We Look Forward to the Vatican’s Continued Engagement in Promoting Peace on the Korean Peninsula                    Kim, Hong-seopPh.D. Chairman,Incheon YMCA Prof. Emeritus INUJoint Representative,  Network for Peace & UnificationThe Pope (Summus Pontifex) serves as the spiritual leader of the Catholic Church, the Bishop of Rome, and the sovereign of Vatican City State. Today, the global Catholic community is estimated to comprise approximately 1.5 billion faithful, including roughly 1.3 billion members of the Latin (Western) Church and around 200 million adherents of the Eastern Catholic Churches. When combined with the world's approximately 900 million Protestants, Christians collectively number an estimated 2.3 billion people, accounting for about 31 percent of the global population.The current Pope, Leo XIV, is the 267th pontiff of the Catholic Church and assumed the papacy on May 8, 2025. Although the Pope's formal ecclesiastical office is that of the Bishop of Rome, the modern papacy has evolved into a global institution with substantial moral, diplomatic, and international influence. The Pope today functions not only as a religious authority but also as a prominent global figure whose statements and actions often carry significant political, humanitarian, and diplomatic implications.For many centuries, the papacy was dominated by Italians and, on occasion, by French pontiffs. However, the election of Pope John Paul II of Poland in October 1978 marked the beginning of a new era in which non-Italian leaders assumed an increasingly prominent role. He was succeeded by Pope Benedict XVI of Germany, Pope Francis of Argentina—the first pontiff from the Americas—and, most recently, Pope Leo XIV, an American-born pope with deep ties to Peru.Although the Pope remains, in formal ecclesiastical terms, the Bishop of Rome, the international role of the papacy has expanded considerably over time. As Bishop of Rome, the Pope maintains a pastoral relationship with Catholic communities throughout the world. At the same time, through institutions such as the College of Cardinals and the Roman Curia, he serves as both the symbolic head and the effective leader of the global Catholic Church.Catholicism was introduced to the Korean Peninsula during the late Joseon Dynasty through the intellectual movement known as Seohak ("Western Learning"). It gradually spread through the efforts of both foreign missionaries and indigenous believers, despite repeated government persecutions that produced a large number of martyrs and left a lasting legacy in the history of Korean Catholicism.I still vividly recall the historic arrival of Pope John Paul II at Gimpo International Airport in May 1984, when he became the first pope to visit the Korean Peninsula. After performing the traditional gesture of kissing the ground upon his arrival, he greeted the Korean people in their own language, quoting a well-known Confucian saying: “Is it not a joy to welcome a friend who has come from afar?”During his visit to South Korea for the 44th World Eucharistic Congress in October 1989, Pope John Paul II expressed his hope that “God would grant Korea and all its people the grace of spiritual happiness and fraternal harmony.”Following the first Inter-Korean Summit in 2000, President Kim Dae-jung conveyed to the Vatican a proposal for the Pope to visit North Korea. John Paul II responded with considerable interest and expressed his willingness to make the journey, emphasizing the importance of reconciliation, dialogue, and peace on the Korean Peninsula. Although the visit ultimately did not materialize, the Pope’s positive response reflected the Vatican’s longstanding support for peace and inter-Korean reconciliation.In his prayers for peace on the Korean Peninsula, Pope John Paul II repeatedly expressed deep concern for the people of North Korea and consistently emphasized the values of reconciliation, solidarity, and human fraternity. Reflecting his longstanding commitment to peace and dialogue, he supported efforts to promote greater understanding between the two Koreas.During discussions in 2000 regarding a possible papal visit to North Korea, he reportedly remarked that “it would be a miracle for me to go to North Korea.” The statement reflected both his humility and his recognition of the extraordinary political and diplomatic challenges involved. At the same time, it underscored his enduring hope that such a visit might contribute to reconciliation and peace on the Korean Peninsula.The Pope’s Engagement with the Korean Peninsula and Our ResponsePope Leo XIV, who succeeded Pope Francis, had developed a longstanding connection with Korea even before his election to the papacy. During his tenure as Prior General of the Order of Saint Augustine, he visited South Korea on five occasions. As a result of these experiences, he is widely regarded as a pope with a deep understanding of Korean affairs.During his visits, he traveled to areas near the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ), where he witnessed firsthand the realities of the Korean Peninsula’s division. He reportedly expressed profound sorrow over the continued separation of the Korean people and demonstrated a keen interest in the prospects for reconciliation and lasting peace. These experiences have contributed to expectations that Pope Leo XIV will continue the Vatican’s longstanding commitment to peace and dialogue on the Korean Peninsula.Through his engagement with issues concerning the Korean Peninsula, Pope Leo XIV has consistently demonstrated his dedication to peace, reconciliation, and