From Traditional Security to an “Alliance of Technology, Industry, and Security”: Opening a New Horizon for Mutual Prosperity Between South Korea and the United StatesWon-mok ChoiProfessorEwha Womans University Law SchoolThe global economic order is undergoing a fundamental transformation. Global supply chains are being rapidly restructured, while strategic competition between the United States and China is blurring the boundaries between the economy, technology, and security. As competition over advanced technologies—including artificial intelligence (AI), semiconductors, biotechnology, and aerospace—intensifies, technological capacity and industrial competitiveness have become central elements of national security.In the past, military security was the central pillar of international alliances. Today, however, military cooperation alone is no longer sufficient to ensure an alliance’s long-term sustainability. A nation’s security and resilience are increasingly tied to who controls critical technologies, who can maintain reliable supply chains, and how quickly its economy and industries can recover from a crisis.Against this backdrop, the ROK-U.S. alliance, which has endured for more than 70 years, is approaching a new turning point. It must evolve into a comprehensive strategic partnership that extends beyond military and security cooperation to encompass industry, technology, supply chains, economic security, and shared democratic values. By combining South Korea’s world-class manufacturing and information and communications technology (ICT) capabilities with the United States’ advanced technologies and innovation ecosystem, the two countries can move beyond conventional cooperation and become partners in shaping the future of the global industrial order.The Technological Alliance Is Already Taking Shape on the Factory FloorThe transformation of South Korea-U.S. industrial cooperation is not merely an abstract aspiration. New value chains are already emerging as the technologies, capital, and manufacturing capabilities of the two countries converge across key industries.The AI semiconductor sector is a prominent example. U.S.-based NVIDIA leads the global AI semiconductor market in chip design and computing platforms, while South Korean semiconductor companies have established a competitive position in the manufacturing and mass production of key components, including high-bandwidth memory (HBM). The combination of U.S. core technologies and South Korea’s manufacturing and mass-production expertise is helping build a critical ecosystem for the global AI industry.The collaboration between SK hynix and NVIDIA is a notable example of this technological alliance. In the high-performance memory sector, which is essential to the performance of AI accelerators, the integration of South Korean manufacturing expertise with U.S. AI design and platform technologies is strengthening the competitiveness of companies in both countries.The partnership between LG Electronics and NVIDIA is also expanding the convergence of the future mobility and AI industries. As cooperation extends to automotive electronics, autonomous driving, and AI-enabled smart homes, a new industrial ecosystem is taking shape—one that integrates automobiles, home appliances, and software.The partnership between Naver and NVIDIA illustrates how this technological alliance is expanding into software and platform development. As the capabilities of the two countries converge in AI models, data centers, and cloud infrastructure, cooperation is extending beyond hardware to encompass the broader AI ecosystem.Investments by South Korean companies in the United States should be understood in the same context. The expansion of Korean production facilities in strategic industries such as semiconductors, batteries, and biotechnology can strengthen U.S. manufacturing competitiveness while creating new business opportunities for Korean companies in the world’s largest market. The more effectively the two countries combine their respective strengths, the greater the potential for mutual benefit.It Is Time to Move Beyond “Factory Relocation” Toward Joint InnovationAs industrial cooperation deepens, however, new challenges are emerging. Above all, the two countries must reduce policy uncertainty and create an environment in which companies can make long-term investment decisions with greater confidence.U.S. industrial policies, including the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) and the CHIPS and Science Act, are encouraging investment in the United States and significantly influencing the investment strategies of global companies. The South Korean government should closely assess these shifts in U.S. industrial policy and strengthen sophisticated trade diplomacy that engages both the public and private sectors, so that Korean companies are not subjected to unreasonable discrimination or unexpected disadvantages.At the same time, South Korea and the United States must deepen their technological cooperation. It is not enough for Korean companies simply to establish factories in the United States and secure access to the U.S. market. The two countries should expand joint research and development (R&D) frameworks involving governments, universities, research institutions, and businesses, and work together to secure leading positions in critical technologies and international standards for emerging industries such as next-generation AI, semiconductors, biotechnology, and aerospace.Supply-chain cooperation must also be treated as a matter of national security, not merely economic policy. The two countries should reduce excessive dependence on any single country for critical minerals, materials, and components while establishing an integrated supply-chain early-warning system. Institutional mechanisms for rapidly sharing information and coordinating responses to disruptions in global supply chains would provide a practical foundation for the technology alliance.We Must Evolve into a “Security Alliance” That Protects DemocracyAs technology becomes central to national competitiveness, the concept of security is also changing rapidly. Whereas security once focused primarily on military threats crossing national borders, less visible threats—including cyberattacks, information manipulation, deepfakes, and AI-driven interference in public opinion—can now undermine both democratic institutions and national security.South Korea and the United States, in particular, must develop a common understanding of the risk that external actors could exploit cyberspace and advanced technologies to unlawfully interfere with democratic institutions and electoral processes. This does not mean singling out a particular country or exaggerating the threat. Rather, it means establishing a joint defense framework through which democratic nations can protect institutional trust from unlawful or undue external interference.To that end, the two countries should strengthen the security of election-related information and communications systems and expand technical cooperation to rapidly detect and analyze deepfakes and AI-generated disinformation. Cooperation between their intelligence and cybersecurity agencies should also be further institutionalized.The ROK-U.S. alliance must evolve beyond a partnership focused exclusively on responding to military threats and become an alliance that protects shared values, including democracy, the rule of law, and freedom. If technology can be used to threaten democracy, it must also be harnessed to protect it.The Future of the ROK-U.S. Alliance Depends on People and KnowledgeUltimately, people will determine the long-term sustainability of a technological alliance. No matter how effective industrial policies or R&D systems may be, the partnership cannot endure without the talent needed to advance it.In strategic industries such as AI, semiconductors, aerospace, and biotechnology, South Korea and the United States should expand exchanges of master’s and doctoral researchers and develop joint-degree programs. They should also establish a stronger foundation for universities and research institutions in both countries to conduct joint research and enable young researchers to collaborate across borders.An institutional framework that facilitates the mobility of skilled professionals is equally important. Korean professionals should be able to contribute to advanced industries in the United States, while American technical personnel should be able to participate in South Korea’s R&D ecosystem. To support these objectives, the two countries should continue to pursue improvements to visa procedures for Korean professionals entering the U.S. market, along with appropriate institutional support from the U.S. Congress.The future of the ROK-U.S. alliance will not be built solely through summit meetings or intergovernmental agreements. The alliance can become deeply rooted across both societies only when researchers, business leaders, students, experts, local governments, and local communities are connected through sustained engagement.New Diplomacy Through K-Culture and Local CommunitiesIn this regard, exchanges at the private-sector and local-government levels are becoming increasingly important. Expanding cultural exchanges and corporate social responsibility (CSR) initiatives in U.S. states and local communities where Korean companies operate can strengthen the social foundation of South Korea-U.S. relations.The influence of Korean culture—including K-pop, K-food, and K-content—is already spreading across American society. When this cultural engagement is combined with Korean companies’ CSR activities and community involvement, it can support a new form of public diplomacy that goes beyond cultural exports and helps build trust among local communities.Cooperation between state and local governments should also be expanded. While diplomacy at the national level coordinates strategic priorities, exchanges among state and local governments and communities can connect people in both countries through their daily lives and workplaces. As these multilayered networks grow, the ROK-U.S. alliance can become more deeply rooted and sustainable.We Must Prepare for the Next 70 Years of the ROK-U.S. AllianceThe ROK-U.S. alliance now stands at a critical juncture. For more than 70 years, it has focused on deterring war and safeguarding peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula. The alliance of the future must build on that foundation and move beyond preserving peace to creating shared prosperity.Technology and industry will be central to this effort. By combining U.S. core technologies and innovation capabilities with South Korea’s manufacturing capacity, mass-production expertise, and industrial ecosystem, the two countries can jointly establish new standards in future industries such as AI, semiconductors, batteries, biotechnology, and space. By extending this cooperation to supply-chain security, cybersecurity, and the protection of democracy, the ROK-U.S. alliance can evolve into a genuine “alliance of technology, industry, and security.”Achieving this transformation will require coordinated efforts: sophisticated trade diplomacy by the government, bold technological innovation by businesses, joint research by universities and research institutions, and active engagement by civil society and local communities. The future of the ROK-U.S. alliance does not depend simply on signing more agreements. It depends on creating a framework in which the two countries combine their strengths, address each other’s vulnerabilities, respond jointly to shared crises, and invest together in common opportunities.If the ROK-U.S. alliance succeeds in this evolution, the two countries can become more than allies navigating a changing international order. They can become strategic partners that help shape the future. This is a practical and forward-looking path toward preparing the alliance for the next 70 years.

K-Defense: To the Four Major Powers—Export an “Innovation System,” Not Weapons— A Major Shift in National Security: Designing K-Defense’s Next Leap Through Asymmetric K-RMA —Chi-beom ShinProfessor of Military Science Konyang UniversityDirector of External Cooperation Future Society, Inc.The global defense industry is undergoing a fundamental transformation. The protracted Russia-Ukraine war, the spread of conflicts in the Middle East, strategic competition between the United States and China, and the fragmentation of global supply chains have blurred the boundaries among security, the economy, technology, and industry. Once a specialized sector supporting national security, the defense industry has evolved into a strategic national industry that integrates military power, advanced technology, manufacturing, exports, diplomacy, and supply chains.Amid this far-reaching transformation in the security environment, the South Korean defense industry has achieved remarkable results. The K2 main battle tank, K9 self-propelled howitzer, Chunmoo multiple rocket launcher, and FA-50 light attack aircraft have demonstrated their competitiveness in global markets through their performance, competitive pricing, rapid delivery, and follow-on support. Yet current achievements do not guarantee future success. Although K-Defense’s strengths today lie in advanced weapons systems and manufacturing capabilities, its future competitiveness will depend on how quickly lessons from the battlefield can be translated into new technologies, tested, refined, and integrated into operational forces.This is precisely the point I have consistently emphasized in Fostering the K-Defense Industry Based on Defense Innovation During a Major Security Transition, a book I recently co-authored, as well as in various columns. For the Korean defense industry to join the ranks of the world’s four leading defense powers, it must move beyond being an “industry that produces good weapons” and become a “defense innovation ecosystem that learns from changes in warfare and continuously evolves.”The Real Strength of a Drone Lies in the System That Evolves The battlefield in Ukraine has demonstrated that the key to future warfare does not lie in any single weapons system. The combined use of commercial drones, artificial intelligence, satellite communications, electronic warfare, and precision-strike systems has exposed vulnerabilities in expensive tanks, armored vehicles, and air defense systems. At the same time, even drones that have proved effective on the battlefield can rapidly lose some of their utility when adversaries employ jamming, decoys, and counter-drone systems.This means that a learning system capable of continuously improving drones is more important than the drones themselves. What is needed is a cycle in which combat units identify operational problems, companies and research institutions develop solutions, those solutions are tested in realistic operational environments, and the resulting improvements are fed back to the units. Ultimately, military strength and defense-industry competitiveness depend not only on the performance of individual weapons, but also on the speed of the “observe–learn–test–improve–deploy” cycle.Ukraine’s BRAVE1 program brings together the military, government, defense contractors, startups, and investors to translate battlefield requirements into technological development and procurement. The U.S. Army’s Project Convergence likewise brings together joint forces, allies, and industry partners to repeatedly validate multi-domain operational concepts, command and control, unmanned systems, and artificial intelligence in realistic environments. Project Convergence Capstone 6, conducted in 2026, involved approximately 10,000 participants who tested more than 90 technologies, concepts, and force structures. The results of these experiments will inform future acquisition decisions and force-structure development.NATO has also identified the rapid adoption of technology as a key priority. The “Rapid Adoption Action Plan,” adopted in 2025, aims, in principle, to identify, test, and integrate new technologies into member states’ armed forces within 24 months. The message conveyed by these developments is clear.Supremacy in future warfare will not belong to the country that spends the most time developing the most sophisticated weapons. It will belong to the country that can rapidly experiment with emerging technologies—even imperfect ones—learn from failure, and turn those lessons into improved capabilities.Combining Asymmetric K-RMA with the K-Defense IndustrySouth Korea cannot match the scale of defense spending and military resources available to countries such as the United States and China. Rather than competing quantitatively across every domain, South Korea needs an asymmetric approach that identifies areas in which it has advantages and exploits an adversary’s structural vulnerabilities. This is the starting point for what I call “Asymmetric Korean Military Innovation,” or Asymmetric K-RMA.Asymmetric K-RMA is not simply a concept focused on acquiring asymmetric weapons. It is an innovation strategy designed to maximize strategic effectiveness with limited resources by combining operational concepts that are difficult for an adversary to anticipate, rapid decision-making, cognitive superiority, manned-unmanned teaming (MUM-T), and the military application of advanced civilian technologies. Rather than merely imitating an adversary’s strengths, it seeks to create new forms of competition that are difficult for an adversary to counter by leveraging South Korea’s operational environment and its industrial and technological foundations.From this perspective, the South Korean defense industry must do more than sell finished platforms. It must offer “asymmetric solutions” that integrate operational concepts, weapons systems, education and training, logistics support, and local production, tailored to the threats, terrain, military structures, and budgets of individual export customers. Representative examples include a “high-low mix” that combines high-cost, cutting-edge systems with low-cost unmanned systems that can be deployed at scale; the coordinated employment of crewed tanks alongside unmanned drones and robots; AI-enabled target identification and command-and-control decision support; and electronic warfare and counter-drone systems.The competitive unit of the K-Defense industry must also be an ecosystem, rather than an individual company or weapons system. The systems-integration capabilities of major corporations, the innovative technologies of small and medium-sized enterprises and startups, the specialized expertise and foundational research of universities, the military’s operational knowledge, and the government’s institutional and diplomatic support must be integrated into a cohesive whole. Overseas customers are seeking not a single weapon, but a sustainable capability to address their own national security challenges.For Defense AI, Operational Context Matters More Than AlgorithmsA major transformation in defense AI is now underway. The government is also developing defense-specific AI foundation models, standards for dual-use civilian-military drones, civilian-military demonstration systems, and defense-export support systems through interministerial coordination. This is a sound direction. However, simply transferring AI systems whose performance has been demonstrated in the civilian sector to military settings will not, by itself, transform combat capabilities.On the battlefield, data is often incomplete, scarce, and unreliable because of deception and electronic warfare. Commanders must make decisions by synthesizing not only a target’s location, but also the adversary’s intentions, the missions and capabilities of friendly forces, terrain and weather conditions, rules of engagement, and the commander’s operational intent. Future command-and-control systems must therefore move beyond simply incorporating large language models (LLMs) and retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) toward a “Runtime Operational Ontology” that structures changes in the operational situation in real time.AI should do more than summarize large volumes of information. It must help commanders answer questions such as: “What has changed just now?” “How does that change affect the operation?” and “Which decision should take priority?” Only then can AI enhance the accuracy and speed of anticipation, decision-making, and preemptive action, while substantially increasing operational tempo. The final judgment and responsibility, however, must remain with human commanders. The core purpose of defense AI is not to replace human decision-making with automation, but to augment human judgment through human-AI collaboration.The Acquisition System Must Shift from “Purchasing the Right Answer” to “Managing Evolution”AI, drones, robots, and software evolve far more rapidly than traditional weapons systems. The existing acquisition system—which proceeds from defining required performance specifications through development, testing and evaluation, and mass production—resembles the purchase of a finished “right answer.” By the time a project is completed, however, the technology may already be outdated, or battlefield requirements may have changed.Expanding rapid-demonstration projects and the use of civilian technology is not enough. A clear path must connect technologies proven effective in pilot operations to actual fielding and follow-on procurement. The system must also formally recognize that software and AI models are not products finalized after a single round of testing and evaluation, but capabilities that require continuous updating.The linear acquisition process of “requirements submission–development–testing–mass production” must therefore be transformed into a cycle of “identifying operational problems–developing minimum capabilities–real-world experimentation–user evaluation–rapid fielding–continuous improvement.” Rather than defining perfect performance requirements at the outset, this approach would rapidly provide combat units with minimum operational capabilities and iteratively improve them by incorporating feedback from service members and data from field experiments. We must also move away from a culture that treats failure solely as grounds for accountability. Controlled failure is not a waste of resources; it is a learning cost that can help prevent more serious failures on the battlefield.K-Defense: Joining the Ranks of the Four Leading Global Powers by Building an Innovation Ecosystem, Not by Chasing Export FiguresThe sustainability of the K-Defense industry cannot be assessed solely by short-term export figures or the number of contracts awarded. It must also be capable of supporting local production and technical cooperation after an export, as well as providing education and training, logistics support, performance upgrades, and supply-chain stability. Defense exports go beyond business-to-business transactions; they mark the beginning of long-term security cooperation between nations.Exporting an innovation ecosystem is not merely an abstract slogan. It means conducting joint combat trials with the partner country, establishing a technology cooperation network involving local universities and companies, and continuously improving performance based on operational data. When weapons sales are accompanied by joint trials, specialized training, and follow-on technology development, the K-Defense industry can move beyond the role of a one-time supplier and become a defense innovation partner to the partner country.More importantly, exports must not be separated from the enhancement of South Korea’s own military capabilities. We must establish a virtuous cycle in which operational data and requests for improvement from overseas users inform domestic capability development, while the results of realistic testing by the South Korean military, in turn, strengthen export competitiveness. The military is the first user and the most rigorous tester; it is also a key institution in ensuring the reliability of K-Defense.The questions guiding K-Defense policy must now change as well. We must move beyond asking, “How many weapons have we exported?” and instead ask: “How quickly have we identified emerging threats?” “How rapidly have we translated operational requirements into technology?” “Have test results led to actual procurement and exports?” and “How effectively have we shared operational data with our allies?”The future of the K-Defense industry will not be forged solely within factory walls. It will be realized only when the problem-solving mindset of combat units, the knowledge of universities and research institutions, the experimentation of startups, the manufacturing capabilities of defense companies, and the government’s policies and diplomacy are brought together within a single innovation ecosystem. What South Korea needs is not a longer list of cutting-edge weapons, but a national capacity to learn, experiment, and evolve more rapidly.The speed of innovation matters more than weapon performance alone. What is stronger than a drone is the experimental system that continuously improves it; what is stronger than AI is the military expertise required to apply it effectively in an operational context. If the Korean defense industry can export this innovation ecosystem, South Korea can move beyond simply manufacturing weapons and become a global defense powerhouse offering solutions for future warfare.

