Proposals for Multilateral Discussions on Ending the War on the Korean Peninsula and Establishing a Peace RegimeJu-yeon Lee Northeast Asian History FoundationAt the ceremony commemorating the 81st anniversary of Liberation Day, President Lee Jae-myung stated, “We will embark on a journey to end the war and transform the unstable armistice regime on the Korean Peninsula into a peace regime,” thereby calling for multilateral discussions aimed at formally ending the war and establishing a peace regime on the Korean Peninsula. President Lee also explained that such multilateral discussions could lead to effective measures to halt North Korea’s nuclear development. In other words, he signaled that a multilateral framework could ultimately contribute to achieving both peace and denuclearization on the Korean Peninsula.Regarding Lee’s proposal for multilateral discussions, experts have offered both positive and negative assessments. From a positive perspective, such discussions could help break the prolonged deadlock in inter-Korean dialogue and provide a starting point for renewed engagement. Furthermore, the participation of relevant countries could help manage potential crises on the Korean Peninsula and in Northeast Asia. In particular, given that recent international conflicts have tended to erupt and escalate rapidly, sometimes as a result of miscalculation or unintended developments, multilateral discussions are viewed favorably for their potential to reduce the risk of military conflict.On the other hand, a critical perspective expresses skepticism about the prospects for multilateral talks. This skepticism stems largely from the failure of the Six-Party Talks in the past to produce substantive results, with the negotiations yielding largely declaratory outcomes. Furthermore, there is concern that security instability on the Korean Peninsula could actually worsen if such talks were to face strong opposition from the United States, which has traditionally been South Korea’s principal security partner.However, despite the debate between proponents and critics, the Lee Jae-myung administration’s proposal for multilateral talks can be viewed as having more potential benefits than drawbacks. This is because, among the various approaches to bringing North Korea back to the negotiating table to address issues of peace and denuclearization on the Korean Peninsula, a multilateral dialogue framework currently appears to be one of the most promising options.Of course, judging from Unification Minister Jeong Dong-young’s assertion that four-party talks involving South Korea, North Korea, the United States, and China should follow the U.S. decision to scale back South Korea-U.S. joint military exercises, and that efforts to promote such talks are necessary, it appears that these four countries would be the principal participants in the proposed multilateral discussions.So, is establishing a consultative mechanism in the form of four-party talks the right approach to advancing peace on the Korean Peninsula? Compared with the Six-Party Talks (South Korea, North Korea, the United States, China, Russia, and Japan) held in the past, the principal advantage of the four-party talks (South Korea, North Korea, the United States, and China) is that, with fewer stakeholders involved, the parties would be able to focus on and address the core agenda items more effectively. For instance, organizing a six-party talks would require complex coordination of the schedules of representatives from all six countries, as well as the selection and preparation of a suitable venue, potentially resulting in substantial administrative burdens and costs. Furthermore, reducing the number of stakeholders through a four-party format could make decision-making on key issues more efficient.In particular, if issues such as Japan’s abductee problem are incorporated into the broader agenda, it could become more difficult to maintain a clear focus on peace on the Korean Peninsula. Consequently, if the multilateral discussions pursued by the Lee Jae-myung administration take the form of four-party talks, a negotiating forum could be established relatively quickly, providing a basis for institutionalizing future multilateral discussions and, above all, potentially achieving tangible results more rapidly.While it is true that the four-party format offers significant advantages, the four parties—South Korea, North Korea, the United States, and China—would not be sufficient for multilateral discussions aimed at promoting peace on the Korean Peninsula and throughout Northeast Asia. In particular, conducting multilateral discussions without Russia appears inconsistent with the current geopolitical realities of Northeast Asia and the broader international security environment. Of course, as noted earlier, it is difficult to deny that the Six-Party Talks in the past failed to produce tangible results. However, given that Russia–North Korea relations have effectively reached the level of a military alliance amid the ongoing Russia–Ukraine war, excluding Russia would significantly constrain efforts to engage North Korea.Furthermore, as the aftermath of the Russia–Ukraine war has deepened divisions within the international community and geopolitical tensions between the South Korea–U.S.–Japan and North Korea–China–Russia alignments have become increasingly entrenched in Northeast Asia, it is necessary to move beyond simply establishing an agenda for peace on the Korean Peninsula and consider creating a consultative mechanism dedicated to peace and stability in the broader Northeast Asian region. From this perspective, including Japan in the multilateral discussions would be more reasonable than excluding it.Of course, there are significant challenges to immediately reconvening the Six-Party Talks under the current circumstances. Above all, given Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, establishing a multilateral platform that includes Russia remains highly contentious. Furthermore, with President Putin’s recent visit to the Kuril Islands, Russia–Japan relations appear to be entering an increasingly confrontational phase. In other words, as noted above, establishing a multilateral dialogue framework would itself be extremely difficult under the current circumstances.Therefore, I propose establishing multilateral talks in a phased and gradual manner. First, because restoring a channel of communication with North Korea is of paramount importance, we should initiate dialogue through a four-party format involving South Korea, North Korea, the United States, and China. Then, if we succeed in institutionalizing the four-party talks as a regular forum, we should consider expanding the framework into broader multilateral formats, such as “4+1” or “4+2.” In other words, we should distinguish between the four core parties—South Korea, North Korea, the United States, and China—and additional participants, such as Russia and Japan, and gradually broaden the framework.There is a Korean proverb that says, “Too many cooks spoil the broth.” In other words, even if the Six-Party Talks are reconvened, they could potentially produce undesirable or counterproductive outcomes. However, another Korean proverb says, “Even a sheet of paper is easier to lift together,” while an African proverb states, “Alone we go fast, but together we go far.” In short, from a long-term perspective, we must establish a peace regime on the Korean Peninsula—and, by extension, a durable peace and security framework in Northeast Asia—through the creation of a multilateral dialogue framework.

