North Korea Inside· Pyongyang Hosts Event Marking 105th Anniversary of Chinese Communist Party; Jo Yong-won and Senior Officials Attend· North Korea Warns: “Those Who Abuse the People Will Not Escape the Law’s Ruthless Judgment”· Kim Jong-un Visits Wonsan-Kalma Tourist Facilities Amid Expectations of Growing Chinese TourismKim Myong-sungSecretary General of the SAND InstitutePyongyang Hosts Event Marking 105th Anniversary of Chinese Communist Party; Jo Yong-won and Senior Officials AttendNorth Korea and China reaffirmed their close bilateral ties through a series of commemorative events held in Pyongyang to mark the 105th anniversary of the founding of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). The events were attended by senior North Korean officials, including Jo Yong-won, Director of the Workers’ Party of Korea (WPK) Organization Department and one of Kim Jong-un’s closest confidants, underscoring the strategic importance that both sides continue to attach to bilateral relations.According to the Chinese Embassy in Pyongyang on July 1, Chinese Ambassador Wang Yajun hosted a reception at the embassy on June 30 to commemorate the anniversary.The North Korean delegation included Jo Yong-won, Director of the WPK Organization and Guidance Department; Kim Song-nam, Director of the WPK International Department; Mun Song-hyok, Deputy Director of the WPK International Department; Vice Foreign Minister Kim Myong-su; Vice Minister of External Economic Relations Ryu Eun-hae; and Vice Minister of Culture Pak Kyong-chol. Members of the diplomatic corps accredited to North Korea also attended the event.In his remarks, Ambassador Wang stated, “Since entering the new era, General Secretary Xi Jinping and General Secretary Kim Jong-un have held seven historic summits that have charted the course for the development of relations between our two parties and two countries.”He added that China stands ready to “faithfully implement the important consensus reached by the top leaders of both countries, deepen exchanges on governance experience between our parties and states, promote the healthy and stable development of bilateral relations, and jointly safeguard regional peace and development.”Responding on behalf of the North Korean side, Kim Song-nam praised China’s recent achievements, stating that “under the leadership of the Communist Party, China has achieved remarkable progress in high-quality economic development, social stability, and the enhancement of its international standing.”Prior to the reception, participants toured a photo exhibition commemorating the 105th anniversary of the founding of the CCP.On the same day, Pyongyang also hosted a symposium on exchanges of party-building experience between the WPK and the CCP. Ambassador Wang noted that “this year marks both the 105th anniversary of the founding of the Communist Party of China and the first year of North Korea’s implementation of the decisions adopted at its Ninth Party Congress.”He added that China is prepared to work with North Korea to implement the important consensus reached by the leaders of both parties, while expanding mutual learning so that socialist development in both countries can achieve new progress.North Korean participants likewise emphasized the importance of sharing party governance experience and strengthening cooperation in socialist construction, expressing support for expanding exchanges between the two ruling parties.To mark the anniversary, Kim Jong-un also sent a congratulatory message and a floral basket to Chinese President Xi Jinping.In his message, Kim reaffirmed Pyongyang’s commitment to strengthening bilateral ties, stating, “It is the unwavering position of our Party and government to continuously strengthen and develop the DPRK–China friendship centered on the socialist cause.”Jo Yong-won’s personal attendance—given his status as one of Kim Jong-un’s closest aides—combined with both sides’ repeated emphasis on implementing leader-level agreements and expanding party-to-party exchanges, suggests that bilateral relations continue to be managed through close institutional coordination between the two ruling parties. The events underscore the central role of party diplomacy in maintaining stability and continuity in contemporary DPRK–China relations.North Korea Warns: “Those Who Abuse the People Will Not Escape the Law’s Ruthless Judgment”North Korea has recently intensified its messaging that “even Workers’ Party officials will face legal punishment if they commit crimes,” signaling a renewed effort to tighten discipline among the country’s ruling elite. While framed as an affirmation of the “rule of law,” the campaign appears aimed at curbing corruption and misconduct within the Party, government, and military, while reinforcing loyalty to Kim Jong-un.On June 29, Korean Central Television (KCTV), during its Law and Citizens program, delivered a stern warning against violations of state law, declaring that “there can be absolutely no exceptions or special privileges before the laws of the Republic.”The broadcast further asserted that “violating state law constitutes a renunciation of one’s status as a dignified citizen of the Republic and a grave criminal act that assists the enemies’ anti-socialist schemes.” It added that “those who abuse their authority over the people and infringe upon their interests will not escape the ruthless judgment of the Republic’s laws.”Analysts view North Korea’s repeated emphasis on “equality before the law” as a direct response to corruption and entrenched privilege within the party-state apparatus. In authoritarian systems, references to the rule of law typically serve less as a commitment to judicial independence than as an instrument of political control and regime legitimacy.More specifically, the messaging appears intended to demonstrate Kim Jong-un’s willingness to subject even senior Workers’ Party officials to formal legal punishment.Earlier, North Korea announced that the Second Plenary Meeting of the Ninth Central Committee of the Workers’ Party, held from June 20 to 22, had decided to refer Pak Hui-chol, Director of the Organization Department of the General Political Bureau of the Korean People’s Army, to judicial authorities for investigation on corruption allegations. Rather than handling the case solely through internal party disciplinary procedures, the decision to pursue criminal prosecution against a senior military party official appears designed to reinforce the message that no official is beyond the reach of state law.The campaign also coincides with Kim Jong-un’s increasingly public criticism of declining discipline within the party. In a June 30 editorial, Rodong Sinmun argued that “outdated practices, backward thinking, and obsolete habits that no longer correspond to present-day realities must be overcome and eliminated.”The newspaper also criticized bureaucratic complacency, stating that “an official preoccupied only with personal safety and self-preservation is, in effect, no different from one who does not exist.”The editorial further called for intensified efforts to dismantle “outdated formulas and frameworks, stubborn conservatism, and unscientific empiricism.” The language has been widely interpreted as a warning that officials who fail to adapt to Kim Jong-un’s evolving policy priorities—or who resist implementing them—could face removal.Separately, on June 29, Rodong Sinmun urged party officials to “make no compromises on conviction or principle,” reiterating that unwavering political loyalty remains the foremost expectation of the leadership.Kim Jong-un’s recent decision to reinstate his longtime confidant Jo Yong-won as Director of the Workers’ Party Organization and Guidance Department is likewise viewed as part of a broader effort to reinforce internal discipline. Jo returned to the position approximately three months after being reassigned to serve as Chairman of the Standing Committee of the Supreme People’s Assembly.The Organization and Guidance Department remains the party’s most powerful institution for overseeing cadre appointments, personnel management, and political discipline. Observers assess Jo’s reinstatement as reflecting Kim’s determination to directly address growing concerns over lax discipline and corruption within both the party and the military, while strengthening internal cohesion ahead of future political priorities.Kim Jong-un Visits Wonsan-Kalma Tourist Facilities Amid Expectations of Growing Chinese TourismKim Jong-un, Chairman of the State Affairs Commission of North Korea, has conducted consecutive inspections of newly completed railway and medical facilities at the Wonsan-Kalma Coastal Tourist Zone, one of his signature economic development projects. As Pyongyang continues to expand its tourism infrastructure, analysts suggest the inspections may signal preparations for a broader reopening of international tourism, particularly targeting Chinese visitors following the limited resumption of Russian tourism.According to the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) on June 26, Kim provided on-site guidance at newly completed facilities within the Wonsan-Kalma Coastal Tourist Zone on June 24. During his inspection of the newly constructed Kalma Tourist Railway Station, he reviewed both construction quality and operational readiness.Reflecting on the pace of construction, Kim remarked, “It seems like only yesterday that we selected a site near the coastal tourist zone to improve transportation convenience for visitors, yet a modern railway station has been completed in just one year,” praising the officials responsible for the project.At the same time, Kim identified shortcomings discovered during the final stages of construction and called for more rigorous quality control. He emphasized the need to strengthen construction regulations by requiring contractors to assume legal responsibility for the quality of completed structures over a specified warranty period and to carry out any necessary repairs and maintenance.Images released by North Korean state media show that the station includes a modest restaurant and souvenir shop on the first floor, while the second floor features convenience-store-style retail outlets. The layout suggests that Pyongyang intends the facility to function not only as a transportation hub but also as a service center designed to enhance the visitor experience.Kim also announced plans to modernize railway stations in provincial capitals across the country based on experience gained from the Kalma project. Stressing the importance of scientific planning, he stated that station designs should reflect both passenger and freight demand as well as regional characteristics. He further instructed officials to develop specialized plans for the operation of dedicated tourist trains.Kim subsequently inspected the newly constructed emergency medical center within the Wonsan-Kalma Coastal Tourist Zone. According to North Korean media, the facility includes an emergency resuscitation unit, operating theaters, recovery rooms, and laboratory facilities.During the inspection, Kim emphasized the need to further improve both the functionality and professionalism of the medical center. He also reaffirmed his government’s commitment to constructing modern hospitals in 20 cities and counties annually under the “20×10 Regional Development Policy,” one of his flagship domestic development initiatives.The Wonsan-Kalma Coastal Tourist Zone, officially opened in July 2025, is a large-scale seaside resort capable of accommodating approximately 20,000 visitors. Personally championed by Kim Jong-un, the project is intended to become one of North Korea’s premier tourism destinations while generating much-needed foreign currency through international tourism.North Korea has thus far resumed foreign tourism only on a limited basis, primarily for Russian visitors. Against this backdrop, analysts assess that Pyongyang’s efforts to upgrade transportation and medical infrastructure may be aimed at preparing for a broader reopening of the tourism sector, including the potential return of Chinese tourists.China remains North Korea’s largest potential source of international visitors. As cross-border exchanges between the two countries continue to recover following the COVID-19 pandemic, some observers believe Pyongyang intends to position Wonsan-Kalma as its principal tourism hub for attracting Chinese travelers and expanding foreign currency earnings.Separately, KCNA reported on June 26 that Kim personally observed a test of newly developed artillery systems capable of striking key targets in South Korea, marking the anniversary of the outbreak of the Korean War. The juxtaposition of economic development initiatives and military demonstrations underscores Pyongyang’s continued pursuit of parallel efforts to strengthen both domestic economic capacity and military deterrence.

< North Korean Trends in June 2026 > - DPRK–China Strategic Cooperation, Defense Modernization, and Regional Development Policy Implementation -                    Seung-hyun LeePh.D in Public AdministrationResearch Fellow, Sand Research InstituteIn June 2026, North Korea pursued a policy agenda centered on strengthening strategic cooperation with China, advancing the modernization of its defense capabilities, implementing regional development initiatives, and cultivating a new generation of political leadership. Chinese President Xi Jinping's visit to Pyongyang, together with the DPRK–China summit, represented the most significant developments in North Korea's external relations during the month.Domestically, the regime continued to emphasize progress in its nuclear and missile programs alongside the implementation of regional development policies. Kim Jong-un made a total of nine public appearances during the month.Of these, five (55.6 percent) were related to military affairs, while three (33.3 percent) focused on economic and social issues. Although the overall number of public appearances declined slightly from May, military activities still accounted for more than half of the total, underscoring the regime's sustained emphasis on strengthening national defense.Political activities were largely concentrated on the DPRK–China summit, while economic and social engagements continued to highlight regional development initiatives and efforts to cultivate a new generation of political leadership.A particularly noteworthy development was the DPRK–China summit, during which the two countries agreed to expand cooperation across political, economic, cultural, and security domains. In addition to reaffirming their traditional relationship, both sides pledged to strengthen strategic communication in response to changes in the regional and international security environment.The summit underscored Pyongyang's intention to maintain a stable strategic partnership with Beijing despite continued international sanctions. It also suggested Beijing's willingness to sustain engagement with North Korea as part of its broader effort to manage stability on the Korean Peninsula and preserve its regional influence. In addition, North Korea broadened its diplomatic engagement with other socialist states, as reflected in the visit of a delegation from Vietnam's Ministry of Public Security.In the military domain, the most significant developments included the reported operation of a new uranium enrichment facility and Kim Jong-un's inspections of key defense-industrial enterprises. During these visits, he emphasized the expansion of nuclear materials production capacity and the strengthening of the defense industrial base, reaffirming his commitment to enhancing North Korea's nuclear deterrent.While observing the sea trials of the naval destroyer Kanggon-ho, Kim also underscored the importance of naval modernization and improved maritime operational capabilities, illustrating North Korea's continued pursuit of parallel development in both strategic nuclear forces and conventional military capabilities. His observation of artillery weapons tests later in the month similarly reflected ongoing efforts to improve the performance and operational effectiveness of tactical weapons systems.In the economic sector, Kim Jong-un reviewed progress in regional development initiatives through inspections of the Sinuiju Greenhouse Complex and the Vegetable Science Research Center. North Korea emphasized the adoption of modern agricultural technologies and reiterated its commitment to revitalizing regional economies and improving living standards.The completion of rice planting in major agricultural areas nationwide, together with Premier Pak Thae Song's inspections of the agricultural and coal sectors, further underscored the regime's continued focus on food security and the maintenance of key industrial infrastructure.Meanwhile, North Korea placed considerable emphasis on educating the next generation of Party cadres and youth through commemorative events marking the 80th anniversaries of the Party Central Cadre School and the Korean Children's Union. Kim Jong-un instructed Party officials to cultivate cadres with both revolutionary commitment and strong policy implementation capacity. At Youth League events, he underscored the role of younger generations as a driving force behind national development and the continuation of the country's revolutionary traditions.These activities should be understood not merely as commemorative occasions but as part of a broader effort to reinforce long-term regime stability and ideological cohesion.Overall, developments in June 2026 indicate that North Korea continued to pursue a dual-track strategy of strengthening strategic cooperation with China externally while advancing defense modernization, regional development initiatives, and leadership succession domestically. The regime also sought to integrate its diplomatic, military, economic, and social priorities in ways that reinforce both regime stability and policy coherence.Taken together, these developments suggest that Pyongyang is likely to maintain its current policy trajectory, with continued emphasis on strengthening its nuclear and military capabilities alongside the implementation of regional development policies.

North Korea Inside· Kim Jong-un Signals Deeper Consolidation of North Korea–China Ties· North Korea Highlights “100-Day Economic Achievements” Ahead of Party Plenary Meeting, Emphasizing Local Development Efforts· North Korea Rejects Denuclearization Calls, Says “Disarmament of a Combatant Is an Illusion”Kim Myong-sungSecretary General of the SAND InstituteKim Jong-un Signals Deeper Consolidation of North Korea–China TiesNorth Korean State Affairs Commission Chairman Kim Jong-un sent a congratulatory message and a flower basket to Chinese President Xi Jinping on the occasion of Xi’s 73rd birthday, underscoring the continued strengthening of ties between Pyongyang and Beijing.The Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) reported on June 16 that Chairman Kim sent the message on the previous day. In the message, Kim stated, “I extend my warm congratulations to Comrade General Secretary Xi Jinping on his birthday,” and expressed his sincere wishes for Xi’s continued good health and further success in leading China’s socialist development as the core leader of the Communist Party of China.KCNA also reported that the ribbon attached to the congratulatory flower basket sent by Kim bore the message: “Warm congratulations to Comrade General Secretary Xi Jinping on his birthday.”The message and flower basket were delivered to an official of the International Liaison Department of the Communist Party of China Central Committee via the North Korean ambassador to China.This marks the first time since President Xi’s 70th birthday in 2023 that North Korea has publicly issued a birthday congratulatory message in the name of its top leader. The gesture is particularly notable as it came just one week after Xi completed a two-day state visit to Pyongyang on June 8, during which he held a summit with Kim Jong-un.During the summit, the two leaders reportedly discussed measures to expand cooperation in political, economic, and security-related areas and reaffirmed their commitment to elevating North Korea–China relations into a “strategic cooperative partnership for a new era.”Analysts assess that the public release of Kim’s congratulatory message goes beyond a routine diplomatic gesture and reflects an effort to demonstrate the restoration and strengthening of North Korea–China strategic ties, both domestically and internationally.Against the backdrop of intensifying strategic competition between the United States and China, North Korea's strategic calculations appear to be converging more closely with Beijing's efforts to expand its influence on the Korean Peninsula. Pyongyang is widely assessed as viewing closer ties with China as a means of expanding diplomatic space and improving economic resilience under conditions of sustained sanctions and international isolation.At the same time, North Korea's deepening military cooperation with Russia, alongside its efforts to restore and stabilize relations with China, has led some analysts to argue that a loose North Korea–China–Russia alignment may be gradually taking shape.North Korea Highlights “100-Day Economic Achievements” Ahead of Party Plenary Meeting, Emphasizing Local Development EffortsAhead of the Second Plenary Meeting of the Ninth Central Committee of the Workers’ Party of Korea scheduled for later this month, North Korea has launched an extensive propaganda campaign highlighting economic achievements across various sectors during the 100 days since the Ninth Party Congress.The campaign is widely interpreted as an effort to strengthen ideological unity among workers and reinforce momentum toward implementing the economic objectives established by the Party.In an article published on the 15th titled “Miracles and Innovations Created on the Front Lines of the New Five-Year Plan Following the Supreme Leader’s Guidance,” KCNA reported that “overall industrial production has increased by 105 percent during the 100 days since the Party Congress.”The report stated that workers and officials across the country had mobilized their “mental strength and scientific and technological capabilities” to continuously establish new production records and advance toward higher targets.KCNA highlighted the Sangwon Cement Complex, which Chairman Kim Jong Un visited immediately after the Ninth Party Congress in February, as a key example. According to the report, the facility shortened the period of intensive equipment maintenance and launched a campaign aimed at achieving significant production increases, recording an average daily production rate of 107 percent in March and subsequently meeting production targets for April and May.The agency also reported that the February 8 Jikdong Youth Coal Mine launched various mass campaigns, including “one extra shift,” “supporting the next shift,” and “one additional coal cart,” resulting in coal production exceeding planned targets by more than 1,000 metric tons.KCNA further claimed that enterprises across major sectors—including construction materials, coal mining, metallurgy, chemicals, electricity, machinery, and light industry—achieved substantial production growth through technological innovation and ideological mobilization.The report emphasized the importance of ideological preparation, stating that recent achievements demonstrate that there are no insurmountable obstacles when the country first identifies internal reserves and strengthens scientific and technological capabilities.It also reiterated North Korea’s commitment to achieving the economic objectives established at the Ninth Party Congress, stating that the country would continue setting new standards and breaking new records.Rodong Sinmun, the official newspaper of the Workers’ Party of Korea, also reported on its front page that construction of 20 comprehensive service facilities nationwide under the “Local Development 20×10 Policy” had been completed with the participation of military construction units.The newspaper added that military personnel were continuing roofing and exterior finishing work in preparation for the Party plenary meeting.The Plenary Meeting of the Central Committee of the Workers’ Party of Korea serves as a key policy-making body responsible for reviewing and deciding major domestic and foreign policy issues. The Political Bureau approved a decision on May 24 to convene the Second Plenary Meeting of the Ninth Central Committee later this month.North Korea Rejects Denuclearization Calls, Says “Disarmament of a Combatant Is an Illusion”North Korea criticized the recent South Korea–U.S. Nuclear Consultative Group (NCG) meeting, which reaffirmed the shared goal of North Korea’s denuclearization, arguing that discussions of denuclearizing a “combatant state” amount to “a groundless illusion.”In a statement released through KCNA on June 14, a spokesperson for North Korea’s Foreign Ministry condemned what it described as a “collective nuclear confrontation campaign” involving the United States, Japan, and South Korea.The spokesperson stated that repeated attempts by the United States and its allies to pressure a sovereign state would have consequences, warning against what Pyongyang characterized as provocative actions.The statement further asserted that “anti-DPRK rhetoric and coordinated nuclear threats” by the United States and its partners would not affect North Korea’s status as a nuclear-armed state, adding that the issue of denuclearization had already been “conclusively settled.”It also claimed that defense cooperation among South Korea, the United States, and Japan, along with joint military exercises incorporating extended deterrence scenarios, further justified North Korea’s efforts to enhance its nuclear and military capabilities.The statement claimed that the development of a nuclear deterrent is a legitimate measure intended to prevent external threats, protect national sovereignty, and contribute to regional security.The spokesperson further insisted that no pressure from Washington, Seoul, or Tokyo would alter North Korea’s claimed status as a nuclear-armed state, declaring that denuclearization could not be reversed.South Korea and the United States held the sixth meeting of the Nuclear Consultative Group in Seoul on June 11, issuing a joint statement reaffirming their shared objective of achieving North Korea’s denuclearization.Following the Extended Deterrence Dialogue with Japan held on June 8–9, the United States also reiterated its commitment to the complete denuclearization of North Korea.