The Strategic Imperative of a U.S.–North Korea Summit for Peaceful Coexistence on the Korean PeninsulaEui-haeng ChoSeoul Theological UniversityThe situation on the Korean Peninsula is once again approaching a critical diplomatic inflection point. North Korea’s nuclear and missile capabilities have progressed beyond the development stage and are increasingly moving toward operational deployment, while its growing military cooperation with Russia is directly linking security dynamics on the Korean Peninsula to the broader strategic confrontation unfolding across Eurasia. Even more concerning, North Korea’s adoption of a “two hostile states” policy has effectively severed inter-Korean channels, while substantive U.S.–North Korea negotiations have likewise remained stalled for an extended period.With the two principal diplomatic channels—the inter-Korean relationship and U.S.–North Korea relations—effectively paralyzed, North Korea’s military capabilities continue to expand largely unchecked, exacerbating strategic instability on the Korean Peninsula. Paradoxically, it is precisely under these circumstances that the strategic imperative of a U.S.–North Korea summit becomes more apparent. As inter-Korean dialogue remains suspended, U.S.–North Korea dialogue constitutes the only high-level diplomatic channel with the potential to directly address the nuclear issue and manage military tensions on the Korean Peninsula.The Structural Disruption of Inter-Korean Relations and Shifts in Strategic Diplomatic SpaceKim Jong-un’s declaration that the two Koreas constitute “two hostile states” is more than rhetorical posturing. It represents a fundamental shift in North Korea’s strategic framework for managing inter-Korean relations on the Korean Peninsula. As a result, even the basic military communication channels needed to prevent accidental clashes and unintended escalation have been effectively disrupted.Even if the South Korean government continues to promote “peaceful coexistence” as a central policy objective, it will be difficult to break the current impasse through unilateral initiatives alone without a meaningful response from Pyongyang. Moreover, following the collapse of the 2019 Hanoi Summit, North Korea has increasingly shifted its diplomatic center of gravity toward China and Russia. In particular, the deepening of North Korea–Russia ties since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has reinforced Pyongyang’s perception that it can secure greater diplomatic, security, and economic space without engaging directly with the United States.However, this diplomatic stalemate cannot be sustained indefinitely. The history of the Korean Peninsula demonstrates that major shifts in the security environment can occur rapidly when changes in the international system converge with the strategic interests of the parties involved. What is needed, therefore, is not a passive wait-and-see approach, but a strategic framework capable of creating the conditions for renewed dialogue.The Possibility of Resuming U.S.-North Korea Dialogue and Practical ChallengesGiven the evolving trajectory of U.S. foreign policy and the volatility of the U.S. political environment, the possibility of renewed leader-level dialogue between the United States and North Korea remains open. With inter-Korean channels effectively blocked, the resumption of U.S.–North Korea summit diplomacy could provide a critical opening for restoring high-level political communication on the Korean Peninsula and restarting a negotiation process that has remained stalled for years.Against this backdrop, a series of signals pointing toward a possible resumption of U.S.–North Korea summit diplomacy has emerged. U.S. President Donald Trump has recently drawn renewed attention to his previous summit diplomacy with Kim Jong-un by posting photographs on social media from their meetings in Singapore and at Panmunjom. North Korea, for its part, has continued to strongly criticize U.S.–South Korea and U.S.–South Korea–Japan military exercises, while describing the personal relationship between Trump and Kim as “good.” This suggests that Pyongyang has not entirely closed the door to renewed dialogue. Taken together, these signals from Washington and Pyongyang indicate that the prolonged diplomatic impasse could potentially begin to shift toward renewed engagement.Experts in U.S. policy circles, including Victor Cha, the CSIS Korea Chair, are also closely watching the possibility that political momentum could create an opening for renewed U.S.–North Korea dialogue. One potentially viable scenario would involve the leaders first reaching a preliminary political understanding, followed by working-level negotiations to address the technical details of implementation.Of course, the gap between North Korea’s insistence on its status as a nuclear-armed state and the U.S. commitment to “complete denuclearization (CVID)” remains extremely difficult to bridge in the short term. That is precisely why a summit is necessary. The objective should not be to secure either a temporary or comprehensive agreement in a single meeting, but rather to break the current deadlock—which has reached a dangerous level—and establish a durable negotiating framework for managing the risks.Moving Beyond the “Big Deal” to “Phased Risk Management”Any forthcoming U.S.–North Korea summit should move beyond the “big deal” framework of seeking a comprehensive, one-time settlement. The experiences of the Singapore and Hanoi summits have demonstrated that complex and highly technical nuclear issues cannot be resolved solely through a grand political agreement between national leaders.A more realistic starting point is the “restoration of the negotiation process and risk management.” The immediate priority should be to establish a freeze that halts North Korea’s production of fissile material and constrains further expansion of its nuclear and missile capabilities. A credible roadmap should begin with the establishment of verification mechanisms and the implementation of a freeze, and then gradually expand to include the dismantlement of nuclear facilities and reductions in North Korea’s nuclear arsenal.This approach does not constitute acceptance or legitimization of North Korea’s nuclear program. Rather, it represents a pragmatic effort to manage the risks posed by North Korea’s advanced nuclear capabilities, prevent further uncontrolled expansion, and preserve a viable pathway toward the ultimate objective of complete denuclearization.From “Mediator” to “Pacesetter” Who Designs the OrderSouth Korea’s role in this broader strategic environment is becoming increasingly important. Seoul’s role should not be limited to that of a “mediator” seeking to bridge differences between Washington and Pyongyang. Instead, South Korea should act as a “pace-setter” that helps create the conditions for the United States and North Korea to return to the negotiating table and ensures that political understandings reached by their leaders are translated into substantive working-level negotiations and institutional safeguards.To achieve this, South Korea must proactively create diplomatic space for dialogue while maintaining the robust deterrence provided by the ROK–U.S. alliance. Deterrence and dialogue are not mutually exclusive. Effective dialogue requires credible deterrence, while sustained dialogue can, in turn, create opportunities to reduce military tensions and establish a more stable security environment.Building Institutional Peace with an Eye to the “Aftermath” of the SummitThe convening of a U.S.–North Korea summit should not itself be treated as the ultimate objective. The critical question is whether a leaders’ meeting can generate sustained working-level negotiations and, ultimately, restore military hotlines and institutionalized crisis-management mechanisms. These efforts should then lead to broader structural changes, including measures to prevent accidental clashes between the two Koreas and a gradual transition from the existing armistice framework toward a more durable peace regime.Inter-Korean relations should likewise focus less on the premature restoration of trust and more on establishing “institutional mechanisms for managing mistrust.” Restoring military communication channels, reducing tensions in border areas, and expanding humanitarian cooperation should be among the immediate priorities.Ultimately, peaceful coexistence on the Korean Peninsula cannot be achieved through a one-time agreement or unilateral concessions by either side. What is required is a sustained diplomatic process that restores strategic communication between the United States and North Korea while simultaneously reducing the risk of conflict between the two Koreas. A U.S.–North Korea summit could provide the critical diplomatic opening needed to initiate such a process. Rather than waiting passively for dialogue to resume, South Korea should proactively develop a sophisticated strategic roadmap to ensure that renewed U.S.–North Korea talks translate into sustained negotiations and ultimately support a stable transition toward a more durable peace on the Korean Peninsula.

The ROK–U.S. Alliance: Evolving from a Military Alliance to a Comprehensive Partnership in Industry, Advanced Technology, and DefenseBeom-jin ParkProfessor Graduate School of Business Kyung Hee University/Reserve Navy CaptainThe ROK–U.S. alliance is undergoing its most significant qualitative transformation since the signing of the ROK–U.S. Mutual Defense Treaty in 1953. For more than seven decades, the foundation of the alliance has been a military partnership designed primarily to deter North Korean aggression against the South. U.S. Forces Korea, the ROK–U.S. combined defense posture, and U.S. extended deterrence have served as the pillars of the Republic of Korea’s security, survival, and prosperity.However, national security today can no longer be safeguarded by military power alone. Shipyards, semiconductor fabrication facilities, artificial intelligence (AI) data centers, nuclear power, space and cyber capabilities, drones and robotics, as well as supply chains for critical minerals and batteries, have all become integral components of national security. While the outcome of war is ultimately determined on the battlefield, we have entered an era in which the ability to deter conflict, prevail in war, and sustain military operations is increasingly determined by industrial capacity, technological superiority, production capabilities, and resilient supply chains.North Korea and the Emerging Northern Axis of Nuclear and Military ThreatsThese changes are directly linked to the rapidly deteriorating security environment on the Korean Peninsula. North Korea has made its nuclear forces a central pillar of its national security strategy and is diversifying its nuclear and conventional capabilities to include nuclear warheads, intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), hypersonic weapons, reconnaissance satellites, and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). At the 9th Congress of the Workers’ Party of Korea in February 2026, North Korea announced its intention to continue strengthening its nuclear capabilities over the next five years, while also setting development goals for unmanned systems and electronic warfare capabilities. In particular, by expanding its nuclear delivery systems beyond land-based platforms to sea- and submarine-based platforms, North Korea is seeking to develop a highly survivable second-strike capability capable of evading South Korean and U.S. detection, tracking, and missile defense systems.The expansion of North Korea’s naval capabilities reflects this broader strategy. On June 23, 2026, North Korea held a commissioning ceremony for the Choe Hyun (DDG-51), a new 5,000-ton multipurpose destroyer. At the ceremony, Kim Jong-un referred to the “nuclear armament of the navy” and ordered the construction of two surface combatants annually, including Choe Hyun-class destroyers or larger vessels such as a 10,000-ton cruiser. He also declared North Korea’s intention to conduct blue-water naval operations in the future, stating, “The era when the navy existed solely as a force for coastal defense is a thing of the past.”Furthermore, by advancing the development of nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs), North Korea is seeking to make its navy a core component of its nuclear strategy. Going forward, the nuclear threat that South Korea and the United States must address will no longer be limited to fixed missile sites, multiple rocket launcher bases, and transport-erector-launchers (TELs) on land. Instead, a far more complex operational environment is emerging—one in which the allies must simultaneously detect, track, deter, and, if necessary, neutralize covertly operating undersea nuclear forces as they maneuver across the East Sea, the West Sea, and potentially into the Pacific Ocean.Military cooperation between North Korea and Russia further complicates the security environment. The August 2026 Japanese Defense White Paper assessed that, since 2023, North Korea has supplied Russia with millions of artillery shells and more than 100 short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs), while sending more than 14,000 troops to the Kursk front. In the process, North Korea is gaining valuable experience in modern warfare, including the operational use of drones and other emerging technologies. At the same time, the possibility that North Korea could receive Russian transfers of reconnaissance satellite, missile, electronic warfare, and submarine-related technologies cannot be ruled out.In addition, on June 8, 2026, Chinese President Xi Jinping paid a state visit to Pyongyang, his first visit to North Korea in seven years.The ROK–U.S. alliance is undergoing its most significant qualitative transformation since the signing of the ROK–U.S. Mutual Defense Treaty in 1953. For more than seven decades, the foundation of the alliance has been a military partnership designed primarily to deter North Korean aggression against the South. U.S. Forces Korea, the ROK–U.S. combined defense posture, and U.S. extended deterrence have served as the pillars underpinning the Republic of Korea’s security, survival, and prosperity. However, national security today can no longer be guaranteed by military power alone.Shipyards, semiconductor fabrication facilities, AI data centers, nuclear power, space and cyber capabilities, drones and robotics, as well as supply chains for critical minerals and batteries, have all become integral components of national security. While the outcome of war is ultimately determined on the battlefield, we have entered an era in which the ability to deter conflict, prevail in war, and sustain military operations is determined increasingly by industrial capacity, technological superiority, production capabilities, and resilient supply chains.North Korea and the Emerging Northern Axis of Nuclear and Military ThreatsThese changes are directly linked to the rapidly deteriorating security environment on the Korean Peninsula. North Korea has made its nuclear forces a central pillar of its national security strategy and is diversifying its military capabilities to include nuclear warheads, ICBMs, SLBMs, hypersonic weapons, reconnaissance satellites, and UAVs. At the 9th Congress of the Workers’ Party of Korea in February 2026, North Korea announced its intention to continue strengthening its nuclear capabilities over the next five years, while also setting development goals for unmanned systems and electronic warfare capabilities. In particular, by expanding its nuclear delivery systems beyond land-based platforms to sea- and submarine-based platforms, North Korea is seeking to develop a highly survivable second-strike capability that could evade South Korean and U.S. detection, tracking, and missile defense systems.The expansion of North Korea’s naval capabilities is an extension of this broader strategy. On June 23, 2026, North Korea held a commissioning ceremony for the Choe Hyon, a new 5,000-metric-ton multipurpose destroyer. At the ceremony, Kim Jong-un referred to the “nuclear armament of the navy” and ordered the construction of two Choe Hyon-class or larger surface combatants each year, including 10,000-metric-ton-class cruisers. He also declared North Korea’s intention to conduct blue-water naval operations in the future, stating, “The era when the navy existed solely as a force for coastal defense is a thing of the past.” Furthermore, by advancing the development of SSBNs, North Korea is seeking to make its navy a core component of its nuclear strategy. Going forward, the nuclear threat that South Korea and the United States must address will no longer be limited to fixed missile sites, multiple rocket launcher bases, and TELs on land.Instead, a far more complex operational environment is emerging—one in which the allies must simultaneously detect, track, deter, and, if necessary, neutralize submarine-based nuclear forces operating covertly as they maneuver across the East Sea, the West Sea, and potentially into the Pacific Ocean.Military cooperation between North Korea and Russia further complicates the security environment. The August 2026 Japanese Defense White Paper assessed that, since 2023, North Korea has supplied Russia with millions of artillery shells and more than 100 SRBMs, while deploying more than 14,000 troops to the Kursk front. Through this military cooperation, North Korea is gaining valuable experience in modern warfare, including the operational use of drones and other emerging technologies. At the same time, the possibility that North Korea could receive reconnaissance satellite, missile, electronic warfare, and submarine-related technologies from Russia cannot be ruled out.In addition, on June 8, 2026, Chinese President Xi Jinping paid a state visit to Pyongyang—his first visit to North Korea in seven years.On May 26, 2026, the South Korean government announced the “Master Plan for the Development of Nuclear-Powered Submarines in the Republic of Korea.” The project, known as the “Jangbogo N Project,” aims to launch the lead vessel in the mid-2030s and bring it into operational service in the late 2030s. The plan calls for a displacement of approximately 8,000 metric tons and the construction of at least three nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSNs).The master plan sets out five principles: the use of low-enriched uranium enriched to less than 20 percent; long-duration fuel cycles; domestic design and construction in South Korea; the application of civilian nuclear and shipbuilding technologies; and comprehensive life-cycle management. It also establishes three commitments: not to possess nuclear weapons of any kind; to fulfill nonproliferation obligations in close cooperation with the United States; and to establish an appropriate safeguards framework with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). On June 2–3, a follow-up meeting on security-related fact sheets was held in Seoul to discuss issues related to nuclear fuel supply, enrichment, and reprocessing.However, significant challenges remain. The current U.S.–South Korea Nuclear Agreement was designed primarily for civilian nuclear cooperation and does not provide a legal framework for the transfer of nuclear fuel for military propulsion. A separate U.S.–South Korea Naval Nuclear Propulsion Cooperation Agreement must therefore be concluded, which would, in turn, require congressional review under the U.S. Atomic Energy Act. To date, the United States has provided nuclear propulsion technology and fuel arrangements for submarines only to the United Kingdom and Australia.Given that the U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee has requested a review and report on ROK-U.S. cooperation regarding South Korea’s nuclear-powered submarines as part of its deliberations on the Fiscal Year 2027 National Defense Authorization Act, it would be strategically unwise to wait until Washington reaches a final determination before preparing an appropriate response. Now is the time to ensure that both nonproliferation principles and the strategic rationale for the project are fully reflected in U.S. policy. The Jangbogo N Project is not simply a procurement program involving the acquisition of several submarines; it is a national strategic initiative encompassing reactor and nuclear fuel arrangements, design and construction, combat systems, crew training, and basing, maintenance, and sustainment infrastructure. It must therefore be institutionalized in a manner that ensures continuity and stability across changes in government.AI and Semiconductors: The Second Pillar of the AllianceAnother pillar of the alliance is AI and semiconductors. On July 24, 2026, at the San Francisco AI Summit, Korean companies and U.S. Big Tech firms announced plans for $950 billion in semiconductor supply and production cooperation, as well as the construction of a 5-gigawatt AI data center, through six agreements. Samsung Electronics will collaborate with Broadcom on the supply of advanced memory and AI semiconductor foundry services worth $200 billion over five years, while SK Group will work with NVIDIA and other partners on data center construction and long-term memory supply. Hyundai Motor Group will partner with NVIDIA and Waymo on “physical AI” initiatives, while Naver will secure $10 billion to build a global AI factory.The two countries have a highly complementary relationship in the AI sector. The United States possesses world-class capabilities in GPUs, AI foundation models, cloud computing, and semiconductor design, while South Korea has demonstrated significant strengths in high-bandwidth memory, semiconductor manufacturing and packaging, high-volume production, and quality control. The advanced packaging plant that SK hynix broke ground on in Indiana on August 27, 2026, exemplifies this emerging partnership.With an investment of more than $4 billion, the facility is expected to begin mass production of seventh-generation HBM in the second half of 2029. Wafers manufactured in South Korea will be packaged and tested in the United States for domestic supply, while the company will work with U.S. universities to jointly develop next-generation technologies. In the AI era, semiconductors, data centers, electricity, software, talent, and critical minerals are increasingly interconnected as components of a single strategic supply chain. If the two countries build and secure this supply chain together, it could become a critical strategic asset extending well beyond its economic value.Defense Industry Cooperation: From Buyer to PartnerThe defense industry also requires a similar transformation. Future defense cooperation must move beyond a one-way model in which South Korea primarily purchases U.S. weapons and instead evolve into a virtuous cycle of “joint research, development, production, operation, and export.” The Memorandum of Understanding on “Drone and Anti-Drone Cooperation and Market Participation,” signed by South Korean and U.S. defense authorities on May 15, 2026, symbolizes this shift. The two countries agreed to establish joint supply chains and common standards and certification systems, while also pursuing the registration of South Korean-made products on the U.S. Department of Defense’s online drone trading platform. This goes beyond simply expanding defense exports; it could provide the foundation for a “joint defense industrial ecosystem” in which the armed forces of both countries operate interoperable systems and leverage each other’s production capacity during times of crisis.However, it would be problematic if, under the banner of joint development, South Korea were effectively relegated to a production role while the United States retained exclusive control over critical technologies, intellectual property rights, and export authorization to third countries. Negotiations on the ROK–U.S. Defense Mutual Procurement Agreement (RDP-A) have been underway since 2022. Although the two sides agreed in 2024 to accelerate efforts to conclude the agreement, negotiations remain unresolved because of objections raised in the U.S. Congress and an ongoing review by the Government Accountability Office.Once the RDP-A is concluded, the price disadvantages associated with the U.S. “Buy American” policy would be reduced or eliminated, allowing South Korean defense products to compete on more equal terms with U.S.-produced systems. For MASGA and drone cooperation to generate tangible results, this institutional gap must first be addressed. A genuine defense-industrial partnership is not simply about jointly manufacturing weapons; it is about sharing risks, costs, technologies, markets, and returns.Supply Chains and Reassessing the “Security with the U.S., Economy with China” FrameworkSupply chains cannot be overlooked either. A single advanced weapons system incorporates countless semiconductors, sensors, software components, rare earth elements, and specialty metals; if even one critical component becomes unavailable, the entire production process can be disrupted. The benchmark for strategic competition is therefore shifting from “How cheaply and quickly can it be produced?” to “How resilient and secure is the supply chain that supports it?” The traditional division of labor reflected in the concept of “security with the U.S., economy with China” also requires a fundamental reassessment in strategic industries.At the same time, severing all economic ties with China would not serve South Korea’s national interest. What is needed is not an ideological or emotional approach to “decoupling from China,” but a strategy of disciplined risk management. A more realistic approach is to establish “trusted supply chains” in which South Korea develops domestic capabilities in strategically indispensable technologies, while sharing risks and burdens with the United States, Japan, Australia, Canada, Europe, and other like-minded partners in areas where diversification is feasible. The Foundation of a Military AllianceHowever, expanding cooperation in industry, advanced technology, and defense cannot substitute for the military alliance, which remains the foundation of the broader partnership. Quite the contrary. As the North Korean nuclear threat intensifies and military cooperation between North Korea and Russia becomes increasingly institutionalized, industrial and technological cooperation can develop sustainably only if the combined defense posture and extended deterrence commitments remain credible and robust. At the sixth U.S.–ROK Nuclear Consultative Group (NCG) meeting, held in Seoul on June 11, 2026, the two sides reaffirmed their commitment to extended deterrence and agreed to deepen cooperation on the operational concept of Combined Nuclear and Conventional Integration (CNI), crisis response, and the employment of strategic assets. The NCG, which initially functioned largely at a symbolic level, is increasingly developing into a substantive mechanism capable of shaping combined operational planning. Even as dialogue with North Korea remains necessary, the combined defense posture must not be weakened as a concession in negotiations. Dialogue and deterrence are not mutually exclusive; rather, they are complementary pillars that must operate simultaneously.Six Tasks for the FutureThe tasks ahead are clear. First, while maintaining extended deterrence and the combined defense posture as the central pillars of the alliance, we must integrate shipbuilding, SSNs, AI, semiconductors, nuclear energy, space, cyber capabilities, drones, and critical minerals into a comprehensive national security framework. Second, we must develop MASGA into a mutually beneficial shipbuilding partnership and pursue expanded cooperation while continuing efforts to remove legal and regulatory barriers to the construction of U.S. Navy vessels in South Korea. Third, the Jangbogo N Project must address two priorities simultaneously—concluding a separate cooperation agreement governing nuclear-powered submarine development and revising the ROK–U.S. Nuclear Agreement—while building indigenous capabilities in design, construction, operation, maintenance, and sustainment. Fourth, cooperation in AI and semiconductors must be expanded to include resilient supply arrangements for military AI and semiconductors used in command and control, unmanned systems, and missile defense. Fifth, while concluding the RDP-A, we must protect the technology and intellectual property rights of South Korean companies and establish a framework for joint exports to third countries. Sixth, the two countries should establish a high-level ROK–U.S. “Strategic Consultative Body on Industry, Advanced Technology, and Defense” to coordinate and integrate cooperation across all of these domains.Toward the Next 70 YearsWhile the alliance of the past was fundamentally a security partnership that combined U.S. military power with South Korea’s strategic geographic position, the alliance of the future must become a comprehensive strategic partnership that combines U.S. military power and cutting-edge technologies with South Korea’s industrial capabilities in shipbuilding, semiconductors, nuclear energy, and defense. The alliance of the future must not remain merely an “alliance that fights together.” It must evolve into an alliance that researches and develops together, builds and sustains together, produces and exports together, and protects each other’s industries and supply chains in times of crisis. Building a relationship in which each side provides indispensable strategic value to the other is the most realistic and sustainable path for the ROK–U.S. alliance as it evolves beyond a traditional military alliance into a comprehensive partnership encompassing industry, advanced technology, and defense.