human dignity.First, Pope Leo XIV has demonstrated a deep concern for the Korean Peninsula and the suffering caused by its prolonged division. He has repeatedly encouraged Catholics worldwide to stand in solidarity with the Korean people and to pray for reconciliation and lasting peace. Consistent with the Vatican's longstanding commitment to nonviolence and dialogue, he has emphasized that conflicts in troubled regions “must be resolved through dialogue and fraternity, not through force.”Second, Pope Leo XIV has promoted a message of peace through the universal language of sports. During an audience at the Vatican, he was presented with an honorary 10th-degree black belt and a dobok by the World Taekwondo (WT).On that occasion, he praised taekwondo's contribution to advancing peace and humanitarian values worldwide, particularly through programs that support refugee youth. He emphasized that sports can serve as a powerful instrument for peace by transcending national borders, political divisions, and ideological differences, thereby fostering mutual understanding, respect, and solidarity among peoples.Third, Pope Leo XIV's planned visit to South Korea for the 2027 World Youth Day (WYD) in Seoul represents a historic opportunity. The visit is likely to become the most significant manifestation of his engagement with the Korean Peninsula to date and could serve as a catalyst for meaningful progress toward reconciliation and peace.His forthcoming sixth visit to South Korea would make him the pope with the most visits to the Korean Peninsula in history, underscoring the depth of his longstanding connection with the Korean people. The Catholic Church in Korea, together with the broader international community, holds high expectations that Pope Leo XIV will use the occasion of the 2027 World Youth Day to deliver a powerful message of reconciliation, peace, and hope—not only to South Korean youth but also to the people of North Korea.Fourth, Pope Leo XIV has drawn attention to the ethical and social challenges posed by emerging technologies. In Magnifica Humanitas (“Great Humanity”), he warned that misinformation generated and amplified through digital platforms, data systems, and algorithms could deepen polarization and exacerbate hostility in situations of conflict and war.He also cautioned that the rapid expansion of an AI-driven digital economy could contribute to the erosion of human dignity and the exploitation of labor. Accordingly, Pope Leo XIV has emphasized that artificial intelligence should serve the common good and remain accessible to all. He has further argued that political authorities bear a responsibility to prevent excessive concentrations of technological and informational power while safeguarding human dignity, peace, and justice.Fifth, President Lee Jae-myung’s visit to the Holy See represents more than a symbolic diplomatic engagement; it offers an important opportunity to broaden international support for renewed efforts to promote peace on the Korean Peninsula. In a recent briefing, National Security Advisor Wi Seong-rak outlined President Lee’s official schedule for his visit to the Holy See and reaffirmed the government’s commitment to working closely with the Vatican to advance peace, reconciliation, and dialogue on the Korean Peninsula.President Lee attended the “Special Mass for Peace and Solidarity” at the Vatican the previous day, where he delivered a commemorative address. Marking the 26th anniversary of the June 15 Inter-Korean Joint Declaration, he underscored the importance of dialogue and cooperation between the two Koreas, stating that “the spark of hope for peace on the Korean Peninsula ignited by the June 15 Declaration remains alive.”On June 15, President Lee held a private audience with Pope Leo XIV, followed by discussions with Cardinal Pietro Parolin, the Holy See’s Secretary of State. During these meetings, President Lee conveyed the Korean people’s aspirations for lasting peace on the Korean Peninsula and outlined his government’s vision for advancing dialogue, reconciliation, and cooperation between the two Koreas. In response, the Holy See reaffirmed its longstanding commitment to and continued interest in promoting peace and reconciliation on the Korean Peninsula.Both sides agreed to cooperate closely to ensure the successful hosting of the 2027 World Youth Day in Seoul, and President Lee took the opportunity to formally invite Pope Leo XIV to visit South Korea.Pope Leo XIV’s anticipated visit to South Korea, together with his message of peace and reconciliation for the Korean Peninsula and the broader international community, has the potential to provide renewed momentum for efforts to promote dialogue, mutual understanding, and peaceful coexistence. Many hope that his visit will encourage both South and North Korea to pursue a more constructive path toward reconciliation and lasting peace.Implications for South KoreaFirst, the Pope’s engagement has the potential to contribute to efforts aimed at reducing tensions on the Korean Peninsula and fostering a more favorable environment for peace. At a time when inter-Korean relations are undergoing significant change—including North Korea’s redefinition of inter-Korean relations through constitutional revisions and its increasing emphasis on the concept of two separate states—the Pope’s statements and actions may carry important political and symbolic significance. His advocacy of dialogue, reconciliation, and peaceful coexistence could help encourage a more constructive atmosphere on the Korean Peninsula.Second, his involvement may help