Halting North Korea’s Nuclear Program and Building a Peace Regime on the Korean PeninsulaJong-cheol ParkVisiting Research Fellow Institute for Unification Studies1. President Trump’s Signals for Dialogue and Diplomatic CalculationsWith President Trump recently sending a series of conciliatory messages to North Korea, attention is increasingly focused on the prospects for resuming U.S.-North Korea dialogue. On August 17 (local time), President Trump expressed openness to the possibility of dialogue with North Korea during a question-and-answer session with reporters at the White House. Just one day earlier, he announced that he had instructed the Department of Defense to significantly scale back U.S.-South Korea joint military exercises, citing concerns that they could send the wrong signal to North Korea.On August 15, President Trump posted on social media a photograph of his June 2019 meeting with Chairman Kim Jong-un at Panmunjom. On August 17, he posted a digitally altered image highlighting his positive relationship with Chairman Kim, sending a series of conciliatory signals toward North Korea. These actions can be interpreted as deliberate gestures aimed at creating conditions for the resumption of U.S.-North Korea dialogue.Behind these gestures toward North Korea may also lie a broader calculation aimed at achieving a diplomatic breakthrough. Given the limited diplomatic progress the Trump administration has made in the Russia-Ukraine war and in U.S.-Iran ceasefire negotiations, President Trump may view renewed engagement with North Korea as an opportunity to secure a tangible foreign-policy achievement. In particular, with the U.S. midterm elections approaching in November, there is a possibility that the administration will seek visible diplomatic results on issues related to the Korean Peninsula.2. North Korea’s Advancing Nuclear Capabilities and Evolving StrategyAfter more than three decades of development and negotiations, North Korea is not a nuclear-weapon state recognized under international law, but it is widely assessed to have developed a de facto nuclear weapons capability. For North Korea, nuclear weapons are no longer merely a bargaining instrument but a core component of its strategy for regime survival and national security. Building on its nuclear capabilities, North Korea seeks to reinforce its national identity, enhance its international standing, and secure strategic advantages on the Korean Peninsula.North Korea’s strategy toward South Korea has also undergone a fundamental transformation. Pyongyang has institutionalized a “two hostile states” framework that defines South Korea not as a partner for dialogue and reunification but as a hostile state. This hostile posture has further severed inter-Korean relations and increased instability on the Korean Peninsula. As inter-Korean relations have deteriorated and crisis-management mechanisms have become increasingly ineffective, the risk remains that an accidental military incident could escalate into a broader confrontation.At the same time, North Korea is strengthening its international position by deepening comprehensive military and economic cooperation with Russia while maintaining and expanding its ties with China. Stronger North Korea-Russia relations and continued engagement with China help mitigate Pyongyang’s concerns about international isolation while increasing its leverage in potential negotiations with the United States. Furthermore, North Korea has adopted an approach commonly described as “Engage the U.S., Isolate the South” (tongmi, bongnam), seeking security guarantees and sanctions relief through direct negotiations with Washington while keeping the door to inter-Korean dialogue largely closed.3. Lessons and Outlook for North Korean Nuclear NegotiationsThe U.S.-North Korea summits in Singapore in 2018 and Hanoi in February 2019 provide important lessons for assessing the prospects for future nuclear negotiations. In particular, the Hanoi summit ended without an agreement because the two sides failed to bridge fundamental differences over the scope, sequencing, and reciprocal measures associated with denuclearization. While the United States sought a comprehensive approach to denuclearization, North Korea favored a phased and partial process in which the dismantlement of selected nuclear facilities would be exchanged for sanctions relief.Since the breakdown of the Hanoi summit, North Korea’s nuclear capabilities have advanced significantly. Its stockpile of nuclear warheads and fissile materials has grown, its missile capabilities have improved, and the legal and institutional foundations underpinning its nuclear forces have been further developed. As a result, any future negotiations over North Korea’s nuclear program will begin under conditions substantially more difficult than those that prevailed in 2018–2019.North Korea now treats its possession of nuclear weapons as an established fact and rejects negotiations premised on immediate denuclearization. At the same time, it is demanding sanctions relief, an end to what it characterizes as U.S. military pressure and hostile policies, the suspension of ROK-U.S. joint military exercises, guarantees for regime security, and the normalization of U.S.