The Importance of the U.S.-South Korea Alliance for Peace and Stability on the Korean PeninsulaEui-haeng Cho ProfessorSeoul Theological UniversityAugust 25, 2026, marks the first anniversary of the first summit between President Lee Jae-myung and U.S. President Donald Trump, held in Washington. As of August 2026, the ROK-U.S. alliance stands at a critical juncture, evolving into a more future-oriented partnership suited to a new era and grounded in the strong trust accumulated over more than seven decades.Since the signing of the ROK-U.S. Mutual Defense Treaty in 1953, the ROK-U.S. alliance has served as a cornerstone of security, safeguarding peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula. Today, moving beyond the traditional framework of a military alliance, the two countries are developing a comprehensive strategic partnership by expanding cooperation across a broad range of areas, including economic security, advanced technologies, supply chains, shipbuilding, nuclear energy, and the defense industry.In particular, it is noteworthy that sustained communication between the leaders of the ROK and the United States has continued since the inauguration of the Lee Jae-myung administration.At the 2025 Washington summit, the two leaders agreed to modernize the ROK-U.S. alliance to make it more mutually beneficial and future-oriented in response to the evolving international security environment. President Lee articulated a vision for a new era of a “pragmatic alliance centered on national interests” and reaffirmed that the U.S. commitment to the defense of South Korea, as well as the ROK-U.S. combined defense posture, would remain firmly in place.This reflects an evolution of the ROK-U.S. alliance from a relationship characterized by one-sided dependence toward a partnership in which both countries contribute to shared security and prosperity based on their respective capabilities.One Year After the Summit: Expanding Cooperation from a Security Alliance to an Economic and Technological PartnershipOne of the key achievements of ROK-U.S. summit diplomacy over the past year has been the establishment of a foundation for comprehensive cooperation that recognizes the increasingly inseparable relationship between security and economic prosperity.At the second ROK-U.S. summit, held on the sidelines of the APEC Summit in Gyeongju in October 2025, the two countries established a concrete framework for security and economic cooperation, followed by the release of a joint fact sheet outlining this framework in November. The United States and South Korea have expanded cooperation by leveraging their respective strengths in sectors such as shipbuilding, defense, and advanced industries. The United States has also expressed support for strengthening South Korea’s defense capabilities and expanding cooperation in advanced defense technologies.The expansion of South Korean investment in the United States is another key pillar of ROK-U.S. economic security cooperation. By combining South Korea’s globally competitive industries—including shipbuilding, semiconductors, batteries, and automobiles—with U.S. technological advantages and market capabilities, the two countries can contribute to the resilience of global supply chains and jointly develop new industrial ecosystems.The shipbuilding sector, in particular, has the potential to become a defining symbol of the future of the ROK-U.S. alliance. By combining U.S. maritime security capabilities with South Korea’s advanced shipbuilding expertise, the two countries can establish a new model of cooperation that strengthens their respective security capabilities while generating broader economic benefits.The same principle applies to the defense industry. Strengthening South Korea’s defense capabilities not only enhances its national defense capacity but also contributes to the effectiveness and sustainability of the ROK-U.S. combined defense posture. If the two countries expand cooperation in the joint development and production of advanced weapons systems and enhance their interoperability, the alliance will be better positioned to respond to the changing character of warfare and emerging security challenges.This trend represents a significant strategic shift, demonstrating that the ROK-U.S. alliance is evolving from a traditional “security alliance” into a “future-oriented strategic alliance” encompassing security, economic, technological, and industrial cooperation.European Visit, Engagement with President Trump, and Commitment to Cooperation for Peace on the Korean PeninsulaPresident Lee Jae-myung’s visit to Europe in June 2026 also provided an opportunity to broaden the international strategic framework surrounding the ROK-U.S. alliance. Lee arrived in Brussels, Belgium, on June 9 and held a ROK-Belgium summit and a ROK-EU summit, among other engagements. In Brussels, the leaders discussed a range of issues, including expanding trade, cooperation among small and medium-sized enterprises, and security cooperation.President Trump subsequently attended the G7 Summit in Evian, France. During the summit, President Lee and President Trump exchanged views on the ROK-U.S. alliance and issues concerning the Korean Peninsula, thereby maintaining close communication and reinforcing mutual trust between the two leaders. In particular, Lee urged Trump to take an active role in advancing sustainable peace on the Korean Peninsula, while Trump expressed his willingness to play an appropriate role in promoting progress on issues concerning the Korean Peninsula.This is significant because communication between the South Korean and U.S. leaders is not confined to formal bilateral summits but continues on the broader multilateral diplomatic stage. At a time when the international community faces increasingly complex and interconnected security challenges, the fact that the two leaders continue to reaffirm their shared commitment to peace on the Korean Peninsula and regional stability provides an important foundation for strengthening the resilience of the ROK-U.S. alliance.Continued communication between the South Korean and U.S. leaders also carries important implications for North Korea. As North Korea’s nuclear and missile capabilities continue to advance, close coordination between South Korea and the United States, while keeping the door to diplomacy open, can help manage tensions on the Korean Peninsula and create opportunities for meaningful dialogue and peace.At the 2025 summit, President Lee expressed his intention to work closely with President Trump toward the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and the establishment of lasting peace. President Trump, for his part, has consistently demonstrated an interest in issues concerning North Korea. If the two leaders can effectively combine their respective diplomatic strengths, new opportunities could emerge to reduce tensions and advance peace through dialogue with North Korea.Ambassador Steel’s Appointment: An Opportunity to Strengthen On-the-Ground Communication Within the AllianceThe arrival of Michelle Steel, the new U.S. Ambassador to South Korea, in July 2026 is highly significant for the effective management and further development of the ROK-U.S. alliance.The appointment of a U.S. ambassador to South Korea after the position had remained vacant for an extended period provides an important opportunity to further strengthen diplomatic communication between the two countries. In particular, Ambassador Steel—who was born in Seoul and previously served as a U.S. Representative—is well positioned to serve as a bridge between the two nations, drawing on her experience in both Korean and American societies.In August 2026, Ambassador Steel paid a courtesy call on President Lee Jae-myung and expressed her commitment to strengthening the ROK-U.S. alliance. Her role extends beyond simply conveying U.S. government policy to South Korea. Equally important will be her efforts to expand communication and deepen mutual understanding among the governments, legislatures, businesses, experts, and civil society of both countries.For the ROK-U.S. alliance to maintain long-term stability and resilience, these working-level and interpersonal networks must be strengthened alongside trust between the leaders. In this regard, Steel’s appointment could serve as a new starting point for elevating the Alliance to the next level.In particular, as economic cooperation and collaboration in advanced technologies between the ROK and the United States continue to expand, the role of the U.S. Embassy in Seoul will become increasingly important. The embassy can serve as a diplomatic bridge connecting companies and governments in both countries and translating cooperation in future-oriented industries—including shipbuilding, defense, semiconductors, artificial intelligence, nuclear energy, and space—into concrete and sustainable projects.Toward a Mature Alliance That Prioritizes Cooperation Over DisagreementIn ROK-U.S. relations, the national interests and policy priorities of the two countries will not always fully align. What matters is that when differences arise, the two sides prevent them from escalating into unnecessary friction and instead seek practical solutions through dialogue between the heads of state and consultations among diplomatic and security officials.A mature alliance is not one in which the two countries hold identical views on every issue. Rather, it is an alliance in which institutions, mechanisms, and mutual trust are sufficiently strong to manage differences and reconcile divergent perspectives. Over the past seven decades, the ROK-U.S. alliance has accumulated extensive experience in managing such differences while jointly navigating numerous international changes and crises affecting the Korean Peninsula.Therefore, going forward, the two countries should continue to coordinate constructively on issues arising in the fields of security, trade, and technology within the framework of the Alliance. In particular, extended deterrence and the combined defense posture remain core foundations of the ROK-U.S. alliance. If South Korea continues to strengthen its own defense capabilities while the United States further institutionalizes and strengthens its extended deterrence commitment, deterrence on the Korean Peninsula can be further enhanced.The transfer of wartime operational control must likewise be pursued in a manner that strengthens the defense capabilities of both South Korea and the United States and reinforces the combined defense posture. The key consideration should be conditions and capabilities, rather than speed. Seoul and Washington should therefore engage in thorough and sustained consultations to establish stable conditions for a transition that is credible and enjoys public trust.Toward a “Future-Oriented” Comprehensive Strategic Alliance for the Next 70 YearsThe future of the ROK-U.S. alliance extends well beyond traditional military security. If the two countries combine their respective strengths in strategically important sectors—including artificial intelligence, semiconductors, space, nuclear energy, shipbuilding, defense, and cybersecurity—the ROK-U.S. alliance can evolve into a new form of strategic partnership encompassing both economic and technological security.In particular, South Korea’s expanding defense cooperation with NATO and its growing role as a responsible security partner in the Indo-Pacific can contribute positively to the further evolution of the ROK-U.S. alliance. South Korea’s proposal at the 2026 NATO Summit to expand defense industry cooperation and strengthen interoperability based on NATO standards further demonstrates the country’s growing role as a global security partner.South Korea has evolved beyond being an ally that primarily receives security support from the United States. It has become a key partner capable of contributing, alongside the United States, to international peace, security, and prosperity. The United States, in turn, has gained an important strategic partner whose industrial, technological, and defense capabilities can contribute meaningfully to shared objectives.This relationship of interdependence and mutual complementarity gives the ROK-U.S. alliance considerable strategic potential for the future.The first anniversary of the 2025 Washington ROK-U.S. summit, the 2026 European summit diplomacy, and the arrival of U.S. Ambassador to South Korea Michelle Steel represent important milestones in the further development of the ROK-U.S. alliance. The two countries must now prepare for the next 70 years by building on the achievements of the past seven decades. In the security domain, the two countries must maintain an ironclad combined defense posture; in the economic sphere, they must expand mutually beneficial cooperation; and in advanced technologies, they must jointly strengthen their competitiveness in the industries that will shape the future.Above all, trust remains paramount. If sustained communication between the leaders, close consultations among diplomatic and security officials, and broad exchanges among legislators, businesses, and the expert community continue, the ROK-U.S. alliance can develop into a more mature and resilient partnership capable of withstanding changes in the international environment.The ROK-U.S. alliance is evolving beyond a relationship forged primarily by the security needs of the past into a strategic partnership capable of jointly shaping the future of both countries. If the two countries accelerate this transformation—building on the momentum generated by the first anniversary of the summit and Ambassador Steel’s arrival—the ROK-U.S. alliance can become a model of a future-oriented alliance that contributes not only to peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula but also to a free and open international order and global peace and prosperity.

President Lee’s Liberation Day Address: “Liberation of Peace” and a New Approach to North Korea                    Seon-taek WangVisiting ProfessorSogang UniversityFor the people of the Republic of Korea, Liberation Day is a solemn occasion for reflecting on the nation’s history. It marks the end of 35 years of Japanese colonial rule, during which Korea’s sovereignty was taken away and the lives, property, and dignity of its people were systematically violated. Above all, it is a day to honor the memory and sacrifices of the patriots and independence activists who gave their lives, youth, and material possessions to restore the nation’s independence. The 81st anniversary of Liberation Day carries particular significance. A country that once suffered the loss of its sovereignty has since emerged as a global leader across a range of political, economic, technological, and cultural fields.In his Liberation Day address, President Lee Jae-myung introduced the concept of “New Liberation.” Rather than treating liberation solely as a historical event marking the end of Japanese colonial rule, he recast it as a forward-looking national vision and a set of objectives for the future. He identified four dimensions of this vision: “Liberation of Hope,” “Liberation of Opportunity,” “Liberation of Balance,” and “Liberation of Peace.”This expansion of the meaning of liberation—from a historical achievement to a framework for the future—represents a notable shift in perspective. From the standpoint of foreign policy and national security, the concept of “Liberation of Peace” is particularly consequential. President Lee articulated the objective of eliminating the risks of war and confrontation and building a Korean Peninsula on which peace is not an exception but the prevailing condition.Against this backdrop, this year’s message to North Korea was notably different from those of previous administrations. Past presidents have often used Liberation Day addresses to unveil high-profile initiatives intended to capture the attention of Pyongyang and the domestic and international public. These have included proposals for inter-Korean summits, large-scale economic cooperation projects, and new visions for Korean unification. Yet relatively few of these initiatives have produced sustained changes in inter-Korean relations. In some cases, the proposals appeared to prioritize political momentum or public attention over a realistic assessment of North Korea’s position and strategic calculations. Once Pyongyang failed to respond, many of these initiatives quickly lost momentum.President Lee took a different approach this year. He did not announce a new summit or unveil a large-scale economic initiative. Instead, he reaffirmed the core principles of his North Korea policy, first articulated in last year’s Liberation Day address marking the 80th anniversary of liberation, while providing greater clarity on how those principles should be implemented. Rather than seeking immediate breakthroughs, he emphasized strategic direction, policy consistency, and a sustained commitment to clearly defined objectives. Three elements are particularly noteworthy.First, President Lee called for dialogue without attaching it to grand political or economic concessions.President Lee emphasized the importance of dialogue and expressed his determination to move beyond the current state of conflict and replace the unstable armistice regime with a durable peace regime. The significance of this approach lies in its sequencing. Rather than beginning with large-scale inducements or initiatives designed to secure an immediate North Korean response, it places priority on reducing the risk of conflict and establishing the foundations for peaceful coexistence.This is a pragmatic approach that recognizes the current reality: virtually all formal channels of inter-Korean communication remain suspended. Under such circumstances, restoring communication and reducing the risk of unintended escalation may be more important than attempting to achieve an immediate political breakthrough.Second, President Lee reaffirmed the three principles of his North Korea policy announced last year and developed them into a more concrete framework for peaceful coexistence.Last year, President Lee identified three basic principles: respecting the North Korean regime, rejecting unification through absorption, and refraining from hostile actions against North Korea. This year, he built on those principles by articulating a framework of “inclusive peaceful coexistence” based on mutual respect, “stable peaceful coexistence” in which conflict is no longer necessary, and “responsible peaceful coexistence” that contributes to peace beyond the Korean Peninsula.From Pyongyang’s perspective, this framework provides an additional basis for assessing whether the Lee administration’s policy represents a temporary political initiative or a long-term strategic orientation. In other words, the credibility of the policy will ultimately depend less on a single speech than on whether these principles are applied consistently over time.Third, President Lee did not compromise on core principles simply to create an opening for dialogue.President Lee emphasized that peace on the Korean Peninsula should ultimately contribute to the broader objective of a “nuclear-free world.” He also indicated that effective measures to halt the advancement of North Korea’s nuclear capabilities could be discussed as part of the process of establishing a peace regime.This is a particularly important point. The nuclear issue remains one of the most sensitive issues from Pyongyang’s perspective, yet President Lee did not avoid it in an effort to make dialogue more politically attractive. Instead, he appears to have concluded that dialogue is more likely to produce durable results if both sides understand one another’s objectives, constraints, and red lines from the outset.The history of inter-Korean dialogue provides ample evidence for this approach. Difficult issues were often deferred in order to create the conditions for meetings, only to reemerge as sources of disagreement once negotiations began. At other times, ambiguous agreements produced conflicting interpretations and ultimately contributed to renewed tensions.Against this background, the explicit reference to the nuclear issue demonstrates that the vision of peaceful coexistence is not simply political rhetoric. It represents an effort to establish a more balanced and sustainable framework—one that clearly articulates Seoul’s own objectives and principles while leaving sufficient space for North Korea to articulate its own concerns and demands.None of this means, however, that North Korea is likely to alter its current position simply in response to President Lee’s address. Pyongyang has already fundamentally redefined inter-Korean relations as a “hostile relationship between two states” and has substantially revised its strategic approach toward the South. It would therefore be unrealistic to expect such a strategic judgment to change on the basis of one or two speeches.At the same time, North Korea is likely to examine the Lee administration’s policy framework carefully and assess whether it represents a durable shift in Seoul’s approach. If Pyongyang comes to believe that the administration will consistently uphold its three core principles and that peaceful coexistence and shared prosperity constitute long-term policy objectives rather than temporary political messaging, that perception could eventually influence North Korean decision-making.Inter-Korean relations have long since moved beyond the point at which they can be transformed by a single bold proposal or dramatic political event. What is required now is a departure from policies driven primarily by short-term outcomes or by abrupt shifts in response to North Korea’s actions.Instead, Seoul should maintain clearly defined long-term objectives and consistent principles while creating a sustained process through which North Korea can gradually assess the credibility of South Korea’s intentions.In this respect, the significance of President Lee’s Liberation Day address lies not only in what he proposed, but also in what he deliberately chose not to propose. There were no high-profile initiatives promising immediate breakthroughs. There was no attempt to generate momentum through a dramatic new initiative. Instead, the address soberly acknowledged the current realities on the Korean Peninsula and set out the principles and policy directions that Seoul intends to pursue.The address reaffirmed the principles articulated last year, gave greater substance to the vision of peaceful coexistence, and addressed the difficult nuclear issue without evasion. This combination of principle and pragmatism may ultimately prove more consequential than any single policy initiative.“Liberation for Peace” remains a long-term objective. Achieving it will require patience and a willingness to resist the temptation of seeking immediate political results. Clearly articulating South Korea’s principles, maintaining policy consistency, and steadily presenting credible options for North Korea to consider may offer a more effective path forward than repeatedly pursuing dramatic short-term breakthroughs.If sustained over time, this approach could help institutionalize South Korea’s North Korea policy—one that combines principle with pragmatism, consistency with flexibility, and deterrence with dialogue. More importantly, it could provide the foundation for a gradual transition from a cycle of confrontation and crisis toward a more stable framework of peaceful coexistence on the Korean Peninsula.

Proposals for Improving Inter-Korean Relations and Advancing Peace on the Korean Peninsula: On the Occasion of Korean Liberation Day                    Hyun-kyung YounResearch ProfessorInstitute for Unification StudiesEwha Womans UniversityAs the Korean Peninsula marks the 81st anniversary of Liberation, “peace” has once again emerged as a central topic of discussion. The Lee Jae-myung administration has designated 2026 as the “first year of peaceful coexistence on the Korean Peninsula” and announced a policy direction aimed at transforming inter-Korean hostility and confrontation into a relationship of peaceful coexistence. The Fifth Basic Plan for the Development of Inter-Korean Relations likewise identifies “peaceful coexistence and shared growth on the Korean Peninsula” as its vision and sets out the goal of institutionalizing peaceful coexistence as the new norm governing inter-Korean relations. Given the repeated cycles of confrontation and disengagement that have characterized inter-Korean relations, it is difficult to dispute the broader objective of peaceful coexistence. The more fundamental question, however, is: What exactly do we mean when we speak of “peaceful coexistence”?Although peace may appear to be a value on which most people can readily agree, it is, in practice, a highly contested and ambiguous concept. Is a situation peaceful simply because war has not broken out? Can North and South Korea be said to coexist peacefully as long as there is no direct military conflict, even as North Korea continues to develop its nuclear and missile capabilities? Conversely, does peace become unattainable as North Korea’s nuclear capabilities advance, even in the absence of armed conflict?Even when confronted with the same developments, some may perceive a serious security threat, while others may regard them as relatively limited. Some define peace as a condition underpinned by credible military deterrence, while others view it as a condition characterized by sustained dialogue and exchanges between the two Koreas. When the very criteria by which we assess peace differ so fundamentally, simply agreeing on the term “peaceful coexistence” does not necessarily mean that we share a common understanding of the kind of inter-Korean relationship we seek to establish.The “Crisis of Relational Language” That Must Be Addressed Before the Inter-Korean CrisisThe “crisis of relational language” surrounding inter-Korean relations became particularly evident when Kim Jong-un began defining the relationship between the two Koreas as one between “two hostile states” in late 2023. North Korean authorities have been abandoning much of the terminology they had traditionally used to describe inter-Korean relations, including “nation,” “people,” “unification,” “reconciliation,” and “cooperation.” By contrast, South Korea continues to define inter-Korean relations as “a special relationship formed provisionally in the process of pursuing unification, rather than a relationship between states.” The gap between North Korea’s conceptualization of the relationship and the framework maintained by South Korea has therefore never been wider.The problem, however, cannot be explained solely by North Korea’s changing definition of inter-Korean relations. The common language used to describe the relationship between the two Koreas has been eroding within South Korean society for some time. Different perspectives now coexist: some regard unification as a natural national objective, while others question its necessity; some view North Korea primarily as a partner for cooperation, while others regard it principally as a security threat; and some continue to regard inter-Korean relations as a special relationship between members of the same nation, while others increasingly perceive them as de facto relations between separate states. With each change of government, South Korea’s emphasis and policy direction toward North Korea have also shifted.The challenge facing the Korean Peninsula today, therefore, is not simply a crisis in inter-Korean relations. It is also a crisis of language—a crisis over how inter-Korean relations should be defined and what they should ultimately become. Kim Jong-un has articulated his vision in unambiguous terms by characterizing the two Koreas as “two hostile states” and has sought to institutionalize this perspective throughout North Korean society. South Korea, while rejecting Kim’s characterization, has not yet sufficiently articulated—in terms that the broader public can readily understand—what kind of inter-Korean relationship it ultimately seeks to establish.In this context, simply presenting “peaceful coexistence” as a policy slogan is insufficient. We need to revisit a recurring problem throughout the history of inter-Korean relations. The two Koreas have previously agreed on broad principles such as “independence,” “peace,” “national unity,” and “reconciliation and cooperation.” Yet the use of identical terminology did not mean that the two sides shared the same conceptual understanding. The North and South have long attached fundamentally different meanings to concepts such as “self-reliance” and “peace.” Even when they signed agreements using the same terminology, they often interpreted those terms differently, and language that was ostensibly agreed upon sometimes became a source of domestic political and social conflict.“Peaceful coexistence” could face the same problem. Even if both North and South Korea adopt the term, that does not necessarily mean that they share a common understanding of what peaceful inter-Korean relations should entail. Moreover, if South Korean society itself does not first develop a sufficiently concrete understanding of peaceful coexistence, any attempt to incorporate the concept into an inter-Korean agreement risks reducing it to yet another abstract policy slogan.From Peace as a “Value” to an Observable “Condition of Relations”Before proposing peaceful coexistence to North Korea, South Korean society should first clarify what constitutes a peaceful inter-Korean relationship. This does not mean unilaterally determining the terms of future negotiations with North Korea. Rather, it means establishing our own policy criteria: what South Korea’s North Korea and unification policies are ultimately intended to achieve, and under what circumstances we would be able to explain to the public that inter-Korean relations have improved and that peace has advanced.The existing National Community Unification Formula sought to explain the broad objective of unification in terms that the public could understand by identifying specific stages: reconciliation and cooperation → inter-Korean confederation → unified state. Peaceful coexistence likewise requires language that can be understood in concrete terms. This does not mean, however, that peaceful coexistence should be transformed into another stage-based theory. Instead, we should shift our understanding of peace from a singular “value” to an observable “condition of inter-Korean relations.”If we ask the public, “Has peace been achieved on the Korean Peninsula?” many would likely find the question difficult to answer. The answer depends heavily on where one sets the threshold for peace. The question becomes more manageable if it is reframed in more concrete terms:  . Can North and South Korea communicate effectively when a crisis occurs?  . To what extent can each side anticipate the other’s actions and likely responses?  . Are communication channels and institutional mechanisms that remain operational even when political tensions escalate in place?  . Have the number and intensity of incidents that could potentially trigger military conflict been reduced?Unlike abstract value judgments, these questions can be assessed against observable developments in inter-Korean relations. We can examine whether crisis-management mechanisms between the two Koreas actually function, whether agreed procedures and rules of conduct enhance predictability, and whether humanitarian, sociocultural, academic, sports, health-related, and civilian contacts can be sustained even when official government-to-government relations deteriorate.Can we conclude that peace has advanced simply because a summit has taken place? The signing of a joint declaration and an increase in the frequency of inter-Korean dialogue are certainly grounds for optimism, but they do not by themselves demonstrate that peace has become firmly established. These developments and agreements are important, but we must go further and assess how they have actually changed the state of inter-Korean relations. We should ask whether the risk of military conflict has declined, whether effective crisis-management mechanisms have been established, whether the predictability of the other side’s actions and responses has improved, and whether institutionalized relationships have emerged that are resilient to changes in political circumstances.Under such an approach, peaceful coexistence need not be defined exclusively by particular ideological positions or views on unification. Those who strongly support unification and those who question its necessity may nonetheless share an interest in a Korean Peninsula in which crises can be managed and the behavior of the other side is reasonably predictable. Likewise, while proponents of strong deterrence and advocates of dialogue and inter-Korean exchanges may differ over the means of achieving peace, they can still engage in a more concrete discussion about the type of relationship that should ultimately be established.If efforts to build domestic consensus on peaceful coexistence begin with the broad and highly abstract question, “What is peace?”, they are likely to generate political and public fatigue. A more productive approach would be to identify the conditions that must be met for inter-Korean relations to be considered more peaceful than they are today. Rather than attempting to define peace in the abstract, we should explain what needs to be possible for a relationship to qualify as peaceful.South and North Korea Should Agree on “Rules of Peace,” Rather Than the “Meaning of Peace”Once South Korea has clarified the vision of peaceful coexistence it seeks, its approach to inter-Korean agreements should also evolve. The two Koreas do not necessarily need to reach agreement on the fundamental meaning of peace itself. Realistically, such an agreement may not even be possible. South Korea, for example, may regard the ROK-U.S. alliance and credible military deterrence as essential components of peace on the Korean Peninsula, while North Korea characterizes those very arrangements as threats to its security. Given these fundamental differences over how peace should be achieved, insisting that the two sides first agree on a common definition of peace could make agreement more difficult rather than less.I therefore propose that future efforts toward peaceful coexistence focus on building a body of agreed rules of conduct, rather than attempting to reach consensus on abstract values and concepts. Paradoxically, even when the two sides have fundamentally different political systems, security perceptions, and views of unification, they may still be able to agree on rules that make each side’s behavior more predictable and help manage crises. Indeed, it is through the accumulation of such practical and incremental agreements that peaceful coexistence can acquire substantive meaning.This approach could also help address the recurring problem of “agreed language but divergent meanings” that has characterized inter-Korean relations. Rather than assuming that we share the same vision of the future simply because we use the same terminology, we should begin by establishing concrete rules that can be observed and upheld even when the two sides maintain fundamentally different views. Peaceful coexistence should not simply be declared; it must be constructed over time through concrete practices and institutions.On the 81st Anniversary of Liberation: We Need Language That Defines Concrete Relations, Not Grand SlogansSince Liberation, we have often described the future of the Korean Peninsula using broad concepts such as “unification,” “nation,” “peace,” and “shared prosperity.” These values remain important. But at this juncture, simply adding another overarching slogan is no longer sufficient—particularly when North Korea is rejecting the traditional language of “nation” and “unification,” while South Korean society itself is undergoing significant changes in how it understands unification and inter-Korean relations.What we need now is not another grand declaration, but a more concrete vocabulary for describing and defining the relationship between the two Koreas. The task is to identify what peaceful coexistence would actually look like in practice, what rules should govern the relationship, and what mechanisms should remain operational even when political relations deteriorate.The 81st anniversary of Liberation provides an opportunity to reconsider the meaning of peace not as an abstract aspiration, but as a measurable and sustainable condition of inter-Korean relations. The objective should not be to persuade everyone to embrace a single definition of peace. Rather, it should be to establish a framework within which different political and security perspectives can coexist while reducing the risk of confrontation.Ultimately, peaceful coexistence will become meaningful only when it is reflected in the daily management of inter-Korean relations: when communication channels remain open during crises, when military incidents can be contained, when agreed rules are respected, and when the two sides develop sufficient predictability to prevent disputes from escalating into armed conflict.Peaceful coexistence, therefore, should not remain a slogan. It should become a relationship that can be observed, assessed, and gradually institutionalized.As we mark the 81st anniversary of Liberation, the question we should ask ourselves may be even more fundamental than “When will unification occur?” What is needed now is for the South Korean government to develop a framework and vocabulary that enable the public to understand and assess the kind of inter-Korean relationship it seeks to establish. The same principle applies to peaceful coexistence.It should not remain merely a declaratory value, but should instead be understood as a concrete condition of inter-Korean relations that the public can recognize and relate to in their daily lives. On that foundation, the two Koreas should work to establish rules of conduct for coexistence while acknowledging that they hold fundamentally different conceptions of peace. Peaceful coexistence can begin with agreement on specific rules governing what the two systems will refrain from doing, what they will uphold, and how they will respond when a crisis occurs.