North Korea Inside· Xi Jinping and Kim Jong-un Meet in Pyongyang, Pledge Stronger North Korea–China Cooperation· Kim Jong-un Attends Sea Trials of the Kanggun-ho with Ju Ae, Urges Prompt Naval Commissioning· Kim Yo-jong: “Nuclear-Weapon State Status Is an Absolute, Uncrossable Line”Kim Myong-sungSecretary General of the SAND InstituteXi Jinping and Kim Jong-un Meet in Pyongyang, Pledge Stronger North Korea–China CooperationChinese President Xi Jinping and North Korean Chairman of the State Affairs Commission Kim Jong-un reaffirmed their commitment to strengthening strategic cooperation between North Korea and China by agreeing to expand cooperation across all fields—including politics, the economy, and culture—during their summit in Pyongyang. The two sides also agreed to revitalize high-level exchanges and enhance strategic communication, while strengthening coordination in responding to regional and international developments.According to the Korean Central News Agency on May 9, President Xi said in a reply speech at a banquet held at the Mokran House in Pyongyang a day earlier that “China–DPRK relations stand at a new historic starting point,” adding that “We will develop China–DPRK relations to a higher level, open a brighter future for the socialist cause of both countries, and promote the continuous progress of human society.” He further added that “China and North Korea have always shared a common destiny, and the traditional friendship between our two countries is an invincible friendship with a long history.”In his welcoming speech earlier, Chairman Kim emphasized, “We will lead China–DPRK friendship to new heights and develop it into a model of the strongest and most strategic relations between socialist countries.” He further assessed that, “because they are united by a common ideology and comradely friendship, the two parties and two countries have been able to share a common destiny over a long period of time and firmly cement the bonds of unity and cooperation.”The Korean Central News Agency reported, “Comrade Kim Jong-un noted that through this Pyongyang summit and talks, the will to jointly build a bright future for the peoples of both countries on the path of struggle for socialism has been reaffirmed.”The two countries also agreed to hold separate commemorative events to mark the 65th anniversary of the signing of the North Korea–China Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation, which falls next month. The treaty is regarded as a symbolic document that has served as the institutional foundation of bilateral relations since its signing in 1961.The summit also included an exchange of views on the recent international situation. The Korean Central News Agency reported that the two leaders “reached a satisfactory consensus” on “strengthening strategic coordination and cooperation between the two parties and two countries amid the complex and multifaceted global political situation, firmly safeguarding the sovereignty, security, and development interests of both nations, and jointly safeguarding regional and global peace and development.”Kim particularly emphasized the strategic importance of North Korea–China relations. He stated, “We will continue to regard North Korea–China friendship as our most important and primary strategic task,” adding, “We will spare no effort to strengthen and develop the relationship between our two countries into a special, sincere, and solid strategic relationship that serves as a model for relations among socialist countries.”He also reaffirmed his support for China on the Taiwan issue, stating, “No matter how the situation changes, our Party and government will fully support and endorse the policies and positions of the Chinese Party and government aimed at safeguarding their core interests based on the One-China principle.”North Korea described the summit as “a historic occasion that demonstrated the immutability of DPRK–China friendship and set a new milestone in the development of the strategic cooperative relationship between the two parties and two countries.”However, some discrepancies emerged between the content released by the Chinese side and reports in North Korean media. While Chinese state-run media prominently reported President Xi’s remarks the previous day on strengthening exchanges with North Korea in areas such as diplomacy, law enforcement, and the military, North Korea’s Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) did not mention these remarks. Some observers interpret this as an instance of coordinated message management between North Korea and China with regard to the expansion of military cooperation.The results of the summit released by Xinhua News Agency did not include any mention of North Korea’s denuclearization or the resolution of the Korean Peninsula issue. Instead, the two leaders repeatedly emphasized the protection of sovereignty, security, and development interests, as well as the strengthening of strategic cooperation.Some interpret this as an indication that, with North Korea having declared itself a nuclear-armed state, China’s diplomatic focus is shifting away from denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and toward the strengthening of strategic cooperation with North Korea.While the United States stated in materials released following last month’s U.S.–China summit that the two countries had reaffirmed their shared goal of North Korean denuclearization, China emphasized its opposition to sanctions against North Korea in a recent joint statement with Russia, without reference to the denuclearization issue.Some observers suggest that, during the process of coordinating President Xi’s visit to North Korea, China may have tacitly accepted—or at the very least not objected to—North Korea’s position that the denuclearization agenda was unacceptable.Prior to his visit, President Xi also published an op-ed in Rodong Sinmun in which he did not once use the term “Korean Peninsula”—a phrase he had referenced six times in 2019—instead emphasizing opposition to hegemony and the strengthening of strategic cooperation.Xi Jinping Returns to China, Sends Thank-You Message to Kim Jong-unIn a thank-you message sent to North Korean State Affairs Commission Chairman Kim Jong-un upon his return from a state visit to China, Chinese President Xi Jinping stated that “China–North Korea relations have already embarked on a new historical journey,” reiterating the close ties between the two countries. North Korea also mobilized all state-run media to extensively publicize the outcomes of President Xi’s visit and to highlight friendly relations between the two nations.According to the Korean Central News Agency on June 10, in a message of thanks sent to Chairman Kim on May 9—the day of his return—President Xi stated, “I am satisfied with the results of this visit,” adding that “China–North Korea relations have already embarked on a new historical journey.” He expressed gratitude to Chairman Kim and First Lady Ri Sol-ju for the successful conclusion of his visit, noting that “this fully demonstrates the deep friendship between the two parties and two countries.”President Xi particularly emphasized that during the summit, he and Chairman Kim “exchanged in-depth views on issues of mutual concern and reached a series of important common understandings,” adding that “this has added new, epoch-making content to China–DPRK relations.” He further stated, “We have demonstrated our firm resolve to uphold traditional friendship, jointly promote development and prosperity, and safeguard regional and global peace and stability.”He also proposed to Chairman Kim, “Let us jointly seize the trend of the times and safeguard and develop China–DPRK relations based on the fundamental and long-term interests of both countries.” At the end of the message, he added, “I look forward to meeting Chairman Kim again,” and expressed his wish that “China–DPRK friendship be passed down from generation to generation and remain evergreen.”North Korea intensively publicized the achievements of Xi’s visit to its domestic audience, highlighting the strategic value of North Korea–China relations. Rodong Sinmun, the official newspaper of the Workers’ Party, devoted four of its six pages that day to articles related to Xi’s visit. At the top of the front page, the national emblems and flags of both countries were displayed, accompanied by the red slogan: “The history and tradition of North Korea–China friendship will be eternal and immortal.”The newspaper provided detailed coverage of Xi’s wreath-laying ceremony at the Tower of Friendship, his visit to the Workers’ Party Central School of Cadres, his luncheon with Kim and his wife, and the large-scale farewell event held by Pyongyang citizens. The Tower of Friendship is a symbolic site honoring Chinese People’s Volunteer Forces soldiers who died during the Korean War, and the image of Xi and Kim laying wreaths together is interpreted as symbolizing the two countries’ “blood alliance.”In particular, Rodong Sinmun published 52 related photos on that day alone. Pages 3 and 4, which covered Xi’s departure from Pyongyang, featured 22 photos from the farewell ceremony, including images of Xi and Kim shaking hands, as well as First Lady Peng Liyuan and First Lady Ri Sol-ju embracing. The previous day’s coverage of the first day of the visit also reached an unprecedented level, with the usual six-page spread expanded to ten pages and a total of 80 photos included.Korean Central Broadcasting and Korean Central Television also focused their programming on President Xi’s visit as a major news story. That morning, Korean Central Television featured anchor Ri Chun-hee as the lead presenter in its regular broadcast, providing a detailed account of the second day of the visit. The Korean Central News Agency also released a series of related articles accompanied by a large number of photos.Experts view this visit and the subsequent propaganda campaign as an attempt by both North Korea and China to showcase their recently strengthened strategic cooperative relationship, both domestically and internationally, while simultaneously demonstrating solidarity to the international community, including the United States. In particular, President Xi’s reference to a “new historic journey” is interpreted as reflecting his intention to elevate North Korea–China relations beyond traditional friendship toward a long-term strategic cooperative partnership.Kim Jong-un Attends Sea Trials of the Kanggun-ho with Ju Ae, Urges Prompt Naval CommissioningNorth Korean State Affairs Commission Chairman Kim Jong-un personally observed the sea trials of the new 5,000-ton destroyer Kanggun-ho—which ran aground during its launch ceremony last year—and emphasized the need to strengthen naval capabilities to secure nuclear deterrence. This is interpreted as a demonstration that the vessel, which suffered a loss of face due to the failed launch, has now entered a normal sea trial phase, while also revealing the regime’s intent to extend its nuclear- and missile-centered strategic capabilities to the naval domain.North Korea’s state-run Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) reported on June 6 that Chairman Kim visited the destroyer Kanggun-ho, which began operational capability assessment trials on June 4, to observe its sea trials. Photos released by North Korea showed his daughter Ju-ae accompanying him.Kim boarded the destroyer, toured combat stations including the integrated command post, and received briefings on the test schedule for the ship’s weapons systems and the trial voyage plan. He assessed that “the ship’s cruising and high-speed maneuvering capabilities are excellent, ensuring that its mobility meets operational requirements.”He went on to emphasize the need to strengthen naval capabilities, stating, “We can deter war and safeguard peace only by possessing a substantial and powerful military force capable of responsibly exercising military sovereignty in any space—on land, at sea, or in the air.”In particular, Kim directly linked the role of the Navy to nuclear capabilities. He stated, “The issue of rapidly strengthening the Navy into a force capable of reliably fulfilling its role as part of our nuclear deterrent—a force capable of delivering a fatal blow to the enemy at any time, both underwater and on the surface—is the most crucial core task in our Party’s new five-year national defense development policy.”This statement is interpreted as lending weight to North Korea’s recent plans to expand its nuclear-armed surface fleet and submarine forces. Since last year, North Korea has emphasized the expansion of the Navy’s strategic role by successively unveiling plans for new destroyers, strategic cruise missiles, and nuclear-powered submarines.On that day, Kim instructed officials from shipbuilding and weapons system research institutes, as well as scientists and technicians, saying, “I hope the Choehyun-ho and Kanggun-ho destroyers will be commissioned into the Navy as soon as possible.”The Kanggun-ho ran aground last May during its launch ceremony after the hull tilted to one side and capsized. Chairman Kim, who witnessed the scene at the time, strongly reprimanded the incident as a “serious and grave accident and a criminal act” and ordered disciplinary action against those responsible.North Korea subsequently refurbished the vessel following restoration work, and by publicly revealing this sea trial, it appears to be signaling both domestically and internationally that it has overcome the aftermath of the accident and that operational deployment is imminent. In particular, bringing Kim Ju-ae along is interpreted as an effort to highlight the naval modernization project as a key achievement of the Kim Jong-un era while emphasizing its symbolic connection to the succession structure.Kim Yo-jong: “Nuclear-Weapon State Status Is an Absolute, Uncrossable Line”Ahead of Chinese President Xi Jinping’s visit to North Korea, Pyongyang has repeatedly flaunted its nuclear capabilities, asserting that “nuclear-weapon state status is a reality.” Analysts suggest that this move is intended to preempt any discussion of denuclearization during the North Korea–China summit while seeking de facto recognition of its nuclear-weapon state status from China.On June 7, the Korean Central News Agency reported on a statement released the previous day by Kim Yo-jong, Director of the General Affairs Department of the Workers’ Party of Korea. Director Kim stated that “the status of a nuclear-armed state is an absolute, unyielding red line,” completely rejecting the “confirmation of the common goal of North Korea’s denuclearization” announced by the U.S. side last month following the U.S.–China summit. She claimed, “It is complete fabrication and baseless false information,” adding, “We possess the most accurate information regarding the existence of such facts.”This statement, released one day before President Xi’s visit to North Korea on May 8 and 9, is interpreted as a reiteration that North Korea has no intention of bringing the denuclearization issue to the negotiating table. North Korea recently made public footage of Chairman Kim Jong-un inspecting a new uranium enrichment facility, openly demonstrating its determination to advance its nuclear capabilities.North Korea experts analyze that this message is strongly intended to exclude denuclearization discussions from Xi’s agenda during his visit. They suggest that, by defining its status as a nuclear-armed state—as enshrined in its constitution—as an irreversible national policy rather than a subject for negotiation, North Korea has sent a coercive signal to China to recognize this stance.Attention is focused on what message Xi will deliver in Pyongyang. While China officially maintains the principle of denuclearization on the Korean Peninsula, it has recently refrained from making related remarks. There is speculation that even if China does not publicly acknowledge North Korea’s nuclear status, it may adopt language that partially reflects North Korea’s position.Expanding economic cooperation is also cited as a key agenda item for this summit. Amid prolonged international sanctions, North Korea is hoping for economic recovery through increased Chinese tourism and the normalization of trade, while China is also considering its strategic interests in developing its northeastern region.In particular, attention is focused on whether progress will be made on the issue of Tumen River access to the sea, which China has long pursued. China has been advancing plans to gain access to the East Sea via the lower reaches of the Tumen River in order to strengthen the maritime logistics competitiveness of its three northeastern provinces. At last month’s China–Russia summit, the two countries announced that they would continue trilateral consultations with North Korea on the Tumen River access issue.If an agreement is reached, the economic cooperation network connecting North Korea’s Rason (Rajin–Sonbong) region with China’s three northeastern provinces and Russia’s Primorsky Krai is expected to be further strengthened. Some observers suggest that such economic cooperation could serve as a foundation for expanded strategic cooperation among North Korea, China, and Russia in the long term.However, the prevailing view is that the likelihood of China establishing a cooperative framework with North Korea and Russia at the level of a military alliance is limited. This is because, even amid strategic competition with the United States, China does not want the situation on the Korean Peninsula to deteriorate in an uncontrollable direction. Instead, it is expected that China will seek to deter North Korea’s military provocations and to manage, to a certain extent, the military rapprochement between North Korea and Russia.Diplomatic circles are also paying close attention to the possibility that President Xi will attempt to serve as a bridge for the resumption of North Korea–U.S. dialogue by conveying the U.S. position, as confirmed at last month’s U.S.–China summit, to Chairman Kim. There is speculation that the outcome of President Xi’s visit to North Korea will be a crucial turning point in determining the future of the North Korean nuclear issue and the situation on the Korean Peninsula.

