NK Inside· North Korean Deputy Minister of National Defense to Attend China-Hosted Beijing Xiangshan Forum· North Korea Received Putin’s Congratulatory Message First but Replied to Xi Jinping First· NIS: “Kim Ju-ae Has Entered the ‘Designated Successor’ Stage”; Verification of Possible Elder Brother ContinuesMyongsung KimSecretary General of the SAND InstituteNorth Korean Deputy Minister of National Defense to Attend China-Hosted Beijing Xiangshan ForumNorth Korea announced on September 16 that a delegation led by Kim Kang-il, Deputy Minister of National Defense, will attend the Beijing Xiangshan Forum.The Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) reported that day that a delegation from the Ministry of National Defense, led by Deputy Minister Kim, departed Pyongyang on September 15 to attend the forum.The Xiangshan Forum is an annual multilateral security conference hosted by China to promote dialogue on regional security and the development of a new security order in the Asia-Pacific. This year marks the 20th anniversary of the forum's establishment.The forum is widely regarded as China’s counterpart to the Shangri-La Dialogue, Asia’s largest Western-led multilateral security conference, which is held annually in Singapore by the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), a British think tank.Kim Hyong-ryong, then Vice Minister of the People’s Armed Forces, now the Ministry of National Defense, attended the forum as North Korea’s representative in 2018 and 2019. However, amid cooling relations between North Korea and China, a military attaché from the North Korean Embassy in China reportedly represented Pyongyang at the forum in the past two years.North Korea’s decision to publicly dispatch a vice-ministerial-level delegation for the first time since 2019 has prompted speculation that military cooperation between Pyongyang and Beijing could be gaining momentum following the summit between North Korean State Affairs Commission Chairman Kim Jong-un and Chinese President Xi Jinping last June.North Korea Received Putin’s Congratulatory Message First but Replied to Xi Jinping FirstIn his reply to Russian President Vladimir Putin, North Korean State Affairs Commission Chairman Kim Jong-un emphasized the “alliance” between North Korea and Russia and reaffirmed his commitment to comprehensively expanding and deepening bilateral cooperation. However, his reply was publicly released two days after his response to Chinese President Xi Jinping was announced. Kim responded to Xi’s congratulatory message within three days, compared with five days for Putin’s message.According to North Korean media outlets, including the Rodong Sinmun, Chinese President Xi sent a congratulatory message to Kim Jong-un on September 9, while Russian President Putin sent his message a day earlier, on September 8. However, Kim’s reply to Xi was publicly released on September 13, while his reply to Putin was released on September 15. Thus, although Putin sent his message first, Kim’s response to Xi was announced first.The speed of Kim’s response is particularly notable when compared with last year. In 2025, Kim replied to Xi’s September 9 congratulatory message on September 20, 11 days later. This year, however, he responded within three days.The Rodong Sinmun, the official newspaper of the Workers’ Party of Korea, reported on September 15 that Kim stated in his reply, “I and the entire Korean people feel greatly encouraged and express our deep gratitude for the warm congratulatory message you sent on the occasion of the 78th anniversary of the founding of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.”Kim assessed, “Today, the two countries—North Korea and Russia—and their two peoples are strengthening their bonds of loyalty and unity amid the turbulent tides of history, jointly safeguarding justice and peace, and ceaselessly writing a new chapter in the history of our great alliance.”He went on to emphasize “a shared vision for the bright future of DPRK-Russia relations, based on the traditions of friendship, good-neighborliness, and mutual assistance, as well as the solid alliance between our two countries.“He added, “The resolve of myself and the government of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to comprehensively expand and deepen our cooperation with the Russian Federation is, without a doubt, unshakable.”Kim also reaffirmed his support for Russia’s war in Ukraine. He stated, “I am firmly convinced of the Russian Federation’s victory in today’s holy war to defend the country’s security interests and international justice,” and pledged “unwavering support” for Putin and the Russian people.NIS: “Kim Ju-ae Has Entered the ‘Designated Successor’ Stage”; Verification of Possible Elder Brother ContinuesSouth Korea’s National Intelligence Service (NIS) maintained its previous assessment that Kim Ju-ae, the daughter of North Korean State Affairs Commission Chairman Kim Jong-un, has entered the stage of being designated as his successor. The agency also stated that it has identified a younger sibling whose gender has not been confirmed, while the existence of an elder son has yet to be verified.On September 10, the NIS stated, “We currently assess that Ju-ae is in the stage of being designated as a successor, and we are investigating the existence of a sibling whose gender is unknown.” Regarding the possibility that Kim has an elder son, the agency explained, “We are continuing to verify this,” but added, “Even if he exists, it is the NIS’s assessment that he is not in a position to become a successor.”The NIS’s assessment of Ju-ae’s position in the succession process has become increasingly definitive over the past three years. Until 2023, the agency had left open the possibility that Kim Jong-un might have an elder son. In a report to the National Assembly’s Intelligence Committee last July, the NIS identified Ju-ae as a leading candidate for succession while leaving open the possibility that another sibling could emerge as successor.The assessment has become more specific since the beginning of this year. In February, the NIS assessed that Ju-ae had entered the “designated successor” stage, citing indications that she was expressing views on certain North Korean policy issues. The agency reaffirmed this assessment in its September 1 report to the National Assembly’s Intelligence Committee.In particular, the NIS assessed that the recent increase in Ju-ae’s public appearances is intended to establish her in the minds of North Korean citizens as the country’s next leader. The agency noted that Ju-ae has been raising her public profile as a potential successor by consistently appearing alongside Kim at major public engagements, including military and diplomatic events.Meanwhile, a media outlet previously reported, citing a high-level North Korean source, that all three children of Kim and First Lady Ri Sol-ju are daughters. The report also stated that South Korean and U.S. intelligence agencies were revising their previous assessment that at least one of the children was likely a son.In response, the NIS has maintained its assessment that Ju-ae has a sibling whose gender has not been confirmed, while reiterating that the existence of an elder son has yet to be verified. Given the secrecy surrounding Kim’s family and North Korea’s succession arrangements, further verification will be necessary to determine the gender of Ju-ae’s sibling and whether Kim has an elder son.

NK Inside· Tumen River Road Bridge Linking North Korea and Russia Completedy· Kim Jong-un Attends Commissioning of New 5,000-Ton Destroyer Kang-gon· North Korean Defense Minister Warns of “Strong Countermeasures” Against U.S.-ROK-Japan ExercisesMyongsung KimSecretary General of the SAND InstituteTumen River Road Bridge Linking North Korea and Russia CompletedThe Tumen River Road Bridge linking North Korea and Russia has been completed just over a year after construction began, marking a significant expansion of the two countries’ cross-border transportation infrastructure. Pyongyang has portrayed the project as an important foundation for expanding economic cooperation, trade, tourism, and people-to-people exchanges, while also presenting it as a symbol of the increasingly close bilateral relationship.The Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) and Korean Central Broadcasting reported on September 8 that the bridge connecting Rason, North Korea, and Khasan, Russia, had been completed. Completion ceremonies were held simultaneously in Rason, North Korea, and Khasan, Russia, on September 7.According to North Korean state media, construction was completed in 495 days. The new bridge is designed to accommodate various forms of road transportation and facilitate the movement of people across the border. Pyongyang described the project as an important addition to the infrastructure supporting bilateral economic cooperation and said it would help expand cooperation in trade, tourism, and other sectors.The bridge is particularly significant because it complements the existing railway connection between North Korea and Russia. Until now, the Tumen River railway bridge has served as the principal land transportation link between the two countries. The new road bridge provides a separate route for vehicles and road-based cargo, potentially increasing the capacity and flexibility of cross-border commercial activity.North Korea also attached symbolic importance on the bridge’s name, Yakov Novichenko. Novichenko was a Soviet military officer who reportedly shielded Kim Il-sung with his body after a grenade was thrown at the North Korean leader during a ceremony at Pyongyang Station Square in 1946.North Korean media described the naming of the bridge as reflecting the two countries’ determination to strengthen their “friendly and good-neighborly” relations and deepen mutual trust. The emphasis on Novichenko’s historical connection to Kim Il-sung appears intended to frame the contemporary North Korea–Russia relationship as rooted in a longstanding political and military partnership rather than merely in current economic interests.North Korean Prime Minister Pak Tae-song and Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin participated in the completion ceremony via video link from Pyongyang and Moscow, respectively.According to North Korean state media, Mishustin said that the friendship, good-neighborly relations, and mutual assistance between the two countries would not be affected by changes in the international environment. He also pledged that Russia would continue its efforts to strengthen bilateral relations across a broad range of sectors.Pak similarly said that North Korea would continue pursuing cooperative projects designed to generate tangible benefits for the development and prosperity of both countries.The road bridge was included in the agreements reached during the June 2024 North Korea–Russia summit in Pyongyang. Construction began in April 2025 near the existing railway bridge over the Tumen River.The two-lane bridge is approximately 5 kilometers long, including its connecting sections, while the main bridge structure spans roughly 1 kilometer.The completion of the bridge is likely to facilitate greater movement of goods, vehicles, and people between North Korea and Russia. It could also increase the resilience and capacity of the two countries’ bilateral logistics network at a time when economic and strategic ties between Pyongyang and Moscow have expanded significantly.At the same time, the new road connection could have implications beyond commercial activity. Although there is no public evidence that the bridge was designed specifically for military purposes, its availability as an additional land transportation corridor could provide logistical value to the broader North Korea–Russia strategic partnership.Kim Jong-un Attends Commissioning of New 5,000-Ton Destroyer Kang-gonNorth Korean leader Kim Jong-un has emphasized the development of the country’s naval nuclear capabilities while overseeing the commissioning of the new 5,000-ton-class destroyer Kang-gon, signaling Pyongyang’s continued efforts to expand the role of naval forces in its nuclear deterrence strategy.According to the Rodong Sinmun and other North Korean state media outlets on September 7, Kim attended the commissioning ceremony for the destroyer at Wonsan Port in Kangwon Province on September 6. He was accompanied by his wife, Ri Sol-ju, and his daughter, Ju-ae.In remarks delivered at the ceremony, Kim argued that strengthening the Navy’s capabilities was necessary to deter potential attacks and safeguard North Korea’s security and development. He said that adversaries would be less likely to contemplate military action if they feared North Korea’s ability to retaliate.Kim also highlighted what he described as progress toward the “nuclear armament” of the Navy. He said that developing naval nuclear capabilities would diversify and operationalize North Korea’s deterrence posture and added that the country would demonstrate further progress in approximately eight months.North Korea did not specify what weapons systems or programs Kim was referring to. His remarks could indicate plans to unveil or deploy additional naval platforms, missile systems, or other capabilities, although the available information does not permit a definitive assessment.The Kang-gon is the second 5,000-ton-class destroyer of its class constructed by North Korea. It is named after Kang Gon, a prominent North Korean military figure who served as the country’s first Chief of the General Staff. The vessel follows the lead ship of the class, Choe-hyon, which was reportedly delivered to the West Sea Fleet in June.The commissioning of the Kang-gon follows a significant setback during its construction. At a launch ceremony at Chongjin Port in May, the vessel reportedly tilted to one side and failed to enter the water properly, leaving the ship partially grounded. Kim Jong-un publicly criticized those responsible for the accident, drawing attention to persistent questions surrounding North Korea’s shipbuilding capacity, industrial management, and quality-control systems.North Korea subsequently repaired and relaunched the vessel. Following weapons testing and inspections, the destroyer was formally commissioned, indicating that it entered operational service roughly one year and four months after the launch accident.Jo Chun-ryong, the Workers’ Party secretary responsible for the defense industrial sector, reported on the vessel’s construction and commissioning. Captain Choe Chol-jin also delivered remarks, pledging to carry out the ship’s assigned missions.Kim Jong-un later boarded the destroyer and posed for photographs with its crew, providing a highly publicized display of the vessel’s completion and operational status.The decision to stage a high-profile commissioning ceremony attended by Kim and members of his family appears designed to demonstrate progress in North Korea’s naval modernization program to both domestic and foreign audiences. It is particularly significant because Pyongyang has increasingly emphasized the development of maritime platforms capable of contributing to its nuclear deterrence posture.Nevertheless, important questions remain unanswered. North Korea has not disclosed the precise weapons systems deployed aboard the Kang-gon, nor has it provided evidence demonstrating that the vessel currently possesses an operational nuclear strike capability. Likewise, the specific military program that Kim Jong-un indicated would be completed or demonstrated “eight months” from now remains unclear.The coming months will therefore be important in determining whether North Korea’s latest naval initiatives represent primarily a conventional modernization effort or a broader effort to establish a more credible and survivable sea-based component of its nuclear forces.North Korean Defense Minister Warns of “Strong Countermeasures” Against U.S.-ROK-Japan ExercisesNorth Korea has issued a new warning of military retaliation against the United States and its allies, citing the trilateral Freedom Edge exercise involving the United States, South Korea, and Japan, as well as a series of other U.S.-led military activities across the Indo-Pacific.The statement, issued late on September 7 by North Korean Defense Minister Kim Song-gi through the Korean Central News Agency, was his first major public statement since assuming the post. Kim warned that North Korea would respond with “strong and reciprocal countermeasures” if the United States and its allies pursued what Pyongyang described as a renewed military confrontation.Kim specifically cited the Freedom Edge exercise, which began on September 7, as well as the Orient Shield exercise involving the United States, Japan, and Australia, which was scheduled to begin on September 8.He also criticized the planned deployment of the U.S. Army’s Typhon mid-range missile system in connection with Orient Shield and referred to plans to deploy a U.S. Army Special Forces-related unit, described by North Korean media as a Multi-Domain Rapid Deployment Force, to South Korea later this year.The minister characterized the succession of U.S.-led military exercises and deployments as evidence of an increasingly integrated military posture directed against North Korea. He argued that the accumulation of such activities was creating a serious security threat on the Korean Peninsula and in the broader region.The defense minister also portrayed North Korea’s continued military modernization as a necessary response to these developments. He argued that the most effective means of preventing conflict and safeguarding North Korea’s sovereignty and security interests was to continue developing and deploying advanced military capabilities.More significantly, the minister invoked North Korea’s constitutional mandate to deter hostile forces and punish provocations, suggesting that Pyongyang retains the option of responding militarily if it determines that its security interests have been threatened.The statement therefore goes beyond a routine denunciation of allied military exercises. By issuing the warning in the name of the newly appointed defense minister, Pyongyang appears to be signaling that its military leadership is prepared to link future allied exercises and U.S. force deployments to potential North Korean countermeasures.His appointment is also notable. At the Second Meeting of the Ninth Central Military Commission of the Workers’ Party on August 29, Kim Jong-un presided over a reshuffle of senior military leadership. Ro Kwang-chol was removed as defense minister and reassigned as first deputy director of the Party’s Military Industry Department, while Kim Song-gi, who had previously served as director of the General Political Bureau of the Korean People’s Army, was appointed defense minister.Minister Kim’s previous responsibilities centered on political and ideological affairs within the military. His rapid transition from the military’s senior political leadership to the defense ministry, followed almost immediately by a public warning directed at the United States, South Korea, and Japan, could indicate an effort by Pyongyang to reinforce the political and ideological messaging underpinning its military posture.North Korea has repeatedly used allied military exercises and the deployment of U.S. strategic assets as justification for demonstrations of military capability, including ballistic missile launches. The immediate question, therefore, is whether Kim Song-gi’s warning will remain rhetorical or be followed by concrete military activity.Particular attention should be paid to the timing and nature of any North Korean response as Freedom Edge, Orient Shield, and other regional exercises proceed. Any missile launches, naval activity, or other military demonstrations during this period would provide a clearer indication of whether Pyongyang intends to translate the new defense minister’s rhetoric into operational action.