A Freeze as the Entry Point, Denuclearization as the End Goal: A Realistic Approach to the North Korean Nuclear Stalemate                    Young Joon ChoiFormer Vice Minister of Unification Visiting ProfessorInstitute for Far Eastern Studies Kyungnam UniversityRecent international attention has been dominated by instability in the Middle East, including the confrontation between the United States and Iran. Even the war in Ukraine has at times receded from public attention. Meanwhile, the North Korean nuclear issue has virtually disappeared from the international agenda. Ballistic missile launches in violation of United Nations Security Council resolu-tions no longer generate serious debate, much less collective action.Yet the issue’s disappearance from headlines does not mean that it has been re-solved. North Korea has continued to advance its nuclear and missile capabilities while international scrutiny and pressure have weakened. Pyongyang now pre-sents its nuclear forces as a permanent foundation of its national status and secu-rity, while portraying demands for denuclearization as an infringement on its constitution and sovereignty. [1]The key question, therefore, is where the issue is heading, what risks may emerge if the current situation continues, and what can realistically be done in circumstances where a comprehensive solution is not immediately available.What Has Changed Since 2017?In 2017, the Korean Peninsula faced a severe crisis. North Korea conducted its sixth nuclear test and launched intercontinental ballistic missiles, while the United States warned of a strong military response. Nevertheless, the United States, China, and Russia still shared a basic understanding that North Korea’s nuclear development posed a serious threat to the international non-proliferation regime. China and Russia joined the remaining members of the Security Council in unanimously adopting Resolutions 2371, 2375, and 2397, which significantly strengthened sanctions against North Korea. [2]South Korea also maintained channels of communication with Pyongyang and sought to mediate between North Korea and the United States. These efforts contributed to the first US–North Korea summit in 2018. The negotiations ultimately failed, but an international consensus still existed that North Korea’s nuclear development could not simply be ignored.The conditions in 2026 are substantially different. North Korea no longer treats its nuclear program as a temporary bargaining instrument. It regards nuclear weapons as an irreversible basis of national status and expects any future talks with the United States to proceed on that premise.Russia’s position has also changed fundamentally. In March 2024, Russia vetoed a draft UN Security Council resolution that would have extended the mandate of the UN Panel of Experts monitoring sanctions implementation and violations. In June 2024, Russia and North Korea signed the Treaty on Comprehensive Strategic Partnership and expanded their military and security cooperation.[3] The sanctions remain in force, but a central mechanism for investigating violations has disappeared. Having benefited from North Korean military support in the war in Ukraine, Moscow has little incentive to pressure Pyongyang.China continues to support peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula, political dialogue, and, in its broader official position, denuclearization. It is nevertheless reluctant to support additional sanctions or pressure, viewing the issue increasingly through the wider context of strategic competition with the United States and expanded trilateral security cooperation among the United States, South Korea, and Japan.[4]The United States must simultaneously address Ukraine, the Middle East, and strategic competition with China. Although denuclearization remains an official objective, North Korea has fallen lower on Washington’s list of immediate priorities. President Donald Trump’s personal interest in Kim Jong Un could create an opening for dialogue, but leader-to-leader relations alone cannot resolve a problem that has become far more complex.North Korea now defines inter-Korean relations as relations between two hostile states. As a consequence, South Korea has seen a significant erosion of the leverage it previously exercised in its role as a mediator. The present stalemate therefore reflects not merely an absence of dialogue, but a transformation of the international political structure that once made cooperation possible.Why Continued Nuclear Expansion Cannot Be IgnoredNorth Korea has actively exploited these changes. It has gained economic bene-fits and diplomatic support through military cooperation with Russia while maintaining a degree of economic stability through its ties with China. The Bank of Korea estimates that the North Korean economy grew by 3.5 percent in 2025. [5] Although such estimates are necessarily uncertain, they suggest that Pyong-yang is not facing an economic crisis severe enough to compel a return to nego-tiations.This does not mean that North Korea will remain permanently satisfied with iso-lation. Sustained economic development and industrial modernization will even-tually require broader trade, access to capital and technology, and greater inte-gration into the international economy. North Korea may therefore retain a long-term interest in sanctions relief and improved relations with the United States, even while refusing to relinquish its nuclear weapons.The longer the international community remains inactive, the greater the risk that North Korea’s nuclear status will come to be treated as an established reality in diplomatic and military planning, even without formal legal recognition. As North Korea gains greater confidence in its nuclear deterrent, it may increasingly view itself not as a weak state in Northeast Asia, but as a strategic power capable of directly challenging the United States. Such confidence could intensify its opposition to the defense policies of South Korea and Japan and encourage Pyongyang to believe that nuclear deterrence provides greater latitude for con-ventional provocations.At the same time, calls for indigenous nuclear weapons or stronger nuclear-deterrence arrangements are likely to grow in South Korea and Japan. Such de-velopments could provoke responses from China and Russia, encourage further North Korean military expansion, and accelerate a regional arms race. Because Northeast Asia is also home to critical semiconductor and advanced-technology supply chains, persistent military instability could have consequences far be-yond the region, affecting the global economy. The Real Choice: A Verifiable Freeze or Uncontrolled ExpansionUnder present conditions, a comprehensive and immediate solution is difficult to envision. North Korea has no intention of surrendering its nuclear arsenal. The United States has limited capacity to devote sustained diplomatic resources to the issue. Russia has little incentive to encourage negotiations, while China is un-likely to support pressure strong enough to threaten the stability of the North Korean regime.If the international community merely repeats the objective of complete denu-clearization without pursuing intermediate measures, however, North Korea’s stockpiles of fissile material, warheads, and delivery systems will continue to expand. A policy that preserves its principles in rhetoric while allowing the ac-tual threat to grow cannot be considered successful.The immediate objective should therefore be to freeze  the further expansion of North Korea’s nuclear capabilities.Such a halt would not mean recognizing North Korea as a legitimate nuclear-weapon state or abandoning the goal of denuclearization. Rather, it would con-stitute an interim measure designed to prevent further deterioration, reopen ne-gotiations through verifiable steps, and create a pathway toward eventual reduc-tions and dismantlement.The objection is obvious: a "freeze" approach could appear to tolerate North Korea’s existing arsenal and provide Pyongyang with additional time to consol-idate its nuclear status. That risk is real. Yet the practical choice today is not be-tween immediate denuclearization and a stop. It is between a verifiable halt and the uncontrolled expansion of North Korea’s nuclear capabilities. A situation in which warheads and fissile material continue to increase without agreement or monitoring cannot be safer than one governed by a properly designed and veri-fiable halt.A Phased and Verifiable ProcessA freeze approach to North Korea’s nuclear program should be pursued in stages. An initial agreement could suspend nuclear tests and intercontinental bal-listic missile launches. A subsequent phase could extend the freeze to fissile-material production facilities and place limits on further increases in North Ko-rea’s nuclear arsenal. Later stages could include declarations of nuclear facilities and materials, verification measures, reductions, and ultimately dismantlement.Verification would be essential. Any agreement would require procedures capa-ble of confirming not only the suspension of tests and missile launches but also the operational status of major facilities involved in the production of nuclear material.North Korean compliance could be met with phased and reciprocal measures, including humanitarian assistance, limited economic cooperation, temporary suspension of selected sanctions, and steps toward improved political relations. Such measures should be reversible in the event of North Korean violations of the agreement.South Korea and the United States must uphold denuclearization as the ultimate objective while recognizing the need for intermediate stages. A freeze ap-proach should be jointly designed not as an alternative to denuclearization, but as the beginning of a gradual process leading toward it. A Multilateral Approach Involving China and JapanCreating the conditions for a freeze will require more than simply waiting for direct talks between North Korea and the United States. These two countries re-main the central parties, but neither currently appears ready to invest fully in a serious negotiating process. Neighboring countries should therefore help create an environment conducive to the resumption of talks.China views North Korea as a strategic buffer and as an asset in its broader competition with the United States. However, the unlimited expansion of North Korea’s nuclear and missile capabilities does not necessarily serve China’s inter-ests. It strengthens the rationale for U.S. alliances, closer trilateral military coop-eration, and more frequent deployments of American strategic assets to North-east Asia. It also increases the risk of nuclear proliferation among China’s neighbors.It would be unrealistic to expect Beijing to exert severe pressure on Pyongyang solely for the purpose of denuclearization. Nevertheless, South Korea and China share limited but important interests in preventing instability, regional nuclear proliferation, and an uncontrolled arms race. Seoul should demonstrate that con-straining further North Korean nuclear expansion also serves China’s broader security interests.Japan could provide an additional, though secondary, channel of engagement. The 2002 Japan–DPRK Pyongyang Declaration established principles for re-solving historical and outstanding issues, normalizing diplomatic relations, pro-moting economic cooperation, and addressing nuclear and missile concerns through dialogue. [6] The abduction issue and Japanese domestic politics signif-icantly constrain engagement, but the prospect of normalization and economic cooperation could still provide North Korea with incentives.South Korea should not view improved Japan–North Korea relations as a threat. Instead, it should use such engagement as another means of reconnecting North Korea with the international community and reducing tensions.This approach does not require the immediate restoration of a comprehensive multilateral framework. Rather, it would connect overlapping bilateral and mul-tilateral channels involving South Korea, the United States, China, Japan, and North Korea. Its purpose would be to halt further nuclear expansion and create conditions under which North Korea could return to negotiations.A Longer Road May Be the Safer RoadThe North Korean nuclear problem is urgent, but it cannot be resolved quickly. Attempting to leap across a chasm where no bridge exists may leave the situa-tion even more dangerous. If complete denuclearization cannot be achieved im-mediately, the international community must identify a longer but more realistic path forward.South Korea cannot remain passive simply because direct inter-Korean dialogue is currently blocked. It should maintain close coordination with the United States while working with China and Japan to create an external environment in which renewed negotiations become possible.Denuclearization remains the indispensable ultimate goal. However, the legiti-macy of that objective does not by itself make every pathway toward it realistic. The international community must first halt further nuclear expansion, build confidence through verification and reciprocal measures, and then proceed gradually toward reductions and dismantlement.A freeze approach to North Korea’s nuclear program is not the destination. It is the entry point through which negotiations can resume. Only by passing through that entrance and traveling a long and difficult road can the international community ultimately reach denuclearization.[Notes]1. In June 2026, Kim Yo-jong rejected the G7’s call for North Korea’s denuclearization, de-scribing it as a violation of the country’s sovereignty and constitution. She also character-ized North Korea’s nuclear status as irreversible and non-negotiable. Source: Reuters, “North Korea’s Kim Yo-jong condemns G7 call for denuclearization as violation of sover-eignty,” June 18, 2026 (accessed August 3, 2026).2. In response to North Korea’s nuclear and missile activities in 2017, the UN Security Council unanimously adopted Resolutions 2371, 2375, and 2397, imposing increasingly stringent sanctions. Sources: United Nations, “Resolution 2371 press release,” August 5, 2017 (accessed August 3, 2026); United Nations, “Resolution 2375 press release,” Septem-ber 11, 2017 (accessed August 3, 2026); United Nations, “Resolution 2397 press release,” December 22, 2017 (accessed August 3, 2026).3. In March 2024, Russia vetoed a draft UN Security Council resolution that would have ex-tended the mandate of the UN Panel of Experts supporting the Security Council’s North Ko-rea Sanctions Committee. In June 2024, Russia and North Korea signed the Treaty on Com-prehensive Strategic Partnership. Sources: United Nations, “Security Council Fails to Ex-tend Mandate for Expert Panel Assisting Sanctions Committee on the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea,” March 28, 2024 (accessed August 3, 2026); President of Russia, “Rus-sia–DPRK Talks,” June 19, 2024 (accessed August 3, 2026).4. China continues to emphasize peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula and advocate a political settlement of the issue, while its stated policy remains focused on denuclearization and dialogue rather than intensified pressure. Sources: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, “Nuclear Arms Control,” July 23, 2024 (accessed August 3, 2026); Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, “Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Mao Ning’s Regular Press Conference on May 28, 2026,” (accessed August 3, 2026).5. The Bank of Korea estimated that North Korea’s real gross domestic product increased by 3.5 percent in 2025. Because North Korea does not publish comprehensive national accounts data, this figure represents an external estimate. Source: Bank of Korea, “Gross Domestic Product Estimates for North Korea in 2025,” July 31, 2026 (accessed August 3, 2026).6. The 2002 Japan–DPRK Pyongyang Declaration addressed the normalization of relations, historical and outstanding bilateral issues, economic cooperation, regional security, and nu-clear and missile-related concerns. Source: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, “Japan–DPRK Pyongyang Declaration,” September 17, 2002 (accessed August 3, 2026).