North Korea Inside· Kim Jong-un Expresses Concern Over New Generation of Officials at Central Party Cadre School 80th Anniversary Ceremony· Kim Jong-un Visits Sinuiju Greenhouse Farm for Third Time This Year With Daughter in Attendance· North Korean Foreign Minister Says Ties With Russia Are at “Alliance Level” Amid Speculation Over Xi Jinping VisitKim Myong-sungSecretary General of the SAND InstituteKim Jong-un Expresses Concern Over New Generation of Officials at Central Party Cadre School 80th Anniversary CeremonyNorth Korean State Affairs Commission Chairman Kim Jong-un, amid the growing prominence of the so-called “market generation” within the cadre system, warned against phenomena such as factionalism, bureaucratism, and illicit accumulation of wealth that are eroding public trust in Party cadres. He also emphasized the critical importance of ideological education and the systematic cultivation of successor cadres.At the 80th anniversary celebration of the Workers’ Party Central Cadre School, Kim stated, “The cultivation of Party cadres has never before been presented as such an urgent and consequential task as it is today.”According to Rodong Sinmun on June 2, Chairman Kim paid a congratulatory visit to the Workers’ Party Central Cadre School in Pyongyang the previous day. The Central Cadre School is North Korea’s premier institution for training and retraining Party cadres and is widely regarded as a key incubator for developing the Party’s core leadership talent.He expressed concern about young cadres in the context of revolutionary generational succession, stating, “Due to the generational succession of the revolution, young people who lack Party discipline and possess sensibilities different from those of the previous generation are forming the main body of the cadre ranks,” and added, “If we fail to properly raise successors, we cannot expect the Party’s future development or the continuity of the revolutionary cause.”The newspaper reported that Kim pointed to the reality that young cadres who have not experienced the trials of war and post-war reconstruction differ from the older generation in terms of worldview and character, and stressed the need for corrective measures. This is interpreted as an effort to guard against ideological laxity among younger cadres who did not experience the Korean War or the post-war hardship period, and to reinforce systemic cohesion through intensified ideological education.Kim instructed, “The Central Cadre School must focus on education aimed at instilling our Party’s view of the people in students, alongside the cultivation of Party spirit,” adding, “All students must embody the spirit and demeanor of serving the people with conviction and sincerity.” He also strongly criticized perspectives that prioritize economic and material factors, describing them as “either expressions of ignorance that fail to properly understand what convictions and spirit defend and uphold this country, or the ramblings of individuals who have failed to fully internalize the Party’s people-centered philosophy.”He described the Central Cadre School as “a political education institution that faithfully serves the cause of Juche-oriented Party building and a strategic stronghold guaranteeing the Party’s existence and development,” emphasizing that “the founding principle that cadre cultivation must take precedence over all other tasks remains an absolute and enduring truth.”He went on to stress the importance of talent development, stating, “We are now in an era in which human resources, not technological means or natural resources, constitute the nation’s foremost strategic asset.” He also emphasized that, in order to complete revolutionary succession, “the unity of guiding ideology, the unity of leadership-centered principles, and the unity of the leadership system” must be strictly maintained.After the event, Kim toured the school’s historical exhibition hall and instructed, “The Central Cadre School must play a role in continuously strengthening the leadership and combat capabilities required for the permanent existence and ever-advancing development of our Party.”On the same day, an exhibition match was held at the school’s sports field featuring North Korean women’s football teams that had recently achieved championship victories on the international stage. The Naegohyang Women’s Football Club, which won the 2025–2026 Asian Football Confederation (AFC) Women’s Champions League (AWCL) held in South Korea, faced the North Korean national team, winners of the AFC U-17 Women’s Asian Cup held in China.Before attending the match, Kim met with players and coaching staff to personally convey congratulations and encouragement. He expressed his expectation that they would continue to achieve success in international competitions and bring honor to the country.The match was attended by Ri Yong-sik, president of the Central Cadre School, along with school officials, students, and individuals recognized for their contributions to education. Accompanying Kim on the visit were Party Secretaries Kim Jae-ryong, Ri Il-hwan, Jeong Kyong-taek, Ri Hi-yong, Kim Song-nam, Ju Chang-il, and Kim Jong-gwan.Marking the 80th anniversary of the Central Cadre School, North Korea held a series of commemorative events—including artistic performances, sports competitions, and exhibitions of educational achievements—at Party schools in Pyongyang and across provincial and municipal regions, underscoring the central importance of the Party cadre training system.Kim Jong-un Visits Sinuiju Greenhouse Farm for Third Time This Year With Daughter in AttendanceNorth Korean State Affairs Commission Chairman Kim Jong-un, accompanied by his daughter Ju-ae, conducted on-site guidance at a large-scale greenhouse farm in Sinuiju, North Pyongan Province, emphasizing the expansion of agricultural production and the advancement of science- and technology-based farming. As North Korea promotes the Sinuiju Greenhouse Farm as a flagship achievement of its “improvement of people’s livelihoods” and “regional development policy,” observers note that Kim has visited the site for the third time this year.North Korean State Affairs Commission Chairman Kim Jong-un, accompanied by his daughter Ju-ae, conducted on-site guidance at a large-scale greenhouse farm in Sinuiju, North Pyongan Province, emphasizing the expansion of agricultural production and the advancement of science- and technology-based farming. As North Korea promotes the Sinuiju Greenhouse Farm as a flagship achievement of its “improvement of people’s livelihoods” and “regional development policy,” observers note that Kim has visited the site for the third time this year alone.The Korean Central News Agency reported on June 1 that Kim visited the Sinuiju Greenhouse Complex the previous day to inspect production conditions, agricultural scientific research, and management operations. His wife, Ri Sol-ju, and daughter Ju-ae accompanied him on the visit.In photos released by North Korean media, Kim was seen inspecting the site with his hands behind his back, while Ju-ae walked alongside him with her hands clasped in front of her. Accompanying officials, including Cho Yong-won, President of the Presidium of the Supreme People’s Assembly; Kim Jae-ryong, Party Organization Secretary; and Ri Il-hwan, Party Propaganda Secretary, stood at attention or took notes, highlighting a contrasting visual dynamic.The news agency reported that after touring various hydroponic and soil-based greenhouses, experimental cultivation facilities, and rapeseed fields, Kim expressed satisfaction upon receiving a report that hundreds of tons of vegetables were being harvested daily. He subsequently called for diversification of crop varieties, the application of science- and technology-based cultivation methods, and intensified competition among farms.He also instructed that the share of mechanization in agricultural operations be expanded and that transportation automation be advanced to improve production efficiency. In addition, he outlined tasks including the expansion of storage and distribution infrastructure, the establishment of a system for disseminating advanced agricultural technology, and the training of specialized greenhouse farming personnel.Kim also inspected construction sites for a new healthcare facility, a comprehensive service center, and a vegetable processing plant within the greenhouse complex. The news agency reported that construction progress has reached approximately 50 percent.The Sinuiju Greenhouse Complex is a large-scale agricultural development project in the Wihwa Island area downstream of the Yalu River, which suffered extensive flooding in 2024. The site covers an area approximately 1.5 times the size of Yeouido in Seoul. North Korea has framed the project as a symbolic achievement of Kim Jong-un’s “people-first policy” and regional development strategy.In particular, Kim has visited the site five times in total, including for its groundbreaking ceremony last year, and selected it as the site of his first field inspection this year. This marks his third visit this year and is interpreted as reflecting Pyongyang’s intention to highlight agricultural production achievements directly tied to public livelihoods despite ongoing economic difficulties.North Korean Foreign Minister Says Ties With Russia Are at “Alliance Level” Amid Speculation Over Xi Jinping VisitNorth Korea used a memorial event honoring Alexander Matsegora, the late Russian ambassador to Pyongyang, as an opportunity to publicly signal that North Korea–Russia relations have effectively reached an alliance-level status. As bilateral cooperation expands beyond military affairs into security, intelligence, economic, and energy domains, Pyongyang is also showing signs that preparations may be underway for a possible visit by Chinese President Xi Jinping.According to Russia’s state-run TASS news agency on May 31, North Korean Foreign Minister Choe Son-hui attended the unveiling ceremony of a memorial plaque for former Ambassador Matsegora held at the Russian Embassy in Pyongyang the previous day and stated, “The two countries share a common position on all strategic issues, which amounts to an alliance-level relationship.”Foreign Minister Choe added, “By consistently safeguarding our core mutual interests, we are achieving comprehensive expansion and development of bilateral relations and tangible progress in improving the welfare of our peoples,” and emphasized, “It is our firm political stance to comprehensively expand and develop relations with Russia based on the comradeship and trust forged in blood during times of severe hardship.”North Korea’s Rodong Sinmun also gave prominent coverage to the memorial event on page two of its edition that day. According to the newspaper, Choe paid tribute, stating that “Comrade Matsegora’s contributions to strengthening and developing North Korea–Russia friendship will remain permanently in the shared memory of both peoples.” Cho Yong-won, President of the Presidium of the Supreme People’s Assembly and North Korea’s second-highest-ranking official, also attended the event to offer condolences.However, Rodong Sinmun did not include the phrase “alliance-level relationship” reported by TASS. This is interpreted as an effort to calibrate domestic messaging while still highlighting the elevation of bilateral ties in external communications.Matsegora, who was appointed ambassador to North Korea in late 2014, was a central figure in managing North Korea–Russia relations for more than a decade while based in Pyongyang. He reportedly maintained such close ties with the North Korean leadership that Kim Jong-un personally visited his funeral home following his death last December.Recently, North Korea–Russia cooperation appears to be expanding beyond the military domain into security and intelligence collaboration. North Korea dispatched a delegation from its State Security apparatus to the International Security Forum held in Moscow on the 28th. Rodong Sinmun reported that Ri Chang-dae, Director of the State Security Department, met with Sergei Shoigu, Secretary of the Russian Security Council, to discuss strengthening intelligence cooperation and addressing regional security challenges.Since the deployment of North Korean troops to Russia, the two countries have steadily expanded cooperation across virtually all sectors, including trade, investment, energy, agriculture, education, and healthcare. Analysts assess that North Korea is seeking to mitigate international isolation while securing economic and technological support through its strategic alignment with Russia.Against this backdrop, indications of possible preparations for a visit by Chinese President Xi Jinping to Pyongyang have also been observed.NK News, a U.S.-based outlet specializing in North Korea reporting, recently stated that satellite imagery and on-the-ground visuals showed the installation of high fences, mobile cranes, and large temporary structures around Kim Il-sung Square in Pyongyang. The location corresponds to the site where a large ceremonial pavilion was erected during Russian President Vladimir Putin’s visit last year.Additional signs of preparation for a high-level foreign visit have been observed at Pyongyang Sunan International Airport. Several Air Koryo aircraft were reportedly relocated from their usual parking positions between May 28 and 29, a pattern similar to preparations observed ahead of Vladimir Putin’s visit last year.Furthermore, construction of new accommodation and residential facilities within the Paekhwawon State Guest House complex has fueled speculation that these developments may be intended to accommodate a large Chinese delegation.However, assessments differ regarding the timing of a possible Xi visit. Chinese state media has reported that the President of Laos is scheduled to visit China from June 2 to 6, leading some analysts to suggest that a Xi visit during the first week of June is unlikely.

< North Korean Trends in May 2026 > - North Korea’s Military-Industrial Expansion and the Institutionalization of North Korea–Russia Military Cooperations -                    Seung-hyun LeePh.D in Public AdministrationResearch Fellow, SAND InstituteIn May 2026, Chairman Kim Jong-un conducted a total of 11 public activities, including 7 in the military sector and 4 in the political sector. No public activities in the social or economic sectors were confirmed. Compared to April, the proportion of military-related activities increased further, suggesting that North Korea’s policy of “completing war preparations,” which it has consistently emphasized since the beginning of the year, is entering a more practical phase focused on military capability development.The most notable aspect of North Korea’s developments in May 2026 was Kim Jong-un’s strong focus on the defense industry. Following his on-site guidance at a major defense industrial enterprise on May 6, Kim visited several defense industrial facilities in succession on May 11. During these inspections, he reviewed weapons production, assessed the level of modernization in manufacturing processes, and personally directed the establishment of a comprehensive artillery production system, the construction of a sniper weapons manufacturing facility, and improvements to quality control mechanisms.These activities suggest an intention not merely to encourage production, but also to simultaneously expand mass-production capabilities for weapon systems and restructure the defense industrial sector. In particular, the repeated on-site inspections of defense industrial facilities since the beginning of the year demonstrate that North Korea has positioned the defense industry as a central pillar of its national development strategy.The strengthening of naval power also emerged as a prominent feature of North Korea’s military policy in May. On May 7, Kim Jong-un observed a comprehensive maneuverability evaluation of the new destroyer Choe Hyon, personally inspecting the vessel’s maneuverability, navigational stability, and combat system performance. This appears to be a follow-up to his on-site guidance at a major shipyard in March, the public unveiling of a strategic nuclear submarine under construction, and the testing of the destroyer’s weapons systems in April.Recent developments indicate that North Korea is seeking to transform its navy from a force focused primarily on coastal defense into a key component of its strategic deterrence posture. It is therefore highly likely that efforts to expand both its submarine fleet and surface combat capabilities will continue in the coming years.The overhaul of the military command structure also emerged as a significant feature of developments in May 2026. On May 17, Kim Jong-un convened a meeting of division and brigade commanders from across the armed forces and called for innovations in military training and strengthened combat readiness in response to changes in the character of modern warfare. In particular, he reiterated the principle that “the army’s foremost revolutionary task is the completion of war preparations” and emphasized the need to establish a training system that is both realistic and scientifically grounded.These developments suggest that the North Korean military is actively studying and incorporating lessons from the changing battlefield environment shaped by the war in Ukraine. Given that North Korea has recently been overhauling not only its artillery, armored, and special operations forces but also its command structure and logistical support systems, the modernization of the Korean People's Army appears to be extending beyond the expansion of military hardware to encompass a comprehensive reorganization of its overall war-fighting system.Developments in North Korea–Russia relations continued to constitute a major aspect of North Korea’s external environment in May 2026. During the month, North Korea completed the construction of a Memorial Hall for Combat Merits in Overseas Military Operations and extensively publicized events commemorating Russia’s Victory Day. These actions indicate that Pyongyang is utilizing military cooperation with Russia not merely as an instrument of friendly diplomacy, but also as an important component of regime propaganda.In particular, there are signs that North Korea is seeking to bolster domestic confidence in the regime by portraying its relationship with Russia as part of a common anti-U.S. and anti-Western front and by highlighting the achievements of bilateral strategic cooperation. Through its partnership with Russia, North Korea appears to be pursuing multiple objectives, including the mitigation of diplomatic isolation and the acquisition of tangible benefits in the areas of military-technical and economic cooperation.In the economic sector, major reports in May focused on the opening of the 24th Pyongyang Spring International Trade Fair, the completion of the first phase of the Tanchon Power Plant, a large-scale blasting operation at the Musan Mining Complex, and nationwide rice-transplanting campaigns. North Korea also highlighted its economic performance, claiming that it had fulfilled 107 percent of its national economic plan for April.At the same time, Kim Jong-un’s direct involvement in economic affairs was largely absent, with the notable exception of the defense industrial sector. Most economic projects were implemented under the leadership of the Cabinet and local administrative bodies. This does not necessarily indicate a decline in the importance of economic policy. Rather, it suggests that, as national priorities have increasingly shifted toward strengthening military capabilities, the economic sector has entered a phase focused on policy implementation and execution.Overall, compared to April, the focus in May shifted further away from political commemorative events and toward military and defense-industrial affairs. Whereas April was characterized by the Day of the Sun celebrations, demonstrations of political solidarity, and concurrent artillery drills and weapons tests, May witnessed the implementation of more substantive measures aimed at strengthening military capabilities, including the expansion of defense-industrial production, the enhancement of naval power, the training of military commanders, and the deepening of military cooperation with Russia.Although the overall number of Kim Jong-un’s public activities remained largely unchanged, the content and character of those activities became markedly more concrete and operational in nature. This suggests that North Korea’s long-standing emphasis on “completing war preparations” is increasingly being translated into practical measures designed to strengthen its military capabilities and war-fighting capacity.In summary, North Korea’s key developments in May 2026 centered on the expansion of the military-industrial complex, the modernization of naval capabilities, the deepening of North Korea–Russia military cooperation, and the strengthening of combat readiness across the armed forces. These developments should be understood not merely as demonstrations of military power, but as part of a systematic effort to enhance North Korea’s actual war-fighting capabilities.Looking ahead, North Korea is likely to continue inspecting and enhancing defense-industrial productivity, strengthening its naval capabilities, and testing new weapons systems, while simultaneously managing summer agricultural activities and pursuing economic objectives. Furthermore, Pyongyang is expected to maintain its strategy of calibrated tension management by strategically leveraging cooperation with Russia to adjust the level of pressure exerted on the United States and South Korea.From this perspective, May 2026 can be regarded as a turning point at which North Korea further translated its policy of “completing war preparations” into concrete measures and institutionalized its implementation across multiple sectors.