strengthen the prospects for renewed inter-Korean dialogue and foster a more favorable environment for reconciliation between the two Koreas.Third, his engagement may contribute to moderating domestic political and social polarization surrounding issues related to inter-Korean relations, peace, and reunification. By emphasizing dialogue, mutual understanding, and human fraternity, the Pope's message may encourage more constructive public discussion of the Korean Peninsula's future.Fourth, his engagement may enhance South Korea's diplomatic profile in East Asia and contribute to efforts aimed at promoting greater regional stability and peace. Given the Vatican's moral authority and international influence, continued cooperation between South Korea and the Holy See may also strengthen international support for peacebuilding initiatives on the Korean Peninsula.Ultimately, the Pope's engagement with Korean Peninsula issues may generate effects that extend beyond the region itself. By fostering a culture of peace and reconciliation in Northeast Asia, it could contribute to broader international efforts to advance conflict resolution and sustainable peace.Implications for North KoreaFrom North Korea's perspective, Pope Leo XIV's engagement could provide an opportunity to enhance its international image and present itself as a more responsible member of the international community. The Pope's visit to South Korea, his statements concerning the Korean Peninsula, and the possibility of future engagement with North Korea could serve as a catalyst for new diplomatic opportunities in East Asia. Such developments may encourage broader international dialogue and create additional avenues for North Korea to engage with emerging international frameworks, including the United Nations, BRICS, and countries of the Global South. In this respect, papal engagement could help expand the diplomatic space available to all parties beyond the existing patterns of strategic competition and geopolitical confrontation in the region.Domestically, such engagement could provide an opportunity for North Korea to reinforce official messaging while projecting an image of stability, confidence, and greater openness to the outside world.Over time, sustained engagement with the Holy See and the broader international community could contribute to a gradual improvement in North Korea's international image and help soften perceptions of the country as isolated and confrontational. Ultimately, if accompanied by meaningful policy reforms and sustained international engagement, North Korea could play a more constructive role in advancing universal values and addressing shared global challenges, including peace and security, environmental cooperation, international exchange, and human rights.As we reflect on the challenges and opportunities before us, the wisdom of earlier generations remains highly relevant: “Peace requires more effort than war” (Napoleon Bonaparte); “There is no path to peace; peace is the path” (Mahatma Gandhi); and “The best way to preserve peace is to prepare for it” (George Washington).Just as God prepared the way for the return of the Israelites and the rebuilding of the Temple through Cyrus during the Babylonian Exile, we cannot know through which nation, individual, or institution He may choose to begin His work on the Korean Peninsula at the appointed time (kairos), after more than eight decades of division.Our responsibility is therefore to faithfully carry out our mission as stewards of peace and reconciliation on the Korean Peninsula—steadily, patiently, and with perseverance. Like Noah, who relied solely on God's word, endured criticism, and devoted years to building the ark, we must continue our efforts in faith, even when the path forward remains uncertain.

Korea–Europe Cooperation in an Evolving Strategic Environment                    Sungwon LeeResearch Fellow Sejong InstituteHow Should We View Korea-Europe Cooperation?In recent years, interest in and discussions surrounding security cooperation between South Korea and Europe have expanded significantly. A number of analytical frameworks have been employed to explain the growing momentum behind cooperation between the two regions. First, there has been increasing recognition of South Korea and Europe as partners that share common values and norms in the Indo-Pacific.Both sides released their respective Indo-Pacific strategies at roughly the same time, underscoring their importance as like-minded partners that share regional visions, values, and normative principles within the broader framework of U.S. leadership. In addition, the concept of “shared threats” has emerged as an important narrative underpinning the rationale for Korea–Europe cooperation. Following the outbreak of the Russia–Ukraine war in 2022, Europe’s growing demand for military equipment and the urgent need for rearmament have created substantial opportunities for the expansion of South Korea’s defense industry into European markets. Most notably, North Korea’s deployment of troops to Russia has reinforced the so-called “one theater” narrative—the notion that security challenges in Europe and Asia are increasingly interconnected—and has further broadened discussions regarding security cooperation between the two regions.At the same time, the international order is undergoing profound transformation. While frameworks such as the Russian threat, China’s rise, and the Indo-Pacific strategy are useful in explaining specific drivers and characteristics of Korea–Europe cooperation, they nonetheless provide only a partial explanation