When Fake News About South Korea Becomes U.S. Policy                    Keeyoung YoonAdjunct ProfessorHankuk University of Foreign StudiesWhen "Criticism" Becomes Misinformation: Setting the Record Straight on Korea's Digital RegulationsTo most American readers, South Korea is a familiar and trusted ally: a vibrant democracy, a global technology leader, and a key partner of the United States on semiconductors, artificial intelligence, supply chains, and Indo-Pacific security. Yet in some corners of Washington's policy discourse, a very different image of South Korea emerges—one portrayed as discriminating against American firms, quietly favoring Chinese companies, and erecting digital trade barriers found nowhere else in the world.The issue is not whether South Korea's digital regulations are beyond criticism. No regulatory framework is immune to scrutiny, and both the South Korean government and the National Assembly bear responsibility for explaining their policies more transparently. But criticism and misinformation are not the same thing.That pattern—not any single allegation—is the real danger. A blatantly false headline is easy to recognize; a plausible-sounding claim is much harder to detect. "South Korea is targeting American companies." "South Korean regulation is a gift to China." "South Korea is the only country in the world that charges network usage fees." "The Coupang case is an example of the South Korean government's persecution of an American company." These assertions are concise and forceful. Yet tracing them back to their sources reveals a consistent pattern: substituting a law's stated purpose with a speculative consequence, describing legislation still pending before the National Assembly as though it were already in force, or repackaging a company's litigation arguments as matters of national security.Case One: The App Market LawIn August 2021, Reuters reported that South Korea was advancing legislation to prevent Google and Apple from requiring developers to use their proprietary payment systems, suggesting that the measure could effectively prevent the two companies from collecting commissions on in-app purchases. South Korea's own regulator, the Korea Communications Commission, described the same law differently. In an October 2021 press release, the Commission explained that the central purpose of the amended Telecommunications Business Act was to prohibit app market operators from requiring developers to use a specific payment method—not to abolish commissions outright.Subsequent implementation confirmed this distinction. Apple's guidance for developers in South Korea states that apps using external payment methods remain subject to a 26 percent commission. In other words, Apple permitted alternative payment methods while continuing to collect commissions. Claims in news reports and on social media that the law had "ended" Apple and Google's commissions therefore overstated its actual effect. As the research report concludes, this case illustrates how an exaggerated "end of commissions" narrative portrayed South Korea's regulation as far more sweeping—and far more hostile to digital platforms—than it actually was.Case Two: Platform RegulationIn January 2024, Charles Freeman, Senior Vice President for Asia at the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, argued that South Korea's proposed platform regulation could arbitrarily target foreign firms in violation of international trade commitments. The Korea Times also reported remarks attributed to former White House National Security Advisor Robert O'Brien suggesting that the proposed legislation could become a "gift" to the Chinese Communist Party. Together, these comments reinforced a broader narrative in the United States that South Korean regulation "punishes American companies and helps Chinese ones.“South Korea's Fair Trade Commission, however, described a very different regulatory framework. In an official briefing in September 2024, Chairman Han Ki-jeong explained that the Commission had abandoned its original proposal to pre-designate covered platforms in favor of determining market dominance retroactively, based on actual violations. According to the official government policy briefing, platforms with annual revenue below 4 trillion won would be excluded, and the proposed rules would apply to four categories of anticompetitive conduct—self-preferencing, tying, restrictions on multihoming, and most-favored-nation clauses—across six sectors, including brokerage, search, video, social media, operating systems, and digital advertising. Nationality was not among the criteria.The Washington-based Korea Economic Institute of America reached a similar conclusion in an October 2024 analysis, noting that South Korea's own leading digital platforms, including Naver and Kakao, would also fall within the scope of the proposed legislation. This makes the claim that the measure was designed to target American firms difficult to substantiate. At the heart of the controversy, therefore, lies the transformation of a nationality-neutral, market-dominance framework into a narrative of anti-American regulation.Case Three: The Network Usage Fee DisputeIn April 2026, the Korea JoongAng Daily reported that the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) had posted on its official X account that no country in the world charges network usage fees for internet traffic except South Korea. It is a striking claim, implying that South Korea operates a uniquely exceptional system.USTR's own official documents present a more nuanced picture. The agency's 2026 National Trade Estimate Report states that, since 2021, several bills have been introduced in South Korea's National Assembly that would require certain foreign content providers to pay network usage fees to Korean internet service providers. In other words, it describes proposed legislation—not an existing, universally applicable legal requirement. USTR's 2024 National Trade Estimate Report uses similar language, referring to bills pending before the National Assembly that could require such payments.A bill under consideration and a law in force are not the same thing. Yet in parts of the U.S. policy debate, conditional language—"would require" and "could require"—has gradually been transformed into the categorical claim that "South Korea imposes network usage fees." As the research report concludes, the recurring distortion in this debate has been to conflate four distinct issues: the 2020 service-stability obligation, pending legislation, administrative discussions, and ordinary commercial interconnection agreements. The result is the misleading impression that South Korea already has a legal regime requiring foreign content providers to pay network usage fees.Case Four: CoupangOn July 1, 2026, Republican members of the U.S. House Judiciary Committee released an interim report titled Closed for Competition: South Korea's Discriminatory Attacks on American-owned Businesses. The accompanying press release alleged that South Korea had conducted a discriminatory campaign against American-owned firms, with Coupang presented as the principal example.The report characterized Coupang's data breach as an incident involving a disgruntled former employee who downloaded a limited amount of customer data. It acknowledged that although the employee could theoretically have accessed information associated with as many as 33.7 million accounts, the data actually downloaded and retained involved approximately 3,000 accounts. The report further asserted that more than ten Korean government agencies had issued 4,229 document requests and conducted 652 employee interviews related to Coupang, presenting this as evidence of a coordinated, government-wide campaign.South Korea's Personal Information Protection Commission (PIPC), however, reached a markedly different conclusion. In a June 11, 2026 press release, the Commission found that inadequate management of authentication signing keys and access controls—fundamental security failures—had resulted in the exposure of the personal information of approximately 37.55 million individuals. The Commission imposed a fine of approximately 624.68 billion won, together with an additional administrative penalty, and separately fined Coupang Fulfillment Services for related violations.Independent reporting likewise highlighted the divergence between the two narratives. The Associated Press reported that the South Korean government rejected the House report as reflecting only Coupang's account of the events, while the Ministry of Foreign Affairs maintained that the investigation had been conducted lawfully and without discrimination under domestic law. Reuters similarly reported that the presidential office disputed the "3,000 accounts" figure cited by Coupang and the congressional report, emphasizing that Korean authorities regarded the potential exposure of tens of millions of accounts as a serious security incident. The central discrepancy, therefore, is the contrast between a narrative centered on a "limited breach of 3,000 accounts" and the formal findings of Korean regulators, which concluded that fundamental security failures resulted in the exposure of the personal information of tens of millions of people.The Common ThreadThese four cases appear unrelated, yet they share the same underlying pattern. In the app market case, "a ban on requiring a specific payment method" became "the end of commissions." In the platform regulation debate, "a market-dominance standard" became "targeting American firms." In the network usage fee dispute, "pending legislation" became "an already-enforced system." In the Coupang case, "an investigation into a privacy-law violation" became "discriminatory persecution of an American company." As the research report concludes, this pattern repeatedly compresses complex South Korean laws and regulatory policies into simple slogans—"anti-American regulation," "a gift to China," "the end of commissions," and "an already-enforced network usage fee regime"—that obscure what the underlying rules actually do.This is not merely a Korean problem. The United States is fully entitled to criticize the domestic regulations of a close ally. If South Korean law is opaque, excessive, or genuinely discriminatory, American officials and lawmakers should raise those concerns. But such criticism must rest on an accurate understanding of the facts. Is the measure a bill or an enacted law? Is the governing standard nationality or market dominance? Did the law abolish commissions, or did it prohibit requiring a specific payment method? Is a company's litigation narrative being given greater weight than a government's official investigative findings? When these questions go unasked, criticism ceases to be a legitimate defense of free trade and instead becomes the spread of misinformation.The stakes for the United States are significant. Washington has long championed a rules-based international order and transparent trade policy. But when an ally's lawful domestic regulations are mischaracterized and corporate grievances are reframed as matters of national interest, U.S. trade policy risks appearing less a matter of principle than an instrument of political or commercial pressure.South Korea also has much at stake. Misleading narratives can narrow the democratic space for legitimate debate over platform accountability, privacy protection, consumer protection, and fair competition. But the greatest cost may be borne by the U.S.–South Korea alliance itself, whose strength ultimately depends on mutual trust and a shared commitment to facts.What is needed now is not an emotional rebuttal but a stronger commitment to factual accuracy. The South Korean government and the National Assembly should proactively provide English-language fact sheets, explanatory materials, and side-by-side comparisons of legal texts, clearly distinguishing what is in force from what remains pending, what is prohibited from what is permitted, and whether domestic and foreign firms are subject to the same legal standards. American media, members of Congress, think tanks, and trade officials, for their part, should not treat the advocacy of any single company or industry as a sufficient basis for shaping alliance policy.Misinformation may serve short-term interests—delaying regulation, strengthening a negotiating position, or providing a convenient political talking point. Over time, however, it erodes American credibility, undermines South Korea's regulatory sovereignty, and weakens the strategic value of the U.S.–South Korea alliance.South Korea is not asking the United States to disregard the interests of its own companies. It is asking the United States to examine the facts first. In a relationship as consequential as the U.S.–South Korea alliance, that is not too much to ask.[References]•  Apple Inc. (n.d). Distributing apps using a third-party payment provider in South Korea. https://developer.apple.com/support/storekit-external-entitlement-kr•  Kang, T.-H. (2026, April 28). USTR highlights Korea’s network usage fee among “craziest trade barriers.” Korea JoongAng Daily. https://www.koreajoongangdaily.com/korea/ustr-highlights-koreas-network-usage-fee-among-craziest-trade-barriers/12588287•  Kim, H. & Shim, K.-S. (2026, July 3). S.Korea presidential office rejects Coupang, US claims of discriminatory treatment. Reuters. https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/south-korea-presidential-office-disputes-coupang-claim-only-3000-records-2026-07-03/•  Kim, H. & Lester, S. (2024, October 11). Digital trade wars 2: New US legislation labels K FTC's tech regulation discriminatory, but is it? Korea Economic Institute of America. https://keia.org/analysis/digital-trade-wars-2-new-us-legislation-labels-kftcs-tech-regulation-discriminatory-but-is-it/•  Kim, T.-H. (2026, July 2). South Korea disputes US congressional report claiming discrimination against Seattle-based Coupang. Associated Press. https://apnews.com/article/south-korea-coupang-data-breach-house-committee-b4da0647a0cdf0c9dd9be9e820e3e4bb•  Korea Communications Commission. (2021, October 17). KCC follows up on act prohibiting forcing certain in-app payments [News release]. https://www.kmcc.go.kr/download.do%3Bjsessionid%3DJmeP0wNRMxYrgb8U72wL5QUwlUKWZaJTUY7KWVnk.servlet-aihgcldhome20?fileSeq=52513•  Korea Communications Commission. (2021, November 17). KCC drafts amendments to Telecommunications Business Act Enforcement Decree and enacts notice prohibiting forcing certain in-app payments [News release]. https://www.kmcc.go.kr/download.do%3Bjsessionid%3D34-wDc1Gp82Yli4lyapRS3wEBV7xvaz54Or1K4ew.servlet-aihgcldhome10?fileSeq=52647•  Korea Fair Trade Commission. (2024, September 9). Legislative Direction for Promoting Fair Competition in Platforms and Preventing Recurrence of the TMON · WeMakePrice Crisis. Policy briefing of Republic Of Korea. https://www.korea.kr/briefing/policyBriefingView.do?newsId=156649831•  Korea Legislation Research Institute. (n.d.). Telecommunications Business Act. Korean Law Translation Center. https://elaw.klri.re.kr/eng_service/lawView.do?hseq=64463&lang=ENG•  Lee, J. & Shim, K.-S. (2026, July 2). US House committee says South Korea discriminated against Coupang. Reuters. https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/us-house-committee-says-south-korea-discriminated-against-coupang-2026-07-02/•  Office of the United States Trade Representative. (2024). 2024 National Trade Estimate Report on foreign trade barriers. https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/2024%20NTE%20Report.pdf•  Office of the United States Trade Representative. (2026, March). 2026 National Trade Estimate Report on foreign trade barriers. https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/files/Press/Releases/2026/National%20Trade%20Estimate%20Report%202026.pdf •  Personal Information Protection Commission. (2026, June 11). Personal Information Protection Commission Resolves to Impose Sanctions on Coupang and Its Affiliates for Personal Information Leaks and Infringements. Policy briefing of Republic Of Korea. https://pipc.go.kr/np/cop/bbs/selectBoardArticle.do?bbsId=BS074&mCode=C020010000&nttId=12171& •  U.S. Chamber of Commerce. (2024, January 29). U.S. Chamber warns against rush to pass Korea’s Online Platform Competition Promotion Act; Calls for transparency and dialogue. https://www.uschamber.com/international/u-s-chamber-warns-against-rush-to-pass-koreas-online-platform-competition-promotion-act-calls-for-transparency-and-dialogue •  U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on the Judiciary. (2026, July 1). Closed for competition: South Korea’s discriminatory attacks on American-owned businesses [Interim staff report]. https://judiciary.house.gov/sites/evo-subsites/republicans-judiciary.house.gov/files/evo-media-document/south-korea-discriminatory-enforcement-report-draft-final.pdf •  U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on the Judiciary. (2026, July 1). New report exposes South Korea’s discriminatory attacks on American-owned businesses [Press release]. https://judiciary.house.gov/media/press-releases/new-report-exposes-south-koreas-discriminatory-attacks-american-owned •  Yang, H. (2021, August 24). South Korea set to curb Google, Apple commission dominance. Reuters. https://www.reuters.com/technology/skorea-set-curb-google-apple-commission-dominance-2021-08-24•  Yonhap. (2023, December 29). Former Trump aide says Korea’s proposed tech rules would be “gift” to China. The Korea Times. https://www.koreatimes.co.kr/foreignaffairs/20231229/former-trump-aide-says-koreas-proposed-tech-rules-would-be-gift-to-china

The Practical Implications of a "Freeze-First" Approach to North Korea's Nuclear Program: A Phased Strategy and the Conditions for Resuming U.S.–North Korea Negotiations                    Nam-eun KimChungnam National UniversityThe North Korean nuclear issue has entered a phase in which the normative objective of complete denuclearization increasingly conflicts with the strategic reality of Pyongyang's expanding nuclear capabilities. North Korea seeks to institutionalize its status as a nuclear-armed state as a precondition for negotiations, while the United States continues to uphold the principle of complete denuclearization without presenting a credible diplomatic pathway for achieving that objective. Meanwhile, China's increasingly passive posture and Russia's growing strategic alignment with Pyongyang have eroded the effectiveness of the international sanctions regime. Against this backdrop, the South Korean government has advanced a "freeze-first" strategy that seeks to halt the further expansion of North Korea's nuclear capabilities as an initial step toward reopening negotiations.On June 19, 2026, President Lee Jae-myung disclosed during a press briefing following his ten-day visit to Europe and participation in the G7 Summit that North Korea's nuclear program had been the central topic of his more than 90-minute bilateral meeting with U.S. President Donald Trump during the official G7 dinner in Évian, France. This disclosure was significant not merely as an account of high-level diplomatic engagement, but because it marked the first indication that Seoul's phased denuclearization strategy had been formally presented to a U.S. president at the highest political level.Pyongyang, however, conveyed a fundamentally different message during the same period. On June 23, Rodong Sinmun published the results of the Enlarged Second Plenary Meeting of the Ninth Central Committee of the Workers' Party of Korea, held from June 20 to 22, reporting that Kim Jong Un had identified the continued expansion of North Korea's nuclear forces and the full exercise of its status as a nuclear-weapon state as the country's sole strategic course. North Korea continues to portray its nuclear arsenal as indispensable to regime survival and national sovereignty while increasingly framing its nuclear status not as a subject for negotiation, but as a prerequisite for future dialogue.The simultaneous articulation of Seoul's phased approach and Pyongyang's insistence on the irreversibility of its nuclear status underscores that the principal obstacle to future negotiations is not merely the resumption of dialogue. Rather, it reflects a deeper structural disagreement over the ultimate objective of the negotiating process.1. South Korea's "Freeze-First" Strategy: A Phased Path from Nuclear Freeze to DenuclearizationThe proposal presented by President Lee to President Trump centers on a phased strategy of freezing, reducing, and ultimately eliminating North Korea's nuclear capabilities.During his press briefing, President Lee explained that negotiations have reached an impasse because North Korea insists that its status as a nuclear-weapon state must first be recognized before dialogue can begin, whereas the international community remains unwilling to abandon the objective of complete denuclearization. Under these circumstances, he argued, meaningful negotiations have become virtually impossible.To overcome this deadlock, President Lee proposed first preventing any further expansion of North Korea's nuclear capabilities before pursuing gradual reductions and, ultimately, complete denuclearization. The immediate objectives include halting the further production of fissile materials, preventing the transfer of nuclear materials abroad, and suspending the continued development of intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) technologies. These initial measures would then be followed by a broader process of reducing mutual security threats and creating the conditions necessary for eventual denuclearization.According to President Lee, President Trump responded that "this could be one possible approach" and indicated that he would give the proposal serious consideration.This initiative reflects Seoul's continued shift toward a more pragmatic and phased approach to addressing the North Korean nuclear issue.The Fifth Basic Plan for the Development of Inter-Korean Relations (2026–2030) identifies "achieving substantive progress on the North Korean nuclear issue through a phased and pragmatic approach" as one of the government's principal policy objectives. Similarly, Minister of Unification Jeong Dong-young has emphasized the importance of creating favorable conditions for both inter-Korean and U.S.–North Korea dialogue while pursuing gradual, practical measures toward denuclearization.Likewise, Yeondoo Jung, South Korea's Head of the Bureau of Diplomatic Strategy and information of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, outlined a three-stage framework—freeze, reduction, and dismantlement—at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva. Under this approach, North Korea's nuclear and missile programs would first be frozen, followed by the gradual reduction of its nuclear capabilities and, ultimately, their complete dismantlement.Taken together, these initiatives reflect Seoul's effort to preserve complete denuclearization as the long-term objective while recognizing the practical necessity of first halting the continued expansion of North Korea's nuclear capabilities.2. North Korea's Hardline Position: Institutionalizing Its Status as a Nuclear-Weapon StateFor Seoul's phased strategy to succeed, North Korea must have at least some incentive to return to negotiations. The outcomes of the June 2026 Party Plenary Meeting, however, indicate that Pyongyang currently places far greater priority on institutionalizing its status as a nuclear-weapon state than on resuming denuclearization talks.During the meeting, Kim Jong-un cited discussions in South Korea regarding the acquisition of nuclear-powered submarines, combined U.S.–ROK military exercises, and allied intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) activities as the principal drivers of heightened tensions on the Korean Peninsula. Against this backdrop, he reaffirmed that "the continuous expansion and strengthening of nuclear forces and the full exercise of our status as a nuclear-weapon state constitute the only correct strategic course."Kim further characterized North Korea's nuclear forces as the foundation of the country's military sovereignty and the central pillar of both its deterrence posture and war-fighting strategy, while directing the continued expansion of its defense capabilities. The Plenary Meeting also denounced the U.S.–ROK Nuclear Consultative Group (NCG), portraying its nuclear planning exercises as evidence of the "criminal nature" of a "nuclear war apparatus." Such rhetoric reinforces Pyongyang's longstanding narrative that strengthened U.S.–ROK extended deterrence serves as the principal justification for the continued expansion of its own nuclear arsenal.This position had already been foreshadowed several days earlier. On June 18, Kim Yo-jong, Vice Department Director of the Workers' Party of Korea, declared that "denuclearization is an issue that has already been conclusively settled." Her statement further underscored Pyongyang's determination to regard its nuclear status not as a subject for negotiation but as a fixed reality—and a prerequisite for any future dialogue.If this position remains unchanged, North Korea is unlikely to embrace Seoul's freeze–reduction–denuclearization framework. Instead, it is more likely to seek to redefine future negotiations as discussions on nuclear arms control or strategic arms management rather than denuclearization. Whereas South Korea views a nuclear freeze as the first stage of a broader denuclearization process, Pyongyang is more likely to regard such an agreement as implicit international recognition of its status as a de facto nuclear-weapon state. This divergence in the interpretation of a "freeze" constitutes one of the most fundamental conceptual obstacles to any future negotiation process.3. The United States: A Principled Position Without a Clear StrategyThe official U.S. position continues to center on the complete denuclearization of North Korea. In early June 2026, coinciding with Chinese President Xi Jinping's June 8–9 visit to Pyongyang, Washington reaffirmed this position through two separate diplomatic channels.First, at the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Board of Governors meeting in Vienna on June 9, the U.S. delegation rejected assertions that North Korea's weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile programs constitute "a closed issue." Second, in the joint statement issued following the U.S.–Japan Extended Deterrence Dialogue (EDD) held in Tokyo on June 8–9, the U.S. Departments of State and Defense, together with Japan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Defense, rejected Russia's characterization of North Korea's nuclear program as a settled matter and reaffirmed their shared commitment to the complete denuclearization of North Korea.These statements stand in marked contrast to China's decision not to publicly reference denuclearization during President Xi's visit to Pyongyang. They also underscore Washington's continuing effort to prevent the emergence of international narratives that could be interpreted as implicitly recognizing North Korea as a legitimate nuclear-weapon state.Beyond reaffirming this long-standing principle, however, the U.S. approach continues to face significant strategic limitations. President Trump's reported remarks during his meeting with President Lee Jae-myung suggest an implicit recognition that the existing policy framework has reached its limits. According to President Lee, President Trump observed that "it is unfortunate that no practical measures were taken before North Korea actually acquired nuclear weapons," before adding that Seoul's phased proposal "could be one possible approach" worthy of further consideration.Although the 2018 Singapore Summit reaffirmed the shared objective of complete denuclearization, the United States has yet to develop a practical negotiating framework capable of translating that objective into sustained diplomatic progress. President Lee's observation that President Trump expressed frustration over the current state of U.S.–North Korea diplomacy further illustrates this dilemma: Washington continues to uphold denuclearization as its strategic objective while lacking a clearly defined diplomatic pathway to achieve it.Against this backdrop, Seoul's freeze-first strategy assumes particular significance. Rather than abandoning the principle of complete denuclearization, it seeks to establish realistic conditions for resuming negotiations by first halting the continued expansion of North Korea's nuclear capabilities.4. China and Russia: Strategic Silence and Explicit Support Weaken International PressureThe international pressure campaign surrounding North Korea's nuclear program has weakened considerably as both China and Russia have recalibrated their respective approaches toward Pyongyang.During President Xi Jinping's June 8–9 visit to North Korea—his first in seven years—Beijing notably omitted any public reference to "the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula" in the official readout of the summit. This marked a clear departure from Xi's 2019 visit, during which both sides explicitly reaffirmed their commitment to the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.The omission suggests that Beijing increasingly views North Korea's nuclear issue through the broader prism of regional strategic competition rather than primarily as a nonproliferation challenge. China's current priorities appear to include stabilizing Sino–North Korean relations, preventing Pyongyang from drifting further toward Moscow, managing strategic competition with the United States, and responding to the expanding security cooperation among the United States, South Korea, and Japan.This interpretation is consistent with the assessments of several leading U.S. analysts. Sydney Seiler, Senior Adviser at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), has argued that meaningful denuclearization discussions between Beijing and Pyongyang are increasingly unlikely because China's leverage over North Korea has diminished significantly. Likewise, Patricia Kim, Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution, has observed that public pressure from Beijing is unlikely to alter Pyongyang's firmly entrenched nuclear policy and could instead accelerate North Korea's strategic dependence on Russia.Taken together, these assessments suggest that China is gradually shifting from serving as a principal advocate of denuclearization to acting as a strategic manager of regional stability and balance-of-power dynamics.Russia's position has become even more explicit.The joint statement issued following the Xi–Putin Summit on June 1 likewise omitted any reference to denuclearization. Instead, China and Russia jointly declared their opposition to "diplomatic isolation, economic sanctions, and military pressure that threaten North Korea's security." Rather than encouraging denuclearization, the statement signaled expanded political support for Pyongyang.The subsequent U.S.–Japan Extended Deterrence Dialogue further underscored this growing divergence. Its joint statement explicitly rejected Russia's assertion that North Korea's nuclear weapons program is "a closed issue," reflecting Washington's and Tokyo's concern that Moscow's position could contribute to the gradual international normalization of North Korea's status as a nuclear-weapon state.Compared with China's strategic silence, Russia has adopted a far more proactive posture in supporting Pyongyang. Together, these developments have weakened international coordination on North Korea policy and further eroded the credibility of the international sanctions regime.The cumulative impact of China's restraint and Russia's overt support has become increasingly evident in multilateral institutions.The Eleventh Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), held at United Nations Headquarters in New York from April 27 to May 22, 2026, failed for the third consecutive review cycle to produce a final consensus document, following similar failures in 2015 and 2022. More significantly, language condemning North Korea's nuclear weapons program—which had appeared in draft texts during previous review conferences—was omitted altogether.These developments underscore an important reality: Seoul's freeze-first strategy cannot succeed through international sanctions alone. Instead, future diplomacy will necessarily depend less on multilateral pressure and more on close U.S.–ROK policy coordination, robust verification mechanisms, and clearly defined reciprocal implementation measures.5. The Practical Implications of a Freeze-First Strategy: Opportunities for Compromise and Effective ImplementationAgainst the backdrop of the current diplomatic stalemate, Seoul's freeze-first approach offers a potentially realistic entry point for renewed negotiations.With North Korea categorically rejecting denuclearization talks and the United States remaining committed to complete denuclearization, negotiations are unlikely to resume unless both sides can identify a politically acceptable intermediate objective. In this context, a freeze on the further expansion of North Korea's nuclear program offers a practical starting point that preserves the long-term objective of denuclearization while creating space for renewed diplomacy.The three immediate objectives proposed by Seoul—halting additional production of fissile materials, prohibiting the transfer of nuclear materials abroad, and suspending further ICBM development—represent concrete and verifiable measures designed to prevent both the qualitative and quantitative expansion of North Korea's nuclear capabilities. Their relative clarity makes them suitable candidates for an initial negotiating agenda.More importantly, the freeze-first approach would enable South Korea to play a more active role in shaping the structure of future negotiations. Rather than remaining a passive observer of U.S.–North Korea diplomacy, Seoul could help define the scope of the freeze, establish verification mechanisms, design reciprocal incentives, and determine the conditions under which negotiations would transition from a freeze to reductions in nuclear capabilities. By doing so, South Korea would strengthen its ability to ensure that future negotiations adequately reflect its own security interests.Nevertheless, the approach also carries significant risks.North Korea already possesses operational ICBMs and an expanding nuclear arsenal. Consequently, an agreement focused solely on freezing future development could be interpreted as tacit acceptance of its existing nuclear capabilities. Previous diplomatic experience—including the 1994 Agreed Framework and the 2007 Initial Actions Agreement under the Six-Party Talks—demonstrates that freeze arrangements can become protracted and ultimately ineffective when they are not accompanied by robust verification mechanisms and credible pathways toward subsequent implementation.There is also a significant risk that Pyongyang would seek to redefine future negotiations as discussions on nuclear arms control rather than denuclearization. Moreover, in an international environment where sanctions enforcement has weakened due to China's restraint and Russia's support, a freeze agreement could inadvertently reduce the bargaining leverage of both Seoul and Washington.These risks should not be interpreted as arguments against a freeze-first strategy. Rather, they highlight the importance of careful institutional design.The comprehensive denuclearization approach pursued since 1994 has produced limited tangible progress despite more than three decades of diplomatic efforts. At the same time, both Washington and Pyongyang appear to recognize the limitations of the current impasse without having identified a viable alternative. These circumstances underscore the need for a new negotiating framework.A carefully designed freeze-first strategy offers one such alternative. It preserves complete denuclearization as the ultimate objective while creating politically feasible conditions under which both the United States and North Korea could return to the negotiating table. If accompanied by clearly defined limits on the scope of the freeze, rigorous verification procedures, predetermined responses to violations, and explicit benchmarks for transitioning to a reduction phase, a freeze-first framework could become more than simply a mechanism for facilitating another U.S.–North Korea summit. It could provide a realistic foundation for restarting a sustained denuclearization process on the Korean Peninsula.