North Korea Inside· South Korean Government to Provide 300 Million KRW in Support for Cheering Squad for North Korean Women’s Football Team· North Korea to Farm on Its Own, Refrains from Mobilizing Support Personnel· North Korean Media Reports on Participation of North Korean Troops in Russia’s Victory Day Military ParadeKim Myong-sungSecretary General of the SAND InstituteSouth Korean Government to Provide 300 Million KRW in Support for Cheering Squad for North Korean Women’s Football TeamThe South Korean government has decided to provide a total of 300 million KRW from the Inter-Korean Cooperation Fund to a civic organization forming a cheering squad for the North Korean women’s football team, the Naegohyang (“My Hometown”) Women’s Soccer Club, during its visit to South Korea. The initiative aims to expand opportunities for civilian-level exchanges and enhance mutual understanding despite strained inter-Korean relations.On May 12, an official from the Ministry of Unification told reporters at the Seoul Government Complex, “The government has decided to provide support from the Inter-Korean Cooperation Fund to the cheering squad, considering that this event contributes to enhancing mutual understanding between the two Koreas.”The Ministry approved the plan the previous day, following deliberation by the Inter-Korean Cooperation Fund Management Deliberation Committee, to provide a total of 300 million won to cover the costs of the civilian cheering squad. The funding will cover necessary expenses for the group’s activities, including match tickets and cheering equipment.The government explained that, since the North Korean team’s participation in the tournament was announced, various civic organizations have requested assistance in forming cheering squads and covering related expenses. The organizations leading these efforts are primarily known to be groups related to separated families and inter-Korean exchange and cooperation. When the planned numbers from each organization are combined, the total size of the cheering squads is expected to reach around 2,500 people.The funds will be disbursed after civic organizations submit documentation verifying related expenses to the Inter-Korean Exchange and Cooperation Support Association, which will then review the applications before providing support. Detailed guidelines regarding cheering methods and chants will also be established.An official from the Ministry of Unification stated, “While we will generally leave this to the discretion of civil society organizations, we will provide guidelines given the unique nature of this case.” When asked specifically whether the use of the term “North Korea” would be discouraged, the official replied, “Something along those lines.”This measure is widely interpreted as a response to North Korea’s recent designation of inter-Korean relations as a “hostile relationship between two states” and its heightened sensitivity to the use of the term “North Korea,” even in the context of international sporting events.The Naegohyang Women’s Football Club is scheduled to arrive via Incheon International Airport on May 17 and will face Suwon FC Women in the semifinals of the AFC Women’s Champions League at Suwon World Cup Stadium on May 20.This marks the first time in seven years and five months—since the ITTF World Tour Grand Finals in December 2018—that a North Korean delegation has visited South Korea to participate in an official tournament. Attention is focused on whether the event could serve as a modest opening for sports exchanges amid the current stalemate in inter-Korean relations.North Korea to Farm on Its Own, Refrains from Mobilizing Support PersonnelNorth Korea has stepped back from its annual “total mobilization for agriculture” approach—which previously sent students, factory workers, soldiers, and even housewives to the countryside during the rice-planting season—and has instead publicly encouraged farms this year to rely on their own workforce and mechanization.As labor shortages have worsened due to the simultaneous launch of large-scale construction projects, this shift is interpreted as an effort to reduce the deployment of auxiliary personnel to rural areas and to have each farm assume greater responsibility for its own production.On the 12th, Minju Joson, the official newspaper of North Korea’s Cabinet, published an article titled “Let Us Wage the Movement to Farm Independently in the Agricultural Sector with Greater Vigor,” urging agricultural officials and workers to “bring about a bountiful autumn through their own efforts.” Observers note that it is unusual for North Korean media to emphasize “independent farming” over the mobilization of external support during the peak farming season.The newspaper stated, “The masters of agricultural production are the officials and workers in the agricultural sector,” defining this year’s agricultural front as the forefront of socialist construction. It further emphasized, “All the more so, officials and workers in the agricultural sector must deeply instill the awareness that they are the masters responsible for the nation’s rice granary and bring about a bountiful autumn through their own efforts across every vast field.”In particular, citing Cheongsan Farm in Kangseo District as an example, the newspaper reported that “without receiving any support, they are pushing forward with all farming tasks in a timely and high-quality manner to achieve high yields.” This was intended to demonstrate that farming can be carried out without external assistance. The message is interpreted as reflecting the reality that state-level rural support personnel need to be redirected to other sectors.In fact, North Korea is simultaneously pursuing a range of large-scale projects this year, including housing construction in Pyongyang, the development of local industrial plants, rural housing construction, flood recovery efforts, and the expansion of defense-related facilities. Amid chronic labor shortages, the construction sector has absorbed large numbers of youth shock brigades, military personnel, and urban workers, making it highly likely that the capacity to support rural areas during the peak farming season has been significantly reduced.Minju Joson also indirectly acknowledged this. The newspaper stated, “If the countryside farms on its own, another breakthrough will be opened to smoothly resolve the strained labor problem of the national economy.” This suggests that self-reliant farming in rural areas is not merely a production method but also a measure aimed at alleviating the nationwide labor shortage.North Korea has repeatedly implemented a nationwide mobilization system during the rice-planting season. Typically, rice seeds are sown in seedbeds starting in mid-March, with transplanting beginning in early May and concluding in late May to early June.During this period, students from third year of lower secondary school and above, officials from Party and administrative agencies, factory and enterprise workers, housewives, and even soldiers have been deployed for approximately 40 days to participate in the “rural support campaign.” In effect, it functioned as a system of total societal mobilization.In an editorial on the front page of Rodong Sinmun on May 11, the previous day, the paper urged, “Let us all rise up in the struggle to make this year, in which the Ninth Party Congress was held, shine with achievements in grain production,” adding, “We must concentrate all our strength on rice transplanting and complete it in a timely manner.” In effect, this conveyed a dual message: while calling for general mobilization on the one hand, it also urged farms to resolve their own challenges on the other.Minju Joson proposed mechanization and technological innovation as the solution to “self-reliant farming.” It called for expanding the research and production of agricultural machinery, stating that “significantly increasing the proportion of mechanized agricultural work is the best way to achieve a breakthrough in grain production through our own efforts.” It also claimed that last year, rural areas across the country introduced “nutrient-rich cold-bed seedlings,” reducing the labor previously required for seedling cultivation, and that some regions completed rice transplanting without external assistance.The article also contained typical self-reliance rhetoric. Referring to the period of the anti-Japanese armed struggle, the newspaper emphasized “anti-Japanese fighters who pioneered the revolution with nothing but their bare hands” and “fought using Yanji bombs made with their bare hands,” while also invoking post-war reconstruction and the Chollima Movement. This suggests an intention to address the rural labor shortage through the mobilization of the regime’s characteristic emphasis on “spiritual strength.”Observers suggest that North Korea is attempting to make pragmatic adjustments to its agricultural policy amid the dual pressures of food and labor shortages. As it becomes increasingly difficult to rely on external labor on a sustained basis, the state appears to be shifting a greater share of production responsibility to rural communities while prioritizing the allocation of manpower to construction and other strategic sectors.North Korean Media Reports on Participation of North Korean Troops in Russia’s Victory Day Military ParadeNorth Korean state media reported in detail, just one day later, on the participation of North Korean troops in Russia’s Victory Day military parade commemorating the Allied victory in World War II.On May 10, the Korean Central News Agency reported that a military parade marking the 81st anniversary of victory in the Great Patriotic War was held the previous day in Red Square, Moscow, and that, at Russia’s invitation, “a mixed contingent of the Korean People’s Army’s ground, naval, and air forces participated in the Victory Day parade in Moscow.” Army Colonel Choi Young-hun led the contingent in the march, and Russian President Vladimir Putin met with the commander after the parade to express his gratitude.Rodong Sinmun, the official newspaper of the Workers’ Party of Korea read by North Korean citizens, also carried the news on its first and second pages, accompanied by photographs, providing a detailed account of the atmosphere at the event. The newspaper reported that “as the song ‘The Fight for Justice’ played, the Russian national flag and the Victory Banner appeared in the square,” and it also included excerpts from President Putin’s speech.The newspaper continued, “Alongside the Russian military parade units, a contingent of soldiers from the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, who achieved immortal feats of valor in the battles to liberate Kursk, marched across Red Square.” It also reported that President Putin met with veterans, participants in special military operations, and People’s Army commanders who took part in the parade. It further gave prominent coverage to Russia’s Victory Day-related news, including the fact that President Putin issued a congratulatory letter on May 6 to mark the occasion and published excerpts from it.It continued, “Alongside the Russian military parade units, a contingent of soldiers from the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, who achieved immortal feats of valor in the battles to liberate Kursk, marched across Red Square.”It also reported that President Putin met with veterans, participants in special military operations, and People’s Army commanders who took part in the parade. The newspaper further gave prominent coverage to Russia’s Victory Day-related news, including the fact that President Putin issued a letter on May 6 to mark the occasion and included excerpts from it.Meanwhile, on the same day in Pyongyang, members of the Russian Embassy in North Korea visited the Liberation Monument to lay wreaths and commemorate Victory Day. The Liberation Monument is a symbol honoring Soviet soldiers who died in 1945 while driving Japanese forces out of North Korea.During the event, which was held with North Korean honor guards in attendance, participants observed a moment of silence in memory of the Soviet martyrs, followed by the playing of the national anthems of Russia and North Korea.

North Korea Inside· North Korea Amends Constitution to Reflect “Two-State” Policy: New Territorial Clause Added, Unification Clause Removed· North Korean Women’s Football Team to Visit South Korea on May 17 for AFC Women’s Champions League Semifinals· Kim Jong-un Meets with Youth League Delegates to Offer EncouragementKim Myong-sungSecretary General of the SAND InstituteNorth Korea Amends Constitution to Reflect “Two-State” Policy: New Territorial Clause Added, Unification Clause RemovedIt has been confirmed that North Korea has enacted a constitutional amendment reflecting the “two-state” policy advocated by Chairman Kim Jong-un, including the addition of a territorial clause defining only the northern part of the Korean Peninsula as its territory and the removal of the clause on national reunification.The amendment also defines the Chairman of the State Affairs Commission as the “head of state” and, for the first time, explicitly grants authority over the use of nuclear weapons, thereby further strengthening Chairman Kim’s formal status and institutional authority.According to the preamble of North Korea’s revised constitution, released during a press briefing for the Ministry of Unification’s press corps at the Seoul Government Complex on May 6, references related to inter-Korean relations and unification—such as “the northern half,” “national reunification,” and “the complete victory of socialism”—which had appeared in the preamble and main text following the “two-state” declaration (amended in September 2023), have been entirely removed.For example, Article 9 of the previous Socialist Constitution, which stated, “We struggle to achieve the complete victory of socialism and realize the reunification of the motherland based on the principles of independence, peaceful reunification, and great national unity,” has been deleted.As references to the achievements of Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il were removed, all references to the reunification cause in the preamble have also been eliminated. As Chairman Kim had announced in January 2024, a new territorial clause has been established.Article 2, newly introduced alongside the provision on the state name “Democratic People’s Republic of Korea” (Article 1), defines the territory as follows: “The territory includes the land bordering the People’s Republic of China and the Russian Federation to the north, and the Republic of Korea to the south, as well as the territorial waters and airspace established on that basis.”However, the southern land and maritime boundaries were not specifically defined. Professor Jeong-cheol Lee of Seoul National University, a North Korea expert who attended the briefing, interpreted this omission by stating, “The moment the issue of maritime boundaries arises, there are aspects that make compromise difficult,” adding, “I believe the omission indicates that the North did not wish to create such a dispute.”While the “two-state relations” policy declared by Chairman Kim in late 2023 was broadly reflected, contrary to his earlier announcement, there was no explicit designation of South Korea as a “hostile state.” In January 2024, at the Supreme People’s Assembly, Kim stated, “It is appropriate to explicitly stipulate in the relevant clause that we will strengthen educational and ideological work to ensure that the Republic of Korea is firmly regarded as the number one hostile nation and an unchanging principal enemy.”Combative expressions found in the previous constitution—such as “imperialist aggressors,” “liberated from exploitation and oppression,” and “subversive activities of internal and external hostile elements”—have also been removed.The authority and status of the Chairman of the State Affairs Commission have been significantly strengthened. In the order of state institutions, the Chairman of the State Affairs Commission is listed first and is defined as the “head of state.” This marks the first time in North Korea’s constitutional history that the Chairman of the State Affairs Commission has been placed before the Supreme People’s Assembly.As references to previous leaders’ achievements in state-building and reunification were removed, “people-first ideology”—Kim Jong Un’s governing philosophy—was explicitly stated in the preamble. The Chairman of the State Affairs Commission’s exclusive command authority over nuclear forces was specified for the first time, and a new clause establishing the legal basis for this authority was also added.In addition, the authority of the Chairman of the State Affairs Commission to “appoint and dismiss key officials” now explicitly extends to the “Chairman of the Supreme People’s Assembly” and the “Prime Minister of the Cabinet.” Furthermore, the Supreme People’s Assembly’s power to recall the Chairman of the State Affairs Commission has been removed, effectively eliminating any formal mechanism of checks and balances.It has been confirmed that socialist welfare provisions previously described in idealized terms—such as “free medical care,” “a tax-free country,” and “a society without unemployment”—have all been removed. Meanwhile, “martyrs of overseas military operations” have been added to the list of groups eligible for special social protection, which previously included “revolutionary fighters” and “honorary soldiers.” This addition is understood to explicitly recognize those killed in external military engagements, including the Russia–Ukraine war.In the foreign policy provisions, “protection of national interests” has been added as an “immutable principle” alongside the fundamental ideals of “independence, peace, and friendship.” Experts have analyzed that, judging by the structure of the clauses and the level of expression, North Korea’s new constitution appears to be an attempt to project an image of a “normal state.”The constitutional amendments confirmed this time—including deletions, new additions, and revisions—were reflected across three rounds of amendments (January 2024, January 2025, and March 2026) following Chairman Kim’s “two-state relations” declaration in late 2023. While the clause on national reunification is presumed to have been removed during the October 2024 amendment, the exact timing of revisions to each provision was not confirmed at the briefing held that day.Professor Lee assessed the draft constitution, stating, “While a new territorial clause has been established and expressions and provisions emphasizing statehood have emerged, the absence of references to hostile relations or a state of war allows us to make a cautiously optimistic assessment that this could serve as a foundation for peaceful coexistence between the North and South.”North Korean Women’s Football Team to Visit South Korea on May 17 for AFC Women’s Champions League SemifinalsNorth Korea’s Naegohyang (“My Hometown”) Women’s Football Club will visit South Korea on May 17 to compete in the semifinals of the Asian Football Confederation (AFC) Women’s Champions League. The visit by a North Korean women’s club team is seen as a symbolic moment illustrating that international sports exchanges continue despite strained inter-Korean relations.The Ministry of Unification announced on May 4 that the Pyongyang-based Naegohyang Women’s Football Club is scheduled to arrive on May 17. The team will face Suwon FC Women in the semifinals of the 2025–2026 AFC Women’s Champions League on May 20 at Suwon Sports Complex.The Naegohyang Women’s Football Club is considered a rising force in North Korean women’s football. As a corporate-backed club sponsored by “Naegohyang,” a consumer goods company producing food, beverages, and sporting goods, it differs in character from North Korea’s traditional sports teams, such as the 4.25 Team and the Amnokgang Sports Team, which are affiliated with military or state institutions.Founded in 2012, the club rose to prominence after winning the North Korean First Division title in the 2021–2022 season. It is also reported that a significant portion of its squad consists of national team-level players who have recently achieved success at the FIFA U-17 and U-20 Women’s World Cups.The team has also demonstrated its competitiveness in this tournament. The Naegohyang Women’s Football Club advanced to the semifinals of the AFC Women’s Champions League with a record of three wins and one loss. In the group stage, they defeated Suwon FC Women 3–0 but lost 0–4 to Japan’s Tokyo Verdy Beleza, another semifinalist. For Suwon FC Women, who will meet them again in the semifinals, the match carries a strong sense of rivalry.North Korea is one of the leading women’s football powers on the international stage. As of April 2026, it is ranked 11th in the world and 2nd in Asia by FIFA. In the FIFA U-20 Women’s World Cup, it has won the title three times—in 2006, 2016, and 2024—placing it alongside Germany and the United States among the most successful teams in the tournament’s history. It also holds the record for the most FIFA U-17 Women’s World Cup titles, having won four times in 2008, 2016, 2024, and 2025.Their performance on the Asian stage is equally notable. They have won the AFC Women’s Club Championship three times—in 2001, 2003, and 2008—and have also claimed the AFC U-20 Women’s Championship title twice. At the Asian Games, they secured gold medals on three occasions—in 2002, 2006, and 2014.North Korean State Affairs Commission Chairman Kim Jong-un’s interest in women’s football is also well known. He, who is known to take a keen interest in sports, met with the winning squad and coaching staff of the 2025 U-17 Women’s World Cup team during a ceremony marking North Korea’s Constitution Day held at the Mansudae Assembly Hall last December, offering encouragement and posing for a commemorative photograph.The Asian football community also regards the competitiveness of North Korean women’s football highly. During the FIFA Council meeting held last month in Vancouver, Canada, AFC President Sheikh Salman bin Ibrahim Al Khalifa met with Kim Il-guk, President of the North Korean Football Association, and stated, “The North Korean Football Association is a beacon of excellence for all of Asia,” adding, “The recent success of North Korean women’s football has solidified its position as a global model for the development of women’s football.”The visit by the North Korean team is drawing particular attention because it marks the first visit to South Korea by any North Koreans since late 2023, when North Korean State Affairs Commission Chairman Kim Jong-un redefined inter-Korean relations not as relations between fellow Koreans, but as “hostile relations between two states” and, furthermore, as “relations between two belligerent nations at war.”The decision appears to reflect North Korea’s intention to maintain its “state-to-state” principle while continuing and even strengthening its participation in international sports, given that the event is organized by the Asian Football Confederation (AFC), an international governing body.North Korea has recently focused on expanding its participation in international competitions, particularly in sports where it has demonstrated competitiveness, such as football, wrestling, and swimming, in an effort to project an image of a normal state. It is suggested that the decision to participate in the tournament hosted in South Korea was made within this broader context.North Korea has also submitted a letter of intent to participate in the Asian Games to be held this September in Nagoya, Japan—a country it has designated as an adversary—and has announced plans to send a large delegation.Although this does not constitute direct inter-Korean government-to-government exchanges, some observers express hope that the tournament could serve as a catalyst for the resumption of inter-Korean dialogue, given that sports have historically played a role in opening channels of communication at key junctures in inter-Korean relations.A prime example is the 2018 inter-Korean summit between President Moon Jae-in and Chairman Kim Jong-un, when the North Korean delegation’s participation in the PyeongChang Winter Olympics served as a turning point amid a thaw in tensions.Observers note that North Korea’s decision to participate this time is unusual, given that it has consistently boycotted international competitions held in South Korea in the past. Last September, North Korea’s decision not to send a delegation to the World Archery Championships in Gwangju reaffirmed the continued suspension of inter-Korean sports exchanges.However, some analysts point out that while this visit carries significant symbolic value—given that it involves a low-stakes sporting event and is facilitated through a third-party international organization rather than direct inter-Korean exchanges—it has limitations in terms of producing tangible improvements in inter-Korean relations.Kim Jong-un Meets with Youth League Delegates to Offer EncouragementKim Jong-un, Chairman of the State Affairs Commission of North Korea, met with delegates from the Socialist Patriotic Youth League and emphasized the role of young people in national development. Observers interpret this as an effort to strengthen cohesion among the younger generation on the occasion of the Youth League’s congress—the country’s largest youth organization—while also signaling potential long-term succession dynamics, given the recent increase in public appearances by his daughter, Ju-ae.North Korea’s Korean Central News Agency reported on May 3 that Kim met with participants of the 11th Congress of the Socialist Patriotic Youth League the previous day and took a commemorative photograph with them. The event was attended by Kim Jae-ryong, Ri Il-hwan, and Ju Chang-il, secretaries of the Workers’ Party of Korea Central Committee, as well as Kim Song-gi, Director of the General Political Bureau of the Korean People’s Army.Kim shook hands with each of the newly elected chairpersons and vice-chairpersons of the 11th Central Committee of the Youth League and offered his congratulations. He praised them, stating, “Never before has the extraordinary patriotic consciousness, surging revolutionary fervor, and fearless struggle of the youth so firmly defined the vast battlefields of socialist construction as in the present era.” He continued, “The noble character and iron-willed fighting spirit of our youth, unparalleled in any other country, constitute a proud symbol of our national strength.”He also emphasized, “The legendary feats of our youth are a source of great pride for our Party and a powerful driving force for our overarching cause,” adding, “The strength and honor of the Youth League, the leading vanguard of patriotic youth, must continue to be elevated.” This is interpreted as a reaffirmation of his intent to mobilize young people into labor, construction, and national defense sectors as a key engine for sustaining the regime.The 11th Congress of the Youth League was held in Pyongyang, five years after the 10th Congress in 2021. The meeting included a review of the Central Committee’s work, amendments to the charter, and elections for central leadership bodies. The Socialist Patriotic Youth League is North Korea’s largest youth organization, with mandatory membership for young people and students aged 14 to 30.Many analysts suggest that North Korea’s recent emphasis on youth organizations reflects an effort to strengthen control over the younger generation amid economic hardship and the erosion of social discipline. This appears to be based on the assessment that younger cohorts, increasingly exposed to external information and market-oriented experiences, may be less ideologically aligned with the regime than in the past.