- North Korea Responds to Trump’s Outreach: “Our Status as a Nuclear Power Must Not Be Weakened”- Major Military Leadership Shuffle in North Korea: Pak Jong-chon Makes a Sudden Return- North Korea Emphasizes Patriotism and Ideological Education for “Market Generation” Youth on Youth DayMyongsung KimSecretary General of the SAND InstituteNorth Korea Responds to Trump’s Outreach: “Our Status as a Nuclear Power Must Not Be Weakened”North Korea has reaffirmed that it will maintain its policy of responding to U.S. President Donald Trump with the “strongest possible measures,” asserting that there has been no fundamental change in Washington’s hostile policy toward Pyongyang. Although President Trump has repeatedly expressed his willingness to engage in dialogue with North Korean leader Kim Jong-un, Pyongyang has made clear that it is unlikely to enter negotiations as long as the United States maintains “complete denuclearization” as the objective of its North Korea policy. Against this backdrop, North Korea appears to be pressing Washington for a fundamental shift in its policy toward Pyongyang—including recognition of North Korea’s status as a nuclear-armed state, the suspension of ROK-U.S. joint military exercises, and an end to U.S. criticism of North Korea’s human rights record—as potential preconditions for a U.S.-North Korea summit.In a statement carried by the Korean Central News Agency on August 31, a spokesperson for the North Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated, “There is not the slightest change in our policy toward the U.S., which is to respond with the strongest possible measures to the U.S.’s unchanging hostile policy until the very end.”The spokesperson stated, “The Republic will resolutely and clearly exercise its sovereignty to safeguard the supreme interests of national security on the premise that there has been and will be no change whatsoever in U.S. policy toward the DPRK.” The spokesperson further asserted, “The Republic’s current status as a nuclear-weapon state, which has been enshrined in the country’s supreme law, will not be weakened or diluted by the U.S.’s repeated statements on ‘denuclearization.’”The statement appears to have been issued in response to Washington’s continued refusal to recognize North Korea as a nuclear-weapon state and its insistence that denuclearization remain the central objective of U.S. policy toward Pyongyang. On August 26, a U.S. State Department spokesperson stated that there had been no change in U.S. policy toward North Korea, which remains centered on denuclearization, and reaffirmed Washington’s commitment to that objective.North Korea also adopted a hard-line position toward strengthened trilateral military cooperation among South Korea, the United States, and Japan. Referring to “Freedom Edge,” the multidomain exercise planned by the three countries to strengthen deterrence against North Korea, the spokesperson argued that “the Trump administration has reaffirmed its unchanging policy of hostility, which seeks to gravely infringe upon our nation’s sovereignty, political system, and security interests through ‘denuclearization’ hype, ‘human rights’ smear campaigns, and military threats.”The spokesperson further asserted, “A delusional obsession with the past cannot, under any circumstances, grasp reality or restrain the future.” He added, “In this grave situation, where the U.S.’s persistent policy of hostility toward the DPRK is evolving into an even more dangerous form, it is meaningless to expect a reduction in regional tensions.”North Korea’s statements can be interpreted as signaling that substantive dialogue would be difficult if Washington seeks to engage Pyongyang on essentially the same terms pursued during the first Trump administration. In particular, given North Korea’s self-identification as a nuclear-armed state, the statement represents another attempt to pressure Washington to adjust its policy in a manner that acknowledges the reality of North Korea’s nuclear capabilities. From Pyongyang’s perspective, such a shift appears to be a prerequisite for meaningful negotiations.North Korea also reiterated its stated rationale for maintaining and expanding its nuclear arsenal. The spokesperson asserted, “Our nuclear weapons are the absolute guarantee of our sovereignty, and the Republic’s possession of nuclear weapons and their continued strengthening are the most responsible and correct choices for ensuring regional peace and security.”The spokesperson cited the United States’ strengthening of its nuclear capabilities, growing trilateral military cooperation among the United States, South Korea, and Japan, Japan’s rearmament, and South Korea’s military buildup as factors underpinning North Korea’s nuclear policy. He argued, “The unstable regional security environment caused by the U.S. nuclear posture becoming more aggressive and by Japan’s rearmament and South Korea’s military buildup—which are intensifying within the framework of the U.S.-Japan-South Korea trilateral military cooperation—explains our choice.”The statement was issued as President Trump again raised the possibility of holding a summit with Kim Jong-un. Analysts interpret the statement not as an outright rejection of dialogue with Washington, but rather as an effort to strengthen North Korea’s negotiating leverage by making a change in U.S. policy toward Pyongyang a prerequisite for engagement. If working-level or back-channel contacts between North Korea and the United States intensify in the future, the competing positions of the two sides on “denuclearization” and recognition of North Korea as a nuclear-weapon state are likely to emerge as the central issues in any negotiations.Major Military Leadership Shuffle in North Korea: Pak Jong-chon Makes a Sudden ReturnNorth Korea has undertaken a significant reorganization of its military command structure, replacing or reassigning a number of senior military officials. Most notably, Pak Jong-chon, who stepped down from several senior Party positions at the 9th Workers’ Party Congress last February, has returned approximately six months later as Vice Chairman of the Party’s Central Military Commission and a member of the Political Bureau. With the replacement of the Minister of National Defense and changes to key positions responsible for internal military oversight and political control, the personnel changes are being interpreted as an effort to strengthen both defense modernization and military discipline.On August 30, the Korean Central News Agency reported that the 2nd Meeting of the 9th Central Military Commission of the Workers’ Party of Korea, held the previous day under the leadership of State Affairs Commission Chairman Kim Jong-un, discussed organizational matters and changes in the responsibilities of key military commanders.The most significant personnel change was the return of Pak Jong-chon. Under the reshuffle, Pak was reappointed as Vice Chairman of the Party’s Central Military Commission and returned to the Political Bureau of the Party’s Central Committee. Kim Jong-un serves as Chairman of the Party’s Central Military Commission.Pak stepped down from his positions as a member of the Political Bureau and Party Secretary at the 9th Party Congress last February and subsequently left his position as Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission. At the time, his departure prompted speculation that he was being removed from the military’s front-line leadership because of his age. His latest appointment, however, brings him back into the core command structure of the North Korean military.Pak’s return can be viewed as an effort by North Korea to place a senior figure with extensive experience in the development and operational employment of advanced weapons—including missiles and artillery—in a key leadership position. Given Pyongyang’s recent emphasis on defense science and technology and the development of sophisticated weapons systems, the decision to restore a senior official with expertise in military operations and weapons development to key Party and military positions suggests an effort to reinforce the operational experience and technical expertise of the military leadership.Meanwhile, Defense Minister Ro Kwang-chol has been removed from his post. Following his departure as Minister of National Defense, Ro was transferred to the position of First Deputy Director of the Military-Industrial Department of the Party’s Central Committee. His apparent removal from the Party’s central leadership further indicates that he has been excluded from the senior military command structure.Ro’s reassignment, however, does not constitute a complete retirement from public service. As First Deputy Director of the Party’s Military-Industrial Department, which oversees the broader defense-industrial sector, he is expected to remain an important working-level official involved in weapons production and the defense-industrial base. His transfer from the Ministry of National Defense to the military-industrial sector may therefore indicate that Pyongyang regards the defense-industrial base and weapons production as central components of its broader effort to strengthen national defense capabilities.Kim Sung-gi, Director of the General Political Bureau of the Korean People’s Army, who was recently promoted to the rank of General, was appointed as the new Minister of National Defense. The transfer of the official responsible for the military’s political and ideological affairs to the country’s top defense position suggests an effort to strengthen the linkage between political control of the armed forces and defense administration. Following his appointment, the position of Director of the General Political Bureau of the Korean People’s Army was left vacant.Positions responsible for internal military control and inspection also underwent significant changes. Ryu Kwang-u, who had served as Director of the People’s Army Security Bureau, was transferred to the position of First Deputy Director of the General Political Bureau, while Om Ju-ho, who had served as Political Commissar of the Air Force, was appointed as the new Director of the Security Bureau. Ryu was also elected to the Party’s Political Bureau, while Om was elected as a member of the Party’s Central Committee.These personnel changes appear designed to strengthen the military’s internal oversight and counterintelligence functions while reinforcing political and ideological control. The decision to move an official with experience in internal military affairs and security oversight into a senior position within the General Political Bureau, while appointing a figure with a background in political and ideological affairs to head the Security Bureau, can be interpreted as an effort to further consolidate Party control over the military.North Korea’s recent public criticism of corruption and lax discipline within the military, accompanied by indications of tighter internal control, is also likely to have contributed to the reshuffle. The personnel changes appear intended to increase oversight of military commanders and officials, reinforce discipline within the armed forces, and strengthen control over the military leadership.In parallel with the military leadership reshuffle, Kim Jong-un personally met with scientists, researchers, and officials from defense research institutions who had contributed to the development of new weapons systems and improvements in weapons performance, and presented them with awards. He recognized their contributions to defense science and technology by conferring hero titles, medals, and state orders.The Korean Central News Agency emphasized advances in military technology, stating that North Korea’s defense science and research sector had recently developed technologies capable of enhancing war-fighting capabilities and strategic deterrence. It did not, however, identify the specific weapons systems or technologies involved.Kim Jong-un referred to the recently introduced “patented military scientific and technological achievements” and assessed them as technical accomplishments capable of significantly enhancing the modernization of the military’s weapons systems. This underscores North Korea’s determination to regard advances in defense science and technology and improvements in the performance of sophisticated weapons systems—not simply an expansion in the volume of weapons production—as core components of its military modernization strategy.North Korea Emphasizes Patriotism and Ideological Education for “Market Generation” Youth on Youth DayOn August 28, marking Youth Day, North Korea portrayed the younger generation as a central source of national strength and a key component of the country’s future governance, while repeatedly emphasizing patriotism and ideological education. This emphasis appears intended to reinforce the political loyalty of young people, particularly those belonging to the so-called “market generation”—the cohort that came of age during the “Arduous March” of the mid-1990s and subsequently became increasingly familiar with market-based economic activity.In a front-page editorial published on the occasion, Rodong Sinmun, the official newspaper of the Workers’ Party of Korea, emphasized that “the vast army of youth, possessing unparalleled revolutionary spirit and patriotic loyalty, is the pride and strength of our Party and state.” The newspaper described young people as “the Party’s loyal vanguard and reliable reserve force,” asserting that “loyalty to the Party is the foremost ideological and spiritual trait of our youth.”Rodong Sinmun also portrayed young people as a key source of momentum for national development. The newspaper stated, “Our youth are the creators of miracles who are illuminating this new era of national rejuvenation with their heroic deeds,” highlighting their participation in a range of national projects, including efforts to strengthen defense capabilities, increase cement production, and construct power-generation facilities.It also portrayed young people as a key source of momentum for national development. Rodong Sinmun stated, “Our youth are the creators of miracles who are illuminating this new era of national rejuvenation with their heroic deeds,” highlighting their participation in a range of national projects, including efforts to strengthen defense capabilities, increasing cement production, and constructing power-generation facilities.In particular, the newspaper credited young people with playing a leading role in construction projects that North Korean authorities have recently promoted as major national achievements, including Vanguard Street in a new development area of Pyongyang and the Sinuiju Greenhouse Complex Farm. This appears consistent with Pyongyang’s longstanding practice of mobilizing young people for large-scale construction and production campaigns, including during periods of economic hardship.North Korea also sought to reinforce the perceived superiority of its political and social system by contrasting its youth with young people in other countries. Rodong Sinmun claimed that, in the outside world, “youth steeped in extreme misanthropy, the poison of the worship of money, and decadence and pessimism” are contributing to social problems, while North Korea has “pure and steadfast youth who are loyal to society and the collective and devote themselves to the future.”The newspaper further emphasized that “today, as we must transform the pioneering period of the comprehensive development of socialism in our own style into a period of great upsurge,” young people are expected to remain at the center of the Party’s major national projects.It also introduced the concept of “youth-centered politics” in a separate section explaining political terminology. The newspaper defined the concept as “the politics of our Party, which always firmly trusts and promotes young people in revolution and construction, and accomplishes everything by relying on their strength.”Various commemorative events were held in Pyongyang to mark Youth Day. On August 28, the Korean Central News Agency reported that the “National Youth Science and Technology Achievements Exhibition” had opened the previous day at the Science and Technology Palace. The exhibition featured more than 1,800 entries showcasing scientific and technological achievements produced by young people from across the country.On August 27, the Central Youth Art Propaganda Troupe held a performance titled “Youth, Let Us Uphold Our Party” at the open-air theater in Pyongyang Youth Park. On the same day, officials from the Socialist Patriotic Youth League visited the Youth Movement History Museum, which commemorates the history of the youth movement under Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il.North Korea claims that Kim Il-sung founded the Korean Communist Youth League on August 28, 1927, and has commemorated the date annually as Youth Day since 1991.Analysts suggest that the authorities’ emphasis on patriotism and loyalty to the Party on Youth Day is closely linked to changing social and economic attitudes among North Korean youth. A significant portion of North Korea’s current younger generation grew up following the “Arduous March” of the mid-1990s and gained experience with economic activity through markets and informal marketplaces rather than relying exclusively on the state rationing system.This generation is generally considered to have greater familiarity with market-oriented economic behavior than previous generations and to have had relatively greater opportunities to encounter outside cultural influences. Against this backdrop, the authorities’ recent intensification of ideological education and restrictions on young people’s exposure to foreign culture appear to be closely connected to these generational characteristics. The emphasis on patriotism and Party loyalty therefore appears to serve not only as a means of political socialization but also as an effort to manage the potential social and ideological effects of greater exposure to market activity and outside information.

Strengthening Policy Implementation Following the Party Congress: Military Command Restructuring and Continued North Korea–Russia Strategic Cooperation Seung-hyun LeePh.D in Public AdministrationResearch Fellow SAND Research Institute In August 2026, North Korea intensified efforts to translate the decisions of the 9th Party Congress into concrete policy measures, while simultaneously accelerating defense modernization and restructuring its military command system. Externally, Pyongyang continued to deepen its strategic partnership with Russia while refraining from immediately responding to U.S. overtures for dialogue. Internally, it continued to pursue regional development while seeking to improve living standards and strengthen economic conditions for the population.Economic Policy: From “Setting Goals” to “Assessing Implementation Capacity”The 4th Plenary Meeting of the Political Bureau of the 9th Central Committee of the Workers’ Party of Korea, held on August 25, was the most significant political event in North Korea in August. The meeting reviewed progress in implementing major policy tasks adopted at the 9th Party Congress and subsequent plenary meetings. Kim Jong-un, meanwhile, criticized the operational and managerial capabilities of economic policymaking and leadership bodies, arguing that they had fallen short of the objectives set by the Party. This suggests that North Korea has moved beyond simply establishing new economic development goals following the Party Congress and is now focusing more explicitly on the administrative and economic management capabilities needed to translate those goals into tangible results.It is particularly noteworthy that North Korea has framed shortcomings in the economic sector not simply as consequences of sanctions or adverse external conditions, but also as matters of leadership and institutional competence. The future effectiveness of North Korea’s economic policies therefore appears likely to depend less on the formulation of additional policy initiatives than on the regime’s capacity to implement existing policies effectively and ensure control and performance at the production level.Military Modernization: Moving Beyond Weapons to Organizational ReformIn August, three instances of short-range ballistic missile launches were confirmed. On August 6, North Korea launched one short-range ballistic missile from the Wonsan area, followed by another launch on August 12. On August 20, approximately 10 short-range ballistic missiles were launched from the Pyongyang area. In particular, the August 20 launches coincided with the ongoing ROK-U.S. joint military exercises and were widely interpreted as a demonstration of North Korea’s military response capabilities.More significant, however, was the restructuring of North Korea’s senior military leadership at the end of the month. On August 29, the Central Military Commission of the Workers’ Party of Korea reinstated Pak Jong-chon as Vice Chairman, transferred Ro Kwang-chol from Minister of National Defense to First Deputy Director of the Military-Industrial Department, and appointed Kim Song-gi as the new Minister of National Defense. The reshuffle suggests that North Korea increasingly views military modernization not simply as a matter of developing and deploying advanced weapons systems, but as an integrated effort involving the military command structure, the defense-industrial base, and defense science and technology.North Korea-Russia Relations: From “War Cooperation” to “Generational Ties”Liberation Day once again provided a symbolic opportunity to reaffirm North Korea–Russia relations. On August 14, Kim Jong-un visited the Liberation Monument to pay tribute to Soviet troops and emphasized the historical traditions and blood ties underlying the relationship between North Korea and Russia. President Vladimir Putin likewise underscored the two countries’ comprehensive strategic partnership in a congratulatory message and referred to the continuation of bilateral joint projects.Of particular note was the presence of Kim Ju-ae during visits to the Liberation Monument and the Daesongsan Revolutionary Martyrs’ Cemetery. Following her appearance at the Victory Day commemorations in July, Kim Ju-ae again appeared at major historical and diplomatic events associated with Liberation Day in August. This may be interpreted as an effort by Pyongyang to convey that not only its revolutionary traditions but also its strategic relationship with Russia are intended to be carried forward by the next generation.No Response to the U.S. Call for DialogueAnother notable feature of developments on the Korean Peninsula in August was North Korea’s selective non-response to U.S. overtures for dialogue.Although the United States scaled back the scope of the ROK-U.S. joint military exercises and signaled the possibility of renewed engagement with North Korea, Kim Jong-un did not issue a direct response. Instead, Kim Yo-jong downplayed the significance of the reduced scale of the exercises and continued to criticize the United States and South Korea. From Pyongyang’s perspective, North Korea appears to be assessing the implications of Washington’s changing posture while concluding that it remains advantageous to preserve its strategic leverage rather than immediately interpret the shift as a basis for resuming dialogue.Accordingly, future U.S.-North Korea relations are likely to be shaped less by the immediate resumption of summit-level talks than by whether further adjustments in U.S. policy toward North Korea and Pyongyang’s demands can be brought into sufficient alignment to create conditions for substantive negotiations.Continued Regional Development and Improvement of People’s LivelihoodsDespite continued external and military tensions, North Korea has maintained its focus on regional development and improving the livelihoods of its population. Prime Minister Pak Tae-song conducted a series of on-site inspections of factories and enterprises, and toward the end of the month, he inspected construction at the Samjiyon Mountain Tourism District, as well as factories and enterprises in Hamhung. These activities appear intended to link the economic objectives pursued since the 9th Party Congress with improvements in residents’ daily lives and the performance of local economies. For North Korea, regional development is significant not merely as an economic undertaking, but also as a political instrument through which the regime seeks to ensure that residents can directly perceive and experience the achievements of its governance.In conclusion, following the 9th Party Congress, North Korea appears to have entered a phase in which it is placing greater emphasis on policy implementation in the economic and social sectors, restructuring its military organization and capabilities, and, in foreign affairs, assessing the prospects for engagement with the United States while further consolidating its strategic cooperation with Russia. Looking ahead to September, North Korean propaganda is likely to place particular emphasis on the achievements of the state system and internal unity, with National Foundation Day on September 9 serving as a central occasion for reinforcing these themes.