Trust Before Pressure: Digital Regulation, Nuclear-Powered Submarines, and the Future of the U.S.–ROK Alliance                    Jung KimUniversity of North Korean StudiesWhy Alliance Trust Matters NowThe U.S.–ROK alliance has long been sustained by a shared commitment to deterrence, democracy, and regional stability. For decades, its central purpose was clear: preventing war on the Korean Peninsula and deterring North Korean aggression.Today, however, the alliance must operate in a far more complex strategic environment. Military threats, technological competition, digital regulation, supply-chain security, and economic statecraft have become increasingly interconnected. As a result, the future of the alliance will depend not only on military readiness but also on the ability of both governments to manage economic and regulatory disputes without undermining strategic trust.It is in this context that two issues deserve particular attention: digital regulation, including disputes involving Coupang, and South Korea's pursuit of conventionally armed nuclear-powered submarines. At first glance, these appear to be unrelated issues. One falls within the realm of platform governance, competition policy, data protection, and trade.The other concerns maritime deterrence, undersea capabilities, and nonproliferation. Yet both ultimately raise the same fundamental question: whether the United States is prepared to treat South Korea as a mature strategic partner whose domestic governance and defense modernization merit respect, meaningful consultation, and forward-looking support.The alliance should therefore be guided by a clear principle. The United States should defend fairness, but it should not seek privilege. It should address proliferation concerns, but it should not deny South Korea the conventional capabilities necessary to respond effectively to a rapidly evolving security environment.Digital Regulation and the Need for Fairness Without PrivilegeSouth Korea's digital regulatory debates should not be dismissed as protectionism. Like other advanced democracies, South Korea faces genuine challenges in governing large digital platforms. These include consumer protection, data security, fair competition, labor standards, market concentration, and the vulnerability of small merchants. Such concerns represent legitimate public policy priorities. No democratic government can remain passive when digital platforms wield extensive influence over markets, data, logistics, and everyday life.The controversy surrounding Coupang has made these questions especially sensitive. Coupang is deeply embedded in South Korea's consumer economy, yet it is also a U.S.-listed company with a global investor base. Its regulatory treatment in South Korea is therefore no longer viewed solely as a domestic matter. Recent reporting has linked the company's data breach, regulatory investigations, investor concerns, and broader U.S. scrutiny of South Korea's digital regulatory environment to wider tensions in U.S.–ROK economic relations.The United States is justified in asking whether South Korea's digital regulations are transparent, proportionate, and non-discriminatory. If regulatory standards are vague, applied retroactively, enforced selectively, or shaped by political considerations, they risk undermining confidence not only in South Korea's regulatory system but also in the economic foundation of the alliance. Regulatory predictability is essential for investment, innovation, and bilateral trust.At the same time, Washington should be careful not to portray every Korean regulatory action affecting a U.S.-linked firm as inherently anti-American. Such an approach would be strategically counterproductive. It would reinforce the perception that the United States supports rule-based governance only when its application does not disadvantage American companies. It would also weaken the credibility of legitimate U.S. concerns by making them appear less about fairness than about seeking exemption from rules that apply to others.The better approach is not political pressure but disciplined consultation. The United States should advocate due process, legal clarity, and equal treatment for all firms, regardless of nationality. It should encourage South Korea to distinguish clearly among three distinct issues: data-security failures, abuses of market power, and ordinary commercial success. A company should not be penalized simply because it is large, foreign-linked, or politically prominent. Nor should it receive immunity because it has American investors or is listed on a U.S. stock exchange.The alliance needs a dedicated digital trust mechanism. Such a mechanism could be established within the KORUS framework or through a parallel bilateral channel. Its purpose would not be to weaken South Korea's regulatory sovereignty but to prevent regulatory disputes from escalating into broader alliance tensions. It could provide for advance consultation on major platform legislation, regulatory impact assessments, cybersecurity cooperation, data-breach notification standards, and a neutral forum for discussing competition-law concerns.The guiding principle should be straightforward: South Korea should regulate digital platforms through general, transparent, and consistently enforced rules, while the United States should defend procedural fairness without seeking special treatment for U.S.-linked firms.Nuclear-Powered Submarines and Responsible DeterrenceThe second issue concerns South Korea's pursuit of conventionally armed nuclear-powered submarines. This initiative should be understood not as a symbolic quest for prestige but as an important element of alliance modernization.The security environment surrounding the Korean Peninsula is evolving rapidly. North Korea continues to advance its nuclear and missile capabilities, while undersea operations and maritime domain awareness are becoming increasingly important to deterrence. In this evolving strategic environment, South Korea's ability to monitor, track, and deter maritime threats will become an increasingly important component of the alliance's overall effectiveness.A South Korean nuclear-powered submarine should therefore be viewed not as a step toward nuclear armament but as a conventionally armed strategic capability powered by nuclear propulsion. Its principal advantages lie in greater endurance, survivability, persistent undersea presence, and enhanced maritime deterrence.Diesel-electric submarines remain highly capable, but they face inherent operational limitations in endurance and sustained submerged operations. Nuclear propulsion would enable South Korea to operate underwater for extended periods, enhancing its ability to monitor and track North Korean submarine activity while contributing to regional maritime stability.Washington has begun to recognize this strategic logic. Recent reporting and official statements suggest that South Korea's pursuit of conventionally armed nuclear-powered submarines is increasingly being viewed as a potential alliance capability rather than merely a national procurement project. The Changbogo-N program has been presented as aiming to field a first nuclear-powered attack submarine by the mid-2030s. South Korean and U.S. officials have also highlighted its potential contribution to allied maritime capabilities and long-term alliance modernization.The question now is whether the United States will move from cautious acceptance to constructive enablement. Approval in principle is not sufficient. If Washington recognizes South Korea's strategic requirements but delays implementation through bureaucratic caution, export-control uncertainty, fuel-cycle concerns, or industrial constraints, the consequences could be significant. Seoul may conclude that U.S. support is rhetorically strong but operationally uncertain.A forward-looking U.S. policy should rest on four guiding principles.First, Washington should publicly recognize a South Korean nuclear-powered submarine as a conventionally armed strategic capability that is compatible with both the alliance and the global nonproliferation regime. It should make clear that the issue concerns nuclear propulsion, not nuclear weapons.Second, the two governments should establish a dedicated bilateral working group bringing together experts in defense, energy, law, shipbuilding, and nonproliferation. This effort should not be left to fragmented bureaucratic channels but should be managed through a coordinated institutional framework.Third, the United States should support a transparent nuclear fuel-management framework grounded in rigorous safeguards, comprehensive material accounting, and close cooperation with international verification standards. The objective should be to build confidence before mistrust takes hold.Fourth, Washington should integrate the submarine initiative into a broader framework of alliance industrial cooperation. South Korea's world-class shipbuilding industry, robust defense-industrial base, and growing investment in U.S. maritime infrastructure can make significant contributions to allied resilience. Cooperation on conventionally armed nuclear-powered submarines should therefore be understood not as a concession to Seoul but as an investment in strengthening allied maritime capability and long-term strategic integration.Not a Transaction, but Alliance ModernizationThe United States should avoid treating these two issues as transactional bargaining chips. It should not imply that support for South Korea's pursuit of conventionally armed nuclear-powered submarines depends on favorable regulatory treatment for Coupang. Nor should South Korea suggest that legitimate concerns about digital regulation can be set aside because it contributes more to alliance defense. Such linkage would reduce alliance management to transactional bargaining and erode the strategic trust on which the alliance depends.Yet these two issues are connected at a deeper level. Both speak to the meaning of a mature alliance. In the economic domain, maturity means accepting that allies may regulate their markets differently while insisting that such regulation remains transparent, predictable, and fair. In the security domain, maturity means recognizing that a capable ally should assume greater responsibility while remaining firmly anchored in shared norms and nonproliferation commitments.For the United States, the central task is to combine firmness with restraint. It should be firm in defending non-discrimination, due process, and open digital markets, while exercising restraint in avoiding coercive pressure that could make legitimate regulation appear incompatible with alliance solidarity. It should also be firm in upholding the global nonproliferation regime, while taking a forward-looking approach to helping South Korea develop advanced conventional capabilities that strengthen deterrence without crossing the nuclear threshold.Trust as the Alliance’s Most Important CapabilityThe future of the U.S.–ROK alliance will not be determined by military exercises alone. It will also depend on whether the two countries can manage difficult disagreements without turning them into tests of political loyalty. Digital regulation and conventionally armed nuclear-powered submarines are not peripheral issues. They represent the emerging terrain of alliance politics, where economic governance, technological policy, and strategic deterrence increasingly intersect.Washington should therefore send a clear and consistent message. In the digital domain, it should seek fairness, not privilege. In the security domain, it should support responsible deterrence, not nuclear armament. Across both domains, it should treat South Korea as a trusted strategic partner capable of assuming greater responsibility within a transparent, rules-based framework.A credible alliance requires more than extended deterrence. It requires confidence that each side understands the other's domestic constraints, strategic concerns, and long-term responsibilities. For South Korea, this means regulating digital markets through transparent, predictable, and even-handed rules. For the United States, it means supporting South Korea's defense modernization with strategic vision and sustained commitment.Trust is not built by avoiding disagreement. It is built by managing disagreement through shared principles, mutual respect, and institutionalized cooperation. That is the standard by which the next phase of the U.S.–ROK alliance should be judged.

South Korea Is Not Turning Away from the United States: Alliance Continuity, Strategic Adaptation, and the Limits of Ideological Interpretation                    J.R. KimPresidentKorea Council for Peace and Cooperation1. IntroductionAs the Lee Jae-myung administration marks its first year in office, assessments of changes in South Korea’s foreign policy and the future trajectory of the ROK–U.S. alliance have become increasingly active. Since President Lee’s election in June last year, a central question among both domestic and international policy communities has been how the new administration would manage its alliance with the United States and recalibrate its relationship with China.Among the more pessimistic arguments in this debate is an article by Nicholas Eberstadt and Lawrence Peck, “South Korea Takes a Hard Left Turn Against America,” published in the Wall Street Journal. The authors characterize the Lee administration as fundamentally unfriendly toward the United States and argue that its policy direction could ultimately lead to a weakening of the ROK–U.S. alliance.However, such an assessment does not adequately reflect the actual policies of the South Korean government or the current state of the alliance. While legitimate criticism and disagreement may exist regarding specific policies of the Lee administration, the conclusion that South Korea is drifting away from democracy and the ROK–U.S. alliance is not sufficiently supported by observable policy behavior or by the institutional realities of the alliance.Rather, the analysis by Eberstadt and Peck relies heavily on ideological labeling and selective evidence, failing to account for the complex and multifaceted nature of South Korean politics and foreign policy, thereby reducing it to an overly simplified interpretation.2. Alliance Continuity and Historical ContextAt the core of their argument is the claim that the Lee administration is inherently anti-American and ultimately seeks to weaken the ROK–U.S. alliance. However, the evidence presented to support this broad conclusion is limited.Policy differences between allies are not unusual, nor do such differences necessarily imply strategic divergence. Indeed, a review of the history of the ROK–U.S. alliance shows that successive South Korean governments, regardless of their progressive or conservative orientation, have repeatedly differed with Washington on issues such as North Korea policy, China policy, and defense cost-sharing. Nevertheless, such disagreements have largely been managed within the framework of the alliance and have not fundamentally undermined its continuity or stability.Moreover, policy disagreements on specific issues do not equate to opposition to the alliance itself. Such differences are common among sovereign democratic allies and should not be interpreted as evidence of hostility or strategic realignment.Since the Korean War, South Korea has maintained close military cooperation with the United States and continues to rely heavily on U.S. security commitments and extended deterrence in responding to North Korea’s evolving threats. In addition, the two countries have developed deeply institutionalized cooperation in defense, intelligence, advanced technology, economic security, and supply chain resilience.Given these structural realities, it is difficult to conclude that South Korea is undergoing an anti-American shift or moving away from the alliance on the basis of a change in administration or limited policy disagreements. Several former U.S. diplomats and Korea specialists similarly emphasize that political change in South Korea does not automatically translate into alliance weakening, highlighting instead the institutional resilience of South Korean democracy and the structural durability of the alliance.3. The Empirical Reality of the AllianceIn practice, South Korea remains one of the United States’ most important allies. The two countries maintain extensive military cooperation and intelligence-sharing mechanisms and continue to expand collaboration in areas such as advanced technology, supply chain stability, and economic security. In the face of North Korea’s advancing nuclear and missile capabilities, South Korea continues to rely on U.S. extended deterrence, while the United States regards South Korea as a key pillar of its Indo-Pacific strategy.Most importantly, the actual policies pursued by the Lee administration merit careful attention. Since taking office, the administration has repeatedly reaffirmed that the ROK–U.S. alliance constitutes the cornerstone of its foreign and security policy. President Lee, shortly after his inauguration, held a phone call with U.S. President Donald Trump, emphasizing the importance of the alliance and the need for close cooperation. The two countries have since maintained regular high-level consultations through diplomatic and national security channels.More concretely, the administration’s policies are broadly consistent with this official stance. South Korea has not called for the reduction or withdrawal of U.S. Forces Korea and has maintained the existing combined defense posture. It has continued large-scale joint military exercises with the United States and sustained cooperation on extended deterrence and nuclear consultation mechanisms. In other words, the core institutional and security architecture of the ROK–U.S. alliance has remained intact under the current administration.The Lee administration has also maintained trilateral security cooperation among South Korea, the United States, and Japan. It has not sought to terminate the General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA), and the real-time missile warning data-sharing mechanism has been preserved. Despite domestic political sensitivities surrounding relations with Japan, the administration regards trilateral security cooperation as an important policy asset for strengthening regional deterrence and reinforcing the ROK–U.S. alliance.Furthermore, strategic cooperation is expanding beyond traditional military security into economic security. South Korea continues to deepen collaboration with the United States in shipbuilding, semiconductors, batteries, and artificial intelligence, while also exploring cooperation in naval maintenance, repair, and overhaul (MRO). This reflects not alliance contraction, but rather modernization and functional expansion.4. U.S. Policy Assessments and Alliance StabilityThis reality is broadly consistent with official assessments issued by the U.S. government. Washington has repeatedly reaffirmed its commitment to the ROK–U.S. alliance while emphasizing alliance modernization and the expansion of its cooperative scope. Public statements by U.S. foreign and security officials indicate that current U.S. priorities lie less in concerns over alliance weakening and more in strengthening deterrence, expanding economic security cooperation, and deepening Indo-Pacific strategic coordination.While external commentators may offer varying interpretations of the alliance’s future, the U.S. government’s assessment—responsible for formulating and implementing alliance policy—should also be treated as a critical analytical reference point. If South Korea’s policies were perceived as undermining the alliance, U.S. officials would likely have expressed concern through public statements or policy adjustments. However, the prevailing U.S. position continues to emphasize continuity, modernization, and expanded cooperation rather than decline or disengagement.5. China Policy and Strategic ComplexityEberstadt and Peck tend to interpret South Korea’s greater diplomatic flexibility as evidence of strategic realignment away from the United States. Yet South Korea, like many U.S. allies, operates within a complex strategic environment in which it must maintain a security alliance with the United States while managing deep economic interdependence with China. Accordingly, efforts to maintain stable relations with China cannot automatically be equated with strategic distancing from the United States.Unlike during the Cold War, most U.S. allies today pursue dual-track strategies: maintaining security cooperation with the United States while sustaining significant economic ties with China. Japan, Australia, and major European states all exhibit this pattern. The United States itself has adopted a “de-risking” approach rather than full decoupling, focusing on semiconductors, advanced technologies, and critical supply chains. Diplomatic engagement with China therefore cannot automatically be interpreted as evidence of strategic alignment.International alliance politics today operate on a more complex logic than Cold War-era assumptions that security and economic relations must align. Reducing interstate behavior to zero-sum logic risks oversimplifying reality. South Korea’s approach reflects geopolitical and economic constraints rather than ideological alignment. Pursuing differentiated policies in security and economic domains is a common pattern among middle powers.6. Domestic Politics and Democratic ResilienceThe portrayal by Eberstadt and Peck of South Korean domestic politics also relies on exaggerated interpretations. The authors characterize the Democratic Party as “radical left” and suggest that constitutional reform could lead to authoritarian rule. However, such claims are largely speculative and fail to reflect the resilience of South Korea’s democratic institutions.South Korea remains a competitive multiparty democracy with an independent judiciary, free press, vibrant civil society, and high political participation. Constitutional revision requires approval by both the National Assembly and a national referendum, ensuring strong institutional constraints. While democratic backsliding is a legitimate concern in any democracy, current evidence does not support the conclusion that South Korea is undergoing authoritarian transformation.7. Historical Interpretation and Alliance FrictionsThe authors also selectively interpret historical and policy issues. Participation in 1980s democratization movements does not determine contemporary foreign policy orientation, as such backgrounds exist across both progressive and conservative camps. Linking decades-old activism to present-day anti-Americanism involves a significant analytical leap.Similarly, legal disputes involving foreign firms, USFK facilities, and intelligence issues are typical institutional frictions within alliances. Comparable cases exist among U.S. alliances in Europe. These should be understood as managed disagreements within institutional frameworks rather than evidence of strategic rupture.8. The Limits of Ideological InterpretationUltimately, the most fundamental limitation of Eberstadt and Peck’s analysis is its tendency to reduce diverse policy choices to ideological categories. Engagement with China becomes “pro-China alignment,” policy divergence becomes “anti-Americanism,” and constitutional debate becomes “authoritarian drift.” This framework fails to capture the complexity of South Korea’s strategic environment and democratic politics.Such an approach underestimates South Korea’s capacity to simultaneously maintain its alliance with the United States while advancing its own security and economic interests. Policy flexibility among allies is a normal feature of international politics and does not, in itself, indicate strategic defection.9. ConclusionThe ROK–U.S. alliance has endured for more than 70 years not because it reflects the preferences of any single government, but because it is grounded in shared strategic interests, institutionalized cooperation, and broad public support in both countries. Despite changes in political leadership and periodic policy disagreements, the alliance has remained structurally stable.South Korea is not turning away from the United States. Rather, it is pursuing its national interests within a complex strategic environment while maintaining democracy and the alliance as core foundations. Interpretations of democratic collapse or strategic realignment lack sufficient empirical support.Ultimately, assessments of South Korea’s foreign policy and the future of the ROK–U.S. alliance should be grounded in observable policy behavior, institutional continuity, and shared strategic interests rather than ideological inference. The evidence to date supports not alliance erosion or strategic defection, but alliance adaptation and development in response to evolving strategic conditions.