Trends in North Korea (April 2026) - The Parallel Development of Military Technology and Selective Governance Strategies -                    Seung hyun LeePh.D in Public AdministrationResearch Fellow, SAND InstituteNorth Korean developments in April 2026 reflect a complex pattern of regime management, characterized by the simultaneous pursuit of military technological advancement, internal cohesion, and the maintenance of economic foundations, as policy implementation accelerated following the Ninth Congress of the Korea Workers’ Party (KWP).Notably, although the frequency of Chairman Kim Jong-un’s public appearances declined in April compared to the previous month, the emphasis on military affairs was maintained and, in some respects, strengthened. This trend does not indicate a simple reduction in activity but rather a shift toward a more selective governance model that prioritizes strategic impact over the volume of public engagements.First, in the military domain, North Korea conducted a series of intensive tests of multi-layered weapons systems beginning in early April. According to North Korean state media, from April 6 to 8, the country carried out consecutive tests of electromagnetic weapon systems, carbon-fiber dummy projectile dispersal mechanisms, mobile short-range air defense missile systems, and tactical ballistic missile warheads.This sequence represents a departure from the relatively limited scope of past ballistic missile launches and is assessed as an effort to simultaneously enhance electronic warfare capabilities, air defense systems, and wide-area strike capabilities required for modern warfare. In particular, electromagnetic weapons and carbon-fiber projectiles constitute asymmetric capabilities designed to disrupt or paralyze an adversary’s communications networks and power infrastructure, indicating a growing sophistication in North Korea’s military strategy.In mid-April, Kim Jong-un personally observed a weapons systems test aboard the destroyer Choe Hyon-class vessel and subsequently oversaw an artillery firing competition among artillery units to mark Kim Il-sung’s birth (the Day of the Sun). These activities illustrate North Korea’s parallel pursuit of naval capability expansion and modernization of conventional firepower.If on-site guidance at a major shipyard in March and the public unveiling of a strategic nuclear submarine symbolically demonstrated Pyongyang’s commitment to strengthening naval capabilities, the April observation of the destroyer’s weapons test can be interpreted as a follow-up step linking these ambitions to operational deployment. Furthermore, Kim’s characterization of artillery capabilities as “the most important factor determining the outcome of war” suggests that North Korea is drawing strategic lessons from the prominent role of long-range artillery in the Russia–Ukraine war.This prioritization of military affairs is also reflected in the pattern of Kim’s public activities. In March 2026, he conducted a total of nine public engagements, reflecting a relatively balanced distribution: four military-related events, one political event, and four economic and social activities.In contrast, in April, although the total number of public appearances declined to approximately six, military-related activities remained at four, while economic and social engagements fell to just one. In other words, while overall activity declined, the proportion of military-related engagements increased significantly. This shift is interpreted as evidence that he has strategically concentrated attention on the military sector following the articulation of policy priorities through on-site guidance at economic and industrial facilities immediately after the March KWP Congress.In the political domain, large-scale nationwide commemorative events were organized to mark the 114th Day of the Sun. Activities such as visits to the Kumsusan Palace of the Sun, celebratory gatherings involving youth and labor organizations, artistic performances, and sporting events demonstrate the regime’s continued reliance on leader-centric political rituals and institutionalized mechanisms for reproducing legitimacy. Notably, the simultaneous conduct of military drills and commemorative events suggests a dual objective: reinforcing internal cohesion while signaling external confidence in military capabilities.In the economic sector, although Kim’s direct on-site guidance activities declined, North Korean state media continued to emphasize the priority of foundational industries, describing the metallurgical sector as the “eldest son industry.” At the same time, media reporting highlighted ongoing efforts to expand the production base, including flood control measures, the construction of greenhouse agricultural facilities and power plants, and land reclamation projects.These developments do not necessarily indicate an improvement in economic conditions; rather, they suggest continued economic management through the concentration of limited resources on strategic industries and food production infrastructure. Accordingly, the reduction in Kim’s public economic engagements is better understood not as a weakening of economic governance, but as a transition to an implementation phase led primarily by Cabinet institutions and Party organizations.Taken together, developments in April 2026 indicate that North Korea pursued both regime stability and external deterrence through the simultaneous operation of three core pillars: military technological advancement, internal political cohesion, and the maintenance of economic foundations.From the perspective of international politics, this approach can be characterized as a combination of a “managed tension strategy” and a “selective governance strategy.” Rather than engaging in large-scale provocations, North Korea appears to be sustaining a calibrated level of tension through weapons testing and military exercises, while consolidating domestic control through commemorative politics and economic mobilization.Looking ahead to May and beyond, North Korea is likely to pursue a combined approach that includes assessing agricultural productivity, generating localized economic outputs, and conducting low-intensity military demonstrations in response to shifts in the external security environment. In particular, factors such as ROK–U.S. joint military exercises, the trajectory of U.S.–China strategic competition, and the depth of North Korea–Russia cooperation are expected to serve as key variables shaping the scale and intensity of North Korea’s future military activities.

North Korea Inside· North Korea Inaugurates Memorial to Deployed Troops; Kim Jong-un Calls for Strengthening DPRK–Russia Relations as a “Powerful Bulwark”· Kim Jong-un Marks “Partisan Founding Day” with Mortar Firing Competition, Emphasizing Ideological Consolidation and Combat Readiness· Visit by Russian Interior Ministry Delegation to USS Pueblo in Pyongyang Highlights Anti-U.S. Strategic AlignmentKim Myong-sungSecretary General of the SAND InstituteNorth Korea Inaugurates Memorial to Deployed Troops; Kim Jong-un Calls for Strengthening DPRK–Russia Relations as a “Powerful Bulwark”To mark the first anniversary of what it termed the “conclusion of the Kursk Liberation Operation,” North Korea completed a memorial hall in Pyongyang honoring its overseas troop deployment activities and held a large-scale inauguration ceremony. Chairman of the State Affairs Commission Kim Jong-un used the occasion to highlight the sacrifices and contributions of the North Korean military and to reaffirm his commitment to strengthening the bilateral military relationship, in the presence of senior Russian officials.The Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) reported on April 27 that the inauguration ceremony for the Memorial Hall for Combat Merits in Overseas Military Operations had been held the previous day. The event was attended by Chairman Kim Jong-un, Vyacheslav Volodin, Speaker of the Russian State Duma, and Andrei Belousov, Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation.In his address, Chairman Kim stated, “We have inscribed in this memorial hall a new history of North Korea–Russia friendship written in blood, and a new history of justice won through blood.” He further emphasized that the peoples of both countries share this aspiration, declaring, “No matter how the rules of war may change, or whenever and wherever a crisis may arise, we must be strengthened into a sincere, dedicated, and powerful bulwark that always responds with united strength.” He added, “Standing before this memorial hall, our resolve for the future becomes even stronger.”Kim’s assertion that North Korea and Russia must become a “stronghold that responds with united strength” to any crisis is widely interpreted as a renewed signal of both countries’ commitment to implementing the military provisions of the Treaty on Comprehensive Strategic Partnership, signed at the June 2024 Pyongyang summit.Kim also stated that the two countries “fought shoulder to shoulder on the same front for peace and sovereignty, achieving a victory of pivotal significance in preventing the resurgence of fascism and crushing the war ambitions of hegemonic forces.” He added that the “strategic significance” of the Kursk Liberation Operation was immense. He further emphasized that “there is no contribution more sacred than the sacrifice of one’s life,” and asserted that “the hegemonic ambitions and military adventurism pursued by the United States and the West were thwarted by the valiant struggle of the Korean People’s Army.”In particular, the commemorative messaging framed the conflict as a confrontation between “justice and injustice,” emphasizing its ideological legitimacy. Kim reiterated that “the (North) Korean and Russian armies, faithful to the ideology of justice, fought side by side for peace and sovereignty,” adding that “we achieved a victory of crucial significance in preventing the resurgence of fascism and crushing the war ambitions of hegemonic forces.”Notably, Chairman Kim highlighted the sacrifices of North Korean forces by directly referencing instances of self-immolation on the battlefield. He described these sacrifices in concrete terms, stating that “they did not seek any reward for their sacrifice even as the explosions of their self-immolation echoed,” and referring to “heroes who chose self-immolation and suicide to defend their honor.” This is interpreted as the first instance in which the North Korean leader has publicly acknowledged the actual combat conditions faced by deployed troops, which had previously been understood only indirectly.Kim also asserted that North Korea’s participation “thwarted the hegemonic ambitions and military adventurism of the United States and the West,” underscoring the strategic effectiveness of support for Russia. He assessed the Kursk operation by stating, “Although it was a military operation that lasted only a few months, its strategic significance is immense.” He further claimed that North Korean forces “annihilated and eradicated the Ukrainian armed invaders who had encroached upon Russia’s sovereignty and security, contributing to the liberation of the Kursk region,” and that they “secured victory through unparalleled bravery, collective heroism, and an indomitable fighting spirit.”Observers note that by emphasizing the significance of North Korea’s contributions despite the relatively short duration of the operation, Pyongyang may be signaling expectations of reciprocal compensation from Moscow. The commemorative messaging appears intended to underscore that DPRK–Russia military cooperation has evolved beyond symbolic or diplomatic alignment into a relationship characterized by shared combat experience and sacrifice, while simultaneously framing this cooperation as a form of “solidarity of justice” within the international system.Meanwhile, Speaker Volodin delivered a personal letter from Russian President Vladimir Putin. In the letter, President Putin commended the performance of North Korean troops, stating that “their heroic deeds will remain forever in the hearts of the Russian people,” and expressed his intention to further strengthen strategic cooperation between the two countries. The event is thus widely viewed as a symbolic demonstration that bilateral military cooperation has moved beyond diplomatic solidarity to a stage characterized by de facto joint operational engagement and shared sacrifice.In the letter read by Volodin, Putin emphasized that “the fearless feats of the North Korean military will remain forever in the hearts of all Russian citizens,” adding, “I am confident that we will continue to strengthen our comprehensive strategic partnership through joint efforts.” He also noted that, toward the end of World War II, the Soviet Army, together with Korean patriots, liberated the Korean Peninsula from Japanese colonial rule, and that in the 1950s it “provided assistance in defending the independence of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea in its struggle against foreign aggressors.”Since North Korea’s deployment of troops to Kursk, there has been an observable increase in bilateral messaging emphasizing historical ties, including references to the Soviet Union’s role in ending Japanese colonial rule and to the participation of Soviet forces in the Korean War—topics that had not previously been highlighted in this manner in official discourse.Kursk, located in southwestern Russia along the border with Ukraine, was partially occupied by Ukrainian forces in August 2024. North Korea claims that its troop deployment played a decisive role in Russia’s recapture of the region, which Russia officially declared complete on April 26 of the following year.In October of last year, Chairman Kim broke ground on a memorial hall in Pyongyang’s Hwasong District, a newly developed urban area, to commemorate the sacrifices and heroic deeds of deployed troops. He subsequently visited the construction site on multiple occasions, accompanied by his daughter Ju-ae and other officials, to oversee progress.The remains of fallen soldiers have been interred at the site. KCNA reported that Chairman Kim personally placed soil on the remains of one fallen soldier and laid flowers at the interment chamber. The interior of the memorial hall is elaborately decorated with sculptures and paintings depicting combat scenes. Kim also left a handwritten message in the guestbook, stating, “Even if life is buried in the soil they fought to defend, the spirits of the martyrs will live on forever alongside the great honor they safeguarded.”Chairman Kim further toured an exhibition hall displaying captured weapons alongside Russian officials. Images released by the Russian Embassy in North Korea via Telegram, as well as by North Korean state media, showed German-made tanks, various firearms, and drones on display.North Korean attendees included Jo Yong-won, Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme People’s Assembly; Jo Chun-ryong, Party Secretary; and No Kwang-chol, Minister of National Defense, along with other senior Party, government, and military officials, commanders of large combined units of the Korean People’s Army, and soldiers and bereaved families from combat and engineering units deployed to Russia.State media images also confirmed that Ri Chang-ho, Deputy Chief of the General Staff and Director of the Reconnaissance General Bureau, has been promoted to First Deputy Chief of the General Staff, replacing Jung Myong-do. The position had previously operated under a dual leadership structure shared by Jung Myong-do and Lieutenant General Kim Yong-bok.North Korea’s decision to construct a large-scale memorial and hold commemorative events marking the first anniversary of the Kursk operation appears intended to underscore the extent to which its sacrifices contributed to Russia’s efforts to counter U.S. influence, while also seeking to secure continued material and strategic benefits.For its part, Russia demonstrated goodwill by dispatching both Speaker Volodin and Defense Minister Belousov to the event—an unusual move that reflects the importance Moscow places on the bilateral relationship.Chairman Kim Jong-un also held separate meetings with Speaker Volodin and Minister Belousov in Pyongyang, reaffirming the military alignment between the two countries. According to the Russian Embassy in North Korea’s Telegram channel and the state-run TASS news agency, Kim met Volodin on April 26. During the meeting, Volodin conveyed greetings from President Putin and delivered a message congratulating Kim on his reappointment as Chairman of the State Affairs Commission.Volodin expressed particular gratitude for North Korea’s troop deployment, stating, “The North Korean military fought side by side with our soldiers to liberate Russian territory from Ukrainian Nazis.” He added, “The Russian people will never forget the dedication of the North Korean military, who sacrificed their lives for the freedom of the motherland,” emphasizing that “this is the true spirit of comrades-in-arms.” He further assessed that the close relationship between Kim and Putin “has become the decisive key to building the future in the most difficult times.”Volodin arrived in North Korea on April 25 to attend the inauguration ceremony, reportedly at the direction of President Putin. Defense Minister Belousov also arrived the same day for a working visit, with North Korean Defense Minister No Kwang-chol personally receiving him at the airport.Kim subsequently held talks with Minister Belousov to discuss ways to strengthen military cooperation. Belousov stated that Russia is prepared to conclude a mutual military cooperation plan with North Korea covering the period 2027–2031. This is interpreted as an indication that both sides intend to formalize medium- to long-term military cooperation on a five-year basis, moving beyond short-term wartime coordination such as troop deployments.Taken together, the inauguration ceremony appears to mark a starting point for a new phase in DPRK–Russia relations, with both sides using high-level exchanges to highlight and institutionalize the outcomes of their expanding military cooperation for both domestic and international audiences.Kim Jong-un Marks “Partisan Founding Day” with Mortar Firing Competition, Emphasizing Ideological Consolidation and Combat ReadinessNorth Korean State Affairs Commission Chairman Kim Jong-un observed a mortar firing competition and emphasized the need to strengthen ideological resolve among troops on April 25, marking the anniversary of the founding of the Korean People’s Revolutionary Army (KPRA), the anti-Japanese partisan force regarded as the historical foundation of the Korean People’s Army (KPA).According to the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA), Kim visited a combined unit subordinate to the Western District Mechanized Infantry Division of the KPA on the same day to commemorate the 94th anniversary of the KPRA’s founding and to encourage frontline personnel.During the visit, Kim laid a bouquet at a monument commemorating on-site guidance by President Kim Il-sung, observed a moment of silence, and toured the unit’s Revolutionary History Museum. His remarks focused heavily on ideological discipline as a core determinant of military effectiveness.He stated, “The ideological elite status of soldiers is the invincible sword of our Party’s unchanging ideology for building a strong army and our view of war,” adding that “only an ideologically strong army that remains constantly aware of its lineage and roots can resolutely subdue and crush any enemy.”Kim further outlined operational expectations, emphasizing that combined units must “serve as a model for the entire army in political and ideological work with soldiers and in the completion of combat readiness,” in line with their organizational status and mission profile.As part of the visit, Chairman Kim observed a live-fire competition involving light infantry and mortar units drawn from large combined formations across multiple command levels. He was accompanied by senior military and political officials, including Minister of National Defense No Kwang-chol, Chief of the General Staff Ri Yong-gil, and Director of the General Political Bureau Kim Song-gi.KCNA reported that the exercise evaluated combat tactics under simulated operational constraints, with units required to “swiftly overcome natural and artificial obstacles, maneuver into firing positions, eliminate multiple targets within a specified time, and withdraw under cover.”Expressing satisfaction with the exercise outcomes, Kim stated that “combat training must be organized and conducted with a focus on fully implementing the military strategic ideology of our Party and the requirements of Juche-based tactics, while strengthening combat capabilities in every possible way to completely annihilate the enemy.” He directed that such training competitions be expanded in scale and intensity across all unit levels and specialized formations within the Korean People’s Army.In the marksmanship component of the competition, the Park Kyung Artillery Unit, subordinate to the 11th Army Corps, reportedly achieved first place. Chairman Kim subsequently posed for a commemorative photograph with all officers and soldiers of the brigade and observed athletic events together with unit personnel.The KPRA, referenced in the commemoration, was the guerrilla force organized by Kim Il-sung during the anti-Japanese struggle in Manchuria. Since 1978, North Korea has designated April 25, 1932—the date it attributes to the KPRA’s founding—as the official anniversary of its armed forces and has marked the occasion with annual commemorations.Parallel commemorative activities were conducted nationwide. Jo Yong-won, Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme People’s Assembly, along with senior Party and government officials including Kim Song-nam, An Kum-chol, and Kim Jong-gwan, visited the Museum of the Korean Revolution. Prime Minister Pak Thae-song and other officials laid wreaths at the Daesongsan Revolutionary Martyrs’ Cemetery, where anti-Japanese partisans and independence activists are interred.In Pyongyang, KPA personnel, workers, and youth placed floral tributes at the statues of Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il on Mansu Hill. University students from South Hamgyong Province visited the Revolutionary Historic Site in Ryonggang County to pledge loyalty to the leadership.Cultural events were also organized as part of the commemoration. The Ministry of National Defense Symphony Orchestra staged a combined music and dance performance at the Bonghwa Art Theater, while students in Pyongyang participated in a public dance event in front of the Pyongyang Acrobatics Theater, performing songs praising the Kim family leadership.Visit by Russian Interior Ministry Delegation to USS Pueblo in Pyongyang Highlights Anti-U.S. Strategic AlignmentSeparately, a delegation from the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs visited the USS Pueblo during a trip to Pyongyang, drawing attention as a symbolic gesture underscoring perceived “anti-U.S. solidarity” between North Korea and Russia.KCNA reported on April 24 that the Russian delegation, led by Interior Minister Vladimir Kolokoltsev, also visited the Museum of the Victory in the War of Liberation of the Fatherland, North Korea’s principal Korean War museum.The USS Pueblo is a U.S. Navy intelligence-gathering vessel seized by North Korea in 1968 in international waters off Wonsan during the administration of President Lyndon B. Johnson. The incident is widely regarded as a significant escalation in tensions on the Korean Peninsula amid Cold War confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union.Originally commissioned as a U.S. Army cargo vessel in 1944 and later converted into a reconnaissance ship in 1966, the USS Pueblo measures approximately 54 meters in length and 10 meters in width, with a displacement of 906 tons. It was captured by the North Korean Navy while conducting signals intelligence operations after departing from Japan.During the seizure, one crew member was killed and 13 were injured, while the remaining 82 crew members were detained by North Korea for approximately 11 months. The incident marked the first time in over a century that a U.S. naval vessel had been seized on the high seas. In response, the United States deployed the aircraft carrier USS Enterprise and accompanying destroyers to waters near Wonsan, significantly escalating tensions.The crew was repatriated via Panmunjom in December 1968, but the episode generated controversy in the United States due to what was perceived as a “humiliating negotiation,” as Washington—then heavily engaged in the Vietnam War—accepted substantial North Korean demands to secure their release. North Korea ultimately refused to return the vessel.Since then, North Korea has designated the USS Pueblo as “war booty seized from the United States” and has used it extensively for propaganda purposes. Originally moored in Wonsan, the vessel was relocated in 1999 under orders from Kim Jong-il to the Victorious Fatherland Liberation War Museum along the Potong River in Pyongyang, where it remains on public display as a prominent anti-U.S. symbol.The museum itself serves as a key ideological institution, presenting the Korean War as a North Korean victory and reinforcing regime legitimacy through anti-American narratives. Within this framework, the USS Pueblo functions as a central exhibit.The Russian delegation’s visit to the site is interpreted as a symbolic reaffirmation of the deepening strategic alignment between Pyongyang and Moscow. Notably, the United States has never formally decommissioned the USS Pueblo and continues to list it as a commissioned vessel, effectively treating it as a detained U.S. naval asset. As a result, analysts have long suggested that, in the event of renewed U.S.–North Korea negotiations, the potential return of the USS Pueblo could serve as a bargaining chip for Pyongyang.