NK Inside-North Korea to Send Approximately 100 Athletes to Nagoya Asian Games: Could the Games Open a Channel for North Korea–Japan Contacts?-Kim Jong-un Presides Over Enlarged Politburo Meeting, Offers No Response to Trump’s Overtures-Income Polarization in North Korea’s Market Sector Has Worsened Since the 2014–2015 Economic ShockMyongsung KimSecretary General of the SAND InstituteNorth Korea to Send Approximately 100 Athletes to Nagoya Asian Games: Could the Games Open a Channel for North Korea–Japan Contacts?North Korea plans to send a delegation of approximately 100 athletes to the 2026 Aichi-Nagoya Asian Games, which will open next month in Japan. The delegation is expected to compete in 14 sports, including men’s and women’s soccer, weightlifting, boxing, and wrestling.Ko Chol-ho, secretary-general of the North Korean National Olympic Committee (NOC), disclosed the plans in an interview with Choson Sinbo, the official newspaper of the General Association of Korean Residents in Japan (Chongryon), on August 25. The size of North Korea’s delegation will be significantly smaller than that sent to the previous Asian Games in Hangzhou in 2023, when North Korea dispatched 185 athletes to compete in 18 sports.Ko expressed confidence that, despite the smaller delegation and reduced number of participating sports, North Korea could improve its medal performance compared with the Hangzhou Games. “Our athletes, coaches, and sports officials have been preparing over the past four years to achieve even better results,” he said. “They are making every effort, motivated by the desire to meet the expectations of the country and its people through outstanding athletic performances.”Two Japan-based athletes of Korean descent are also included in North Korea’s delegation: Ri Song-a in women’s soccer and Jung Se-ri in karate. The fact that North Korea’s specific plans for the delegation were disclosed through Choson Sinbo, rather than through North Korean state media, appears to reflect, at least in part, the fact that the competition will be held in Japan.North Korea effectively suspended its participation in major international multi-sport events during the COVID-19 pandemic. It did not send a delegation to the Tokyo Olympics, which were held in 2021 after being postponed for one year because of the pandemic. As a result, the International Olympic Committee (IOC) suspended North Korea’s National Olympic Committee from participating in the Olympic Games.North Korea returned to the international multi-sport arena for the first time in five years at the 2023 Hangzhou Asian Games in China, having last participated in the 2018 Jakarta-Palembang Asian Games. North Korea won a total of 39 medals at the Hangzhou Games—11 gold, 18 silver, and 10 bronze—finishing 10th overall in the medal standings. In particular, it won six gold medals in weightlifting, a sport in which North Korea has traditionally been highly competitive.North Korea also sent a delegation to the Paris Olympics last year. Fifteen North Korean athletes competed in seven sports, winning two silver medals and four bronze medals. This participation appears to reflect a gradual normalization of North Korea’s involvement in international multi-sport competitions as the country continues to reengage with the international sporting community following the COVID-19 pandemic.The 2026 Aichi-Nagoya Asian Games will be held from September 19 to October 4 in Aichi Prefecture and Nagoya City, Japan.Against this backdrop, attention is increasingly focused on whether North Korea’s decision to send approximately 100 athletes to the Aichi-Nagoya Asian Games could create an opening for movement in the currently strained North Korea–Japan relationship. Although Pyongyang and Tokyo have remained at odds for years over issues including the abduction of Japanese citizens and North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs, the arrival of a sizable North Korean delegation in Japan could provide a rare opportunity for direct or informal contact between the two sides.The North Korean delegation’s visit to Japan is significant in its own right. Although Japan has, in principle, restricted the entry of North Korean nationals since 2016 in response to North Korea’s nuclear and missile activities, exceptions have been made for athletes participating in international sporting events. As the host country of the Asian Games, Japan has also been coordinating with relevant government agencies regarding the entry and participation of the North Korean delegation.In particular, there has been speculation that North Korea’s Minister of Sports could lead the delegation. If senior North Korean sports officials travel to Japan, they could have opportunities for informal interactions with Japanese government officials and representatives of Japan’s sporting community. Such contacts would be noteworthy because, unlike encounters between South and North Korean delegations at sporting venues or athletes’ villages, high-level contacts between North Korea and Japan remain relatively rare in the absence of formal diplomatic relations between the two countries.At the same time, it would be premature to assume that sports exchanges will immediately lead to high-level political dialogue between North Korea and Japan. The abduction issue remains one of the principal obstacles to improving bilateral relations. The Japanese government continues to call for the immediate return of all Japanese citizens abducted by North Korea. Since 2002, when North Korea acknowledged its abductions of Japanese citizens and five victims were returned to Japan, no additional abductees have been repatriated.The Japanese government has repeatedly expressed its willingness to engage in dialogue with North Korea. In May 2026, at a rally calling for the return of abductees, Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi stated that she would “not rule out any options,” including a summit with North Korean State Affairs Commission Chairman Kim Jong-un, and expressed her determination to make progress on the abduction issue during her tenure. She also appealed directly to Chairman Kim to take a “courageous step forward,” expressing hope that Japan’s message would reach the North Korean people.The critical question, however, is how North Korea will respond. Pyongyang has recently intensified its criticism of Japan’s efforts to strengthen its defense capabilities and its security cooperation with the United States and South Korea. In particular, North Korea has criticized Japan’s efforts to acquire long-range strike capabilities and its testing of U.S.-made Tomahawk cruise missiles, while warning that such developments could trigger a military response. Since last month, criticism of Japan in North Korean state media has also become more pronounced.Against this backdrop, North Korea’s decision to participate in an international sporting event hosted by Japan suggests that Pyongyang is not, at least in the sporting arena, seeking to eliminate all forms of external contact with Japan.From Japan’s perspective, the prospect of renewed U.S.-North Korea engagement also creates an incentive to ensure that North Korea-Japan relations do not become marginalized on the broader diplomatic agenda. Japan’s diplomatic space could become increasingly constrained as North Korea deepens its strategic relationships with China and Russia. North Korea and Russia continue to expand their military and security cooperation, while Pyongyang has also maintained high-level exchanges with Beijing.Accordingly, the Aichi-Nagoya Asian Games are unlikely, by themselves, to produce a fundamental breakthrough in North Korea-Japan relations. They could, however, provide a “low-threshold venue for contact” where the two sides can gauge each other’s intentions without immediately confronting the most contentious political issues.If interactions among athletes, sports officials, and other representatives lead to informal exchanges of views, the Games could provide a modest but potentially meaningful catalyst for reopening communication channels that have remained largely dormant. In this respect, the significance of the Aichi-Nagoya Asian Games may extend beyond the sporting arena: they could offer North Korea and Japan an opportunity to test whether limited engagement in the sports sector can eventually support broader dialogue on bilateral issues.Kim Jong-un Presides Over Enlarged Politburo Meeting, Offers No Response to Trump’s OverturesChairman of the State Affairs Commission Kim Jong-un convened an enlarged meeting of the Political Bureau of the Workers’ Party of Korea (WPK) Central Committee and called for corrective measures to address shortcomings stemming from the “immature operational and command capabilities of economic leadership bodies.” Although U.S. President Donald Trump has recently sent a series of conciliatory signals indicating an interest in resuming dialogue with North Korea, Kim made no public response to those messages.The Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) reported on August 26 that the Political Bureau of the WPK Central Committee convened the 4th Enlarged Meeting of the Political Bureau of the 9th Central Committee on August 25 to strengthen political and practical measures for the successful implementation of key policy tasks for 2026. It added that “Comrade Kim Jong-un presided over the meeting.”The meeting reviewed progress in implementing major policy and construction projects for 2026, as well as the performance of key economic sectors, in accordance with decisions adopted at the first and second plenary meetings of the 9th Central Committee.In this context, Kim pointed to shortcomings that had emerged in the implementation of decisions adopted at the Party Congress. He attributed these problems to “the immature operational and command capabilities of economic leadership bodies, which have failed to keep pace with our heightened ideals and strengthened momentum for progress.” He added that these shortcomings could be overcome through “renewed resolve and a fighting spirit.”Kim did not, however, specify the particular economic projects or policy areas in which such shortcomings had emerged.He further emphasized that the transformation goals established by the 9th Party Congress should not be viewed merely as quantitative economic targets. Rather, he described them as “major political struggle tasks” intended to safeguard the dignity of the state and demonstrate the superiority of North Korea’s political and economic system.He called for the country to “bring this year’s struggle to a victorious conclusion” in order to create the conditions necessary to pursue North Korea’s longer-term strategic objectives.KCNA also reported that the meeting established principles and guidelines for national economic leadership bodies to respond proactively and strategically to changes in the external environment, difficult conditions, and economic challenges. Particular emphasis was placed on ensuring progress in major policy-driven construction projects.The meeting also reviewed strategic adjustments and corresponding measures aimed at strengthening implementation in accordance with prevailing conditions and practical requirements. These measures were intended to ensure the completion of projects scheduled for this year while also improving the implementation of short-, medium-, and long-term economic tasks.Notably, the KCNA report made no reference to President Trump’s recent messages regarding renewed engagement with Kim.On August 25 (local time), President Trump reposted on Truth Social a message he had originally published nine days earlier regarding his decision to scale back U.S.-South Korea joint military exercises. On August 24, he also posted several photographs from his meetings with Kim during the 2018 U.S.-North Korea summit and the 2019 Panmunjom meeting, continuing a series of conciliatory signals toward the North Korean leader.Against this backdrop, Kim’s decision to focus publicly on domestic economic management rather than respond to Trump’s overtures suggests that Pyongyang is, at least for now, prioritizing the implementation of its domestic economic agenda. The absence of a public response does not necessarily indicate that North Korea has ruled out future engagement with Washington, but it underscores that Pyongyang has not yet signaled a willingness to respond directly to Trump’s latest overtures.Income Polarization in North Korea’s Market Sector Has Worsened Since the 2014–2015 Economic ShockIncome polarization in North Korea’s market sector, centered on the jangmadang, has reportedly intensified since the economic shock of 2014–2015, with lower-income households bearing a disproportionate share of the impact.According to a report released on August 23 by Yong-shin Jo, an associate researcher in the Economic Security Research Division of the Bank of Korea’s Economic Research Institute, the income gap among those engaged in informal jangmadang and other market-based activities widened following economic shocks associated with severe droughts and other factors.North Korea’s market sector began expanding rapidly in the mid-to-late 1990s as the country’s rationing system deteriorated amid prolonged economic hardship.The jangmadang, where producers and consumers engage in direct transactions, initially expanded primarily in rural areas before becoming more widespread. The range of goods traded through these markets subsequently broadened to include a wide variety of consumer products.Previous research has suggested that the market sector plays a critical role in household livelihoods, with approximately 70 percent of the general population’s income reportedly derived from market-related activities.North Korea’s market economy, however, lacks effective mechanisms to ensure fair competition, taxation and redistribution, and the protection of private property rights. As a result, it exhibits characteristics of a “quasi-market” system in which access to economic opportunities can be heavily influenced by political connections and access to capital.Jo analyzed changes in income distribution before and after the economic shock that affected North Korea in 2014–2015.During that period, severe drought reduced agricultural production and hydropower generation, while exports declined amid factors including China’s economic slowdown and falling commodity prices. North Korea’s economic growth rate, which had remained positive for the previous four years, fell to negative 1.1 percent in 2015.According to Jo, an analysis of survey data collected from North Korean defectors by Seoul National University’s Institute for Unification and Peace Studies between 2011 and 2020 found that income polarization in informal earnings deepened during 2015–2019 compared with the pre-shock period of 2011–2014.The analysis further found that the widening gap was driven primarily by a sharp increase in the share of lower-income households rather than by a larger share of upper-income households.The report also found that the increased level of income polarization persisted for a considerable period even after the North Korean economy began to recover from the shock.It explained that, in a “quasi-market” environment, external economic shocks can create opportunities for politically connected individuals and those with greater access to capital to increase their economic gains through rent-seeking and low-risk arbitrage. By contrast, lower-middle- and low-income households with weaker economic foundations are more likely to bear the effects of economic shocks directly, producing highly asymmetric outcomes.These findings suggest that economic recovery in North Korea does not necessarily translate into an equitable improvement in household welfare. Rather, the benefits of recovery may be distributed unevenly according to differences in access to political networks, capital, and market opportunities.Against this backdrop, the overall volume of North Korea-China trade has recovered to approximately pre-COVID-19 levels, but the recovery remains uneven and is accompanied by a persistent structural trade deficit.The Hyundai Research Institute reached this assessment in a report titled Analysis and Outlook on North Korea-China Trade in the First Half of 2026, released on August 23.According to the report, total North Korea-China trade reached approximately $1.51 billion in the first half of this year, representing a 19.6 percent increase from approximately $1.26 billion during the same period last year.Annual bilateral trade totaled approximately $2.736 billion in 2025, recovering to 98.1 percent of the level recorded in 2019, before the COVID-19 pandemic.The report assessed that the overall volume of North Korea-China trade had largely returned to pre-pandemic levels during the first half of this year. However, North Korea’s exports remained highly concentrated in a limited number of products, while a structural trade deficit continued to constrain its external economic position.North Korean exports to China during the first half of the year were concentrated in a small number of products, including tungsten ore, recarburizer, and goods subject to simplified customs procedures.The ten largest export categories at the four-digit HS code level accounted for 88.5 percent of North Korea’s total exports. By comparison, the ten largest import categories accounted for only 32.1 percent of total imports.This indicates a pronounced asymmetry in the structure of bilateral trade. North Korea’s exports are concentrated in a relatively small number of foreign-exchange-generating products, while imports are diversified across food, consumer goods, raw materials, and construction materials.Although North Korea’s export-to-import ratio improved from 20.0 percent in the first half of last year to 27.4 percent during the same period this year, the value of imports remained approximately 3.6 times greater than that of exports.As a result, North Korea’s chronic trade deficit with China persisted, widening to approximately $860 million.The report cautioned that an increase in the overall volume of trade should not necessarily be interpreted as an improvement in North Korea’s foreign-exchange earnings or external payment capacity. It emphasized that future assessments of North Korea-China economic relations should focus not only on the volume of bilateral trade but also on changes in the composition and structure of exports and imports.Taken together, the trends in North Korea’s domestic market and external trade point to a broader structural challenge. While North Korea has demonstrated some capacity to restore economic activity and expand external trade, the benefits remain unevenly distributed internally, and the country continues to face limitations in generating sufficient foreign exchange through exports. These constraints are likely to remain important factors shaping Pyongyang’s economic policy and its broader external strategy.

NK Inside· Kim Jong-un Attends Circus Performance with Ju-ae and Visits Revolutionary Martyrs’ Cemetery on Liberation Day· North Korea Calls U.S.–South Korea Exercises a “Grave Military Threat” Despite Trump’s Order to Scale Back· ROK Unification Ministry Seeks to Reduce the “Language of Hostility,” Opens Public Debate on Inter-Korean Terminology and “Main Enemy” DesignationMyongsung KimSecretary General of the SAND InstituteKim Jong-un Attends Circus Performance with Ju-ae and Visits Revolutionary Martyrs’ Cemetery on Liberation DayNorth Korean leader Kim Jong-un marked the 81st anniversary of Korea’s liberation from Japanese colonial rule by attending a circus performance and other sports and cultural events, including swimming and diving competitions, alongside his daughter, Ju-ae. While North Korean state media have continued to report on commemorative activities marking Liberation Day, they have yet to issue any substantive response to South Korean President Lee Jae-myung’s proposal for discussions among the parties concerned on ending the Korean War and transitioning from the armistice regime to a peace regime.The Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) reported on August 17 that the “Comprehensive Acrobatic Performance Celebrating the 81st Anniversary of the Liberation of the Fatherland,” presented by the National Acrobatic Troupe, was held the previous day at the Pyongyang Acrobatic Theater, with Kim Jong-un in attendance.The performance featured tightrope walking and aerial acrobatics that had received awards at international circus festivals. KCNA reported that Kim expressed satisfaction with the performers’ achievements and praised their contributions.According to KCNA, Kim described the National Acrobatic Troupe as “a distinguished artistic ensemble” that has earned the affection of the North Korean people and brought honor and prestige to the country through its world-class acrobatic performances and more than seven decades of artistic activity.Following the performance, Kim posed for a commemorative photograph with officials and performers from the National Acrobatic Troupe. Later that day, he attended a sports and cultural event featuring swimming and diving competitions and watched the events.Kim was accompanied by his daughter, Ju-ae, and his wife, Ri Sol-ju. Photographs released by North Korean state media showed Ju-ae seated in the VIP section immediately beside Kim, occupying the central seat next to her father.The event was also attended by senior North Korean officials, including Workers’ Party of Korea secretaries Jo Yong-won, Ri Il-hwan, Ju Chang-il, and Jong Kyong-thaek; Premier Pak Thae-song; Foreign Minister Choe Son-hui; Defense Minister No Kwang-chol; and Defense Ministry Adviser Pak Jong-chun.Some analysts view Kim’s decision to bring Ju-ae to a high-profile public cultural and sporting event on Liberation Day as part of an ongoing effort to reinforce her public profile as a potential successor. The prominent placement of Ju-ae in official photographs—seated directly beside Kim in the central position—has also drawn attention as a possible indication that the regime continues to elevate her status within North Korea’s political elite.On the eve of Liberation Day, Kim also paid tribute to anti-Japanese revolutionary martyrs and Soviet soldiers who died in combat. The sequence of commemorative activities appears intended to reinforce the regime’s historical legitimacy through the legacy of the anti-Japanese revolution while simultaneously portraying North Korea’s increasingly close relationship with Russia—particularly in the military, diplomatic, and economic spheres—as rooted in a shared historical “blood bond.”According to Rodong Sinmun, the official newspaper of the Workers’ Party of Korea, Kim visited the Taesongsan Revolutionary Martyrs’ Cemetery in Pyongyang on August 14 to commemorate the 81st anniversary of liberation. The ceremony was attended by members of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the Workers’ Party of Korea, as well as senior officials from the Party, government, and military; officials of the Presidium of the Supreme People’s Assembly; members of the Cabinet, committees, ministries, and other central institutions; and senior military commanders.The same day, Kim visited the Liberation Tower in Pyongyang’s Moranbong District. The monument was erected to commemorate Soviet forces that entered northern Korea following Japan’s defeat in 1945 and has long served as a symbol of North Korea-Russia relations.During the ceremony at the Liberation Tower, the Russian and North Korean national anthems were played in succession, and a wreath was laid in Kim’s name. The wreath carried the inscription, “We will never forget the exploits of the Soviet martyrs.”Kim’s decision to pay tribute in succession to anti-Japanese revolutionary martyrs and Soviet soldiers on the occasion of Liberation Day appears to be an effort to link North Korea’s current military cooperation with Russia to its historical relationship with the Soviet Union, thereby reinforcing the regime’s narrative of the legitimacy and durability of the North Korea–Russia partnership.The messaging is particularly significant given North Korea’s support for Russia’s war in Ukraine and the unprecedented expansion of bilateral military cooperation. By portraying the relationship as a “blood bond” that transcends narrower strategic interests, Kim appears to be framing North Korea–Russia solidarity as a long-term historical partnership rather than a transactional alignment driven solely by current geopolitical considerations.Some analysts interpret this messaging as an effort to link the Soviet military’s historical role in the defeat of Japan to the contemporary North Korea–Russia relationship, thereby presenting the current partnership as part of a continuing historical legacy.North Korea Calls U.S.–South Korea Exercises a “Grave Military Threat” Despite Trump’s Order to Scale BackNorth Korea has warned about the South Korea–U.S. joint Ulchi Freedom Shield (UFS) exercise, stating that its “exercise of the right to self-defense to thoroughly neutralize the military threats posed by the enemies” will be demonstrated through “even more explicit actions.”In a commentary released on August 19, KCNA stated that “it is necessary to respond to the increasingly evolving threatening actions of our enemies with evolved new forces.”KCNA further warned that “enemies who infringe upon and threaten the sovereignty and security of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea will remain within the crosshairs of annihilating retaliatory measures.” It added that “all aggressive war exercises conducted by hostile nations will ultimately fail to achieve the objectives pursued by their perpetrators.”North Korea specifically criticized the content, format, and scale of this year’s UFS. KCNA described the exercise as undergoing an “increasingly dangerous evolution,” arguing that it differs from previous iterations in both scope and character.Pyongyang also expressed particular concern over the participation of the United Nations Command (UNC), arguing that the UNC’s involvement represents “a full-scale effort to revive its combat capabilities and expand its role” and constitutes a development that “cannot be overlooked.”North Korea further argued that the prolonged duration of UFS would contribute to a deterioration in security conditions on the Korean Peninsula. KCNA stated that the drills, which had continued for more than ten days, were pushing an already tense situation toward a “tipping point” for renewed conflict.It warned that the “dangerous expansion and intensification” of the exercises would inevitably contribute to further deterioration of the security environment on the Korean Peninsula and in the broader Asia-Pacific region.Notably, the commentary did not directly address U.S. President Donald Trump’s recent order to scale back certain South Korea–U.S. joint military exercises or the ongoing consultations between South Korean and U.S. military authorities on how to implement the directive.Instead, North Korea repeatedly emphasized that it would strengthen its military response, characterizing UFS as an “aggressive war exercise” conducted by the United States and South Korea. Its statement that it would respond to “evolving threats with evolved new forces” appears to leave open the possibility of additional military signaling or demonstrations of force.North Korea’s response is particularly noteworthy because it comes amid renewed discussion of the possibility of U.S.–North Korea dialogue, while South Korea and the United States continue to maintain their combined defense posture. Rather than immediately responding to signals suggesting a potential opening for diplomacy, Pyongyang appears intent on preserving military pressure by continuing to portray the allied exercises as a direct security threat.The statement that North Korea will exercise its “right to self-defense” through “even more explicit actions” has prompted some analysts to caution that additional demonstrations of military capability—including missile launches—cannot be ruled out. The commentary, however, did not identify any specific weapons systems or announce a concrete operational plan.North Korea has previously conducted military activities, including ballistic missile launches, around the time of major South Korea–U.S. military exercises, using the drills as justification for its own demonstrations of force. Whether Pyongyang will again use UFS as a pretext for military escalation remains to be seen.ROK Unification Ministry Seeks to Reduce the “Language of Hostility,” Opens Public Debate on Inter-Korean Terminology and “Main Enemy” DesignationSouth Korea’s Ministry of Unification is launching an effort to reduce what it describes as the “language of hostility” embedded in South Korean society, with the stated goal of promoting mutual respect and peaceful coexistence between the two Koreas. The initiative includes public discussions on how the two Koreas refer to one another and whether to reconsider the use of the term “main enemy.” The ministry also plans to pursue the restoration of inter-Korean communication channels, including the Panmunjom liaison channel and military hotlines, as well as the restoration of the September 19 Comprehensive Military Agreement.On August 15, the Ministry of Unification unveiled follow-up measures related to the three frameworks for peaceful coexistence on the Korean Peninsula—“inclusive peaceful coexistence,” “stable peaceful coexistence,” and “responsible peaceful coexistence”—presented by President Lee Jae-myung in his address commemorating the 81st anniversary of Liberation Day.Speaking at the Liberation Day ceremony at the Sejong Center for the Performing Arts in Seoul, President Lee stated that South Korea would “embark on a journey to end the war and transform the unstable armistice regime on the Korean Peninsula into a peace regime,” reaffirming his commitment to pursuing peaceful coexistence.The Ministry of Unification has decided to begin by addressing hostile perceptions, norms, and institutional practices that continue to shape inter-Korean relations, as part of its effort to advance “inclusive peaceful coexistence.”As its first follow-up measure, the ministry plans to initiate “public discourse aimed at changing the language of hostility within our own society.” Key issues will include the terminology and titles used by the two Koreas when referring to one another, as well as whether the term “main enemy” should be reconsidered. The ministry plans to solicit views from across South Korean society before consulting with relevant government agencies on specific policy measures.The government also plans to further develop the existing National Community Unification Formula to reflect changes in inter-Korean relations. A new implementation framework will be developed based on expert assessments, public consultations, and changes in the security and political environment surrounding the Korean Peninsula.In the area of inter-Korean exchanges and cooperation, initiatives in healthcare, the Wonsan-Kalma tourism zone, a Seoul–Beijing high-speed rail connection, and cooperation related to the Greater Tumen Initiative (GTI) are expected to be developed as part of what the government describes as the “Four Major Peace Exchange” projects.The government also plans to pursue measures designed to reduce military tensions and prevent accidental clashes between the two Koreas. The Ministry of Unification intends to propose dialogue with North Korea when appropriate to restore inter-Korean communication mechanisms, including channels at Panmunjom and military hotlines.The government has also decided to develop specific plans and timelines for restoring the September 19 Comprehensive Military Agreement in consultation with relevant ministries. Signed by the two Koreas in 2018, the agreement includes measures designed to prevent accidental military clashes in border areas and reduce military tensions. The government views its restoration as a means of reestablishing a basic safety mechanism for managing military tensions between the two Koreas.The government is also preparing initiatives for the peaceful use of border areas. These include establishing so-called “peace anchors” through projects such as the “Path of Peace” in the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ), the “DMZ Peace Link Train,” the designation of Peace Economy Special Zones, and the resumption of the Seoul–Wonsan rail line restoration project.The government also plans to accelerate discussions on transitioning from the current armistice regime to a peace regime. Seoul intends to explain its vision for a peace regime on the Korean Peninsula to key countries and seek broader international support, while developing practical measures to halt the continued advancement of North Korea’s nuclear capabilities.The approach is consistent with President Lee’s proposal in his Liberation Day address that the parties concerned should “set aside mutual threats and begin discussions to end this very long war.” President Lee also stated that inter-Korean dialogue could provide an opportunity to discuss “effective measures to halt the advancement of North Korea’s nuclear capabilities.”The Ministry of Unification stated that, based on the President’s firm commitment to peaceful coexistence on the Korean Peninsula, it would work closely with relevant ministries, engage in broad public consultation, and move forward without delay with follow-up measures to implement the three major frameworks.