-North Korea relations.Consequently, even if U.S.-North Korea dialogue resumes, it will be difficult to pursue a comprehensive settlement aimed at immediate and complete denuclearization. A more realistic approach would be to first halt further advances in North Korea’s nuclear capabilities, reduce military tensions, and then pursue a gradual process to reduce the nuclear threat.4. Phased Resolution of the North Korean Nuclear Issue and Transition to a Peace RegimeGiven that North Korea has, in effect, become a nuclear-armed state and that the nuclear issue is intertwined with a range of complex factors—including security concerns, sanctions, regime guarantees, U.S.-North Korea relations, and inter-Korean relations—it will be difficult to resolve the issue in the short term. While maintaining complete denuclearization as the long-term objective, a more realistic strategy would be to first halt further advances in North Korea’s nuclear capabilities and then pursue a gradual reduction of the nuclear threat.To this end, a phased roadmap could begin with a suspension of nuclear and missile testing, followed by restrictions on the production of fissile materials, a phased reduction of nuclear weapons and fissile materials, and ultimately complete denuclearization. At each stage, concrete reciprocal measures should be developed that link verifiable North Korean actions with corresponding steps by the United States and other parties, including sanctions relief, reductions in military tensions, security assurances, and the normalization of relations.The key variable in resolving the North Korean nuclear issue is the state of U.S.-North Korea relations. Without meaningful progress in dialogue between Washington and Pyongyang, it will be difficult to achieve a breakthrough on the nuclear issue or advance a durable peace regime on the Korean Peninsula. U.S.-North Korea dialogue should serve as an entry point for broader peace-building efforts, while inter-Korean dialogue can help mediate, broaden, and institutionalize this process. South Korea should play the role of a “pace-setter” by helping create an environment conducive to U.S.-North Korea negotiations while simultaneously restoring inter-Korean dialogue and cooperation, thereby ensuring that improvements in U.S.-North Korea relations contribute to stability and peace across the Korean Peninsula.Furthermore, efforts to address the North Korean nuclear issue and transition toward a peace regime should proceed in parallel. The two processes are closely interconnected. A virtuous cycle should be established in which progress on the nuclear issue generates momentum toward a peace regime, while progress toward a peace regime reduces North Korea’s security concerns and thereby creates more favorable conditions for addressing the nuclear issue.5. South Korea’s RoleIn this context, it is noteworthy that President Lee Jae-myung highlighted the need for effective measures to halt the advancement of North Korea’s nuclear capabilities and to advance the transition toward a peace regime in his August 15 commemorative address. This reflects the need for a pragmatic approach that, while maintaining the ultimate objective of complete denuclearization, first addresses the immediate and growing nuclear threat and links its reduction to the broader process of establishing a peace regime.South Korea should use major diplomatic opportunities—including the United Nations General Assembly in September and the APEC Summit in China in November—to strengthen strategic communication and policy coordination with relevant countries. By building greater consensus among major powers, including the United States and China, Seoul should seek to create a diplomatic environment conducive to halting further advances in North Korea’s nuclear capabilities, facilitating the resumption of U.S.-North Korea dialogue, and advancing discussions on a peace regime on the Korean Peninsula.Ultimately, South Korea’s national strategy should pursue two complementary objectives: substantially reducing the North Korean nuclear threat and institutionalizing peace on the Korean Peninsula. Because a complete resolution of the North Korean nuclear issue will likely require a prolonged process, the immediate priority should be to manage and contain the nuclear threat while establishing institutional mechanisms to reduce the risk of military conflict and accidental escalation. Through such an approach, South Korea can reduce geopolitical risks on the Korean Peninsula and build a more stable strategic environment conducive to sustainable peace, security, and national development.