and offer limited analytical leverage for assessing its long-term sustainability.Against this backdrop, this paper raises several key questions: Why has the strategic value of South Korea and Europe increased to an unprecedented level? What forms of cooperation can both sides realistically pursue? What constraints and limitations remain? And what issues must be addressed to ensure sustainable cooperation in the years ahead?Shared Strategic Realities between South Korea and EuropeSouth Korea–Europe cooperation should be understood not merely as a response to shared threat perceptions, but as a product of broader structural transformations. Since the end of the Cold War, both South Korea and Europe have pursued reconstruction, economic development, and prosperity within a common structural environment defined by U.S. security guarantees and an open international economic order.Today, however, both are witnessing the gradual erosion of the foundations that have sustained this order. Supply chains are increasingly shaped by geopolitical considerations, while industrial competitiveness has become inseparable from national security concerns.In particular, the shift in U.S. foreign policy following President Trump’s return to office, combined with the proliferation of simultaneous conflicts such as the Russia–Ukraine war and the conflict involving Iran, has placed unprecedented strain on the assumptions and institutional mechanisms underpinning the existing international order. One notable example is the evolving concept of alliances.Traditionally, alliances were understood as security communities grounded in shared values. Increasingly, however, they are being redefined in more transactional terms, with their value assessed according to the extent to which they advance the interests of security-providing states and the level of contributions made by alliance partners.In other words, Europe is confronting not merely an intensification of geopolitical competition, but a fundamental transformation in the way the international order is sustained. South Korea faces a similar reality. From this perspective, South Korea–Europe cooperation should not be viewed primarily as a response to common adversaries such as China and Russia. Rather, it should be understood as a convergence between two actors confronting the same underlying strategic transition.More specifically, South Korea and Europe face three common strategic dilemmas. The first is the tension between alliance dependence and strategic autonomy. Europe recognizes that its security remains heavily dependent on the United States while simultaneously acknowledging that such dependence may be difficult to sustain over the long term. South Korea faces a comparable challenge. Although U.S. extended deterrence remains indispensable, Seoul must also balance this dependence with efforts to strengthen self-reliance and expand its own defense capabilities.The second dilemma concerns maintaining industrial competitiveness amid intensifying great-power competition. The Russia–Ukraine war and the strategic rivalry between the United States and China have demonstrated that defense industrial capacity, supply chains, technological competitiveness, critical minerals, and energy security are all integral components of national security.Security is no longer confined to the military domain; rather, it increasingly encompasses industry, technology, finance, and economic policy. As strategic competition between Washington and Beijing intensifies, the importance of middle-power partnerships capable of reducing technological dependencies and narrowing capability gaps in advanced technology sectors is correspondingly increasing.A third dilemma involves balancing openness with resilience. Both South Korea and Europe have benefited enormously from open economic systems. At the same time, both increasingly emphasize supply chain security and the protection of strategically important industries. They share concerns that excessive protectionism could undermine competitiveness, while excessive openness could expose critical sectors to heightened vulnerabilities.In this respect, South Korea and Europe share similar structural vulnerabilities and strategic dilemmas. These common challenges increase both the necessity for cooperation and the strategic value that each side brings to the other.South Korea’s Strategic Value in Europe’s RearmamentSince the outbreak of the Russia–Ukraine war, Europe has embarked upon a comprehensive and multidimensional rearmament effort. This process should not be understood simply as an arms buildup or an increase in defense expenditures.The deficiencies exposed by the war extended far beyond shortages of military equipment. They included shortcomings in defense industrial production capacity, military logistics, maintenance and sustainment systems, supply chains, and technological capabilities, all of which exposed fundamental limitations in Europe’s ability to sustain modern warfare.As a result, Europe’s objective extends beyond simply addressing immediate capability gaps. It seeks instead to rebuild the broader strategic foundations necessary to support long-term security and deterrence. Many of the policy initiatives currently being pursued across Europe are aimed at restoring this weakened strategic base.At the same time, Europe faces multiple constraints. It must reduce its dependence on the United States, yet no viable substitute for American capabilities exists in the near term. It must substantially increase defense spending while maintaining fiscal sustainability. It must