NK Inside· North Korea Has Criticized Japan Eleven Times This Month Alone, Aligning Its Actions with China and Russia in “Cooperation Against Japan”· North Korea: “Increase Local Government Revenue and Residents’ Per Capita Income” · North Korea Fires Missile into the East Sea Ahead of U.S.-South Korea Joint DrillsMyongsung KimSecretary General of the SAND InstituteNorth Korea Has Criticized Japan Eleven Times This Month Alone, Aligning Its Actions with China and Russia in “Cooperation Against Japan”North Korea has already criticized Japan’s military buildup eleven times this month. Since the beginning of the month, a significant portion of Rodong Sinmun’s critical coverage of Japan has cited statements by Chinese foreign and defense ministry spokespersons, prompting speculation that North Korea is seeking to align its approach with those of China and Russia as part of a broader effort toward “cooperation against Japan.”From August 1 to 12, Rodong Sinmun, the official newspaper of North Korea’s Workers’ Party, published a series of articles and commentaries addressing Japan’s military buildup and nuclear policies. Eight of these pieces directly quoted statements by spokespersons for China’s Foreign and Defense Ministries criticizing Japan. Combined with a statement by Kim Yo-jong, Director of the General Affairs Department of the Workers’ Party, as well as North Korea’s own commentaries, these messages condemning Japan appeared at a rate of nearly one per day.The most notable aspect of North Korea’s campaign against Japan is the direct involvement of Kim Yo-jong.On August 5, Kim issued a statement titled “Japan’s Possession of Preemptive Strike Capabilities as a War-Crime Nation Poses a Serious Threat to International Peace and Stability.” Analysts note that her direct criticism of Japan’s military policies—despite her having primarily addressed issues involving South Korea and the United States—underscores the sensitivity with which the North Korean leadership views Japan’s ongoing military buildup.Kim specifically criticized the test launch of a Tomahawk long-range cruise missile from an Aegis destroyer of the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force. Emphasizing that the Tomahawks acquired by Japan could place North Korea and other neighboring countries within range, she portrayed Japan’s acquisition of the system as evidence that Tokyo is developing a preemptive-strike capability.She warned, “We will absolutely not stand idly by.” More significantly, she stated that the North Korean military and leadership “will establish additional, clear military options in response to Japan’s transformation.” This suggests that North Korea may develop specific military countermeasures in response to Japan’s expanding defense capabilities.On August 6, one day after Kim’s statement, North Korea launched a short-range ballistic missile toward the East Sea. Although Pyongyang did not explicitly link the launch to its tensions with Japan, concerns have emerged that North Korea’s stated determination to respond to Japan’s strengthening long-range strike capabilities could translate into concrete military action.North Korea has also reacted strongly to the possibility that Japan could reconsider its Three Non-Nuclear Principles. On August 2, Rodong Sinmun published an article titled “Why Is Japan Trying to Revise the Three Non-Nuclear Principles?” criticizing the possibility of a review of Japan’s nuclear policy. It characterized discussions within Japan’s defense establishment regarding a possible policy review—including the potential deployment of nuclear weapons—as evidence of “ambitions to possess nuclear weapons.”On August 9, North Korea also criticized the Japanese government’s announcement that it would maintain the Three Non-Nuclear Principles. In a brief commentary titled “A Cheap Trick,” Rodong Sinmun described the government’s commitment to maintaining the principles as a “deception.” It argued that the Japanese government had merely put forward the Chief Cabinet Secretary to contain domestic and international criticism while, in practice, keeping open the possibility of acquiring nuclear weapons.On August 12, North Korea further intensified its criticism of Japan’s moves to revise the Three Non-Nuclear Principles, declaring, “Any attempt to acquire nuclear weapons must be resolutely nipped in the bud.”Behind North Korea’s “attacks on Japan” lies China. Another notable feature of Pyongyang’s recent campaign against Japan is its active amplification of Beijing’s criticism of Tokyo.A significant portion of Rodong Sinmun’s reporting on Japan this month has consisted of statements by spokespersons for China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of National Defense. On August 1, it reported remarks by a Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson criticizing historical revisionism among Japan’s right-wing forces. On August 2, it featured comments by a Chinese Defense Ministry spokesperson criticizing the possibility that Japan’s defense authorities might review the Three Non-Nuclear Principles.On August 4, Rodong Sinmun published remarks by Chinese officials criticizing Japan’s plans to establish a National Intelligence Agency. On August 7 and 8, it featured Chinese comments challenging the “China threat theory” cited in Japan’s Defense White Paper, as well as criticism of Tokyo’s efforts to expand its long-range strike capabilities.On August 9, marking the 81st anniversary of the atomic bombing of Hiroshima, the newspaper carried remarks by a Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson condemning Japan’s moves toward acquiring nuclear weapons. On August 10, it reported comments by a Chinese Defense Ministry spokesperson criticizing Japan’s Tomahawk test launches, deployment of long-range missiles, and efforts to strengthen its counterstrike capabilities.On August 11, Rodong Sinmun even reported remarks by a Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson claiming that approximately 80 percent of the Japanese public opposes maintaining the Three Non-Nuclear Principles and “nuclear sharing.”North Korea’s intensive coverage of China’s criticism of Japan is widely interpreted as an effort to publicly underscore that Pyongyang and Beijing share broadly similar assessments of Japan’s military expansion.A South Korean Ministry of Unification official stated, “North Korea has recently intensified its criticism by portraying Japan’s military developments and trilateral security cooperation among South Korea, the United States, and Japan as threats to peace and security in the Asia-Pacific region.” The official added, “We assess that, while North Korea is actively seeking to justify the expansion of its nuclear capabilities, it is also seeking to strengthen its ties with China and Russia by aligning its position with theirs on regional security issues.”North Korea: “Increase Local Government Revenue and Residents’ Per Capita Income” As North Korea moves forward with the “Local Development 20×10 Policy,” a flagship economic initiative of the Kim Jong-un regime, it has begun to place greater public emphasis on increasing local governments’ revenues and raising residents’ per capita income. Until recently, the policy had focused primarily on expanding physical infrastructure—including factories, hospitals, and cultural facilities—across the country.The latest emphasis suggests a shift toward an “operational” phase in which newly built facilities are expected to generate revenue and contribute to improvements in living standards.In an article titled “The Development of Cities and Counties Must Be Thoroughly Self-Reliant,” published on August 8, Rodong Sinmun, the official newspaper of the Workers’ Party of Korea, emphasized that “we must effectively develop and utilize the region’s natural and geographical potential and resources, and achieve self-reliant development by firmly relying on our own capabilities.” In particular, it cited Sinpo City in South Hamgyong Province, noting that “measures are also being put in place to ensure that the city’s total revenue and per capita income can be increased beyond current levels.”It is notable that North Korean state media explicitly cited both “total regional revenue” and “per capita income”—conventional indicators of economic performance—when assessing local development. This suggests a potential shift in the policy’s performance criteria: rather than measuring success simply by the number of local factories constructed, the leadership appears increasingly interested in the revenue generated by local economies and whether residents’ livelihoods actually improve.The “20×10” local development policy, which North Korean leader Kim Jong-un has vigorously promoted since 2024, calls for transforming the industrial infrastructure of 200 cities and counties over a 10-year period by constructing local industrial facilities in 20 cities and counties each year. Initially, the policy focused on establishing local industrial plants producing food and everyday necessities. Beginning in late 2024, however, North Korea expanded the scope of the policy to include not only local industrial plants but also city- and county-level hospitals, scientific, educational, and cultural facilities, and grain-management facilities—the so-called “three essential projects.”The more difficult challenge lies in the post-construction phase. Even when the central government builds factories and facilities and transfers them to local authorities, those facilities cannot operate effectively if local governments are unable to secure raw materials or face shortages of electricity, transportation, and skilled labor. Even when goods can be produced, inventories are likely to accumulate if purchasing power remains weak and distribution networks are underdeveloped.Against this backdrop, analysts suggest that the North Korean leadership’s repeated emphasis on “self-reliant development” reflects an awareness of these practical constraints. Rodong Sinmun stated that “even when considering the operation of local industrial factories alone, raw material sources, production sites, and consumption areas must be concentrated within the region to ensure maximum effectiveness and achieve expanded reproduction.”In other words, the objective is to source raw materials locally, produce goods locally, and market them locally, thereby keeping economic activity and revenue within the region. This can be understood as an attempt to establish a “virtuous cycle” within North Korea’s local economies. North Korea has highlighted Sinpo City as a leading example. The city illustrates how Pyongyang is seeking to leverage marine resources as part of its local development strategy. Kim Jong-un visited Sinpo several times in 2024 to oversee the construction of a marine aquaculture facility. North Korea is now constructing a seafood processing plant in the same area.Rodong Sinmun reported that Sinpo is “increasing its economic potential by revitalizing modern marine aquaculture facilities and local industrial plants,” adding that “projects to build a modern seafood processing plant near the Sinpo City marine aquaculture facility are also making substantial progress.” This reflects a broader shift in how North Korea approaches local economic management. The objective is no longer simply to expand aquaculture production, but to establish an integrated value chain linking aquaculture, processing, and marketing.By processing locally sourced seafood such as kelp and clams, improving product quality, and marketing the resulting products, North Korea can potentially generate greater value than through the production and sale of raw materials alone.Consistent with this approach, North Korea, in highlighting the Sinpo case, emphasized not only “improving product quality,” but also “reducing costs” and “expanding product varieties.”In other words, local development policy appears to be moving beyond a narrow focus on production volumes toward greater attention to profitability and productivity. There also appear to be fiscal considerations behind North Korea’s growing emphasis on local “revenue.”The “20×10” policy entails large-scale construction projects in 20 cities and counties each year. Simultaneously constructing hospitals, factories, cultural facilities, and grain-storage facilities requires substantial financial resources, labor, and materials. North Korea has long devoted significant resources to its nuclear and missile programs and broader military sector. Expanding local development projects nationwide at the same time inevitably increases the fiscal and resource burden on the central government. Rodong Sinmun’s assertion that “amid the country’s still-limited economic circumstances, the state’s decision to bear the full cost and ceaselessly expand and deepen projects for local transformation on a nationwide scale is a bold decision that only our Party can make” can be understood in this context.The newspaper also emphasized local self-reliance, stating, “It is not the fighting spirit of our people to simply hope that the Party will solve everything and sit idly by waiting for conditions to improve.” Ultimately, this can be interpreted as an effort to establish a division of responsibility in which the central government finances major construction while local governments assume greater responsibility for subsequent operations. Particularly noteworthy is the reference to “per capita income.” Although North Korea has long emphasized improving residents’ livelihoods, it has rarely presented residents’ income at the local level as a key measure of policy performance in the way that market-oriented economies typically do.In this edition of Rodong Sinmun, however, the newspaper cited both “the city’s total revenue” and “per capita income” when describing the development of Sinpo City. This may indicate that Pyongyang is seeking to assess the success of its local development policy not merely in terms of construction achievements or production volumes, but also in terms of the economic value generated by local economies and its impact on residents’ living standards. According to South Korea’s Bank of Korea, North Korea’s nominal gross national income (GNI) in 2024 was estimated at 44.4 trillion won, while its per capita GNI was estimated at 1.719 million won. By comparison, South Korea’s per capita GNI stood at 50.12 million won—approximately 29 times higher.Given the low overall income level of the North Korean economy, simply increasing the supply of goods has clear limitations when it comes to raising household incomes.Ultimately, local economies need production and commercial activities capable of generating actual revenue and income. This appears to be one reason the North Korean leadership has increasingly emphasized not only factory operating rates, raw-material supplies, and product quality and costs, but also local revenues and residents’ incomes.The 20×10 Policy for Local Development is now approaching a critical test. Constructing buildings can, to some extent, be accomplished through centralized resource allocation and mobilization. Keeping factories operating efficiently and generating sustainable revenue, however, presents a fundamentally different challenge. North Korea’s local economies face persistent shortages of raw materials, energy, transportation infrastructure, and skilled workers. International sanctions also make it difficult to reliably import raw materials, equipment, and other production inputs. In particular, even if new consumer-goods factories are completed, sustaining sales will be difficult if local residents lack sufficient purchasing power.Electricity supply is another major constraint. Stable factory operations require reliable access to electricity and raw materials, yet chronic power shortages remain a structural problem in North Korea. Ultimately, whether the country’s concept of “self-reliant development” produces meaningful economic self-reliance will depend less on how many factories are built than on how consistently and efficiently those factories can operate.There are also structural limitations in the policy design itself. North Korea’s current “20×10” strategy relies heavily on the central government to lead major construction projects, after which local authorities are expected to assume responsibility for operations. This approach can reduce regional disparities in the short term by directing central resources to underdeveloped areas. At the same time, however, it risks leaving local authorities responsible for operating costs, raw-material procurement, and securing skilled technical personnel once construction is complete.Rodong Sinmun appears to acknowledge this challenge. It emphasized the need to proceed “with foresight” in training engineers and skilled workers, developing raw-material production bases, and securing supplies. Conversely, this may suggest that the leadership recognizes that local factories are already facing structural shortages of raw materials, labor, and technical expertise. Moreover, if the central government continues to concentrate resources in selected regions, regional disparities could, paradoxically, widen. Resources and skilled personnel may become concentrated in areas deemed politically important or in regions that Kim Jong-un has personally visited and prioritized.Regional development policies are not driven solely by economic considerations. Analysts suggest that the Kim Jong-un regime’s successive efforts to narrow the gap in living standards between Pyongyang and the provinces—and to expand access to consumer goods, medical services, and education in rural areas—also serve a broader political purpose: addressing public dissatisfaction stemming from regional disparities in living conditions.This is particularly important in a North Korean society where marketization has advanced considerably. For many residents, the state’s reported production figures matter less than practical questions: how easily they can obtain food and everyday necessities, how much income they can earn, and what educational opportunities they can provide for their children. Accordingly, simultaneously promoting local factory construction and raising residents’ incomes serves both economic and social-management functions. This helps explain why Kim Jong-un has repeatedly emphasized linking regional development to “improving the people’s livelihood.” The key concept in North Korea’s regional development strategy now appears to be shifting from “factory construction” to “self-reliant development.” The more fundamental question, however, is not whether the slogan of self-reliance is being promoted, but whether local economies can establish sustainable, revenue-generating structures. The Sinpo model—using local marine resources for aquaculture and then processing those products at nearby seafood-processing facilities to generate greater added value—offers one potentially viable model for North Korea’s local economies.In agricultural regions, North Korea could similarly establish raw-material production bases to supply local factories, which could then produce food and everyday necessities for local consumers. If successful, such a model could create a self-sustaining economic cycle: production → processing → sales → income → reinvestment. Conversely, if the central government must continue supplying raw materials, electricity, and skilled labor—and if factories operate primarily in response to political directives—local industrial facilities risk becoming little more than “showcase projects.”Ultimately, the success of Kim Jong-un’s “20×10” local development policy will not be measured by the number of completion ceremonies held. The more meaningful test will be whether local economies can establish a virtuous cycle in which they generate their own revenue, residents’ incomes actually increase, and those revenues are reinvested in local economic activity. From this perspective, North Korea’s decision to explicitly highlight both “total municipal revenue” and “per capita income” in this edition of Rodong Sinmun is particularly significant.North Korea Fires Missile into the East Sea Ahead of U.S.-South Korea Joint DrillsAhead of the U.S.-South Korea joint military exercise “Ulchi Freedom Shield” (UFS), North Korea launched another ballistic missile into the East Sea, marking its first such launch in six days. South Korea’s Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) announced that it detected one ballistic missile launched from the Wonsan area of North Korea toward the East Sea at approximately 6:00 a.m. on August 12.“The North Korean missile flew more than 700 kilometers, and South Korean and U.S. authorities are conducting a detailed analysis to determine its precise specifications,” the JCS said. Missiles with ranges of approximately 300 to 1,000 kilometers are generally classified as short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs).North Korea’s known SRBM arsenal includes the KN-23, a North Korean system modeled on Russia’s Iskander, with an estimated range of approximately 700 to 800 kilometers. However, the JCS did not explicitly classify the missile launched on August 12 as an SRBM.This leaves open the possibility that the missile was a different system from those previously tested or that it was a medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM), generally defined as having a range of 1,000 to 3,000 kilometers, launched on a depressed trajectory to limit its flight distance.South Korean military authorities are reportedly considering both possibilities as they conduct a more detailed assessment of the missile’s characteristics and type.North Korea previously launched an SRBM toward the East Sea from the Wonsan area on the afternoon of August 6, raising the possibility that the latest launch involved the same or a similar missile system.At the time, North Korean state media did not report the launch, prompting speculation that the test represented a somewhat different pattern from Pyongyang’s usual practice of publicly highlighting major weapons tests.Regarding the latest launch, the JCS stated that “South Korean and U.S. intelligence authorities have been closely monitoring developments since the initial stages of the launch and have shared relevant information regarding North Korea’s ballistic missile activity with Japan.”“Under the robust U.S.-South Korea combined defense posture, our military is closely monitoring North Korea’s various activities while maintaining the capability and readiness to respond decisively to any provocation,” the JCS added. The projectile, assessed to have been a North Korean ballistic missile, was also reportedly visible to the naked eye from the coast near Gonghyeonjin in Goseong County, Gangwon Province, approximately 130 kilometers from Wonsan in a straight-line distance.The launch marks North Korea’s eleventh ballistic missile test of the year. The test came ahead of the annual Ulchi Freedom Shield (UFS), which is scheduled to take place from August 17 to 27. North Korea has consistently denounced UFS as a “drill for an invasion of North Korea” and has frequently conducted missile launches and other military demonstrations around the time of the exercises.In response to the latest launch, South Korea’s National Security Office convened an “emergency security situation review meeting” involving relevant agencies, including the Ministry of National Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Officials expressed concern over North Korea’s repeated ballistic missile launches, following the previous launch on August 6, and reviewed the security situation and the military’s readiness posture.