The Historical Significance of the June 15 Joint Declaration and the Lee Jae-myung Administration’s Efforts to Promote Peace on the Korean Peninsula                    Seunghyun LeeVisiting ProfessorInstitute for Unification Studies, Yonsei UniversityFor the South Korean people, June is a month marked by profound historical wounds. The designation of Memorial Day as a national holiday in June—a month most closely associated with the outbreak of the Korean War on June 25—can be understood as a national effort to honor the patriotic martyrs and fallen heroes who sacrificed their lives during times of national crisis, including the Korean War, while also helping to heal the nation’s collective historical trauma.Against this backdrop, the June 15 Joint Declaration, announced at the dawn of the twenty-first century, represented the first occasion in the 55 years since the division of the Korean Peninsula that the principal parties to the Korean War—North and South Korea—met directly and jointly declared their commitment to reconciliation and cooperation before both domestic and international audiences. Its significance is particularly profound because it marked the first historic summit meeting between the leaders of the two Koreas.Twenty-six years have passed since the adoption of the June 15 Joint Declaration, providing more a substantial historical record from which to assess its significance and impact. Although this may be difficult to imagine from today’s perspective—particularly in light of North Korea’s adoption of the “two hostile states” doctrine—the declaration served as the foundation for major inter-Korean cooperation initiatives, including the Mount Geumgang tourism project and the Gaeseong Industrial Complex. In this regard, it can be argued that the declaration made a significant contribution to the promotion of peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula.Over the past 26 years, the framework established by the June 15 Joint Declaration has generated a rich body of inter-Korean experiences, ranging from the “visitor certificate” system used in the Mount Geumgang tourism program to the passport presentation procedures implemented during exchanges involving North Korea’s Naegohyang (“My Hometown”) Women’s Football Club. The fundamental spirit of the June 15 Joint Declaration lies in building upon these accumulated experiences and using them as a foundation for generating new momentum and shaping future change.Must North and South Korea remain two hostile states, as characterized by Chairman Kim Jong-un? Following the June 15 Joint Declaration, the two Koreas entered a period of engagement during which they cooperated as partners in the pursuit of national reunification and the promotion of peace on the Korean Peninsula. This process culminated in a series of landmark agreements, including the October 4 Declaration, the April 27 Panmunjom Declaration, and the September 19 Pyongyang Joint Declaration, each of which built upon the foundation laid by the June 15 Joint Declaration.Following the collapse of the U.S.–North Korea summit process, however, North Korea fundamentally recalibrated its policy toward South Korea. It erected both physical and psychological barriers between the two Koreas and amended its constitution to incorporate territorial provisions, thereby formally asserting—to domestic and international audiences alike—that it is a sovereign state separate from the Republic of Korea.In 2026, confronted with this reality, South Korea is compelled to reconsider how peace can be established on the Korean Peninsula and how inter-Korean relations might be restored. Is there any viable alternative to accepting North Korea’s official position and allowing the two Koreas to coexist simply as neighboring states divided by a border—and, more specifically, as hostile neighbors?If no immediate alternative is available, the fundamental orientation of the current administration’s policy may be understood as a commitment to creating such an alternative for the future and preserving or restoring it whenever it is disrupted. That alternative is a pathway to peace between the two Koreas, one that may reasonably be regarded as an aspiration shared by the Korean people as a whole.South Korea must address the challenge of establishing peace on the Korean Peninsula from multiple perspectives and formulate practical policy alternatives. First, it is essential to consider the broader international environment. Armed conflicts continue to persist across various regions of the world. The Russia–Ukraine war and the conflict involving the United States, Israel, and Iran have underscored the immense and often incalculable human costs of war and geopolitical confrontation.Should the “two hostile states” doctrine become the prevailing framework governing inter-Korean relations and tensions continue to intensify, the potential consequences of such confrontation are not difficult to anticipate. To envision a future for the Korean Peninsula founded on anything other than peace would risk imposing profound suffering on future generations of Koreans.Second, both challenges and opportunities exist at the East Asian regional level. Despite North Korea’s adoption of the “two hostile states” doctrine, South Korea must continue pursuing peace on the Korean Peninsula by cultivating stable and cooperative relations with the region’s major powers, including the United States, China, Japan, and Russia. The highest priority should be the strengthening of the ROK–U.S. alliance and the maintenance of close strategic cooperation with Japan.At the same time, South Korea should pursue a balanced and pragmatic policy toward China in order to preserve strategic equilibrium. With respect to Russia, Seoul should seek to preserve opportunities for future economic cooperation and prepare for the eventual resumption of engagement with the Russian market following the end of the Russia–Ukraine war. More broadly, efforts should be directed toward preventing the entrenchment of a “new Cold War” order in East Asia characterized by the polarization of a U.S.–Japan–South Korea grouping on one side and a North Korea–China–Russia grouping on the other.Third, both challenges and opportunities exist at the level of the Korean Peninsula itself. In pursuit of peace, the Lee Jae-myung administration has established “a peaceful two-state relationship oriented toward eventual reunification” as the minimum framework for managing inter-Korean relations. It has further articulated a set of guiding principles, including respect for the North Korean regime, a commitment not to pursue absorption-based reunification, and a pledge to refrain from hostile actions.Together, these principles are intended to maintain peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula. This approach may be understood as a pragmatic strategy that recognizes reunification as a long-term objective while placing greater emphasis on the preservation of peace and stability than on the pursuit of reunification at the risk of provoking conflict.The restoration of inter-Korean relations constitutes the first step toward preventing conflict and reducing tensions on the Korean Peninsula, and the fundamental spirit guiding this endeavor is embodied in the June 15 Joint Declaration. At its core, the declaration affirms the principle of peaceful coexistence between the two Koreas.The two Koreas have experienced decades of antagonistic relations. Nevertheless, successive South Korean governments have consistently sought to move beyond a state of unmitigated hostility and toward a relationship characterized by the coexistence of both hostile and non-hostile elements. Notably, the two Koreas have repeatedly demonstrated an ability to achieve significant paradigm shifts toward peaceful coexistence, even amid periods of heightened tension and confrontation.Historical experience demonstrates that periods of heightened tension need not preclude meaningful inter-Korean engagement. For example, despite serious incidents such as North Korea’s submarine infiltration operations and the First Battle of Yeonpyeong in 1999, the two Koreas were ultimately able to reach the June 15 Joint Declaration. A similar precedent can be found in the July 4 North–South Joint Statement.In the late 1960s, North Korea dispatched special operatives, including Kim Shin-jo, to South Korea in an attempt to assassinate President Park Chung-hee. Yet, by the early 1970s, the two Koreas had moved beyond this period of acute confrontation and adopted the July 4 North–South Joint Statement. At that time, inter-Korean relations were no less tense and volatile than they are today, and the peninsula appeared perilously close to military conflict. Nevertheless, the two sides succeeded in reopening dialogue and laying the groundwork for improved relations.A similar pattern emerged prior to the restoration of inter-Korean relations in the wake of the 2018 PyeongChang Winter Olympics. At the time, the security environment on the Korean Peninsula was highly unstable, and concerns about a potential military confrontation were widespread due to North Korea’s nuclear tests and missile activities. Historical experience also demonstrates that the two Koreas have been capable of overcoming periods of profound hostility.Following the Rangoon (Aung San) terrorist bombing, for example, the two sides eventually restored relations, leading to the first reunions of separated families. Likewise, they succeeded in creating a new momentum for dialogue that contributed to the conclusion of the Inter-Korean Basic Agreement in the aftermath of the Cold War and the collapse of the socialist bloc. The common thread running through these developments was the shared recognition that the two Koreas must coexist peacefully on the Korean Peninsula.Against this backdrop, what course is the Lee Jae-myung administration seeking to pursue? Its objective is to transform the current hostile relationship between the two Koreas into a non-hostile one and, ultimately, into a genuinely peaceful relationship. This objective is clearly articulated in the recently published White Paper on Unification. The document emphasizes that the government will not passively accept North Korea’s “two hostile states” doctrine as the defining framework for the future of inter-Korean relations, but will instead work to ensure that a discourse of peace prevails.The National Community Unification Formula, which provides a framework for the coexistence of the two Koreas, envisions an intermediate stage of inter-Korean confederation in the form of a loose confederative arrangement. The underlying rationale is that mutual recognition, peaceful coexistence, and the restoration of a sense of national community are essential prerequisites for advancing toward such a stage. In this regard, it is worth recalling the foresight embodied in the June 15 Joint Declaration, which recognized the common ground between South Korea’s proposal for a confederation and North Korea’s proposal for a low-level federation.However, the Lee Jae-myung administration’s commitment to reunification and peace-building should extend beyond these initial efforts. Over the years, a variety of concepts—including “mediator,” “facilitator,” “leader,” “steerer,” and, more recently, “pace-setter”—have been employed to characterize South Korea’s role in promoting peace on the Korean Peninsula.Although South Korea has urged President Trump to act as a “peacemaker” amid the current impasse in both inter-Korean and U.S.–North Korea relations, lasting progress will ultimately require South Korea itself to assume a more active role in overcoming these challenges. In this respect, Seoul must be prepared not only to support peace-building efforts but also to share responsibility for shaping and sustaining peace on the Korean Peninsula.

The Evolving ROK–U.S. Alliance: Expanding Trust Through Understanding and Cooperation                    Jongchul Parkadjunct professor of Daejeon UniversityThe Evolving ROK–U.S. Alliance: From Military Alliance to Comprehensive Strategic PartnershipToday’s international environment is defined by increasingly complex and interconnected challenges, driven by intensifying U.S.–China strategic competition, the restructuring of global supply chains, and the growing salience of economic security issues linked to advanced technologies such as artificial intelligence (AI) and semiconductors.Against this backdrop of geopolitical transition, the ROK–U.S. Alliance—which has served as the cornerstone of peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula and in Northeast Asia for more than seven decades—is evolving into a comprehensive strategic partnership that extends beyond traditional military and security cooperation to include economic security, advanced science and technology, and strategic industries.In recent years, the South Korean government has sought to broaden the scope of the alliance through closer cooperation with the United States in areas ranging from supply chain resilience and advanced technology development to defense-industrial collaboration. This evolution reflects more than a traditional security relationship between two allies; it signifies a model partnership in which countries that share the universal values of liberal democracy and market-based economies cooperate to address emerging global challenges.At the same time, some observers have interpreted policy disagreements arising from this process of alliance evolution as evidence of “cracks” in the alliance or as signs of political decline. Criticism of the ROK–U.S. Alliance recently voiced by certain conservative commentators in the United States appears to stem, in part, from a misunderstanding of both the alliance’s evolving character and the dynamics of South Korean domestic politics.The future of the alliance should be assessed on the basis of objective facts, institutional resilience, and accumulated achievements, rather than ideological assumptions or selective interpretations of individual developments.Objective Facts on Issues in the ROK–U.S. Alliance(1) Access to Information on U.S. Military Bases: Crisis Management for Joint Security, Not an Infringement on Alliance AuthorityA recent commentary in the U.S. media criticized efforts to obtain information related to U.S. military bases, characterizing such measures as reckless and arguing that they endangered sensitive military and intelligence assets.In reality, South Korea’s actions were not intended to infringe upon the sovereignty, authority, or operational security of U.S. military installations. Rather, they were aimed at addressing potential gaps in the combined defense posture through more accurate assessments of the security environment on the Korean Peninsula.Effective information-sharing and coordination are essential components of alliance management and combined military readiness. Interpreting such efforts as evidence of alliance deterioration reflects a limited understanding of how contemporary security cooperation functions between allied states.(2) Information on North Korean Nuclear Facilities: Strategic Communication Through Public Disclosure, Not a Violation of GuidelinesSome critics have argued that remarks made by Unification Minister Chung Dong-young regarding North Korean nuclear facilities constituted a violation of ROK–U.S. intelligence-sharing guidelines. Such claims, however, do not accurately reflect the facts.The information referenced at the time did not originate from classified U.S. or South Korean intelligence sources, nor did it involve military secrets. Rather, it consisted of information already available to the international community through reports issued by domestic and international research institutions, commercially available satellite imagery, and open-source media reporting.South Korea and the United States maintain one of the closest intelligence-sharing relationships in addressing the North Korean nuclear challenge. Public discussion of North Korea policy and strategic communication based on open-source information are standard practices in democratic policymaking. Characterizing such activities as intelligence leaks or violations of information-sharing agreements is therefore inconsistent with the factual record.(3) Addressing the Coupang Data Leak: Law Enforcement to Protect Citizens, Not Discriminatory Action Against U.S. CompaniesThe South Korean government’s response to the Coupang personal data breach—which some critics have cited as evidence of discriminatory treatment toward U.S. companies—was a lawful measure undertaken in accordance with domestic legal requirements and the government’s responsibility to protect citizens’ personal information.As a company conducting extensive business operations in South Korea, Coupang is subject to applicable domestic laws and regulations. When a significant personal data breach occurs, it is both appropriate and necessary for the government to investigate the incident, establish the facts, and implement measures to prevent recurrence.Interpreting such actions as discrimination against U.S. companies risks undermining fundamental principles of the rule of law. The South Korean government seeks to maintain a level playing field for all firms operating within its jurisdiction, irrespective of nationality. Applying uniform legal standards to companies from allied nations when public rights and interests are implicated is fully consistent with established legal and regulatory norms.(4) Middle East Policy and Cooperation with the United States: Multilateral Diplomacy and Shared Humanitarian ResponsibilitiesCriticism that South Korea has been insufficiently supportive of U.S. security interests related to Iran—whether through its decision not to participate directly in military operations in the Strait of Hormuz or through its criticism of Israeli military operations in Gaza—reflects an unduly narrow understanding of the role of allies in contemporary international affairs.South Korea supports peace and stability in the Middle East and has contributed to international efforts through humanitarian assistance to Gaza and diplomatic engagement with regional actors. These initiatives are consistent with South Korea’s broader commitment to international peace and conflict management.Such activities do not undermine U.S. security interests. Rather, they enable South Korea to contribute in diplomatic and humanitarian areas where alternative forms of engagement may be more effective. Expecting allies to adopt identical policy positions across every international issue does not reflect the realities of contemporary diplomacy. As a global pivotal state, South Korea seeks to contribute to regional stability through a multidimensional diplomatic approach while remaining aligned with the broader strategic objectives it shares with the United States.(5) Revisiting Constitutional Reform in South Korea: Overcoming the 1987 Framework and Advancing Democratic ReformA common misconception among some conservative commentators in the United States is the assumption that South Korea’s constitutional reform debate is primarily driven by the desire of a particular political party to secure long-term political power.In reality, discussions on constitutional reform reflect a broader recognition that the constitutional framework established in 1987 may no longer adequately address the political, economic, and social realities of contemporary South Korea. Over the past four decades, South Korea has undergone profound transformation, accompanied by increasing social diversity and increasingly complex governance challenges.Debates over constitutional reform—including proposals related to local autonomy, the expansion of fundamental rights, and the restructuring of political authority—have engaged not only governing and opposition parties but also academic institutions, civil society organizations, and policy experts. Evaluating these discussions solely through the lens of partisan political advantage overlooks the sophistication of South Korea’s democratic institutions and the vibrancy of its civil society. South Korea’s democracy continues to demonstrate a capacity for self-correction, adaptation, and institutional evolution.A Future for the Alliance Based on Shared Interests, Shared Values, and Shared FactsThe ROK–U.S. alliance has evolved successfully through diverse political circumstances and changes of government over the course of its history. This resilience reflects the fact that the alliance is not contingent upon any particular administration or ideological orientation. Rather, it is an institutionalized partnership grounded in shared interests, common values, and convergent strategic objectives.Accordingly, policy differences between allies should not automatically be interpreted as evidence of strategic divergence. Greater attention should instead be devoted to understanding how both countries continue to expand and deepen their cooperation in response to an increasingly complex international environment.The future of the ROK–U.S. alliance must rest on a foundation of mutual understanding, trust, and respect rather than suspicion or ideological prejudice. Today, the alliance is evolving beyond its traditional military foundations into a comprehensive partnership encompassing economic security, advanced technology, supply chain resilience, and strategic-industrial cooperation.To respond effectively to emerging geopolitical challenges and the changing international order, both countries should focus on expanding practical cooperation grounded in shared achievements and objective realities, rather than unnecessarily politicizing policy disagreements. As mutual trust deepens and strategic cooperation expands, the ROK–U.S. alliance will be well positioned to continue evolving as one of the most successful and enduring alliances of the twenty-first century.

Beijing’s Two Summits and the Realignment of Eurasia— U.S.–China Rivalry, China–Russia Alignment, and South Korea’s Strategic Challenges —Professor. Choi Jae dukSeoul School of Integrated Science and TechnologyIn May 2026, Beijing emerged as a symbolic venue reflecting the evolving dynamics of the international order. Just four days after the conclusion of U.S. President Donald Trump’s visit to China, Russian President Vladimir Putin returned to Beijing. While the United States and China sought to manage their strategic competition, China and Russia reaffirmed their strategic partnership aimed at reshaping the international order. Although the two summits pursued different objectives, they ultimately underscored a common underlying trend.On the surface, the U.S.–China summit was primarily characterized by efforts to manage tensions and stabilize bilateral relations. The two sides sought to prevent further deterioration in their relationship by signaling limited areas of economic cooperation, including potential purchases of Boeing aircraft and expanded imports of U.S. agricultural products.However, no meaningful compromises were reached on core strategic issues such as Taiwan, semiconductor export controls, rare earth supply chains, and competition in advanced technologies. As a result, the structural differences between the two sides remain intact.Indeed, the summit further reinforced the view that U.S.–China competition has entered a prolonged and structural phase. Particularly noteworthy was China’s restrained response to indications that the United States might ease certain semiconductor restrictions. This suggests that Beijing has firmly adopted technological self-reliance as a long-term national objective, seeking to reduce its dependence on U.S. technology while developing indigenous industrial ecosystems and supply chains.The United States currently faces a range of strategic challenges. The prolonged war in Ukraine and ongoing geopolitical tensions in the Middle East continue to place significant demands on U.S. diplomatic and military resources. Simultaneously, elevated interest rates, fiscal pressures, and rising supply chain costs are exerting considerable strain on the U.S. economy.To be sure, inflationary pressures and rising Treasury yields could be partially alleviated through a reduction in Middle East tensions and greater stability in global energy markets. Nevertheless, Washington faces the complex task of managing commitments across Europe, the Middle East, and the Indo-Pacific simultaneously, fueling debates over the allocation of strategic assets and the prioritization of foreign policy engagements. Over time, this trend could weaken international confidence in both the predictability of U.S. foreign policy and the durability of American global leadership.Nevertheless, the United States continues to possess the world’s most advanced technological innovation capacity, as well as unparalleled financial and military networks, while China faces structural challenges, including a prolonged real estate downturn, sluggish domestic demand, and increasing external scrutiny. Accordingly, it is more accurate to view the current international environment as a period in which major powers are competing to establish a new equilibrium of power and influence.Against this backdrop, President Putin’s visit to China carries even greater symbolic significance. The visit coincided with the 25th anniversary of the Russia–China Treaty of Good-Neighborliness, Friendship, and Cooperation and the 30th anniversary of the establishment of their bilateral strategic partnership. During the visit, the two countries reaffirmed their “comprehensive strategic partnership.” Notably, through a joint statement, they reiterated their commitment to a multipolar world order and to the construction of a new international system.The central theme of the joint statement was a challenge to the structural foundations of the U.S.-led international order. Criticizing unilateralism, hegemonism, the expansion of military alliances, and bloc-based confrontation, the two countries emphasized the principles of a “multipolar world order” and “indivisible security.” This represents more than diplomatic rhetoric; it reflects a long-term strategic vision aimed at reshaping the rules and distribution of power in the international system.In particular, U.S. strategy toward Eurasia is viewed by both Russia and China as a critical security concern. Russia has long regarded NATO’s eastward expansion as a threat to its security interests, while China similarly interprets the U.S. Indo-Pacific Strategy and developments in the Taiwan Strait as elements of a broader, long-term containment strategy.The war in Ukraine and tensions across the Taiwan Strait may therefore be understood as manifestations of great-power competition at opposite ends of Eurasia. Both Beijing and Moscow view these developments as extensions of efforts by the U.S.-centered order to preserve and expand its influence across the Eurasian region.Against this backdrop, China–Russia relations are moving toward deeper structural integration. Sino–Russian cooperation is characterized less by a complete convergence of values and ideology than by a realist alignment driven by a shared strategic environment.In particular, the two countries are strengthening a complementary framework of economic and strategic cooperation. Russia provides China with stable supplies of energy resources and raw materials, including crude oil, natural gas, and coal, while China supplies Russia with manufactured goods, electronics, and industrial equipment. In this arrangement, Russia serves as a supplier of energy and raw materials, while China contributes manufacturing capacity and industrial production.This cooperation carries significance beyond the expansion of bilateral trade. Given the growing importance of stable energy supplies for the development of artificial intelligence industries and advanced manufacturing, Russia’s energy exports have become an increasingly important component of China’s industrial strategy. At the same time, the two countries are expanding ruble- and yuan-denominated transactions and exploring limited alternatives to the dollar-centered international financial system.While U.S. strategic assets and diplomatic resources are increasingly absorbed by geopolitical crises such as the war in Ukraine and instability in the Middle East, China has focused on strengthening industrial competitiveness, securing supply chains, and accumulating technological capabilities. In effect, Beijing has gained a degree of strategic flexibility within an international environment shaped by multiple concurrent geopolitical conflicts.A particularly noteworthy aspect of the joint statement concerns the Korean Peninsula. Both China and Russia oppose an approach toward North Korea centered primarily on sanctions and pressure, instead emphasizing the need for political and diplomatic solutions.At the same time, China and Russia have adopted a critical stance toward the involvement of external powers in Eurasian security affairs, emphasizing the importance of a regionally centered security architecture.The intensification of U.S.–China competition, the deepening of China–Russia ties, and the expansion of North Korea–Russia cooperation are all contributing to greater uncertainty in South Korea’s diplomatic and security environment. South Korea occupies a geopolitical position at the intersection of maritime and continental powers and faces simultaneous pressures arising from both U.S.–China competition and the broader realignment of Eurasia.While the ROK–U.S. alliance remains the cornerstone of South Korea’s security, Seoul must also consider maintaining constructive relations with China, preserving diplomatic channels with Russia, and diversifying supply chains through deeper engagement with ASEAN and the Global South.In particular, given the substantial differences among the United States, China, and Russia regarding the North Korean nuclear issue, diplomatic efforts aimed at narrowing these differences and promoting policy coordination are becoming increasingly important. While the United States continues to call for the complete denuclearization of North Korea, China consistently reiterates its principled position advocating a “political solution” to issues on the Korean Peninsula, including the nuclear question.Russia, meanwhile, appears to be providing de facto diplomatic support on the North Korean nuclear issue, partly as compensation for North Korea’s troop deployments and military assistance related to the war in Ukraine. Given the wide divergence in the interests and policy approaches of these three countries, achieving a common framework for addressing the North Korean nuclear issue—similar to that established during the Six-Party Talks—appears increasingly difficult.Under these circumstances, a so-called “freeze-first” approach—prioritizing the suspension of additional nuclear tests, the production of highly enriched uranium, and further advances in North Korea’s intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) capabilities in exchange for limited sanctions relief or measures to improve bilateral relations—may represent a realistic policy alternative at the present stage.Although such an approach would not constitute a fundamental solution to the North Korean nuclear issue, it could help prevent further deterioration of the situation while preserving space for future negotiations. This perspective underscores the need for a phased and pragmatic strategy focused on constraining further nuclear expansion rather than expecting complete denuclearization in the near term.Furthermore, in an era in which economic security and geopolitics are increasingly intertwined, strategies aimed at reducing dependence on specific countries and building diversified, multilayered networks are becoming ever more important. Such measures represent a pragmatic approach to preserving national strategic autonomy within a complex and evolving international environment.The two summit meetings in Beijing illustrate that the international order is gradually moving away from a U.S.-centered unipolar framework toward a more competitive multipolar system characterized by overlapping strategic axes. They also demonstrate that the Eurasian space is increasingly becoming the principal arena of this transformation.These shifts in the Eurasian order are having a direct impact on security dynamics on the Korean Peninsula. Looking ahead, South Korean diplomacy faces several critical challenges: how to achieve “connected peace” through “connected growth” amid the fragmentation of globalization and the rise of competing blocs; how to cultivate shared interests with as many countries as possible in order to become a nation of mutual strategic importance; and ultimately, how to foster a favorable strategic environment with like-minded partners in order to preserve peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula.