North Korea Inside· South Korean Ministry of Unification Submits the Fifth Basic Plan for Developing Inter-Korean Relations· Kim Jong-un Observes Destroyer Missile Launches Three Times in April, Possibly Linked to Middle East Developments· “I Will Be the Next Hero”: North Korea Organizes Student Visits to Families of Fallen Soldiers from Russia DeploymentKim Myong-sungSecretary General of the SAND InstituteSouth Korean Ministry of Unification Submits the Fifth Basic Plan for Developing Inter-Korean RelationsOn April 15, South Korea’s Ministry of Unification submitted the “Fifth Basic Plan for the Development of Inter-Korean Relations (2026–2030)” to the National Assembly’s Foreign Affairs and Unification Committee.In the report, the Ministry stated that, based on the ROK–U.S. alliance and with the goal of achieving a “nuclear-free Korean Peninsula,” it would seek to halt North Korea’s production and development of nuclear weapons and intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs).Under the key policy priority of “resolving the North Korean nuclear issue and advancing toward a peace regime on the Korean Peninsula,” the government outlined the following objectives: creating conditions conducive to dialogue aimed at a Korean Peninsula free of war and nuclear weapons; achieving substantive progress on the North Korean nuclear issue through a phased and pragmatic approach; and, in parallel, advancing the establishment of a peace regime on the Korean Peninsula.Specifically, the policy framework includes formulating and implementing a phased resolution strategy based on a “suspension–reduction–elimination” sequence; seeking an immediate halt to North Korea’s nuclear development as an initial step toward a “nuclear-free Korean Peninsula”; promoting the implementation of agreements through phased commitments and reciprocal actions; and strengthening international coordination.The government also indicated that it will pursue the establishment of a peace regime on the Korean Peninsula in parallel. It plans to explore all feasible pathways for transitioning to such a regime and to further develop the contours of a prospective peace agreement. It also intends to pursue the conclusion of such an agreement among relevant parties when conditions permit. In addition, it plans to promote the operation of a four- or six-party cooperative framework to advance peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula and in Northeast Asia.To promote mutually beneficial inter-Korean exchange and cooperation that resonates with the public, the government stated that it will pursue consistent humanitarian cooperation irrespective of political or military considerations and plans to revise relevant legal and institutional frameworks. To alleviate the humanitarian consequences of division, the government intends to strengthen cooperation aimed at materially improving the human rights conditions of North Korean residents. The plan envisions phased implementation, beginning with groups such as persons with disabilities, women, and children, for whom North Korea is assessed to be relatively more receptive.The Basic Plan for the Development of Inter-Korean Relations is a mid- to long-term comprehensive framework that sets out the direction and objectives for advancing inter-Korean relations in pursuit of shared prosperity and peaceful unification. In accordance with the “Act on the Development of Inter-Korean Relations” and its implementing decree, the government formulates a basic plan every five years following consultations with relevant central government agencies.The Plan was newly formulated to reflect the Lee Jae-myung administration’s North Korea policy, following the early termination of the Fourth Plan—adopted under the Yoon Suk-yeol administration—after three years of implementation.In July 2024, based on amendments to the Inter-Korean Relations Development Act, the government conducted an evaluation of the previous Basic Plan. With respect to the Fourth Basic Plan formulated under the Yoon Suk-yeol administration, the current government assessed that the “Bold Plan”—introduced in August 2022 as a denuclearization roadmap—did not produce meaningful progress toward North Korea’s denuclearization and, in some respects, contributed to heightened security instability on the Korean Peninsula.In particular, the government assessed that the emphasis on “peace through strength” and the prioritization of sanctions coordination constrained efforts to address core security challenges through dialogue and cooperation. It further assessed that evolving external dynamics—such as the strengthening of North Korea–Russia relations following the Russia–Ukraine conflict—have accelerated the development of North Korea’s nuclear and missile capabilities. Additionally, the government concluded that the strict application of “reciprocity” during a period of strained inter-Korean relations contributed to a prolonged stalemate.While efforts were made to raise international awareness of North Korean human rights issues, the report noted that an excessive emphasis on internationalizing these issues may have reduced opportunities for inter-Korean cooperation in this area.Meanwhile, with respect to trends in North Korea, the Ministry of Unification assessed that the North Korean economy has moved beyond a contraction phase and entered a period of gradual recovery. It further assessed that North Korea has established and sustained what may be characterized as an “alliance-level” cooperative relationship with Russia, including the transfer of advanced weapons systems and technology, while leveraging U.S.–China strategic competition to expand its strategic autonomy and bargaining leverage.Kim Jong-un Observes Destroyer Missile Launches Three Times in April, Possibly Linked to Middle East DevelopmentsNorth Korean State Affairs Commission Chairman Kim Jong-un observed an additional missile test launch from the destroyer Choe Hyon-ho on April 12, marking his third such observation following visits on April 4 and April 10.In addition to strategic cruise missiles, three ship-to-ship (anti-ship) missiles were fired from the destroyer at a simulated naval target.This is reportedly the first instance in which North Korea has conducted ship-to-ship missile launches from the Choe Hyon-ho.This activity appears to reflect final-stage inspections of onboard weapons systems in line with plans to deploy the vessel—launched in April last year—to the East Sea Fleet within the current year.A South Korean Ministry of Unification official assessed that “this activity is part of the implementation of the defense plan outlined at the 9th Party Congress” and characterized it as “a final systems validation process prior to the vessel’s operational deployment.”At the same time, these developments appear to be influenced by the ongoing conflict between the United States and Iran.Chairman Kim has observed three missile test launches from the Choe Hyon-ho within a 40-day period that coincides with the timeline of the U.S.–Iran confrontation, which began on February 28.This pattern also suggests sensitivity to the recent escalation of the conflict into a maritime standoff involving blockade and counter-blockade dynamics in the Strait of Hormuz.Chairman Kim referenced nuclear capabilities during each of these inspections. During his April 4 visit, he stated that “the naval nuclear armament program is progressing satisfactorily,” and on April 10, he declared that “the national nuclear force has entered a multi-domain operational phase.”During the most recent visit, he further emphasized that “the continuous and unlimited expansion of nuclear war deterrence constitutes the Party’s consistent defense line and its most critical task,” adding that “strategic and tactical offensive capabilities underpinning nuclear deterrence must be further strengthened.”The strategic and tactical offensive capabilities referenced by Chairman Kim are assessed to be directed not only at South Korea but also at the United States.In this context, some analysts assess that North Korea is accelerating efforts to enhance its naval capabilities in response to shifts in the regional military balance, including the reported degradation of Iranian air and naval forces by the United States. It is also reported that North Korea has conducted test launches simulating strikes against U.S. aircraft carriers and forward-deployed military bases in a contingency scenario on the Korean Peninsula.“I Will Be the Next Hero”: North Korea Organizes Student Visits to Families of Fallen Soldiers from Russia DeploymentNorth Korea has organized group visits by graduating secondary school students preparing for military enlistment to Saebyeol-dong, a residential area housing the families of soldiers killed during deployment to Russia, in an apparent effort to reinforce loyalty and ideological commitment. This initiative is widely interpreted as an attempt to highlight the achievements of North Korea’s military deployment, console bereaved families, and instill patriotism and a spirit of sacrifice among younger generations.In a front-page article published on April 13 titled “Upper Secondary School Graduates Who Volunteered for Enlistment in the People’s Army Continue to Visit Saebyeol-dong,” Rodong Sinmun reported that students from multiple schools in Pyongyang visited the families of fallen soldiers and pledged that “we will become a source of pride for our country, our families, and our schools, just as our predecessors who sacrificed their lives for the motherland.” The newspaper further reported that in some schools, all graduates volunteered for frontline assignments.The newspaper cited Chairman Kim Jong-un as stating that “Saebyeol-gil has become a symbol etched in the hearts of the people, representing the lives of those who fought for the motherland on distant battlefields.”While viewing medals and photographs of fallen soldiers, the students reportedly expressed their determination, stating that “we will become sons who can stand proudly before our parents and the motherland” and that “we will be the next heroes.”Students also reportedly participated in activities such as singing with bereaved families, delivering letters, and listening to accounts of the soldiers’ lives. A commemorative tree-planting event was held at Saebyeol-gil Park to reaffirm their “commitment to patriotism.”The North Korean media highlighted what it described as voluntary participation among youth, stating that “pledges to inherit the noble spirit of the fallen and become shining pillars of the nation continue to emerge.” Reports also indicated that some students sent letters to bereaved families expressing their loyalty.These developments are consistent with North Korea’s broader effort to leverage its military deployment in the Russia–Ukraine conflict for domestic propaganda purposes. After reportedly deploying approximately 12,000 troops in October 2024, North Korea did not publicly acknowledge the deployment until April 2025, when it launched a large-scale campaign following Russia’s declaration of a “Kursk victory.”Following imagery of Chairman Kim personally receiving the remains of fallen soldiers in June last year, he awarded state honors to participating troops in August and directed the construction of a residential complex for bereaved families in Pyongyang. More recently, he emphasized that a planned memorial hall for deployed troops would serve as a “center for patriotic education” and announced a mid-April completion ceremony.Analysts assess that these initiatives carry political objectives closely linked to regime stability, extending beyond symbolic commemoration. Specifically, they appear designed to mitigate potential domestic discontent stemming from casualties while framing military cooperation with Russia as a strategic achievement of the Kim Jong-un era.In particular, the emphasis on “experiential, on-site loyalty education” targeting youth is notable. Analysts suggest this reflects an effort to integrate younger generations—often assessed as having relatively weaker ideological cohesion—into a state-sponsored “heroic narrative,” thereby reinforcing their role as a foundational pillar of regime support. Some observers further interpret this trend as connected to the consolidation of the “Kim Jong-un-centered leadership system” emphasized after the Ninth Party Congress and, over the longer term, to the preparation of conditions conducive to a fourth-generation succession.It has been further observed that Saebyeol-dong functions as a “political education and propaganda complex,” extending beyond its residential function to transform the narrative of military sacrifice into a source of regime legitimacy and embed it within the consciousness of younger generations.