NK Inside· North Korea Also Hit by Extreme Heat as Temperatures Near 40°C; Water Parks and Wonsan Beach Attract Large Crowds· North Korea Warns Cadres Against Sycophancy, Declaring Flattery “Anti-Party and Counterrevolutionary”· North Korean Defense Minister Attends China’s PLA Anniversary Event in PyongyangMyongsung KimSecretary General of the SAND InstituteNorth Korea Also Hit by Extreme Heat as Temperatures Near 40°C; Water Parks and Wonsan Beach Attract Large CrowdsAs North Korea experiences a prolonged heat wave, with daytime temperatures approaching 40°C (104°F) and persistent tropical nights, state media have highlighted increasing attendance at beaches and water parks across the country. With Pyongyang recording its fifth consecutive tropical night, the Wonsan-Kalma Coastal Tourist Zone and major water parks in the capital have reportedly attracted large numbers of visitors. These developments underscore both the severity of this summer’s heat wave and the regime’s efforts to promote domestic leisure activities.According to the Korean Central Broadcasting Station (KCBS) on August 3, North Korea issued a heat wave warning for most regions south of the central provinces and parts of the northern areas through August 9. Meanwhile, a high temperature warning remains in effect for Pyongyang, North Pyongan Province, and parts of Jagang Province through August 8.In areas under the high temperature warning, daytime highs are forecast to range from 35°C to 40°C, while regions under the heat wave warning are expected to experience relative humidity levels above 70 percent, with daytime temperatures ranging between 33°C and 35°C.Pyongyang has experienced both extreme daytime heat and persistent tropical nights. On August 3, the city’s morning low reached 28°C, approximately 5°C above the seasonal average, while daytime temperatures were expected to rise to 35°C. The capital has recorded five consecutive tropical nights since July 27, with overnight temperatures remaining above 25°C.As the heat wave continues, North Korea’s principal summer recreation sites have reportedly seen a surge in visitors.Korean Central Television (KCTV) reported that tens of thousands of visitors have traveled to the Wonsan-Kalma Coastal Tourist Zone in the month since its opening on July 1. The broadcaster described crowds extending along the famous Myongsasipri beach, highlighting official efforts to promote Wonsan-Kalma as North Korea’s premier coastal tourism destination.KCTV also reported that the Mangyongdae and Munsu Water Parks in Pyongyang have been operating at full capacity, attracting workers, students, and families on a daily basis.In an August 2 article titled “A Sea of People, A Sea of Laughter,” the Rodong Sinmun stated that Munsu Water Park has been filled to capacity every day during the peak summer season. The article also noted that visitors have arrived not only from Pyongyang but also from other provinces.At the same time, North Korean authorities have intensified public messaging on heat-related health precautions in response to the prolonged period of extreme temperatures.Citing physicians at Pyongyang General Hospital, the Rodong Sinmun advised individuals with cardiovascular disease, diabetes, and hyperthyroidism to exercise particular caution during the heat wave.The newspaper also recommended consuming foods traditionally believed to help relieve heat stress—including watermelon, mung beans, and cucumbers—as well as nutrient-rich dishes such as dog meat soup, fish porridge, and red bean porridge. It further advised residents to avoid excessive outdoor physical activity during periods of high temperatures and humidity and instructed those experiencing symptoms of heat illness to immediately move to cooler environments, apply cooling measures, and seek medical treatment when necessary.The sustained emphasis in North Korean state media on heat-related health guidance appears aimed at mitigating public health risks associated with the prolonged heat wave while minimizing potential social disruption. At the same time, extensive coverage of crowded tourist destinations and recreational facilities serves to showcase the regime’s investment in domestic tourism infrastructure and project an image of social normalcy despite extreme weather conditions.North Korea Warns Cadres Against Sycophancy, Declaring Flattery “Anti-Party and Counterrevolutionary”As North Korea intensifies its recent campaign against corruption and lax discipline among Party officials, the regime has publicly identified flattery and sycophancy within the cadre corps as political threats. By portraying privilege and personal loyalty networks as sources of institutional corruption, Pyongyang appears to be seeking to curb both factionalism and abuses of authority while reinforcing centralized Party control.In a commentary published on August 1 titled “Let Us Make the Party’s Ideology and Intentions Our Creed in Work and Life,” the Rodong Sinmun argued that “when officials abuse their authority through privilege or bureaucratic practices, flattery inevitably takes root,” urging cadres to adhere strictly to Party principles.The newspaper further asserted that “idealizing individuals is itself contrary to Party principles” and declared that “there is no flattery divorced from personal gain or career advancement.” It characterized flattery as a process that “begins with ideological degeneration and ultimately leads to anti-Party and counterrevolutionary acts,” framing the issue as a systemic political threat rather than merely an individual ethical failing.According to the commentary, officials who abandon Party principles inevitably begin evaluating others based on personal relationships and political influence rather than institutional standards, creating an environment in which influential figures become the objects of personal loyalty. The newspaper warned that such practices undermine the revolutionary discipline and collective cohesion of Party organizations.The Rodong Sinmun also condemned officials’ sense of entitlement, arguing that the exercise of privilege reflects a belief that one is “a special being.” It emphasized that authority entrusted by the Party and the people must serve the public interest rather than personal power, privilege, or bureaucratic abuse.The commentary repeatedly emphasized absolute adherence to Party principles, urging officials to remain “not even 0.001 millimeters” removed from the Party line and declaring that cadres should be prepared to defend Party principles “even at the cost of their lives.” It further warned that the Party would continue to act uncompromisingly against any official who deviates from Party discipline, regardless of rank or status.The article is consistent with North Korea’s broader campaign to strengthen internal discipline among officials. In recent months, state media and Party meetings have repeatedly condemned abuses of power, bureaucratism, corruption, and privileged behavior while emphasizing ideological inspections and organizational discipline. One notable example was the recent prosecution of a deputy director of the Korean People’s Army General Political Bureau on corruption charges.Kim Jong-un has likewise repeatedly stressed the need to reform officials’ attitudes toward the public, arguing that changes in their moral character and work style must precede improvements in administrative competence. Against this backdrop, the latest commentary appears intended to identify sycophancy surrounding powerful officials as a root cause of corruption while reinforcing the principle that loyalty should be directed toward the Party and its institutional line rather than toward individuals.Taken together, North Korea’s public criticism of flattery appears to extend beyond efforts to improve organizational culture. Rather, it reflects an effort to curb corruption, factionalism, and excessive competition for political favor while strengthening centralized Party control over the cadre corps. By discouraging personal patronage networks, the regime seeks to reinforce a unified command structure centered on Kim Jong-un and the Party leadership.North Korean Defense Minister Attends China’s PLA Anniversary Event in PyongyangNorth Korea and China reaffirmed their traditional friendship and growing military ties during a reception in Pyongyang commemorating the 99th anniversary of the founding of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). North Korea’s decision to send Minister of National Defense No Kwang-chol—representing a higher level of participation than in previous years—underscored the continued improvement in bilateral relations following recent summit diplomacy between the two countries.According to the Chinese Embassy in Pyongyang and the Rodong Sinmun, the reception was held on July 28 at the Chinese Embassy.The event was attended by senior Chinese officials, including Ambassador Wang Yajun, Minister-Counselor Chi Han, and Defense Attaché Brigadier General Wang Yisheng, as well as approximately 150 participants, including North Korean Minister of National Defense No Kwang-chol, senior Party officials, military officers, government representatives, foreign diplomats, and military attachés stationed in Pyongyang.Particular attention was drawn to North Korea’s decision to elevate the level of representation. Whereas last year’s ceremony was attended by Vice Minister of National Defense Kim Kang-il, this year’s delegation was led by Defense Minister No Kwang-chol, suggesting that bilateral military relations have continued to improve following the North Korea-China summit meetings held in September 2025 and June 2026. Beyond the higher-level representation, however, the overall composition and scale of the event remained largely unchanged.During the reception, officials from both countries emphasized the continuation of military exchanges and cooperation based on agreements reached by their respective leaders.Ambassador Wang Yajun stated that, under the strategic guidance of the top leadership of both countries, the armed forces should strengthen communication, deepen cooperation, and carry forward the traditional friendship forged through shared historical experiences. He further emphasized the importance of cooperation in advancing socialism, improving public welfare, and promoting regional peace and stability.Defense Attaché Wang Yisheng similarly pledged to faithfully implement the outcomes of recent China-DPRK summit diplomacy and reaffirmed China’s commitment to expanding military exchanges in accordance with the guidance of the leaders of both countries.Minister No Kwang-chol responded that the armed forces of North Korea and China have developed enduring comradely ties through a long history of shared struggle and continue to contribute jointly to regional peace, security, and international justice. He expressed confidence that implementing the agreements reached by the two leaders would further advance traditional bilateral friendship and socialist cooperation.China commemorates August 1, 1927—the date of the Nanchang Uprising, which marked the founding of the Chinese Red Army—as PLA Day. North Korea has traditionally recognized the occasion through official editorials in the Rodong Sinmun or by participating in commemorative events hosted by the Chinese Embassy.The Pyongyang reception had been suspended after the 2019 ceremony and resumed in 2025 following a six-year hiatus. The continued participation of senior officials and repeated public commitments to military cooperation suggest that North Korea and China are accelerating the restoration of bilateral cooperation not only in the political and diplomatic spheres but also in the defense and military domains.

< North Korean Trends, July 2026 > Parallel Pursuit of Naval Modernization and Regional Development Amid Deepening Strategic Cooperation with China and Russia                    Seung-hyun LeePh.D in Public AdministrationResearch Fellow, Sand Research InstituteIn July 2026, North Korea continued to pursue a dual-track strategy of advancing naval modernization while implementing regional development initiatives, alongside a foreign policy increasingly centered on strategic cooperation with China and Russia. Although Kim Jong-un's public appearances declined modestly compared to the previous month, his activities reflected an effort to sustain regime stability and maintain policy momentum by balancing priorities across the diplomatic, military, economic, and social sectors. Strengthening strategic ties with China and Russia, modernizing naval capabilities, advancing the "20×10 Regional Development Policy," and reinforcing revolutionary traditions emerged as the regime's principal policy priorities throughout the month.In the political and diplomatic sphere, the 65th anniversary of the DPRK–China Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance marked the month's most significant diplomatic event. Kim Jong-un met with Wang Huning, Chairman of the National Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC), during the latter's visit to Pyongyang and emphasized the importance of further strengthening bilateral relations in response to the evolving strategic environment. The meeting is widely regarded as a follow-up to the June summit between the two countries' leaders and reaffirmed their shared commitment to expanding cooperation across the political, economic, and cultural domains while maintaining close strategic coordination. In addition, North Korean Foreign Minister Choe Son-hui traveled to Russia to participate in the third DPRK–Russia Strategic Dialogue, where both sides continued consultations on implementing the Treaty on Comprehensive Strategic Partnership. Collectively, these diplomatic engagements suggest that Pyongyang continues to rely on closer strategic alignment with Beijing and Moscow to expand its diplomatic maneuvering space amid an increasingly competitive international environment.In the military sphere, naval modernization and the enhancement of strategic deterrence remained central priorities. Kim Jong-un observed operational performance tests of weapons systems aboard the newly commissioned destroyer Ganggon-ho and personally inspected the operational readiness of strategic cruise missiles and shipboard weapons systems. Subsequently, an enlarged meeting of the Central Military Commission of the Workers' Party reviewed command-and-control arrangements, military preparedness, and future force development priorities aimed at addressing the evolving character of modern warfare. During commemorative events marking Victory Day, Kim also highlighted the sacrifices of the wartime generation and the importance of preserving revolutionary traditions, thereby reinforcing ideological cohesion between the military and society. Meanwhile, North Korea's Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of National Defense issued successive statements criticizing the expansion of trilateral security cooperation among South Korea, the United States, and Japan, reaffirming Pyongyang's longstanding hardline stance toward Washington and its regional allies. These developments suggest that North Korea continues to prioritize not only strategic weapons development but also broader military modernization—particularly naval force development—as a central component of its long-term defense strategy.In the economic sphere, implementation of the "20×10 Regional Development Policy" continued. Kim Jong Un conducted on-site inspections of regional development projects in Rakwon County, South Hamgyong Province, where he emphasized expanding local industrial capacity and improving public infrastructure. The regime also accelerated operations at the Wonsan-Kalma Coastal Tourist Zone, reinforcing its strategy of promoting tourism as a source of foreign currency earnings and regional economic growth. At the same time, authorities continued implementing seasonal disaster prevention measures and protecting agricultural infrastructure during the rainy season in an effort to safeguard agricultural production and maintain economic stability. These activities suggest that Pyongyang remains committed to a policy framework aimed at promoting balanced regional development while supporting broader economic recovery.In the social sphere, the regime continued efforts to reinforce revolutionary traditions and strengthen ideological cohesion. Through nationwide commemorations marking the 32nd anniversary of Kim Il-sung's death and Victory Day, North Korean authorities emphasized the continuity of revolutionary history and patriotic values. At the same time, the regime linked the activities of youth and women's organizations with ideological education campaigns aimed at strengthening socialist values among the population. These initiatives appear intended not only to reinforce the human capital foundation supporting national defense and economic development but also to preserve political loyalty and internal cohesion.In summary, North Korea's policy agenda during July 2026 centered on two overarching objectives: expanding its strategic diplomatic space and maintaining domestic stability. Although Kim Jong Un's public activities declined somewhat compared to the previous month, the regime appeared to focus its efforts on a limited number of strategic priorities, including strengthening relations with China and Russia, advancing naval modernization, implementing the "20×10 Regional Development Policy," and reinforcing revolutionary traditions. Notably, both naval modernization and regional development continue to be pursued not as short-term initiatives but as integral components of North Korea's broader long-term national development strategy. Looking ahead, Pyongyang is likely to continue emphasizing defense modernization and regional economic revitalization while deepening strategic cooperation with China and Russia as part of its broader effort to preserve regime stability and sustain its long-term policy objectives.

North Korea Inside· North Korean Women's Union Holds First Congress in Five Years, Prioritizing Ideological Education and Population Growth· Kim Jong-un Publicly Exposes Military Corruption, Labels Case a Political Crime Undermining Party Control· Pak Thae-song Visits China as North Korea and China Commemorate 65 Years of Friendship TreatyMyongsung KimSecretary General of the SAND InstituteNorth Korean Women's Union Holds First Congress in Five Years, Prioritizing Ideological Education and Population GrowthNorth Korea’s Korean Socialist Women’s Union, one of the Workers’ Party’s principal mass organizations, convened its first national congress in five years, identifying ideological education and the promotion of childbirth as its primary priorities for the next five-year period. The congress appears to be part of a broader effort by Pyongyang to strengthen regime cohesion and reinforce social control through party-affiliated organizations following the Ninth Workers’ Party Congress earlier this year.According to the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA), the Eighth Congress of the Korean Socialist Women’s Union was held in Pyongyang on July 13–14. Senior party officials, including Organization Secretary Jo Yong-won and Party Secretaries Jong Kyong-thaek and Ju Chang-il, attended the event, along with members of the Union’s Executive Committee. Kim Jong-un did not make a public appearance at the congress.In a congratulatory message, the Workers’ Party Central Committee argued that the role of mass organizations—including the Women’s Union—has become increasingly important in advancing what it described as the “transformation of the new era” aimed at building a stronger and more prosperous state. The message identified ideological education as the organization’s foremost responsibility and called for intensified campaigns promoting patriotism, class consciousness, and morality.The Party further instructed Women’s Union members to “resolutely reject reactionary capitalist ideology, culture, and lifestyles” while defending North Korea’s socialist values. This emphasis suggests that women remain a primary target of the regime’s ideological control efforts, particularly amid Pyongyang’s ongoing campaign to prevent the spread of South Korean media and other foreign cultural influences.The congress also highlighted the promotion of childbirth as a key policy objective. The Party’s message asserted that ensuring women “give birth to many children and raise them well” constitutes an important national task and called for expanding both the institutional responsibilities of the Women’s Union and the individual role of women in addressing the issue. This emphasis reflects Pyongyang’s growing concern over declining birth rates and demographic challenges and suggests that the regime intends to mobilize mass organizations in support of its pronatalist agenda.Delegates reviewed the Central Committee’s work report, amended the organization’s bylaws, and elected a new central leadership. The report stressed the need to further strengthen ideological education and political mobilization so that Women’s Union organizations can fully perform their role as instruments of political education. At the First Plenary Meeting of the Eighth Central Committee, held immediately after the congress, Chairwoman Jon Hyang-sun was re-elected to lead the organization.The Korean Socialist Women’s Union is one of North Korea’s four major mass organizations, alongside the General Federation of Trade Unions of Korea, the Union of Agricultural Workers, and the Socialist Patriotic Youth League. These organizations serve as key channels through which the Workers’ Party disseminates policy directives and mobilizes workers, farmers, youth, and women. Membership in these organizations is effectively compulsory for their respective constituencies.Since the conclusion of the Ninth Workers’ Party Congress in February, North Korea has accelerated the reorganization of its mass organizations to facilitate the implementation of the Party’s new five-year program. The Socialist Patriotic Youth League convened its Eleventh Congress in April, followed by the Ninth Congress of the General Federation of Trade Unions last month. Against this backdrop, the Women’s Union congress appears to represent another step in Pyongyang’s efforts to strengthen policy implementation, reinforce ideological discipline, and consolidate political unity throughout society.Kim Jong-un Publicly Exposes Military Corruption, Labels Case a Political Crime Undermining Party ControlNorth Korean leader Kim Jong-un has launched a sweeping anti-corruption campaign targeting senior figures within the military’s political establishment, publicly exposing alleged corruption involving officials responsible for personnel management and ideological supervision. The unusually public handling of the case suggests an effort to reinforce Party control over the military while warning senior officers against abuses of power.According to the Workers’ Party newspaper Rodong Sinmun, a joint meeting of senior Party, government, and military officials held in Pyongyang on July 10 publicly disclosed evidence of what the regime described as “extraordinarily serious criminal acts” committed by Pak Hui-chol, former director of the Organization Department of the Korean People’s Army General Political Bureau, and several associates. The meeting was attended by Kim Jong-un, senior Party and military leaders, commanders from across the armed forces, central and local government officials, and representatives from disciplinary and judicial institutions.The General Political Bureau serves as the Party’s principal mechanism for maintaining political control over the military. Through an extensive network of political commissars and political officers, it oversees ideological indoctrination, monitors Party discipline within the armed forces, and exercises significant influence over military personnel appointments. In his previous position, Pak reportedly oversaw organizational and personnel affairs within this system.According to Rodong Sinmun, Pak abused his authority over personnel decisions over the past four years by accepting bribes and promoting loyal associates to key military positions. Authorities accused him of institutionalizing the sale of official positions, engaging in political manipulation, and embezzling state funds and materials to finance an extravagant lifestyle.The newspaper stated that North Korea’s highest judicial authority had found Pak and his associates guilty based on “objective evidence” and announced that the Supreme Court had imposed criminal sentences. The regime, however, did not disclose the specific punishments.The investigation first became public late last month after the Workers’ Party Central Military Commission ordered an inquiry into corruption allegations involving Pak. Shortly afterward, the Second Plenary Meeting of the Ninth Central Committee removed him from the Party’s leadership and referred the case to judicial authorities.Addressing the joint meeting, Kim Jong-un framed the scandal not simply as corruption but as a direct challenge to the Party’s command over the military. He argued that an official entrusted with combating illicit enrichment had instead transformed his authority into “a weapon for personal gain,” describing the misconduct as “a political crime” that undermined the Party’s disciplinary principles while harming the interests of both the state and the people.Kim further argued that the significance of the case lies in the fact that it occurred as the Party has declared an intensified campaign against factionalism, bureaucracy, and corruption. He instructed disciplinary authorities to strengthen oversight and expand anti-corruption investigations throughout the military.He also emphasized that corruption cannot be eradicated without continuous ideological education and institutional oversight of officials, urging cadres to uphold personal integrity and prioritize the interests of the people.Reaffirming the Party’s broader anti-corruption campaign, Kim pledged to continue strengthening both ideological discipline and legal enforcement in order to eliminate corruption and improve the quality of the official corps.Publicly exposing corruption allegations against a senior official within the military’s powerful General Political Bureau is highly unusual in North Korea. The decision to announce the case at a large joint meeting attended by senior military commanders appears intended to deter corruption among military elites, particularly in personnel management, while reinforcing Kim Jong-un’s direct authority over the armed forces. The timing is notable, as the military assumes an increasingly prominent role in supporting North Korea’s expanding defense production, large-scale domestic mobilization campaigns, and overseas deployments, including military cooperation with Russia.Pak Thae-song Visits China as North Korea and China Commemorate 65 Years of Friendship TreatyNorth Korea and China commemorated the 65th anniversary of the 1961 Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance through an exchange of congratulatory messages between their leaders, high-level meetings, and renewed pledges to deepen strategic cooperation. Coming only one month after Chinese President Xi Jinping’s visit to Pyongyang, these diplomatic exchanges underscore both governments’ intention to elevate bilateral relations to what they describe as a “new strategic stage.”According to China’s state-run Xinhua News Agency and China Central Television (CCTV), President Xi Jinping met North Korean Premier Pak Thae-song at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing on July 10. Pak visited China from July 10 to 12 to participate in events commemorating the anniversary of the bilateral treaty.During the meeting, Xi stated that the increasingly complex international environment requires China and North Korea to maintain strategic resolve and deepen mutual confidence. He called for the implementation of the consensus reached with Kim Jong-un to ensure that bilateral relations continue to develop in accordance with the strategic objectives of both countries.Xi further emphasized the importance of preserving the traditional friendship between the two countries across generations and expanding strategic cooperation to safeguard their respective sovereignty, security, and development interests. He also stressed the need to foster an external environment conducive to each country’s socialist development path.Describing the bilateral relationship as one characterized by enduring friendship, mutual assistance, and a shared future, Xi argued that the 1961 treaty established the political and legal foundation for the continued development of China-DPRK relations.Pak conveyed Kim Jong-un’s greetings and praised Xi’s recent visit to North Korea, describing it as an important milestone in bilateral relations. He argued that the friendship treaty provides the legal foundation for long-term strategic cooperation and stated that both countries are jointly advancing socialist development while contributing to regional and international peace in accordance with the treaty’s principles.According to Xinhua, Pak also reaffirmed North Korea’s support for China’s core national interests, including Beijing’s position on Taiwan.Leaders Reaffirm Strategic Importance of the Bilateral RelationshipThe anniversary was also marked by an exchange of congratulatory messages between Kim Jong-un and Xi Jinping, with both leaders highlighting the enduring strategic significance of their bilateral relationship.According to Rodong Sinmun, Kim stated that North Korea seeks to develop relations with China into “the strongest and most strategic relationship among socialist countries.” He characterized the 1961 treaty as having established the legal foundation for the long-term development of bilateral friendship, unity, and mutually beneficial cooperation.Kim further argued that DPRK-China relations have reached “a new strategic height,” enabling both countries to safeguard their sovereignty, security, and development interests amid an increasingly complex international environment while contributing to regional stability. He reiterated that strengthening the traditional socialist partnership with China remains a consistent policy of the Workers’ Party and the North Korean government.In his response, Xi emphasized that China’s commitment to its traditional friendship with North Korea remains unchanged regardless of changes in the international environment. He also reaffirmed Beijing’s continued support for North Korea’s socialist development and its commitment to safeguarding the shared strategic interests of both countries.Referring to his summit with Kim in Pyongyang last month, Xi stated that the meeting established the strategic direction for bilateral relations in the new era. He pledged to maintain close strategic communication with Kim Jong-un to ensure the continued development of bilateral cooperation.Premier-Level Talks Highlight Continued Political AlignmentPak also held talks with Chinese Premier Li Qiang at the Great Hall of the People. According to the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA), Pak stated that China-DPRK relations have reached “a new height” under the leadership of Kim Jong-un and Xi Jinping.Pak described the friendship treaty as a firm political and legal foundation for bilateral cooperation and argued that the increasingly complex international environment requires both countries to uphold the treaty’s principles of unity, cooperation, and the protection of shared interests in order to advance the socialist cause.He further pledged to implement the strategic understandings reached by the two leaders and continue strengthening bilateral solidarity.Li likewise emphasized the strategic importance of the bilateral relationship, describing China and North Korea as neighbors sharing a common destiny that have historically supported one another. He argued that Xi’s recent visit to Pyongyang produced important strategic understandings with Kim Jong-un regarding the future direction of bilateral relations.Li reaffirmed that maintaining and strengthening China-DPRK relations remains a consistent policy of the Chinese government. He expressed Beijing’s willingness to expand high-level exchanges, deepen political trust, and broaden practical cooperation in ways that would benefit both countries while contributing to regional peace and stability.According to KCNA, the two sides also discussed expanding cooperation across multiple sectors in accordance with the agreements reached during the recent Xi-Kim summit in Pyongyang. However, neither side disclosed specific areas of cooperation or announced any new bilateral agreements.Economic Dimension Appears Increasingly ProminentPak’s delegation included senior officials from the Workers’ Party, the Foreign Ministry, and the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations, including Party Secretary Kim Song-nam, International Department Deputy Director Mun Song-hyok, Vice Foreign Minister Kim Myong-su, and Vice Minister of Foreign Economic Relations Ryu Un-hae.The composition of the delegation suggests that both governments are seeking to broaden bilateral cooperation beyond traditional political and diplomatic ties by placing greater emphasis on economic engagement.Overall, Pak’s visit appears to have served three principal objectives: reaffirming political trust established through leader-level diplomacy; commemorating the 65th anniversary of the friendship treaty; and signaling both governments’ intention to deepen strategic coordination across diplomatic, political, and economic domains. The extensive high-level exchanges also indicate that Pyongyang and Beijing intend to further institutionalize their traditional partnership while adapting it to evolving regional and international circumstances.