The Importance of Security and Economic Cooperation Between South Korea and Southeast Asian Nations Following the ASEAN Summit                    Nam-eun KimProfessorChungnam National UniversityThe 48th ASEAN Summit and the Strategic Challenges Facing South Korean DiplomacyThe 48th ASEAN Summit, held on May 8, 2026, in Cebu, Philippines, reaffirmed that Southeast Asia can no longer remain on the periphery of great-power competition. The theme of the summit, “Navigating Our Future, Together,” reflected ASEAN’s determination not to remain a passive object of the regional order, but rather to establish a common direction and proactively shape the future regional cooperative order. Based on this awareness, ASEAN leaders reaffirmed the importance of ASEAN solidarity, centrality, and a rules-based regional order.Amid the simultaneous emergence of energy and food supply instability, uncertainty surrounding maritime transport routes, tensions in the South China Sea, the situation in Myanmar, financial market volatility, and the growing challenges of climate change and disaster response, this message demonstrated ASEAN’s resolve to address these practical challenges collectively.The most prominent agenda item at the summit was the issue of energy and food security arising from the Middle East crisis. ASEAN leaders discussed the impact of the deteriorating situation in the Middle East on regional trade, energy prices, air and maritime transportation, and the protection of citizens overseas, while emphasizing the need for a coordinated response. In particular, initiatives such as regional fuel stockpiling, diversification of crude oil import sources, emergency fuel-sharing arrangements, and power-grid interconnection suggest that ASEAN has begun to view supply shocks not as isolated national problems, but as a shared economic security challenge.This carries important implications for South Korea as well, given that the South Korean economy remains heavily dependent on energy imports, maritime shipping routes, and supply chains related to semiconductors, batteries, automobiles, and shipbuilding. The stability of Southeast Asia’s supply chains should therefore no longer be viewed as an issue confined to the region, but rather as a matter directly linked to South Korea’s economic security.Maritime cooperation was another major outcome of the summit. ASEAN leaders adopted a declaration on maritime cooperation and reaffirmed the importance of regional peace and stability, maritime safety, the blue economy, marine environmental protection, and respect for international law.The declaration is significant in that it approaches maritime issues not merely as matters of territorial disputes or military tensions, but as a comprehensive agenda encompassing freedom of navigation, the stability of maritime transport routes, the sustainable use of marine resources, and maritime risk management. Given that the majority of South Korea’s foreign trade depends on maritime shipping routes, stability in the South China Sea and Southeast Asian waters directly affects the country’s exports and imports, energy security, and supply-chain operations.These summit outcomes demonstrate that South Korea’s cooperation with Southeast Asia must expand beyond trade promotion and development assistance to encompass regional stability and economic security as well. Southeast Asia is not only a production base and market for South Korean companies, but also a strategic space for cooperation where South Korea’s energy security, maritime transport routes, supply-chain restructuring, and peace diplomacy on the Korean Peninsula converge.In particular, following the elevation of South Korea–ASEAN relations to a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership in 2024 and the adoption of the 2026–2030 Action Plan, cooperation between South Korea and ASEAN is moving beyond declaratory friendship and entering a phase of practical implementation.The Action Plan encompasses political and security cooperation, economic cooperation, connectivity, sustainability, and people-to-people exchanges, thereby providing an institutional foundation for advancing South Korea–ASEAN cooperation in parallel with both ASEAN Community-building efforts and South Korea’s broader regional strategy.Therefore, the task facing South Korean diplomacy following the 48th ASEAN Summit is clear. The challenges highlighted at the summit—energy and food security, maritime cooperation, supply-chain stability, and regional crisis management—also constitute direct strategic and diplomatic challenges for South Korea.How will South Korea utilize ASEAN as a regional base of support for peace on the Korean Peninsula? How will it build economic security partnerships capable of jointly addressing supply-chain risks? And how will it strengthen Indo-Pacific connectivity through port, rail, and digital logistics networks? The strategic challenges confronting South Korea–Southeast Asia cooperation in the aftermath of the 48th ASEAN Summit stem precisely from these three questions.Peace on the Korean Peninsula and ASEAN: Strategic Utilization of Spaces for DialogueThe first strategic challenge for South Korea–Southeast Asia cooperation is to broaden the regional support base for peace on the Korean Peninsula. This ASEAN Summit reaffirmed that ASEAN is a regional cooperative body that has consistently managed complex regional issues—such as energy and food security, maritime cooperation, the situation in Myanmar, and the South China Sea dispute—within a multilateral consultative framework. Although ASEAN is not a security alliance with coercive power, it has played an important role in keeping regional conflicts on the agenda and maintaining channels of dialogue.The issue of the Korean Peninsula should also be approached within this context. While ASEAN is not a direct party to the conflict, the fact that many of its member states maintain diplomatic relations with both North Korea and South Korea provides a foundation for expanding discussions on peace on the Korean Peninsula to the Southeast Asian level.In particular, the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) holds diplomatic significance as it is virtually the only regional multilateral security consultative body in which North Korea participates. Of course, the ARF is not a negotiating framework capable of directly resolving North Korea’s nuclear and missile issues.However, it provides a channel through which the Korean Peninsula issue can be addressed not merely as a military concern confined to Northeast Asia, but as an agenda item affecting peace and stability across the broader Indo-Pacific region. Through this framework, South Korea can clearly convey the international community’s concerns regarding North Korea’s nuclear and missile development while simultaneously emphasizing the need for tension reduction and the resumption of dialogue.South Korea’s cooperation with ASEAN must be pursued on the basis of the recognition that North Korea’s nuclear and missile development constitutes a challenge to international norms and UN Security Council resolutions. However, upholding these principles does not mean severing diplomatic channels.While a framework of deterrence and sanctions remains necessary in response to rising North Korean military tensions, the complete closure of channels for tension management could increase the risk of accidental conflict and miscalculation. Therefore, while maintaining a principled stance, South Korea must preserve at least a minimal diplomatic opening for the resumption of dialogue.ASEAN’s significance lies not in its direct influence over North Korea, but in its diplomatic continuity—its consistent treatment of the Korean Peninsula issue as an agenda item related to regional peace and stability. South Korea must leverage this continuity to underscore that North Korea’s nuclear and missile issues are not merely a crisis on the Korean Peninsula, but also a regional agenda item linked to the stability of Southeast Asia. Through this process, the diplomatic foundation for peace on the Korean Peninsula can be expanded beyond Northeast Asia to encompass Southeast Asia as well.The following are concrete measures to achieve this:▪ Regularization of South Korea-ASEAN Consultations on Peace on the Korean PeninsulaSouth Korea needs to regularly address issues related to peace on the Korean Peninsula and regional stability within the political and security cooperation framework of the Korea–ASEAN Comprehensive Strategic Partnership. These consultations should not constitute a separate negotiating body focused solely on the North Korean nuclear issue, but rather a policy dialogue aimed at jointly assessing how developments on the Korean Peninsula affect Southeast Asia’s security environment and economic security.Through this approach, South Korea can broaden the Korean Peninsula issue beyond a narrow intra-regional security concern confined to Northeast Asia and frame it as a shared interest linked to stability across the broader Indo-Pacific region.▪ Coordinating Messages on North Korea through the ARFSouth Korea should utilize the ARF to clearly convey the international community’s concerns regarding North Korea’s nuclear and missile development, while also emphasizing that the door to dialogue remains open should North Korea cease escalating tensions and return to the negotiating table.The key is to maintain the message that the diplomatic door has not been completely closed, without undermining the necessity of sanctions and pressure. Through this approach, South Korea, together with ASEAN member states, can consistently present the diplomatic options available to North Korea should it choose to comply with international norms.▪ Parallel Implementation of Sanctions Against North Korea and Non-Traditional Security CooperationGiven that some ASEAN countries maintain diplomatic relations with North Korea, South Korea should promote information sharing and capacity-building efforts regarding the implementation of sanctions against North Korea, while ensuring that the scope of humanitarian assistance and non-traditional security cooperation is not entirely constrained by the logic of sanctions.Areas such as food security, public health, disaster response, climate adaptation, and maritime safety can contribute to easing tensions on the Korean Peninsula and building regional trust, provided that such cooperation does not conflict with the sanctions regime. Therefore, South Korea must distinguish between principled cooperation aimed at preventing sanctions evasion and limited humanitarian cooperation intended to alleviate humanitarian crises.For these measures to be meaningful, the scope and limits of cooperation with ASEAN must be clearly defined. ASEAN is not an actor with the coercive power to directly drive North Korea’s denuclearization, and its member states do not share identical perceptions of North Korea or identical strategic interests.Therefore, rather than positioning ASEAN as the primary actor in resolving the Korean Peninsula issue, South Korea should utilize it as a cooperative space for fostering a conducive environment for dialogue and expanding regional support. When this point is clearly understood, cooperation with ASEAN can serve as a practical means of complementing South Korea’s peace diplomacy on the Korean Peninsula, rather than becoming engagement without principles.Supply Chain Resilience: The Significance of Southeast Asia as an Economic Security PartnerThe second strategic task of South Korea–Southeast Asia cooperation is the strengthening of supply-chain resilience. At the ASEAN Summit, supply-chain issues were raised not merely as a general economic cooperation agenda, but as an urgent economic security priority in response to the ripple effects of the Middle East crisis. ASEAN leaders discussed the impact of the deteriorating situation in the Middle East on regional trade, energy markets, maritime and air transport, and the safety of citizens abroad, while emphasizing the need for a coordinated response.In particular, fuel stockpiling, diversification of crude oil import sources, emergency fuel-sharing arrangements, regional power-grid interconnection, and food supply stability emerged as key economic security priorities at the summit. This demonstrates that ASEAN is addressing supply-chain crises not merely as logistical disruptions or price increases, but as complex challenges involving energy security, food security, maritime transport routes, and the protection of citizens.This issue has direct implications for South Korea as well. The South Korean economy relies heavily on energy imports, maritime transport routes, and production and logistics networks related to semiconductors, batteries, automobiles, and shipbuilding. Therefore, the stability of supply chains in Southeast Asia must be regarded as a key foundation for the stable functioning of the South Korean economy.If the shock stemming from the Middle East crisis leads to higher energy prices, fuel supply disruptions, rising food prices, and increased maritime shipping costs, the production, logistics, and import–export structures of South Korean companies will inevitably be directly affected. South Korea’s supply-chain cooperation with ASEAN must therefore be designed not merely to diversify production bases for specific industries, but also to strengthen regional resilience so that access to energy, logistics, production, and markets can be maintained even during times of crisis.Southeast Asia is already a key production and investment hub, as well as an important growth market for South Korea. However, the summit demonstrated that Southeast Asia has established itself as an economic security partner connected to the stability of energy, food, logistics, and power grids, going beyond its traditional role as a production base and consumer market.Indonesia’s critical minerals, Vietnam’s electronics and components production networks, Singapore’s role as a financial and logistics hub, and the electrical, electronics, and automotive industrial bases of Malaysia and Thailand are all closely linked to the resilience of South Korea’s supply chains.What is crucial is not to limit this cooperation to the mere expansion of investment in individual countries, but to develop it into a cooperative framework that integrates production, logistics, energy, finance, human resources, and institutional arrangements. While respecting ASEAN centrality, South Korea must establish a cooperation model that simultaneously supports ASEAN’s industrial upgrading and strengthens the resilience of South Korean companies’ supply chains.The concrete action plans to achieve this are as follows:▪ Establishing a Supply Chain Risk Response SystemSouth Korea and ASEAN need to establish a consultative framework for proactively sharing risks related to energy, critical minerals, food, semiconductor components, battery materials, and logistics routes. The fact that the Middle East crisis and instability in maritime transport routes were addressed as key agenda items at the summit demonstrates that such risks can expand beyond issues affecting individual countries and evolve into economic security concerns for the entire region.Therefore, South Korea must work with ASEAN to establish a system capable of the early detection of, and response to, supply disruptions involving key commodities, port congestion, maritime transport risks, surging raw material prices, and energy supply disruptions.▪ Packaging Cooperation on Key Industrial Supply ChainsSouth Korea’s supply-chain cooperation with ASEAN must not be limited to expanding investment in individual industries. Sectors such as batteries, electric vehicles, semiconductor back-end processes, electronic components, and energy storage devices all require the coordinated functioning of raw material procurement, materials and parts production, workforce development, logistics networks, and environmental standards to ensure stability. Building on its technological expertise and industrial experience in batteries, electric vehicles, semiconductors, and the electrical and electronics industries, South Korea must develop a cooperation model that integrates these capabilities with ASEAN’s critical minerals, production bases, logistics hubs, and workforce resources. Such cooperation should go beyond mere cost reduction or resource acquisition and instead aim to simultaneously strengthen ASEAN’s industrial infrastructure and enhance the procurement and logistics stability of South Korean companies.▪ Expanding Cooperation on Food and Energy SecurityAs the summit elevated energy and food security to key agenda items, South Korea needs to expand cooperation in these areas at the level of regional public goods. Cooperation in smart agriculture, food storage and processing, cold-chain logistics, energy storage systems, renewable energy, power-grid management, hydrogen, and ammonia is directly linked to stabilizing livelihoods and strengthening ASEAN’s industrial base.This represents an opportunity for South Korean companies to expand their presence, while also serving as a means of enhancing regional supply-chain resilience amid recurring crises in the Middle East and instability in maritime transport routes.Such cooperation aligns not only with the need to ensure stable supply chains for South Korean companies, but also with ASEAN’s practical need to address vulnerabilities in energy, food, and logistics. When South Korea contributes to strengthening ASEAN’s industrial base, economic cooperation with ASEAN can evolve beyond mere investment expansion into a form of economic security cooperation through which both South Korea and ASEAN jointly mitigate risks.Infrastructure Connectivity: Concrete Cooperation on Ports, Railways, and Digital LogisticsThe third strategic task for South Korea–Southeast Asia cooperation is strengthening infrastructure connectivity centered on ports, railways, and digital logistics. The energy and food security and maritime cooperation emphasized at the ASEAN Summit are not merely crisis-response agendas.To ensure the stable movement of energy and food, and to prevent instability in maritime transport routes from escalating into actual economic shocks, ports, railways, roads, storage facilities, power grids, and customs clearance systems must function in an integrated manner. Therefore, ports, railways, and digital logistics are not merely ancillary elements of supply-chain cooperation, but rather foundational infrastructure for implementing the economic security agenda highlighted at the summit.In particular, infrastructure cooperation in Southeast Asia should not be approached solely as a matter of constructing individual facilities. Even if port capacity is expanded, logistics efficiency will be difficult to improve without effective connections to hinterland railways and roads. Similarly, even if a railway network is developed, supply-chain stability will remain limited if customs procedures and logistics data systems continue to operate in isolation.Food security, too, cannot be achieved through increased production alone; storage and processing facilities, cold-chain logistics, port handling capacity, and digital customs clearance systems must all function in an integrated manner. In this regard, cooperation in ports, railways, and digital logistics constitutes a key area that simultaneously supports the strengthening of ASEAN connectivity and South Korea’s economic security.South Korea can make a substantial contribution to this cooperation based on its experience in port operations, railway systems, smart logistics, digital customs clearance, cold-chain logistics, power grids, energy storage systems, and the shipping and shipbuilding sectors.However, South Korea’s role should not be limited to simply participating in individual infrastructure projects. By proposing a cooperation model that integrates ports, railways, logistics data, hinterland industrial complexes, and energy infrastructure, South Korea can contribute to strengthening ASEAN connectivity while also expanding a stable foundation for South Korean companies’ market entry.Therefore, infrastructure cooperation should be designed from the perspective of “connectivity” rather than mere “construction.” Port automation, rail–port integration, logistics data platforms, digital customs clearance, cold-chain logistics, eco-friendly vessels, and disaster-resilient infrastructure are areas in which ASEAN’s growth strategies and South Korea’s industrial capabilities converge. To this end, South Korea needs to consider implementation strategies in three key directions.▪ Integrated Infrastructure Cooperation Linking Ports, Railways, and Industrial ComplexesSouth Korea needs to propose an integrated cooperation model that bundles ports, railways, hinterland industrial complexes, and logistics centers into a single project framework. By leveraging ODA, the Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund, policy finance, and private investment in combination, South Korea can simultaneously promote the strengthening of ASEAN connectivity and secure stable production and logistics bases for South Korean companies.▪ Strengthening Cooperation on Digital Logistics and Customs Clearance SystemsTo translate port- and rail-centered physical connectivity into tangible economic activity, digital logistics and customs clearance systems must be developed in tandem. South Korea can cooperate with ASEAN in areas such as electronic customs clearance, logistics data platforms, port operation systems, smart warehouses, and cargo-tracking systems.In particular, the standardization of digital logistics information and customs procedures is essential to enabling small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) to participate more stably in Southeast Asian logistics networks.▪ Strengthening Maritime Safety, Disaster Response, and Operational CapabilitiesASEAN waters are a critical region for South Korea’s energy transportation and trade, but they are also vulnerable to the impacts of the climate crisis, typhoons, marine pollution, illegal fishing, piracy, and transnational crime. South Korea can cooperate with ASEAN in areas such as maritime safety, search and rescue, marine pollution response, disaster forecasting, and strengthening port resilience.In addition, there is a need to expand education and training programs in railway operations, port management, logistics data analysis, disaster response, and energy management. This is because the sustainability of infrastructure cooperation depends more on operational capabilities than on physical infrastructure alone. Such cooperation has strong implementation potential, as it constitutes regional public-goods cooperation that is more readily accepted by ASEAN than security cooperation targeting specific countries.This connectivity cooperation can serve as a pathway for translating South Korea’s ASEAN strategy into concrete policy. If South Korea promotes cooperation in ports, railways, digital logistics, and maritime safety, it can contribute to strengthening ASEAN’s capacity to respond to energy, food, and logistics crises. At the same time, this will help lay the groundwork for the stable continuation of South Korean companies’ production and logistics operations.Conclusion: Strategic Direction for South Korea-ASEAN CooperationFollowing the 48th ASEAN Summit, South Korea’s diplomacy toward ASEAN must move beyond a relationship centered primarily on trade and investment and be further developed in a direction that encompasses both peace diplomacy and economic security.Energy and food security, maritime cooperation, supply-chain stability, and regional crisis management are all issues directly linked to South Korea’s security and economy. Therefore, South Korea must expand its cooperation with ASEAN into a strategic partnership capable of jointly addressing regional crisis management and economic security.Under these conditions, South Korea’s diplomacy toward ASEAN must not treat peace on the Korean Peninsula, economic security, and infrastructure connectivity as separate issues. The Korean Peninsula issue is not merely a matter of inter-Korean relations, but must also be addressed within the broader context of peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific region.Economic cooperation, too, must evolve beyond the expansion of production bases and consumer markets into a cooperative framework capable of jointly responding to energy, food, and logistics shocks. Infrastructure connectivity serves as the foundation for operationalizing this cooperation. When cooperation in ports, railways, digital logistics, and maritime safety is advanced in an integrated manner, South Korea and ASEAN can build a cooperative network capable of remaining stable even in times of crisis.The limitations of cooperation with ASEAN are also clear. Member states do not share identical interests, and there are inherent constraints on the role ASEAN can play regarding the North Korean issue, the situation in Myanmar, and the South China Sea dispute. However, as competition among major powers intensifies and regional crises become more complex, the significance of ASEAN—which maintains channels of dialogue and continuously manages regional cooperation agendas—becomes even greater.Ultimately, following the 48th ASEAN Summit, the core of South Korea–Southeast Asia cooperation lies in linking the crisis-management agenda raised at the summit to South Korea’s peace diplomacy and economic security strategies.Through ASEAN, South Korea must broaden the regional support base for peace on the Korean Peninsula, jointly address supply-chain risks, and strengthen Indo-Pacific connectivity through port, rail, and digital logistics networks. As these efforts accumulate, the Korea–ASEAN Comprehensive Strategic Partnership can evolve beyond declaratory cooperation into a substantive framework that supports regional peace and economic security.