Trends in Recent Events Commemorating the 114th Anniversary of President Kim Il-sung’s BirthNorth Korea held a range of commemorative events marking the 114th anniversary of President Kim Il-sung’s birth (April 15) and saturated state-run media with content glorifying his legacy.North Korean media emphasized the spirit of “Putting the People First” (Iminwicheon), a governing principle attributed to Kim Il-sung, and called on residents to demonstrate loyalty to the Party and the state. Notably, state media once again refrained from using the term “Day of the Sun,” traditionally associated with Kim Il-sung’s birthday. This shift is widely interpreted as an effort to recalibrate the prominence of past leaders in order to reinforce Kim Jong-un’s independent authority.In an editorial titled “The ‘People-First’ Ideology of the Great Leader Comrade Kim Il-sung Is the Eternal Political Philosophy of Our Party and State,” published the same day, the Rodong Sinmun, the official newspaper of the Workers’ Party of Korea, asserted that the “People-First” ideology embodies a governing principle in which the people are to be served and regarded as the ultimate source of authority.The newspaper further emphasized that “the political philosophy of ‘The People Are Supreme,’ which the Great Leader (Kim Il-sung) consistently embodied in Party and state affairs, was faithfully carried forward by the Great General (Kim Jong-il) and continues to be advanced under the leadership of the Respected General Secretary (Kim Jong-un),” thereby underscoring the hereditary continuity of this ideological framework within the Kim family.The newspaper continued, “Our cause, which steadfastly upholds the ideology of ‘The People First’ as the eternal political philosophy of the Party and the state and as the banner of struggle and progress, is invincible,” and further urged that “we must advance with renewed resolve and confidence to accelerate the realization of the Workers’ Party of Korea’s ideals, which place the promotion of the people’s welfare at the center of its mission, in pursuit of the victory of the Juche revolutionary cause.”North Korean authorities also appeared to mobilize religious narratives to reinforce the personality cult surrounding Kim Il-sung. On April 9, Rodong Sinmun introduced an anecdote involving a pastor who reportedly referred to Kim Il-sung as “the God of Korea.” This framing appears to be an effort to elevate Kim Il-sung’s status through religious symbolism and reinforce regime legitimacy.In an article titled “Our Leader, Who Lives Forever in the Hearts of the People: The Great Man’s Sublime View of the People,” the newspaper recounted an episode from the post-liberation land reform period. According to the report, a religious figure residing in Ryonggang County, South Pyongan Province, was designated as a landlord and subjected to property confiscation and relocation orders; however, Kim Il-sung intervened and ordered the restoration of the individual’s land and orchard.The newspaper further reported that the pastor, moved by the decision, declared, “General Kim Il-sung is truly the God of Korea who looks after all the people.” It added that Kang Ryang-uk, who at the time served as Secretary of the North Korean Provisional People’s Committee, expressed a similar sentiment.Rodong Sinmun reported that Kang Ryang-uk later stated that this was the day he “witnessed firsthand the true form of the sacred being he had long revered.”Kang Ryang-uk, a central figure in this narrative, was a pastor during the Japanese colonial period and later became an active supporter of Kim Il-sung during the establishment of the North Korean regime. He subsequently held multiple positions, including Chairman of the Central Committee of the Korean Christian Federation, Chairman of the Korean Social Democratic Party, a delegate to the Supreme People’s Assembly, and Vice President of North Korea, operating across both religious and political spheres.This episode illustrates the instrumentalization of religion in support of leader veneration, and the characterization of Kim Il-sung as “God” may be interpreted as an attempt to elevate regime loyalty to a quasi-religious level.Historically, North Korea has described Kim Il-sung as the “Sun of the Nation” and the “Eternal Leader,” and there has been a recent trend toward increased use of symbolic language to reinforce internal cohesion. The current reporting appears to align with broader propaganda efforts aimed at strengthening domestic unity.At the same time, while Kim Il-sung’s birthday has long been commemorated as the “Day of the Sun” and regarded as the most important national holiday, recent years have seen a marked decline in the use of this terminology, consistent with Kim Jong-un’s apparent efforts to recalibrate the legacy of his predecessors and normalize state symbolism.North Korean media have largely avoided the term “Day of the Sun” since approximately 2024. A South Korean Ministry of Unification official observed that “the use of terms such as ‘Day of the Sun’ and ‘Day of the Shining Star’ (February 16, Kim Jong-il’s birthday) has been declining,” adding that “as Kim Jong-un’s independent authority is consolidated, the relative prominence of his predecessors appears to be diminishing.”North Korea had previously referred to April 15 as the “April Holiday” before formally adopting the term “Day of the Sun” in 1997, three years after Kim Il-sung’s death.Earlier, at the Ninth Party Congress held in February and the first session of the 15th Supreme People’s Assembly convened the previous month, North Korea described Kim Jong-un’s tenure as “a great victory distinct from the preceding 75 years since liberation” and “a national revival unprecedented in the country’s history.” These characterizations have been interpreted as part of an effort to further consolidate the personality cult surrounding Kim Jong-un.Nevertheless, commemorative activities marking Kim Il-sung’s birthday continue to be conducted on a large scale. Rodong Sinmun reported on April 15 that the Socialist Women’s Union and the Agricultural Workers’ Union held celebratory gatherings the previous day. The Korean Children’s Union also reportedly convened a nationwide joint meeting of its organization to mark the occasion.The newspaper further reported that officials, workers, soldiers, and students visited the Mangyongdae Native House in Pyongyang, the birthplace of Kim Il-sung. According to the report, approximately 120,000 people visited Mangyongdae this year.In addition, Rodong Sinmun reported that leaders of several countries sent floral tributes to commemorate Kim Il-sung’s birthday. These reportedly included the presidents of Cambodia (April 7), Laos (April 13), Palestine (April 13), and Nigeria (April 14).The newspaper also reported that the ambassadors of Vietnam and Cuba in Pyongyang sent flower baskets and congratulatory messages, while the Syrian chargé d’affaires sent a floral tribute, the Nicaraguan ambassador sent a congratulatory letter, and the Indonesian and Brazilian embassies sent flower baskets.On April 15, citizens visiting Mansudae Hill in Pyongyang laid flowers at statues of Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il to mark the anniversary. That evening, beginning at 8:00 p.m., a nighttime celebration and fireworks display featuring youth and students was held at Kim Il-sung Square.Additional commemorative events included a national food exhibition, a flower festival, and a performance by the art troupe of the Pyongyang Palace of Children and Students.Meanwhile, Kim Jong-un reportedly provided 316.36 million yen (approximately 2.94 billion won) to the General Association of Korean Residents in Japan (Chongryon) in the form of educational aid and scholarships to mark the anniversary.Rodong Sinmun reported on April 14 that the funds were provided “to support the democratic national education of Korean children in Japan.”According to the newspaper, the cumulative total of educational aid and scholarships provided over 172 installments by Kim Il-sung, Kim Jong-il, and Kim Jong-un amounts to 50.3 billion yen (approximately 467.4 billion won).According to South Korea’s Ministry of Unification, North Korea has provided scholarships to Chongryon annually since 1957, typically timed to coincide with Kim Il-sung’s birthday.The scholarship provided this year is reportedly the largest to date. Kim Jong-un’s continued emphasis on Chongryon appears aimed at maintaining the loyalty of younger generations. Some analysts also suggest that this focus may be linked to the background of his mother, Ko Yong-hui, who was born into a Korean community in Japan.At the same time, North Korea–Russia engagement continued during the commemorative period. Workers’ organizations from North Korea and Russia held talks in Pyongyang on April 14 and signed a memorandum of understanding on cooperation.The Korean Central News Agency reported on April 15 that Ri Won-jong, Chairman of the Central Committee of the General Federation of Trade Unions of Korea, and Sergei Chernogaev, Chairman of the Federation of Independent Trade Unions of Russia, held talks at the Pyongyang Assembly Hall the previous day.According to the report, the two sides discussed expanding exchanges and cooperation between their respective trade union organizations in line with the evolving trajectory of DPRK–Russia relations and subsequently signed a “Memorandum of Understanding on Friendship and Cooperation.”On the same day, the Central Committee of the General Federation of Trade Unions of Korea hosted a banquet for the Russian delegation at the Koryo Hotel in Pyongyang.The Federation of Independent Trade Unions of Russia is reported to be the country’s largest trade union organization, with approximately 19 million members. The delegation, led by Chairman Chernogaev, has been visiting North Korea since April 13.The General Federation of Trade Unions of Korea is an affiliated organization of the Workers’ Party of Korea (WPK) and is composed of workers, technicians, and office employees aged 30 or older who are not members of the Party and who are not affiliated with other mass organizations such as the Agricultural Workers’ Union or the Socialist Women’s Union. As DPRK–Russia relations have strengthened in recent years, exchanges across various sectors of society have also expanded.In July of the previous year, a delegation from a North Korean women’s organization, led by Kim Jong-sun, then head of the Workers’ Organizations Department of the WPK, visited Russia and pledged to expand cooperation with Russian women’s organizations.

North Korea Inside· North Korea Fires Missile, Warns Against “Wishful Thinking” and Dashes Hopes for Dialogue· NIS Says Kim Ju-ae Is Kim Jong-un’s Successor, Citing Credible Intelligence· Wang Yi’s North Korea Visit Signals Accelerating China–North Korea Rapprochement Ahead of U.S.-China SummitKim Myong-sungSecretary General of the SAND InstituteNorth Korea Fires Missile, Warns Against “Wishful Thinking” and Dashes Hopes for DialogueFollowing its launch of short-range ballistic missiles toward the East Sea, North Korea warned South Korea not to “indulge in wishful thinking,” thereby reaffirming its hardline stance toward the South. This is widely interpreted as Pyongyang drawing a clear line against expectations of easing tensions that had emerged in some quarters following South Korean President Lee Jae-myung’s expression of “regret” over the drone incident.According to the South Korean Joint Chiefs of Staff on April 8, North Korea fired several short-range ballistic missiles from the Wonsan area at approximately 8:50 a.m. that day. The missiles flew roughly 240km before landing in the East Sea. Military authorities stated that South Korean and U.S. intelligence agencies are closely tracking launch patterns and sharing relevant information, and that precise specifications remain under detailed analysis.This launch marks the second consecutive day of such activity. North Korea fired an unidentified projectile from the Pyongyang area the previous day, but it reportedly disappeared after showing signs of malfunction early in its flight. Military sources assess that there is a high likelihood that the projectile was also a ballistic missile. Consequently, speculation has emerged that North Korea may have carried out consecutive launches to compensate for the failed test.Some analysts assess that North Korea may have tested the high-thrust solid-fuel engine it recently unveiled, or that this may have been a test of a new projectile incorporating that engine. There is also speculation that the test could be linked to intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) technology or involve performance enhancements to multiple rocket launchers intended for use against South Korea.The South Korean government responded immediately. The National Security Office convened an emergency security review meeting and instructed the military to further strengthen its readiness posture. It also urged North Korea to cease such launches, emphasizing that they constitute violations of United Nations Security Council resolutions.In parallel with its military actions, North Korea issued a strongly worded message directed at the South. In a speech delivered the previous day, a senior official responsible for inter-Korean affairs described South Korea as “the most hostile state” and sharply criticized Seoul’s interpretation as “wishful thinking.”This stands in contrast to the relatively restrained assessment previously offered by Kim Yo-jong, Director of the General Affairs Department of the Workers’ Party, regarding President Lee’s expression of regret. At the time, North Korea described it as a “wise move,” signaling a limited but notable degree of receptivity. The South Korean government likewise interpreted this as an indirect indication of mutual intent between the two Koreas and attached significance to it.However, with a hardline statement and missile launches following within half a day, North Korea is widely seen as having effectively ruled out the possibility of improved relations and clearly demonstrated its intention to maintain the existing posture of “two hostile states.”Experts assess that, rather than fully foreclosing the possibility of dialogue, North Korea is pursuing a strategy aimed at securing leverage in potential negotiations through calibrated military pressure. The objective appears to be to assert its position through demonstrable actions—namely, military displays—while continuing to advance its nuclear and missile capabilities.Against this backdrop, it is difficult to rule out the possibility of further provocations by North Korea. In particular, if testing of new weapons systems continue, tensions on the Korean Peninsula are likely to remain elevated in the near term.Nevertheless, the South Korean government maintains its existing policy stance toward North Korea. The Presidential Office stated the same day, “We will continue our efforts toward peaceful coexistence on the Korean Peninsula based on mutual respect,” adding that it “expects the North to respond accordingly.” It further noted that “criticism and inflammatory rhetoric do not contribute to stability on the Korean Peninsula.”NIS Says Kim Ju-ae Is Kim Jong-un’s Successor, Citing Credible IntelligenceOn April 6, South Korea’s National Intelligence Service (NIS) assessed Kim Ju-ae, the daughter of North Korean State Affairs Commission Chairman Kim Jong-un, as his designated successor. This marks an upgrade from its earlier assessment that she was undergoing succession grooming. Since first appearing publicly in November 2022, Kim Ju-ae is believed to have steadily consolidated her position over the past three years and effectively attained successor status.Park Seon-won of the Democratic Party of Korea and Lee Seong-kwon of the People Power Party, the respective party coordinators for the National Assembly’s Intelligence Committee, said the NIS delivered a closed-door briefing to the committee on April 6 covering these issues, including developments in the Middle East and matters related to North Korea.According to Rep. Park, NIS Director Lee Jong-seok stated, in response to a question from committee members about whether Kim Ju-ae should be viewed as the successor, that “it is reasonable to do so.” In response to a follow-up question regarding the credibility of the assessment, Director Lee reportedly added that “this judgment is based not merely on circumstantial indicators but on credible intelligence.”The NIS further noted that, by staging imagery of Kim Ju-ae driving a tank—evoking Kim Jong-un’s own trajectory as heir apparent—the regime appears intent on highlighting her military credentials. It characterized this as a strategic effort to mitigate skepticism surrounding a female successor and to accelerate the construction of a succession narrative.The NIS further assessed that North Korea is seeking to widen its diplomatic maneuvering space by deliberately distancing itself from Iran, traditionally aligned with the anti-U.S. camp, in the aftermath of the Middle East conflict. It noted that, following U.S. and Israeli strikes on Iran, Pyongyang has refrained from providing military or material support and has shown symbolic restraint, including by withholding condolence or congratulatory messages in response to leadership changes in Tehran.In this context, Rep. Park stated that the NIS views these developments as potential preparatory steps designed to secure new diplomatic space in the aftermath of the anticipated U.S.-China summit in May.The NIS also disclosed that, upon reviewing the revised Workers’ Party charter from June 2024, it confirmed the deletion of phrases such as “northern half of the republic” and “united front.” Rep. Lee noted that this indicates the “two hostile states” policy has already been substantially reflected in legal and institutional frameworks. However, the NIS added that it has not confirmed whether this doctrine has been formally codified into law, leaving open the question of whether it has been incorporated into the North Korean Constitution.Wang Yi’s North Korea Visit Signals Accelerating China–North Korea Rapprochement Ahead of U.S.-China SummitChinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi will visit North Korea for a two-day trip beginning on April 9. Against the backdrop of clear signs of recovering North Korea–China relations—including the recent resumption of rail and air links—the visit is being interpreted by some as a carefully calibrated diplomatic move ahead of the upcoming U.S.-China summit and the possibility of renewed North Korea–U.S. engagement.North Korea’s Korean Central News Agency reported on the 8th that “at the invitation of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Comrade Wang Yi, a member of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee and Minister of Foreign Affairs, will visit our country from April 9 to 10.” Minister Wang’s visit comes as high-level exchanges between North Korea and China continue to regain momentum.Recently, North Korea and China have accelerated the restoration of bilateral exchanges through the successive resumption of rail and air links. There is a growing view that relations between the two countries, which had remained stagnant for an extended period following the COVID-19 pandemic, have now entered a phase of substantive recovery.This trend is also evident in political exchanges. Last month, the Chinese leadership sent congratulatory messages to high-ranking officials elected at North Korea’s Supreme People’s Assembly, underscoring the importance of strengthening bilateral ties.The Chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress conveyed a message to his North Korean counterpart expressing a willingness to expand inter-parliamentary exchanges and cooperation, while the Premier of the State Council likewise extended congratulations to his North Korean counterpart, emphasizing the advancement of traditional friendly relations.Messages at the foreign minister level also followed. In a congratulatory message addressed to North Korea’s foreign minister, Minister Wang expressed his intention to enhance communication and coordination between the two countries’ diplomatic establishments.President Xi Jinping similarly sent a message congratulating Chairman Kim Jong-un on his re-election, reaffirming the continued development of bilateral relations. This series of “relay congratulatory messages” is widely interpreted as reflecting Beijing’s intention to manage North Korea–China relations in a stable and controlled manner.Against this backdrop, Minister Wang’s visit to North Korea is attracting heightened attention as it coincides with an evolving international landscape. In particular, U.S. President Donald Trump is expected to visit China in mid-May for a summit with President Xi Jinping, raising the possibility of subsequent engagement between North Korea and the United States.Accordingly, there is growing speculation that, during his visit, Minister Wang may engage in close coordination with his North Korean counterparts on key issues, including developments on the Korean Peninsula, and may convey messages related to the forthcoming U.S.–China summit and potential U.S.–North Korea diplomatic engagement. In particular, given the uncertainty surrounding the resumption of U.S.–North Korea dialogue, attention is focused on whether China will seek to assume a mediating or coordinating role.Overall, the visit is widely viewed as a move aimed not only at restoring North Korea–China relations but also at reaffirming Beijing’s influence amid the shifting diplomatic dynamics surrounding the Korean Peninsula.