North Korea Inside· Kim Jae-ryong’s Continued Presence at Public Events Sparks Speculation Over His New Role· Kim Jong-un Accelerates Deployment of New Destroyer· Kim Jong-un Makes Unscheduled Visit to Kumsusan PalaceKim Myong-sungSecretary General of the SAND InstituteKim Jae-ryong’s Continued Presence at Public Events Sparks Speculation Over His New RoleKim Jae-ryong, former Secretary for Organization Affairs and Director of the Workers' Party of Korea (WPK) Organization and Guidance Department, has continued to accompany North Korean leader Kim Jong-un at a series of high-profile public events despite his recent removal from several senior party posts. His continued public presence has fueled speculation that he may have been reassigned to another important position rather than subjected to a political purge.During Kim Jong-un’s recent on-site inspection of a local development project in Rakwon County, South Hamgyong Province, Kim Jae-ryong was observed accompanying the leader as a member of the inspection delegation. The visit focused on the implementation of the “Regional Development 20×10 Policy,” one of Kim Jong-un’s signature domestic initiatives, further fueling speculation that Kim Jae-ryong may have been assigned a role in overseeing regional development projects.According to Korean Central Television (KCTV), Kim Jong-un inspected construction projects in Rakwon County on July 5. State media footage confirmed that Kim Jae-ryong accompanied the leader despite having been removed at last month’s Second Plenary Meeting of the Ninth Central Committee from several key posts, including membership in the Politburo Standing Committee, Secretary of the Party Central Committee, and Director of the Organization and Guidance Department.His continued public appearances are notable given North Korea’s established practice of immediately removing purged officials from public view. Since his dismissal, Kim Jae-ryong has attended the commissioning ceremony of the new 5,000-ton destroyer Choehyon and participated in an expanded Politburo meeting, suggesting that he remains politically relevant despite the apparent reduction in his formal authority.Evidence also suggests that, although he lost his seat on the Politburo Standing Committee, Kim Jae-ryong may have retained full membership in the Politburo itself. Official footage showed him participating alongside other Politburo members during the adoption of meeting resolutions. Nevertheless, his reduced political standing was reflected in his seating arrangement, as he was positioned in the rear rather than among the senior leadership.The Rakwon County inspection is particularly significant because it focused on the Regional Development 20×10 Policy, one of Kim Jong-un’s highest domestic priorities. The initiative seeks to modernize 200 cities and counties over a ten-year period by constructing local industrial facilities while simultaneously expanding healthcare, education, cultural infrastructure, and grain management systems to reduce regional development disparities.North Korea institutionalized the policy through the Law on the Implementation of the Regional Development 20×10 Policy, enacted in 2024. The legislation established an Ad Hoc Central Steering Committee responsible for coordinating nationwide implementation, including the oversight of industrial facilities, healthcare infrastructure, comprehensive service centers, and grain management projects through provincial-level implementation bodies.Responsibility for the committee was initially reported to have rested with WPK Secretary Jo Yong-won. However, following Jo’s temporary reassignment as Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme People’s Assembly before his return to the Party Secretariat, North Korean authorities have not publicly identified the committee’s current head. Against this backdrop, Kim Jae-ryong’s prominent participation in Kim Jong-un’s inspection has generated speculation that he may have assumed responsibility for overseeing implementation of the regional development initiative.Since its announcement during Kim Jong-un’s 2024 policy address to the Supreme People’s Assembly, the Regional Development 20×10 Policy has become one of the regime’s flagship socioeconomic initiatives. Construction began with the first local industrial complex in Songchon County, South Pyongan Province, and the initiative is now entering its third year. At the Workers’ Party year-end plenary meeting, authorities further expanded the program to include advanced healthcare facilities, science, education, and cultural infrastructure, as well as grain management facilities, in addition to industrial development.North Korean state media portray the initiative as “a uniquely socialist development model” designed to narrow disparities between urban and rural areas and between central and local governments while promoting balanced national development. Kim Jong-un has repeatedly demonstrated his personal commitment to the initiative through frequent on-site inspections of local development projects.Kim Jae-ryong’s precise new responsibilities, however, remain unclear. At the recent plenary meeting, North Korean authorities described his removal only as a “change in duties” without announcing a subsequent appointment. While some observers initially linked the personnel reshuffle to investigations into military corruption, Kim’s continued participation in inspections of major policy initiatives increasingly suggests that he may have been reassigned rather than politically marginalized. Whether he will formally assume a leadership position within the central body overseeing regional development remains to be seen.Kim Jong-un Accelerates Deployment of New DestroyerNorth Korean leader Kim Jong-un has moved to accelerate the operational deployment of the new 5,000-ton destroyer Kanggon despite the vessel’s widely publicized grounding during its launch ceremony earlier this year. By personally supervising tests of the ship’s principal weapons systems—including strategic cruise missiles, naval artillery, and electronic warfare capabilities—Kim underscored his determination to strengthen North Korea’s naval capabilities and advance its maritime nuclear deterrence posture.According to the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA), the destroyer conducted test launches of strategic cruise missiles and evaluations of multiple onboard weapons systems on July 3 as part of a comprehensive assessment of its combat capabilities. The tests reportedly examined target detection, information processing, integrated fire-control capabilities, naval artillery, automatic weapons, and electronic warfare systems.The strategic cruise missile launched during the exercise is widely assessed to belong to North Korea’s Hwasal family of land-attack cruise missiles. Analysts have long assessed that Pyongyang intends to deploy such systems aboard its new destroyers—including both the Choehyon and the Kanggon—as part of efforts to establish a sea-based nuclear strike capability.Photographs released by state media showed the missiles painted blue, prompting speculation among military observers that the coloration may represent a camouflage measure intended to reduce visual detection.South Korea’s Joint Chiefs of Staff confirmed that the military detected cruise missiles and other projectiles launched from the destroyer into the East Sea on July 3. South Korean and U.S. intelligence authorities are reportedly conducting a detailed assessment of the systems involved.The exercise also highlighted the vessel’s close-in defensive capabilities, with KCTV footage showing multiple automatic weapons being fired from the ship during live-fire drills.Following the exercise, Kim Jong-un stated that recent advances in domestic weapons development demonstrated the potential for significant improvements in North Korea’s indigenous naval combat systems. He emphasized the need to further strengthen maritime and underwater combat capabilities while maintaining what he described as a “credible war deterrent” and expanding the country’s war-fighting capabilities.Kim also reaffirmed plans to expand naval bases and shipbuilding capacity nationwide and instructed the Navy to commission the Kanggon within two months. He additionally convened a high-level consultative meeting focused on the development of the country’s shipbuilding industry.The destroyer suffered a highly unusual accident during its launch ceremony in May, when the vessel listed sharply and ran aground before entering service. Although North Korea successfully salvaged the ship within 22 days and subsequently held a second launch ceremony, outside analysts have continued to question its operational readiness.If Kim’s timetable is met, the Kanggon will enter operational service roughly one year after the launch accident. North Korea commissioned its sister ship, the Choehyon, in late June for service with the West Sea Fleet.Taken together, these developments suggest that Pyongyang intends to accelerate the deployment of a dual-coast surface fleet capable of supporting its evolving maritime nuclear strategy.Kim Jong-un Makes Unscheduled Visit to Kumsusan PalaceKim Jong-un paid tribute at the Kumsusan Palace of the Sun shortly after midnight on July 8 to mark the 32nd anniversary of Kim Il-sung’s death, despite the occasion not constituting a major commemorative event. The visit has been widely interpreted as an effort to reinforce elite cohesion following last month’s Second Plenary Meeting of the Ninth Central Committee while simultaneously reaffirming Kim’s own political authority through symbolic association with his predecessors.Particularly noteworthy was the timing of the state media coverage. Unlike the regime’s customary practice of reporting the leader’s activities a day after they occur, North Korean media publicized the visit on the same day, suggesting an effort to promptly project leadership unity to both domestic and international audiences following recent personnel adjustments.The 32nd anniversary does not constitute one of North Korea’s traditional milestone commemorations, which typically occur at five- or ten-year intervals and are marked by large-scale state ceremonies. In contrast, this year’s observances were relatively modest, consisting primarily of ideological education activities targeting young people, workers, and farmers.Kim’s personal appearance at the Kumsusan Palace nevertheless carries considerable political significance. The visit appears intended to reinforce party discipline and elite loyalty following recent personnel reshuffles while underscoring the continuity of the revolutionary leadership tradition.State media described the anniversary as “the greatest day of mourning for the Party, the state, and the people”—a formulation that differs from previous references to “the nation’s greatest day of mourning.” The revised terminology has been used consistently since commemorations marking the anniversary of Kim Jong-il’s death in December and appears to place greater emphasis on the institutional authority of the Party and the state.The linguistic adjustment is consistent with Pyongyang’s broader ideological emphasis on the concept of “two hostile states,” which increasingly highlights the sovereignty and institutional identity of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK).In a front-page editorial published the same day, Rodong Sinmun further reinforced regime legitimacy by portraying Kim Jong-un as faithfully carrying forward Kim Il-sung’s political legacy. The newspaper asserted that Kim is implementing Kim Il-sung’s people-centered governing philosophy more fully than ever before and argued that North Korea would continue to prosper under his leadership.

KWP Central Committee Plenary Meeting Reviews the First Half of 2026: Outcomes and Implications for Peaceful Coexistence on the Korean Peninsula                    Yong-hwan ChoiInstitute for National Security StrategyKey Outcomes of the Second Plenary MeetingThe Second Plenary Meeting of the Ninth Central Committee of the Workers' Party of Korea (WPK) was convened in Pyongyang from June 20 to 22, 2026. As the Party's highest decision-making and personnel body between Party Congresses, the Central Committee Plenary Meeting serves as the principal forum for reviewing policy implementation and establishing strategic priorities. The session assessed progress during the first half of 2026—the inaugural year of the five-year plan adopted at the Ninth Party Congress—and outlined policy priorities for the remainder of the year.First, the meeting identified the coal industry as a strategic sector essential to both the Party and the state. Discussions focused on modernizing coal production through technological upgrades and improving miners' living conditions, including expanded housing construction. Kim Jong-un specifically called for transforming the Chonsong Youth Coal Mine into a model modern mining complex and establishing it as a showcase for the improvement of mining communities. The Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) reported on June 16—immediately prior to the plenary meeting—that the mine had achieved production equivalent to 106 percent of the previous year's output, while the July 6 edition of Rodong Sinmun announced that it had fulfilled 261 percent of its June production target.The renewed emphasis on coal reflects its continued importance as the backbone of North Korea's energy system. Coal remains indispensable for electricity generation and serves as a critical input for agriculture, heavy industry, and light manufacturing. It has also historically been one of the country's principal sources of foreign currency earnings. Amid growing uncertainty in global energy markets resulting from international sanctions, the Russia–Ukraine war, and instability in the Middle East, Pyongyang appears to view domestic coal production as a strategic prerequisite for sustaining economic development.Notably, this policy emphasis persists despite North Korea’s expanding strategic partnership with Russia, which has created greater opportunities for energy and resource imports. This suggests that Pyongyang continues to prioritize its longstanding doctrine of self-reliance (juche) by emphasizing the use of domestically available resources rather than reducing dependence on external supplies.This development also carries potential implications for sanctions policy. Prior to the adoption of UN Security Council Resolution 2371, which imposed a comprehensive ban on North Korean coal exports, coal accounted for approximately 40 percent of the country's total exports. Consequently, an important question is whether expanded coal production is intended solely to meet domestic demand or is also designed to position North Korea for renewed exports should sanctions be eased in the future. Given that China was previously North Korea's largest coal importer, recent improvements in bilateral relations merit close attention as a potential indicator of future trends in sanctions implementation.Second, the plenary meeting adopted a resolution entitled On Formulating Measures to Enhance the Functions and Roles of City and County People's Committees, placing renewed emphasis on strengthening local administrative institutions in support of regional development. This initiative is intended to facilitate the implementation of Kim Jong-un's "Local Development 20×10 Policy," first introduced during the Tenth Session of the Fourteenth Supreme People's Assembly in January 2024.However, the meeting simultaneously criticized local authorities for “deviations from the Party’s intentions” and stressed that all local governance must remain fully aligned with the policies and principles established by the Party Central Committee. These statements suggest that, although local People’s Committees may receive expanded administrative responsibilities, meaningful political decentralization or greater local autonomy is unlikely. Rather, the initiative appears designed to strengthen implementation capacity while preserving centralized Party control.Third, the plenary meeting reaffirmed North Korea's commitment to strengthening both its nuclear deterrent and conventional military capabilities. Citing an increasingly uncertain international security environment, the leadership emphasized the need to continuously expand its nuclear forces and fully exercise its status as a nuclear-weapon state. This assessment is broadly consistent with the strategic direction established at the Ninth Party Congress.Specific defense tasks included accelerating the development and production of conventional weapons, constructing a 10,000-ton strategic guided-missile cruiser, and expanding naval infrastructure through the establishment of new fleet bases. These initiatives demonstrate the continued implementation of Pyongyang's strategy of simultaneously advancing nuclear capabilities and conventional military modernization. Under this approach, North Korea seeks to consolidate what it characterizes as its irreversible status as a nuclear-weapon state while also modernizing its conventional military capabilities, particularly its naval forces.The meeting also reaffirmed the regime's position that inter-Korean relations constitute "the most hostile state-to-state relationship," underscoring the continued institutionalization of the "two hostile states" framework. In this context, the leadership announced the qualitative completion of the project to fortify the southern border, indicating that the military and political separation of the Korean Peninsula remains a strategic priority.Fourth, the plenary meeting addressed organizational restructuring and efforts to reinforce Party discipline. At Kim Jong-un's recommendation, Jo Yong-won was relieved of his position as Chairman of the Standing Committee of the Supreme People's Assembly and reappointed as Secretary of the Party Central Committee and Director of the Organization and Guidance Department (OGD). Having assumed the parliamentary post only three months earlier at the Ninth Party Congress, Jo's rapid return to the OGD underscores the central importance Kim places on the Party's personnel management and organizational oversight functions.Standing Committee of the Supreme People's Assembly would temporarily assume responsibility for the body's operations until a new chairman is elected at a subsequent session of the Supreme People's Assembly. Significantly, the official announcement explicitly cited Articles 90, 96, and 99 of the Constitution as the legal basis for these personnel changes. The unusual emphasis on constitutional procedures appears intended to reinforce the institutional legitimacy of these leadership decisions and project an image of governance operating within an established legal framework.The leadership also implemented additional personnel changes aimed at strengthening organizational discipline within both the Party and the military. Kim Jae-ryong was removed from his positions as a member of the Presidium of the Political Bureau and Director of the Organization and Guidance Department, while Park Hui-chol, Deputy Director of the General Political Bureau's Organization Department, was dismissed on corruption-related charges. These personnel actions indicate that Kim Jong-un continues to rely on anti-corruption campaigns and organizational discipline as key instruments for maintaining elite cohesion and reinforcing centralized political control.Assessment and OutlookAs noted above, the principal objective of the June Plenary Meeting was to assess the initial implementation of the decisions adopted at the Ninth Party Congress in February and establish priorities for the remainder of the year. From an economic perspective, one notable development was the plenary meeting’s markedly stronger emphasis on the coal industry. Whereas the Ninth Party Congress identified metallurgy, chemicals, electricity, coal, and machinery collectively as strategic sectors, the June meeting singled out coal as a distinct priority. This shift warrants close attention.At a time when North Korea's strategic partnership with resource-rich Russia has reached an unprecedented level, Pyongyang's renewed emphasis on domestically available energy resources suggests that self-reliance remains the guiding principle of its economic strategy. Equally important is whether expanded coal production is intended solely to satisfy domestic demand or also to position North Korea for renewed exports should international sanctions be eased in the future. Given China's historical role as North Korea's primary coal importer, future developments in North Korea-China relations and sanctions enforcement warrant careful monitoring.The plenary meeting also reaffirmed the regime’s commitment to implementing the “20×10 Local Development Policy,” including efforts to strengthen the administrative capacity of local People’s Committees. Nevertheless, it remains uncertain whether expanding the authority of local governments alone will be sufficient to ensure effective implementation of the policy. The initiative has gradually expanded beyond industrial development to encompass healthcare and cultural infrastructure, thereby increasing both its scope and resource requirements. However, persistent shortages of capital, industrial equipment, and operational capacity continue to constrain progress. Moreover, questions remain regarding the long-term sustainability of newly constructed facilities, including factories and hospitals. Although the policy reflects a genuine effort to improve living standards and reduce regional disparities, its feasibility and effectiveness within North Korea’s self-reliant development model remain uncertain.In the security domain, North Korea is expected to continue pursuing an irreversible nuclear deterrent while maintaining its “two hostile states” framework for inter-Korean relations. Pyongyang continues to invoke the deteriorating international security environment as justification for expanding and modernizing its nuclear arsenal, while presenting its redefinition of relations with South Korea as a permanent strategic decision rather than a temporary policy adjustment. Given the limited external leverage available to constrain North Korea’s nuclear program, coupled with the continued improvement of its relations with both China and Russia, Pyongyang’s nuclear modernization efforts are likely to continue. Under these circumstances, the current stalemate in inter-Korean relations is also likely to persist over the medium to long term.Challenges to Realizing Peaceful CoexistenceSince taking office, the Lee Jae-myung administration has consistently pursued a policy centered on peaceful coexistence with North Korea. It has articulated three guiding principles: respect for the North Korean regime, rejection of absorption-based unification, and the renunciation of hostile actions. Building on these principles, the administration announced its policy of peaceful coexistence on the Korean Peninsula in February 2026. The initiative pursues three overarching objectives: institutionalizing peaceful coexistence between the two Koreas, establishing a foundation for shared prosperity, and ultimately realizing a Korean Peninsula free from both war and nuclear weapons.To date, however, Pyongyang has shown no indication of responding positively to these initiatives. Instead, it continues to maintain its hostile posture toward Seoul. Military and political tensions remain elevated, and even the inter-Korean military hotline—designed to prevent accidental escalation—has yet to be restored.Given the current international environment and the state of inter-Korean relations, a comprehensive improvement in bilateral ties appears unlikely in the near term. Nevertheless, historical experience demonstrates that relations on the Korean Peninsula have repeatedly shifted in response to changes in strategic circumstances and political incentives. While optimism should be tempered, the possibility of future change should not be dismissed.A critical starting point is understanding why North Korea currently sees little incentive to improve relations with South Korea. One central factor is Pyongyang’s persistent concern over the possibility of absorption-based unification, particularly given the widening gap in economic and national capabilities between the two Koreas. Addressing this concern ultimately requires a broader reconsideration of both the concept of unification and South Korea’s long-term unification strategy.A second challenge involves recognition and mutual respect. At the symbolic level, this includes questions of official terminology—for example, how South Korea should refer to North Korea as Pyongyang increasingly uses the formal designation “Republic of Korea” rather than “South Korea.” More fundamentally, however, it raises broader questions about whether South Korea’s legal and institutional framework adequately recognizes North Korea as a counterpart for peaceful coexistence and dialogue.A third challenge concerns the credibility and sustainability of South Korea’s North Korea policy. Effective engagement requires policy continuity that extends beyond changes in political administrations. It also requires sufficient strategic autonomy within the U.S.–ROK alliance to pursue dialogue when diplomatic opportunities emerge. Taken together, these structural challenges underscore the difficulty of achieving meaningful progress in inter-Korean relations under current conditions.Recent developments—including the KWP Central Committee Plenary Meeting in June—also highlight the importance of understanding North Korea’s evolving foreign policy priorities. Since the collapse of the Hanoi Summit in 2019, Pyongyang has steadily shifted its diplomatic focus away from the United States and toward Russia and China. This strategic realignment helps explain North Korea’s limited interest in resuming negotiations with Washington while underscoring the growing importance of South Korea’s relations with both Moscow and Beijing.To sustain the local development initiatives reaffirmed during the June Plenary Meeting, North Korea is likely to deepen its economic cooperation with China and Russia. Although the North Korean economy appears to have recovered from its most severe contraction, it has yet to establish a self-sustaining growth trajectory. Consequently, external economic support will remain essential if Pyongyang is to achieve tangible economic outcomes. For policymakers, this underscores the importance of accurately assessing North Korea’s evolving domestic priorities, external relationships, and strategic requirements when formulating policy responses.At the same time, recent developments suggest that opportunities for limited engagement remain. The participation of a North Korean women’s football club in the AFC Women’s Champions League competition held in Suwon in May demonstrated that practical exchanges remain possible even amid heightened political tensions. Although the event also illustrated the limitations of inter-Korean engagement under current conditions, it nonetheless suggests that political hostility does not necessarily preclude functional interaction between the two sides.From a policy perspective, effective crisis management remains indispensable. However, policymakers should move beyond an exclusive focus on North Korea’s nuclear capabilities and place greater emphasis on practical measures to reduce military threats and prevent escalation. Achieving this objective will require close coordination between Seoul and Washington while preserving opportunities for U.S.–North Korea dialogue should Pyongyang remain willing to engage. At the same time, any future U.S.–North Korea negotiations are unlikely to produce lasting improvements on the Korean Peninsula—including progress in inter-Korean relations—unless they are accompanied by a clear and consistent approach to the fundamental political and institutional issues outlined above.

North Korea Inside· Pyongyang Hosts Event Marking 105th Anniversary of Chinese Communist Party; Jo Yong-won and Senior Officials Attend· North Korea Warns: “Those Who Abuse the People Will Not Escape the Law’s Ruthless Judgment”· Kim Jong-un Visits Wonsan-Kalma Tourist Facilities Amid Expectations of Growing Chinese TourismKim Myong-sungSecretary General of the SAND InstitutePyongyang Hosts Event Marking 105th Anniversary of Chinese Communist Party; Jo Yong-won and Senior Officials AttendNorth Korea and China reaffirmed their close bilateral ties through a series of commemorative events held in Pyongyang to mark the 105th anniversary of the founding of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). The events were attended by senior North Korean officials, including Jo Yong-won, Director of the Workers’ Party of Korea (WPK) Organization Department and one of Kim Jong-un’s closest confidants, underscoring the strategic importance that both sides continue to attach to bilateral relations.According to the Chinese Embassy in Pyongyang on July 1, Chinese Ambassador Wang Yajun hosted a reception at the embassy on June 30 to commemorate the anniversary.The North Korean delegation included Jo Yong-won, Director of the WPK Organization and Guidance Department; Kim Song-nam, Director of the WPK International Department; Mun Song-hyok, Deputy Director of the WPK International Department; Vice Foreign Minister Kim Myong-su; Vice Minister of External Economic Relations Ryu Eun-hae; and Vice Minister of Culture Pak Kyong-chol. Members of the diplomatic corps accredited to North Korea also attended the event.In his remarks, Ambassador Wang stated, “Since entering the new era, General Secretary Xi Jinping and General Secretary Kim Jong-un have held seven historic summits that have charted the course for the development of relations between our two parties and two countries.”He added that China stands ready to “faithfully implement the important consensus reached by the top leaders of both countries, deepen exchanges on governance experience between our parties and states, promote the healthy and stable development of bilateral relations, and jointly safeguard regional peace and development.”Responding on behalf of the North Korean side, Kim Song-nam praised China’s recent achievements, stating that “under the leadership of the Communist Party, China has achieved remarkable progress in high-quality economic development, social stability, and the enhancement of its international standing.”Prior to the reception, participants toured a photo exhibition commemorating the 105th anniversary of the founding of the CCP.On the same day, Pyongyang also hosted a symposium on exchanges of party-building experience between the WPK and the CCP. Ambassador Wang noted that “this year marks both the 105th anniversary of the founding of the Communist Party of China and the first year of North Korea’s implementation of the decisions adopted at its Ninth Party Congress.”He added that China is prepared to work with North Korea to implement the important consensus reached by the leaders of both parties, while expanding mutual learning so that socialist development in both countries can achieve new progress.North Korean participants likewise emphasized the importance of sharing party governance experience and strengthening cooperation in socialist construction, expressing support for expanding exchanges between the two ruling parties.To mark the anniversary, Kim Jong-un also sent a congratulatory message and a floral basket to Chinese President Xi Jinping.In his message, Kim reaffirmed Pyongyang’s commitment to strengthening bilateral ties, stating, “It is the unwavering position of our Party and government to continuously strengthen and develop the DPRK–China friendship centered on the socialist cause.”Jo Yong-won’s personal attendance—given his status as one of Kim Jong-un’s closest aides—combined with both sides’ repeated emphasis on implementing leader-level agreements and expanding party-to-party exchanges, suggests that bilateral relations continue to be managed through close institutional coordination between the two ruling parties. The events underscore the central role of party diplomacy in maintaining stability and continuity in contemporary DPRK–China relations.North Korea Warns: “Those Who Abuse the People Will Not Escape the Law’s Ruthless Judgment”North Korea has recently intensified its messaging that “even Workers’ Party officials will face legal punishment if they commit crimes,” signaling a renewed effort to tighten discipline among the country’s ruling elite. While framed as an affirmation of the “rule of law,” the campaign appears aimed at curbing corruption and misconduct within the Party, government, and military, while reinforcing loyalty to Kim Jong-un.On June 29, Korean Central Television (KCTV), during its Law and Citizens program, delivered a stern warning against violations of state law, declaring that “there can be absolutely no exceptions or special privileges before the laws of the Republic.”The broadcast further asserted that “violating state law constitutes a renunciation of one’s status as a dignified citizen of the Republic and a grave criminal act that assists the enemies’ anti-socialist schemes.” It added that “those who abuse their authority over the people and infringe upon their interests will not escape the ruthless judgment of the Republic’s laws.”Analysts view North Korea’s repeated emphasis on “equality before the law” as a direct response to corruption and entrenched privilege within the party-state apparatus. In authoritarian systems, references to the rule of law typically serve less as a commitment to judicial independence than as an instrument of political control and regime legitimacy.More specifically, the messaging appears intended to demonstrate Kim Jong-un’s willingness to subject even senior Workers’ Party officials to formal legal punishment.Earlier, North Korea announced that the Second Plenary Meeting of the Ninth Central Committee of the Workers’ Party, held from June 20 to 22, had decided to refer Pak Hui-chol, Director of the Organization Department of the General Political Bureau of the Korean People’s Army, to judicial authorities for investigation on corruption allegations. Rather than handling the case solely through internal party disciplinary procedures, the decision to pursue criminal prosecution against a senior military party official appears designed to reinforce the message that no official is beyond the reach of state law.The campaign also coincides with Kim Jong-un’s increasingly public criticism of declining discipline within the party. In a June 30 editorial, Rodong Sinmun argued that “outdated practices, backward thinking, and obsolete habits that no longer correspond to present-day realities must be overcome and eliminated.”The newspaper also criticized bureaucratic complacency, stating that “an official preoccupied only with personal safety and self-preservation is, in effect, no different from one who does not exist.”The editorial further called for intensified efforts to dismantle “outdated formulas and frameworks, stubborn conservatism, and unscientific empiricism.” The language has been widely interpreted as a warning that officials who fail to adapt to Kim Jong-un’s evolving policy priorities—or who resist implementing them—could face removal.Separately, on June 29, Rodong Sinmun urged party officials to “make no compromises on conviction or principle,” reiterating that unwavering political loyalty remains the foremost expectation of the leadership.Kim Jong-un’s recent decision to reinstate his longtime confidant Jo Yong-won as Director of the Workers’ Party Organization and Guidance Department is likewise viewed as part of a broader effort to reinforce internal discipline. Jo returned to the position approximately three months after being reassigned to serve as Chairman of the Standing Committee of the Supreme People’s Assembly.The Organization and Guidance Department remains the party’s most powerful institution for overseeing cadre appointments, personnel management, and political discipline. Observers assess Jo’s reinstatement as reflecting Kim’s determination to directly address growing concerns over lax discipline and corruption within both the party and the military, while strengthening internal cohesion ahead of future political priorities.Kim Jong-un Visits Wonsan-Kalma Tourist Facilities Amid Expectations of Growing Chinese TourismKim Jong-un, Chairman of the State Affairs Commission of North Korea, has conducted consecutive inspections of newly completed railway and medical facilities at the Wonsan-Kalma Coastal Tourist Zone, one of his signature economic development projects. As Pyongyang continues to expand its tourism infrastructure, analysts suggest the inspections may signal preparations for a broader reopening of international tourism, particularly targeting Chinese visitors following the limited resumption of Russian tourism.According to the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) on June 26, Kim provided on-site guidance at newly completed facilities within the Wonsan-Kalma Coastal Tourist Zone on June 24. During his inspection of the newly constructed Kalma Tourist Railway Station, he reviewed both construction quality and operational readiness.Reflecting on the pace of construction, Kim remarked, “It seems like only yesterday that we selected a site near the coastal tourist zone to improve transportation convenience for visitors, yet a modern railway station has been completed in just one year,” praising the officials responsible for the project.At the same time, Kim identified shortcomings discovered during the final stages of construction and called for more rigorous quality control. He emphasized the need to strengthen construction regulations by requiring contractors to assume legal responsibility for the quality of completed structures over a specified warranty period and to carry out any necessary repairs and maintenance.Images released by North Korean state media show that the station includes a modest restaurant and souvenir shop on the first floor, while the second floor features convenience-store-style retail outlets. The layout suggests that Pyongyang intends the facility to function not only as a transportation hub but also as a service center designed to enhance the visitor experience.Kim also announced plans to modernize railway stations in provincial capitals across the country based on experience gained from the Kalma project. Stressing the importance of scientific planning, he stated that station designs should reflect both passenger and freight demand as well as regional characteristics. He further instructed officials to develop specialized plans for the operation of dedicated tourist trains.Kim subsequently inspected the newly constructed emergency medical center within the Wonsan-Kalma Coastal Tourist Zone. According to North Korean media, the facility includes an emergency resuscitation unit, operating theaters, recovery rooms, and laboratory facilities.During the inspection, Kim emphasized the need to further improve both the functionality and professionalism of the medical center. He also reaffirmed his government’s commitment to constructing modern hospitals in 20 cities and counties annually under the “20×10 Regional Development Policy,” one of his flagship domestic development initiatives.The Wonsan-Kalma Coastal Tourist Zone, officially opened in July 2025, is a large-scale seaside resort capable of accommodating approximately 20,000 visitors. Personally championed by Kim Jong-un, the project is intended to become one of North Korea’s premier tourism destinations while generating much-needed foreign currency through international tourism.North Korea has thus far resumed foreign tourism only on a limited basis, primarily for Russian visitors. Against this backdrop, analysts assess that Pyongyang’s efforts to upgrade transportation and medical infrastructure may be aimed at preparing for a broader reopening of the tourism sector, including the potential return of Chinese tourists.China remains North Korea’s largest potential source of international visitors. As cross-border exchanges between the two countries continue to recover following the COVID-19 pandemic, some observers believe Pyongyang intends to position Wonsan-Kalma as its principal tourism hub for attracting Chinese travelers and expanding foreign currency earnings.Separately, KCNA reported on June 26 that Kim personally observed a test of newly developed artillery systems capable of striking key targets in South Korea, marking the anniversary of the outbreak of the Korean War. The juxtaposition of economic development initiatives and military demonstrations underscores Pyongyang’s continued pursuit of parallel efforts to strengthen both domestic economic capacity and military deterrence.

< North Korean Trends in June 2026 > - DPRK–China Strategic Cooperation, Defense Modernization, and Regional Development Policy Implementation -                    Seung-hyun LeePh.D in Public AdministrationResearch Fellow, Sand Research InstituteIn June 2026, North Korea pursued a policy agenda centered on strengthening strategic cooperation with China, advancing the modernization of its defense capabilities, implementing regional development initiatives, and cultivating a new generation of political leadership. Chinese President Xi Jinping's visit to Pyongyang, together with the DPRK–China summit, represented the most significant developments in North Korea's external relations during the month.Domestically, the regime continued to emphasize progress in its nuclear and missile programs alongside the implementation of regional development policies. Kim Jong-un made a total of nine public appearances during the month.Of these, five (55.6 percent) were related to military affairs, while three (33.3 percent) focused on economic and social issues. Although the overall number of public appearances declined slightly from May, military activities still accounted for more than half of the total, underscoring the regime's sustained emphasis on strengthening national defense.Political activities were largely concentrated on the DPRK–China summit, while economic and social engagements continued to highlight regional development initiatives and efforts to cultivate a new generation of political leadership.A particularly noteworthy development was the DPRK–China summit, during which the two countries agreed to expand cooperation across political, economic, cultural, and security domains. In addition to reaffirming their traditional relationship, both sides pledged to strengthen strategic communication in response to changes in the regional and international security environment.The summit underscored Pyongyang's intention to maintain a stable strategic partnership with Beijing despite continued international sanctions. It also suggested Beijing's willingness to sustain engagement with North Korea as part of its broader effort to manage stability on the Korean Peninsula and preserve its regional influence. In addition, North Korea broadened its diplomatic engagement with other socialist states, as reflected in the visit of a delegation from Vietnam's Ministry of Public Security.In the military domain, the most significant developments included the reported operation of a new uranium enrichment facility and Kim Jong-un's inspections of key defense-industrial enterprises. During these visits, he emphasized the expansion of nuclear materials production capacity and the strengthening of the defense industrial base, reaffirming his commitment to enhancing North Korea's nuclear deterrent.While observing the sea trials of the naval destroyer Kanggon-ho, Kim also underscored the importance of naval modernization and improved maritime operational capabilities, illustrating North Korea's continued pursuit of parallel development in both strategic nuclear forces and conventional military capabilities. His observation of artillery weapons tests later in the month similarly reflected ongoing efforts to improve the performance and operational effectiveness of tactical weapons systems.In the economic sector, Kim Jong-un reviewed progress in regional development initiatives through inspections of the Sinuiju Greenhouse Complex and the Vegetable Science Research Center. North Korea emphasized the adoption of modern agricultural technologies and reiterated its commitment to revitalizing regional economies and improving living standards.The completion of rice planting in major agricultural areas nationwide, together with Premier Pak Thae Song's inspections of the agricultural and coal sectors, further underscored the regime's continued focus on food security and the maintenance of key industrial infrastructure.Meanwhile, North Korea placed considerable emphasis on educating the next generation of Party cadres and youth through commemorative events marking the 80th anniversaries of the Party Central Cadre School and the Korean Children's Union. Kim Jong-un instructed Party officials to cultivate cadres with both revolutionary commitment and strong policy implementation capacity. At Youth League events, he underscored the role of younger generations as a driving force behind national development and the continuation of the country's revolutionary traditions.These activities should be understood not merely as commemorative occasions but as part of a broader effort to reinforce long-term regime stability and ideological cohesion.Overall, developments in June 2026 indicate that North Korea continued to pursue a dual-track strategy of strengthening strategic cooperation with China externally while advancing defense modernization, regional development initiatives, and leadership succession domestically. The regime also sought to integrate its diplomatic, military, economic, and social priorities in ways that reinforce both regime stability and policy coherence.Taken together, these developments suggest that Pyongyang is likely to maintain its current policy trajectory, with continued emphasis on strengthening its nuclear and military capabilities alongside the implementation of regional development policies.