North Korea Inside· Kim Il-sung University Renames Its “Department of Information Science” as the “Department of Artificial Intelligence”· Kim Jong-un Oversees Test of Carbon-Fiber Solid-Fuel Engine for ICBMs· North Korea–China Air Route Resumes After Six-Year SuspensionKim Myong-sungSecretary General of the SAND InstituteKim Il-sung University Renames Its “Department of Information Science” as the “Department of Artificial Intelligence”It has been confirmed that Kim Il-sung University, widely regarded as North Korea’s premier academic institution, has renamed its “Department of Information Science” to the “Department of Artificial Intelligence,” signaling a more systematic national effort to cultivate talent in artificial intelligence (AI).According to the university’s official website, the reorganization took place in July of last year. The newly restructured Faculty of Artificial Intelligence comprises departments specializing in artificial intelligence, information science, information and communications, and programming.The university states that the faculty’s core mission is to support the country’s information industry and AI sector by training highly qualified specialists capable of designing and developing operating systems, AI software, and a wide range of applications. It also aims to play a leading role in advancing cutting-edge software development and promoting the informatization and intelligentization of key sectors of the national economy.To support these objectives, the faculty oversees seven affiliated research institutes, specializing in intelligent science, visual information processing, natural language processing, Internet of Things (IoT) technologies, information security, information management, and AI technologies.The curriculum prominently features courses such as “Deep Learning Applications,” “Machine Learning,” “Data Mining,” and “Cloud Computing,” reflecting a deliberate effort to align with global technological trends, albeit expressed in localized terminology.North Korea has also been expanding AI education at earlier levels. In January, an “integrated elementary–middle–high school” reportedly established an AI education laboratory equipped with educational robots and modern instructional facilities, with plans to provide phased training in AI technologies. In November of the previous year, Kim Myong-il, a senior researcher affiliated with the university’s AI faculty, was recognized as an “Outstanding Information Technologist” for developing an intelligent medical service system.North Korea’s engagement with AI dates back to the 1990s. The Go-playing AI program “Eunbyeol,” developed beginning in 1997, won multiple World Computer Go Championships. More recently, the “Ryongnam-san 5.1” translation program, unveiled in 2017, demonstrated the ability to translate specialized English texts across more than 30 academic disciplines into Korean. Since then, AI applications have expanded into education, exhibitions, and public services, including 24-hour pharmacy operations in Pyongyang.At the same time, North Korea’s AI development appears closely linked to military applications, particularly in the nuclear domain. Academic publications by North Korean researchers have highlighted the use of reinforcement learning in war-gaming simulations and AI-based optimization techniques for nuclear reactor management.External assessments, including those by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute and the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, indicate that North Korea is applying AI across a broad spectrum of areas, including cyber operations, unmanned systems, surveillance, and nuclear infrastructure management.Given these developments, South Korea has begun pursuing countermeasures, including the advancement of AI-enabled manned–unmanned integrated operational concepts and the redesign of military systems to incorporate AI-based combat capabilities.Kim Jong-un Oversees Test of Carbon-Fiber Solid-Fuel Engine for ICBMsNorth Korea has conducted a test of a carbon-fiber-based solid-fuel engine designed for intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), in the presence of Kim Jong-un, highlighting ongoing efforts to modernize its strategic strike capabilities.According to the Korean Central News Agency, Kim observed a ground-based static firing test of a high-thrust solid-fuel engine incorporating carbon composite materials. The engine reportedly achieved a maximum thrust of 2,500 kilonewtons, representing a significant improvement over previous models.The system is believed to be intended for integration into the Hwasong-20 ICBM currently under development, and forms part of a broader five-year defense development plan focused on enhancing strategic deterrence capabilities.Kim characterized the test as a major step forward in strengthening national defense, emphasizing the importance of advancing both the qualitative and quantitative aspects of strategic forces. He also indicated that weapons development would accelerate further through the adoption of technologically advanced and cost-effective components.In parallel, Kim inspected the performance of a new main battle tank’s active protection system, which reportedly demonstrated full interception capability against anti-tank weapons during testing. He also observed training activities of special operations forces, including the public unveiling of female personnel—an unusual development that may carry both military and symbolic significance.Taken together, these developments reflect North Korea’s ongoing emphasis on modernizing military capabilities across multiple domains, while simultaneously leveraging technological advancements—including AI—to enhance operational effectiveness and strengthen strategic deterrence.North Korea–China Air Route Resumes After Six-Year SuspensionDirect commercial air service between China and North Korea has resumed after an approximately six-year hiatus, signaling a gradual normalization of bilateral transportation links. According to China Central Television, an Air China flight (CA121) departed Beijing Capital International Airport on March 30 en route to Pyongyang, marking the first such service since operations were suspended in early 2020 due to the COVID-19 pandemic.The Beijing–Pyongyang route (CA121/CA122) is scheduled to operate once weekly. Flight CA121 departs Beijing at 8:05 a.m. (China Standard Time) and arrives at Sunan International Airport at approximately 11:00 a.m. (North Korean Standard Time), with a flight duration of roughly 1 hour and 55 minutes. The return flight, CA122, departs Pyongyang at 12:00 p.m. and arrives in Beijing at 12:55 p.m. Ticket prices are reported to be around 2,000–2,100 yuan for economy class and 5,800–5,900 yuan for business class.China Central Television (CCTV) described the resumption as a “restoration of air connectivity” between the two countries. The move follows the reopening of cross-border rail service on March 12, signaling a broader trend toward the phased normalization of transportation links and limited people-to-people exchanges between Beijing and Pyongyang.The reopening was accompanied by a diplomatic gesture. According to the Chinese Embassy in Pyongyang, Ambassador Wang Yajun was present at Sunan Airport to greet arriving passengers, alongside North Korean aviation officials. Wang described the resumption of flights as a “symbolic milestone” in bilateral aviation cooperation, highlighting its potential to facilitate exchanges in trade, culture, and personnel movement. He further noted that land, rail, and air routes between the two countries have now all been restored.Despite these developments, uncertainties remain regarding the sustainability of regular operations. Reports indicate that bookings for upcoming flights are not yet fully available through airline channels, raising questions about passenger demand. It also remains unclear whether additional Chinese carriers will resume service to Pyongyang.Meanwhile, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China offered only a general response when asked whether the resumption of flights would lead to the lifting of restrictions on Chinese tourism to North Korea. At a regular press briefing, spokesperson Mao Ning reiterated that China and North Korea are “friendly neighbors,” noting that the restoration of passenger flights would help promote people-to-people exchanges, but provided no further specifics.Overall, the resumption of direct air service represents a cautious yet symbolically significant step toward restoring pre-pandemic connectivity between China and North Korea. However, broader normalization will remain contingent on passenger demand and policy decisions regarding cross-border movement.

North Korean Trends in March 2026 - Systemic Transition and the Shift Toward a Navy-Centric Military Strategy Following the Ninth Party Congress -                    Seung-hyun LeeResearch Fellow SAND InstituteNorth Korea’s developments in March 2026 indicate that the systemic transition initiated at the Ninth Party Congress of the Workers’ Party of Korea has entered a phase of full-scale policy implementation. At the Party Congress held in late February, Kim Jong-un was re-elected as General Secretary, and the “Five Major Party-Building Guidelines” were codified into the Party Constitution, thereby institutionalizing a Party-centered governance system.Subsequent developments observed in March can be understood as efforts to operationalize these political decisions, marked by concurrent adjustments across the political, economic, and military domains.First, in the political sphere, the regime concentrated on disseminating the outcomes of the Party Congress nationwide. Through plenary sessions of Party committees at all levels, mass mobilization rallies, and coordinated study campaigns, North Korea sought to reinforce ideological cohesion and organizational discipline. These efforts extend beyond symbolic propaganda and reflect a systematic attempt to reconfigure the institutional foundations necessary for policy execution.In particular, the renewed emphasis on discipline and work style appears aimed at curbing bureaucratic inefficiencies and corruption while strengthening centralized Party oversight. This trend underscores a deliberate effort by the leadership to consolidate a Party-centric governance model and ensure unified policy implementation.In parallel, North Korea’s external posture suggests continuity in its adversarial stance toward South Korea and the United States, as evidenced by repeated statements from Kim Yo-jong condemning ROK–U.S. joint military exercises. At the same time, Pyongyang appears to be maintaining a stable—albeit largely formal—relationship with China through the exchange of diplomatic messages. This reflects a dual-track approach in which North Korea sustains external tensions while seeking to mitigate diplomatic isolation.In the economic domain, the implementation of a new five-year plan has been accompanied by a renewed emphasis on expanding production in key industrial sectors. Efforts to enhance capacity and modernize facilities in core industries—such as metallurgy, chemicals, and energy—are proceeding in tandem, supported by sector-specific mobilization campaigns that stress output targets and technological innovation.Notably, Kim Jong-un’s on-site guidance at the Sangwon Cement Complex highlights a broader strategy of economic revitalization centered on the construction sector, underscoring the role of foundational industries in supporting large-scale infrastructure development and regional growth. This approach suggests a shift away from short-term, output-driven policies toward the stabilization of the production base and the promotion of qualitative economic development.More significant shifts are evident in the military sphere. Kim Jong-un’s on-site inspection of a major shipyard, including the public disclosure of a strategic nuclear submarine program, signals an emerging emphasis on naval power as a central component of national defense strategy. By framing maritime sovereignty as integral to state sovereignty and calling for the development of elite, nuclear-capable naval forces, the leadership has articulated a clear directive to modernize the shipbuilding industry and expand naval capabilities.This development suggests a transition from a traditionally ground-force-centric military posture toward a force structure increasingly oriented around strategic assets, particularly in the maritime domain. The introduction of a strategic nuclear submarine capability is especially noteworthy, as it enhances the survivability and second-strike potential of North Korea’s nuclear deterrent, indicating an evolution toward a more advanced operational concept for its nuclear forces.At the same time, North Korea has continued a range of military activities—including strategic cruise missile launches, long-range artillery drills, and marksmanship competitions—albeit at a relatively calibrated level of intensity.The practice of observing missile launches via recorded footage, rather than through direct on-site attendance, appears designed to preserve signaling effects while limiting escalation risks. Collectively, these patterns point to a “managed tension” strategy, whereby North Korea seeks to demonstrate credible deterrence capabilities while carefully calibrating the level of provocation in response to the external security environment.

North Korea Inside· Kim Jong-un Attends Tree-Planting Event and Observes 600mm Multiple Rocket Launcher Test with Daughter Ju-ae· Can North Korea-China Tourism Take Off?· Kim Jong-un Visits Construction Site of Memorial Hall for Russian SoldiersKim Myong-sungSecretary General of the SAND InstituteKim Jong-un Attends Tree-Planting Event and Observes 600mm Multiple Rocket Launcher Test with Daughter Ju-aeNorth Korean State Affairs Commission Chairman Kim Jong-un participated in a tree-planting event at Saebyeol-gil, a residential street in Pyongyang developed for the families of soldiers who died while serving in Russia, in observance of Tree-Planting Day (March 14). On the same day, he also continued his security-related activities by observing a test firing of a 600mm multiple rocket launcher.The Korean Central News Agency reported on March 15 that Chairman Kim planted trees the previous day at Motga Park on Saebyeol Street alongside senior officials. His daughter, Ju-ae, was also in attendance. Photographs released by KCNA depicted Chairman Kim and Ju-ae, clad in a leather jacket, jointly moving soil.Additional images showed Chairman Kim, Ju-ae, Foreign Minister Choe Son-hui, Workers’ Party General Affairs Department Director Kim Yo-jong, and other officials working together with shovels.During the event, Chairman Kim recalled North Korean soldiers dispatched to the war in Ukraine who had fallen in battle, expressing his hope that “the noble spirit of these martyrs will be preserved on this land, firmly embedding a pillar of patriotism in the hearts of all people and serving as sustenance to raises successive generations into the most righteous citizens.”He further emphasized, “Patriotism is the wellspring of passion that generates extraordinary power transcending all limits,” adding, “Through the great force of patriotism, we will assuredly build a prosperous and powerful state, a nation of the highest standing in the world.”Chairman Kim personally announced plans last August to construct a housing complex for veterans and bereaved families, and the residential project was completed on February 15 this year.North Korea appears to be emphasizing its treatment of, and support for, troops deployed to the war in Ukraine as a means of underscoring the legitimacy of its involvement and reinforcing internal cohesion.North Korean media further reported that Chairman Kim Jong-un, accompanied by his daughter Ju-ae, observed a live-fire drill involving 600mm ultra-precision multiple rocket launchers on the same day. KCNA stated that the long-range artillery units of the Korean People’s Army’s Western District conducted the drill the previous day, mobilizing twelve 600mm ultra-precision multiple rocket launchers and two artillery companies. This activity has been interpreted as a response to the ongoing “Freedom Shield” (FS) joint military exercises between South Korea and the United States, which commenced on March 9.Can North Korea-China Tourism Take Off?Following the recent resumption of passenger train services between North Korea and China after a hiatus of approximately six years, Chinese travel agencies have begun marketing group tour packages to North Korea.While there are expectations that tourism may resume amid signs of expanding bilateral exchanges, North Korean authorities have not indicated any intention to reopen the sector, resulting in divergent assessments regarding the viability of these packages. Ultimately, observers note that the final decision rests with Pyongyang.According to the Chinese travel industry on March 18, agencies in major cities, including Beijing, have recently promoted North Korean tour packages on social media platforms such as Douyin, the Chinese version of TikTok, and have begun accepting deposit payments.One such package includes departure from Beijing, rail entry into North Korea, and visits to Pyongyang, Kaesong, the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ), and Mount Kumgang. Most itineraries span seven nights and eight days, with prices ranging from 4,680 to 9,380 yuan (approximately 1.01 million to 2.02 million won).However, travel agencies note that departure dates remain “subject to confirmation following approval by North Korean authorities,” underscoring the uncertainty surrounding the actual resumption of tourism. While reservations are being accepted, implementation remains contingent on Pyongyang’s decision.This development has drawn attention as it coincides with indications of resumed passenger rail services between North Korea and China. International passenger trains connecting Pyongyang and Beijing, as well as Dandong and Pyongyang, resumed operations on March 12.Although the resumption of rail services is seen as a signal of expanding people-to-people exchanges and increases the prospects for tourism reopening, North Korea continues to maintain a cautious posture.Notably, North Korea abruptly canceled the Pyongyang International Marathon, scheduled for April 5, despite completing participant recruitment and collecting participation fees last year. Since the Pyongyang Marathon has served as a flagship tourism event—attracting hundreds of foreign participants annually and generating significant foreign currency revenue—the cancellation underscores North Korea’s continued reluctance to fully reopen to international tourism.At the same time, signs of a broader restoration in North Korea–China relations are emerging. North Korea has taken steps to strengthen ties with China, including reinstating the position of KWP International Secretary at the Ninth Party Congress last month and appointing Kim Song-nam to the Political Bureau. On March 15, it also hosted a friendship event at the Wonsan-Kalma Coastal Tourist Zone, inviting Chinese Ambassador Wang Yajin and other officials, signaling its intent to enhance bilateral relations.North Korea–China relations, which had cooled somewhat amid Pyongyang’s closer alignment with Russia, appeared to recover following Chairman Kim’s attendance at China’s Victory Day commemorations last September. Nevertheless, subtle tensions have persisted. The publication of Chairman Kim’s reply letter to General Secretary Xi Jinping on the front page of Rodong Sinmun on March 10, immediately after the Ninth Party Congress, has prompted speculation that bilateral relations may be entering a renewed phase of stabilization.Kim Jong-un Visits Construction Site of Memorial Hall for Russian SoldiersNorth Korean State Affairs Commission Chairman Kim Jong-un has once again visited the construction site of a memorial hall dedicated to Russian soldiers, marking his third inspection of the facility this year.The memorial hall, currently under construction in North Korea, is nearing completion and is scheduled for inauguration next month.The Korean Central News Agency reported on March 17 that Chairman Kim, while providing on-site guidance at the construction site of the Memorial Hall for Military Merits in Overseas Operations the previous day, stated, “The Memorial Hall will be completed to mark the first anniversary of the liberation of Kursk.”According to the report, construction is approximately 93 percent complete.On April 27 of last year, the Central Military Commission of the Workers’ Party announced in a statement transmitted through North Korean media that “the operation to liberate the Kursk region has been victoriously concluded.” In light of this timeline, the memorial’s completion ceremony is expected to take place at the end of next month.North Korean forces deployed abroad participated in the Kursk liberation operation. Kursk, located in southwestern Russia near the Ukrainian border, was partially occupied by Ukrainian forces in August 2024 before being recaptured by Russian troops. North Korean forces are assessed to have played a significant role in Russia’s recapture of the region last April.The scale of casualties remains a key concern. Reports indicate that approximately 6,000 North Korean soldiers were killed or wounded during the Kursk operation. The North Korean leadership belatedly disclosed the deployment last April and subsequently undertook measures to manage domestic sentiment, including holding a state funeral. Chairman Kim’s repeated visits to the memorial site and to the residences of bereaved families are widely interpreted as efforts to underscore that the leadership continues to recognize and commemorate these sacrifices.