North Korea Inside· Kim Jong-un Signals Deeper Consolidation of North Korea–China Ties· North Korea Highlights “100-Day Economic Achievements” Ahead of Party Plenary Meeting, Emphasizing Local Development Efforts· North Korea Rejects Denuclearization Calls, Says “Disarmament of a Combatant Is an Illusion”Kim Myong-sungSecretary General of the SAND InstituteKim Jong-un Signals Deeper Consolidation of North Korea–China TiesNorth Korean State Affairs Commission Chairman Kim Jong-un sent a congratulatory message and a flower basket to Chinese President Xi Jinping on the occasion of Xi’s 73rd birthday, underscoring the continued strengthening of ties between Pyongyang and Beijing.The Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) reported on June 16 that Chairman Kim sent the message on the previous day. In the message, Kim stated, “I extend my warm congratulations to Comrade General Secretary Xi Jinping on his birthday,” and expressed his sincere wishes for Xi’s continued good health and further success in leading China’s socialist development as the core leader of the Communist Party of China.KCNA also reported that the ribbon attached to the congratulatory flower basket sent by Kim bore the message: “Warm congratulations to Comrade General Secretary Xi Jinping on his birthday.”The message and flower basket were delivered to an official of the International Liaison Department of the Communist Party of China Central Committee via the North Korean ambassador to China.This marks the first time since President Xi’s 70th birthday in 2023 that North Korea has publicly issued a birthday congratulatory message in the name of its top leader. The gesture is particularly notable as it came just one week after Xi completed a two-day state visit to Pyongyang on June 8, during which he held a summit with Kim Jong-un.During the summit, the two leaders reportedly discussed measures to expand cooperation in political, economic, and security-related areas and reaffirmed their commitment to elevating North Korea–China relations into a “strategic cooperative partnership for a new era.”Analysts assess that the public release of Kim’s congratulatory message goes beyond a routine diplomatic gesture and reflects an effort to demonstrate the restoration and strengthening of North Korea–China strategic ties, both domestically and internationally.Against the backdrop of intensifying strategic competition between the United States and China, North Korea's strategic calculations appear to be converging more closely with Beijing's efforts to expand its influence on the Korean Peninsula. Pyongyang is widely assessed as viewing closer ties with China as a means of expanding diplomatic space and improving economic resilience under conditions of sustained sanctions and international isolation.At the same time, North Korea's deepening military cooperation with Russia, alongside its efforts to restore and stabilize relations with China, has led some analysts to argue that a loose North Korea–China–Russia alignment may be gradually taking shape.North Korea Highlights “100-Day Economic Achievements” Ahead of Party Plenary Meeting, Emphasizing Local Development EffortsAhead of the Second Plenary Meeting of the Ninth Central Committee of the Workers’ Party of Korea scheduled for later this month, North Korea has launched an extensive propaganda campaign highlighting economic achievements across various sectors during the 100 days since the Ninth Party Congress.The campaign is widely interpreted as an effort to strengthen ideological unity among workers and reinforce momentum toward implementing the economic objectives established by the Party.In an article published on the 15th titled “Miracles and Innovations Created on the Front Lines of the New Five-Year Plan Following the Supreme Leader’s Guidance,” KCNA reported that “overall industrial production has increased by 105 percent during the 100 days since the Party Congress.”The report stated that workers and officials across the country had mobilized their “mental strength and scientific and technological capabilities” to continuously establish new production records and advance toward higher targets.KCNA highlighted the Sangwon Cement Complex, which Chairman Kim Jong Un visited immediately after the Ninth Party Congress in February, as a key example. According to the report, the facility shortened the period of intensive equipment maintenance and launched a campaign aimed at achieving significant production increases, recording an average daily production rate of 107 percent in March and subsequently meeting production targets for April and May.The agency also reported that the February 8 Jikdong Youth Coal Mine launched various mass campaigns, including “one extra shift,” “supporting the next shift,” and “one additional coal cart,” resulting in coal production exceeding planned targets by more than 1,000 metric tons.KCNA further claimed that enterprises across major sectors—including construction materials, coal mining, metallurgy, chemicals, electricity, machinery, and light industry—achieved substantial production growth through technological innovation and ideological mobilization.The report emphasized the importance of ideological preparation, stating that recent achievements demonstrate that there are no insurmountable obstacles when the country first identifies internal reserves and strengthens scientific and technological capabilities.It also reiterated North Korea’s commitment to achieving the economic objectives established at the Ninth Party Congress, stating that the country would continue setting new standards and breaking new records.Rodong Sinmun, the official newspaper of the Workers’ Party of Korea, also reported on its front page that construction of 20 comprehensive service facilities nationwide under the “Local Development 20×10 Policy” had been completed with the participation of military construction units.The newspaper added that military personnel were continuing roofing and exterior finishing work in preparation for the Party plenary meeting.The Plenary Meeting of the Central Committee of the Workers’ Party of Korea serves as a key policy-making body responsible for reviewing and deciding major domestic and foreign policy issues. The Political Bureau approved a decision on May 24 to convene the Second Plenary Meeting of the Ninth Central Committee later this month.North Korea Rejects Denuclearization Calls, Says “Disarmament of a Combatant Is an Illusion”North Korea criticized the recent South Korea–U.S. Nuclear Consultative Group (NCG) meeting, which reaffirmed the shared goal of North Korea’s denuclearization, arguing that discussions of denuclearizing a “combatant state” amount to “a groundless illusion.”In a statement released through KCNA on June 14, a spokesperson for North Korea’s Foreign Ministry condemned what it described as a “collective nuclear confrontation campaign” involving the United States, Japan, and South Korea.The spokesperson stated that repeated attempts by the United States and its allies to pressure a sovereign state would have consequences, warning against what Pyongyang characterized as provocative actions.The statement further asserted that “anti-DPRK rhetoric and coordinated nuclear threats” by the United States and its partners would not affect North Korea’s status as a nuclear-armed state, adding that the issue of denuclearization had already been “conclusively settled.”It also claimed that defense cooperation among South Korea, the United States, and Japan, along with joint military exercises incorporating extended deterrence scenarios, further justified North Korea’s efforts to enhance its nuclear and military capabilities.The statement claimed that the development of a nuclear deterrent is a legitimate measure intended to prevent external threats, protect national sovereignty, and contribute to regional security.The spokesperson further insisted that no pressure from Washington, Seoul, or Tokyo would alter North Korea’s claimed status as a nuclear-armed state, declaring that denuclearization could not be reversed.South Korea and the United States held the sixth meeting of the Nuclear Consultative Group in Seoul on June 11, issuing a joint statement reaffirming their shared objective of achieving North Korea’s denuclearization.Following the Extended Deterrence Dialogue with Japan held on June 8–9, the United States also reiterated its commitment to the complete denuclearization of North Korea.

North Korea Inside· Xi Jinping and Kim Jong-un Meet in Pyongyang, Pledge Stronger North Korea–China Cooperation· Kim Jong-un Attends Sea Trials of the Kanggun-ho with Ju Ae, Urges Prompt Naval Commissioning· Kim Yo-jong: “Nuclear-Weapon State Status Is an Absolute, Uncrossable Line”Kim Myong-sungSecretary General of the SAND InstituteXi Jinping and Kim Jong-un Meet in Pyongyang, Pledge Stronger North Korea–China CooperationChinese President Xi Jinping and North Korean Chairman of the State Affairs Commission Kim Jong-un reaffirmed their commitment to strengthening strategic cooperation between North Korea and China by agreeing to expand cooperation across all fields—including politics, the economy, and culture—during their summit in Pyongyang. The two sides also agreed to revitalize high-level exchanges and enhance strategic communication, while strengthening coordination in responding to regional and international developments.According to the Korean Central News Agency on May 9, President Xi said in a reply speech at a banquet held at the Mokran House in Pyongyang a day earlier that “China–DPRK relations stand at a new historic starting point,” adding that “We will develop China–DPRK relations to a higher level, open a brighter future for the socialist cause of both countries, and promote the continuous progress of human society.” He further added that “China and North Korea have always shared a common destiny, and the traditional friendship between our two countries is an invincible friendship with a long history.”In his welcoming speech earlier, Chairman Kim emphasized, “We will lead China–DPRK friendship to new heights and develop it into a model of the strongest and most strategic relations between socialist countries.” He further assessed that, “because they are united by a common ideology and comradely friendship, the two parties and two countries have been able to share a common destiny over a long period of time and firmly cement the bonds of unity and cooperation.”The Korean Central News Agency reported, “Comrade Kim Jong-un noted that through this Pyongyang summit and talks, the will to jointly build a bright future for the peoples of both countries on the path of struggle for socialism has been reaffirmed.”The two countries also agreed to hold separate commemorative events to mark the 65th anniversary of the signing of the North Korea–China Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation, which falls next month. The treaty is regarded as a symbolic document that has served as the institutional foundation of bilateral relations since its signing in 1961.The summit also included an exchange of views on the recent international situation. The Korean Central News Agency reported that the two leaders “reached a satisfactory consensus” on “strengthening strategic coordination and cooperation between the two parties and two countries amid the complex and multifaceted global political situation, firmly safeguarding the sovereignty, security, and development interests of both nations, and jointly safeguarding regional and global peace and development.”Kim particularly emphasized the strategic importance of North Korea–China relations. He stated, “We will continue to regard North Korea–China friendship as our most important and primary strategic task,” adding, “We will spare no effort to strengthen and develop the relationship between our two countries into a special, sincere, and solid strategic relationship that serves as a model for relations among socialist countries.”He also reaffirmed his support for China on the Taiwan issue, stating, “No matter how the situation changes, our Party and government will fully support and endorse the policies and positions of the Chinese Party and government aimed at safeguarding their core interests based on the One-China principle.”North Korea described the summit as “a historic occasion that demonstrated the immutability of DPRK–China friendship and set a new milestone in the development of the strategic cooperative relationship between the two parties and two countries.”However, some discrepancies emerged between the content released by the Chinese side and reports in North Korean media. While Chinese state-run media prominently reported President Xi’s remarks the previous day on strengthening exchanges with North Korea in areas such as diplomacy, law enforcement, and the military, North Korea’s Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) did not mention these remarks. Some observers interpret this as an instance of coordinated message management between North Korea and China with regard to the expansion of military cooperation.The results of the summit released by Xinhua News Agency did not include any mention of North Korea’s denuclearization or the resolution of the Korean Peninsula issue. Instead, the two leaders repeatedly emphasized the protection of sovereignty, security, and development interests, as well as the strengthening of strategic cooperation.Some interpret this as an indication that, with North Korea having declared itself a nuclear-armed state, China’s diplomatic focus is shifting away from denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and toward the strengthening of strategic cooperation with North Korea.While the United States stated in materials released following last month’s U.S.–China summit that the two countries had reaffirmed their shared goal of North Korean denuclearization, China emphasized its opposition to sanctions against North Korea in a recent joint statement with Russia, without reference to the denuclearization issue.Some observers suggest that, during the process of coordinating President Xi’s visit to North Korea, China may have tacitly accepted—or at the very least not objected to—North Korea’s position that the denuclearization agenda was unacceptable.Prior to his visit, President Xi also published an op-ed in Rodong Sinmun in which he did not once use the term “Korean Peninsula”—a phrase he had referenced six times in 2019—instead emphasizing opposition to hegemony and the strengthening of strategic cooperation.Xi Jinping Returns to China, Sends Thank-You Message to Kim Jong-unIn a thank-you message sent to North Korean State Affairs Commission Chairman Kim Jong-un upon his return from a state visit to China, Chinese President Xi Jinping stated that “China–North Korea relations have already embarked on a new historical journey,” reiterating the close ties between the two countries. North Korea also mobilized all state-run media to extensively publicize the outcomes of President Xi’s visit and to highlight friendly relations between the two nations.According to the Korean Central News Agency on June 10, in a message of thanks sent to Chairman Kim on May 9—the day of his return—President Xi stated, “I am satisfied with the results of this visit,” adding that “China–North Korea relations have already embarked on a new historical journey.” He expressed gratitude to Chairman Kim and First Lady Ri Sol-ju for the successful conclusion of his visit, noting that “this fully demonstrates the deep friendship between the two parties and two countries.”President Xi particularly emphasized that during the summit, he and Chairman Kim “exchanged in-depth views on issues of mutual concern and reached a series of important common understandings,” adding that “this has added new, epoch-making content to China–DPRK relations.” He further stated, “We have demonstrated our firm resolve to uphold traditional friendship, jointly promote development and prosperity, and safeguard regional and global peace and stability.”He also proposed to Chairman Kim, “Let us jointly seize the trend of the times and safeguard and develop China–DPRK relations based on the fundamental and long-term interests of both countries.” At the end of the message, he added, “I look forward to meeting Chairman Kim again,” and expressed his wish that “China–DPRK friendship be passed down from generation to generation and remain evergreen.”North Korea intensively publicized the achievements of Xi’s visit to its domestic audience, highlighting the strategic value of North Korea–China relations. Rodong Sinmun, the official newspaper of the Workers’ Party, devoted four of its six pages that day to articles related to Xi’s visit. At the top of the front page, the national emblems and flags of both countries were displayed, accompanied by the red slogan: “The history and tradition of North Korea–China friendship will be eternal and immortal.”The newspaper provided detailed coverage of Xi’s wreath-laying ceremony at the Tower of Friendship, his visit to the Workers’ Party Central School of Cadres, his luncheon with Kim and his wife, and the large-scale farewell event held by Pyongyang citizens. The Tower of Friendship is a symbolic site honoring Chinese People’s Volunteer Forces soldiers who died during the Korean War, and the image of Xi and Kim laying wreaths together is interpreted as symbolizing the two countries’ “blood alliance.”In particular, Rodong Sinmun published 52 related photos on that day alone. Pages 3 and 4, which covered Xi’s departure from Pyongyang, featured 22 photos from the farewell ceremony, including images of Xi and Kim shaking hands, as well as First Lady Peng Liyuan and First Lady Ri Sol-ju embracing. The previous day’s coverage of the first day of the visit also reached an unprecedented level, with the usual six-page spread expanded to ten pages and a total of 80 photos included.Korean Central Broadcasting and Korean Central Television also focused their programming on President Xi’s visit as a major news story. That morning, Korean Central Television featured anchor Ri Chun-hee as the lead presenter in its regular broadcast, providing a detailed account of the second day of the visit. The Korean Central News Agency also released a series of related articles accompanied by a large number of photos.Experts view this visit and the subsequent propaganda campaign as an attempt by both North Korea and China to showcase their recently strengthened strategic cooperative relationship, both domestically and internationally, while simultaneously demonstrating solidarity to the international community, including the United States. In particular, President Xi’s reference to a “new historic journey” is interpreted as reflecting his intention to elevate North Korea–China relations beyond traditional friendship toward a long-term strategic cooperative partnership.Kim Jong-un Attends Sea Trials of the Kanggun-ho with Ju Ae, Urges Prompt Naval CommissioningNorth Korean State Affairs Commission Chairman Kim Jong-un personally observed the sea trials of the new 5,000-ton destroyer Kanggun-ho—which ran aground during its launch ceremony last year—and emphasized the need to strengthen naval capabilities to secure nuclear deterrence. This is interpreted as a demonstration that the vessel, which suffered a loss of face due to the failed launch, has now entered a normal sea trial phase, while also revealing the regime’s intent to extend its nuclear- and missile-centered strategic capabilities to the naval domain.North Korea’s state-run Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) reported on June 6 that Chairman Kim visited the destroyer Kanggun-ho, which began operational capability assessment trials on June 4, to observe its sea trials. Photos released by North Korea showed his daughter Ju-ae accompanying him.Kim boarded the destroyer, toured combat stations including the integrated command post, and received briefings on the test schedule for the ship’s weapons systems and the trial voyage plan. He assessed that “the ship’s cruising and high-speed maneuvering capabilities are excellent, ensuring that its mobility meets operational requirements.”He went on to emphasize the need to strengthen naval capabilities, stating, “We can deter war and safeguard peace only by possessing a substantial and powerful military force capable of responsibly exercising military sovereignty in any space—on land, at sea, or in the air.”In particular, Kim directly linked the role of the Navy to nuclear capabilities. He stated, “The issue of rapidly strengthening the Navy into a force capable of reliably fulfilling its role as part of our nuclear deterrent—a force capable of delivering a fatal blow to the enemy at any time, both underwater and on the surface—is the most crucial core task in our Party’s new five-year national defense development policy.”This statement is interpreted as lending weight to North Korea’s recent plans to expand its nuclear-armed surface fleet and submarine forces. Since last year, North Korea has emphasized the expansion of the Navy’s strategic role by successively unveiling plans for new destroyers, strategic cruise missiles, and nuclear-powered submarines.On that day, Kim instructed officials from shipbuilding and weapons system research institutes, as well as scientists and technicians, saying, “I hope the Choehyun-ho and Kanggun-ho destroyers will be commissioned into the Navy as soon as possible.”The Kanggun-ho ran aground last May during its launch ceremony after the hull tilted to one side and capsized. Chairman Kim, who witnessed the scene at the time, strongly reprimanded the incident as a “serious and grave accident and a criminal act” and ordered disciplinary action against those responsible.North Korea subsequently refurbished the vessel following restoration work, and by publicly revealing this sea trial, it appears to be signaling both domestically and internationally that it has overcome the aftermath of the accident and that operational deployment is imminent. In particular, bringing Kim Ju-ae along is interpreted as an effort to highlight the naval modernization project as a key achievement of the Kim Jong-un era while emphasizing its symbolic connection to the succession structure.Kim Yo-jong: “Nuclear-Weapon State Status Is an Absolute, Uncrossable Line”Ahead of Chinese President Xi Jinping’s visit to North Korea, Pyongyang has repeatedly flaunted its nuclear capabilities, asserting that “nuclear-weapon state status is a reality.” Analysts suggest that this move is intended to preempt any discussion of denuclearization during the North Korea–China summit while seeking de facto recognition of its nuclear-weapon state status from China.On June 7, the Korean Central News Agency reported on a statement released the previous day by Kim Yo-jong, Director of the General Affairs Department of the Workers’ Party of Korea. Director Kim stated that “the status of a nuclear-armed state is an absolute, unyielding red line,” completely rejecting the “confirmation of the common goal of North Korea’s denuclearization” announced by the U.S. side last month following the U.S.–China summit. She claimed, “It is complete fabrication and baseless false information,” adding, “We possess the most accurate information regarding the existence of such facts.”This statement, released one day before President Xi’s visit to North Korea on May 8 and 9, is interpreted as a reiteration that North Korea has no intention of bringing the denuclearization issue to the negotiating table. North Korea recently made public footage of Chairman Kim Jong-un inspecting a new uranium enrichment facility, openly demonstrating its determination to advance its nuclear capabilities.North Korea experts analyze that this message is strongly intended to exclude denuclearization discussions from Xi’s agenda during his visit. They suggest that, by defining its status as a nuclear-armed state—as enshrined in its constitution—as an irreversible national policy rather than a subject for negotiation, North Korea has sent a coercive signal to China to recognize this stance.Attention is focused on what message Xi will deliver in Pyongyang. While China officially maintains the principle of denuclearization on the Korean Peninsula, it has recently refrained from making related remarks. There is speculation that even if China does not publicly acknowledge North Korea’s nuclear status, it may adopt language that partially reflects North Korea’s position.Expanding economic cooperation is also cited as a key agenda item for this summit. Amid prolonged international sanctions, North Korea is hoping for economic recovery through increased Chinese tourism and the normalization of trade, while China is also considering its strategic interests in developing its northeastern region.In particular, attention is focused on whether progress will be made on the issue of Tumen River access to the sea, which China has long pursued. China has been advancing plans to gain access to the East Sea via the lower reaches of the Tumen River in order to strengthen the maritime logistics competitiveness of its three northeastern provinces. At last month’s China–Russia summit, the two countries announced that they would continue trilateral consultations with North Korea on the Tumen River access issue.If an agreement is reached, the economic cooperation network connecting North Korea’s Rason (Rajin–Sonbong) region with China’s three northeastern provinces and Russia’s Primorsky Krai is expected to be further strengthened. Some observers suggest that such economic cooperation could serve as a foundation for expanded strategic cooperation among North Korea, China, and Russia in the long term.However, the prevailing view is that the likelihood of China establishing a cooperative framework with North Korea and Russia at the level of a military alliance is limited. This is because, even amid strategic competition with the United States, China does not want the situation on the Korean Peninsula to deteriorate in an uncontrollable direction. Instead, it is expected that China will seek to deter North Korea’s military provocations and to manage, to a certain extent, the military rapprochement between North Korea and Russia.Diplomatic circles are also paying close attention to the possibility that President Xi will attempt to serve as a bridge for the resumption of North Korea–U.S. dialogue by conveying the U.S. position, as confirmed at last month’s U.S.–China summit, to Chairman Kim. There is speculation that the outcome of President Xi’s visit to North Korea will be a crucial turning point in determining the future of the North Korean nuclear issue and the situation on the Korean Peninsula.