prioritize regional deterrence while remaining engaged in the Indo-Pacific. Europe is therefore engaged in a complex balancing act among competing strategic imperatives.From this perspective, South Korea’s strategic significance stems from the fact that it is one of the few reliable partners capable of alleviating several of Europe’s structural constraints. The Russia–Ukraine war has demonstrated that success in modern warfare depends not only on military inventories but also on the ability to sustain production and replenish critical capabilities. South Korea has emerged as a country capable of addressing a significant portion of Europe’s capability shortfalls.Indeed, since the onset of the Russia–Ukraine war, major contracts for tanks, self-propelled artillery systems, multiple-launch rocket systems, and FA-50 light combat aircraft have been concluded, particularly with Poland. Interest in South Korean defense systems has also expanded in Romania, the Czech Republic, and the Baltic states. This trend reflects not merely price competitiveness but also South Korea’s ability to provide what Europe urgently requires: rapid production, reliable delivery schedules, operationally proven systems, and resilient supply chains.From a broader strategic perspective, Europe’s objective is not simply the reconstruction of military power; it is the restoration of industrial capacity, technological competitiveness, and supply chain resilience. In this context, South Korea’s strengths in semiconductors, batteries, shipbuilding, digital technologies, artificial intelligence, and unmanned systems align closely with Europe’s evolving strategic priorities.Likewise, South Korea increasingly views Europe not merely as an export destination but as a critical partner in advanced technology, research and development, regulatory frameworks, standards-setting, and industrial ecosystems. Ultimately, the foundation of Korea–Europe cooperation lies not primarily in shared values, but in strategic complementarity.South Korea can provide the production capacity and speed that Europe currently lacks, while Europe can provide advanced technology, market access, and institutional networks that South Korea seeks. This creates an opportunity for both sides to mitigate shared vulnerabilities by leveraging their respective strengths.Constraints on Defense Cooperation Between South Korea and EuropeRecent discussions on South Korea–Europe cooperation have focused largely on defense export achievements. Indeed, South Korea’s defense exports have exceeded $50 billion over the past five years, while its footprint in the European defense market has expanded considerably since the outbreak of the Russia–Ukraine war. However, from a long-term perspective, the current framework of cooperation faces several structural limitations.A defense export model centered on Eastern Europe—which remains geographically proximate to the Russian threat—entails inherent political and strategic uncertainties. While these countries are actively pursuing defense cooperation with South Korea based on acute threat perceptions and pressing defense requirements, future developments such as war fatigue, fiscal constraints, political transitions, and shifts in policy toward Russia could alter their strategic priorities. Consequently, it would be imprudent to assume that current large-scale procurement contracts will necessarily translate into a sustained long-term trajectory.Moreover, prevailing assessments suggest that a cooperation model centered primarily on the export of finished defense systems faces inherent sustainability challenges unless it evolves into broader forms of collaboration, including technology transfer, joint research and development, and the establishment of maintenance, repair, and sustainment capabilities. It is important to recognize that the ultimate objective of Europe’s rearmament effort is not long-term dependence on external suppliers but rather the revitalization and strengthening of its own regional defense industrial ecosystem.From a regulatory standpoint, Europe’s rearmament initiatives are creating new constraints even as they generate opportunities for expanded cooperation. The European Union is pursuing greater defense-industrial self-reliance by strengthening domestic production capabilities and regional supply chains, while increasingly mandating that a substantial proportion of defense components be sourced within Europe. These regulatory developments are likely to constrain the direct participation of non-European defense firms, including those from South Korea.Furthermore, Europe itself is far from strategically homogeneous. Significant differences persist among European countries with respect to threat perceptions, fiscal conditions, domestic political consensus, strategic culture, institutional arrangements, and approaches to alliance management. This diversity complicates the development of a coherent European demand signal and unified policy direction regarding defense cooperation. As such, it constitutes a critical variable that South Korea must carefully consider when formulating its strategic priorities and engagement strategy toward Europe.From this perspective, South Korea–Europe defense cooperation faces several important challenges. Above all, defense cooperation requires a more deliberate and strategic approach, as it extends beyond the sale of military equipment to encompass the development of shared threat assessments and strategic objectives. The central question is not simply which weapons should be sold, but rather which challenges should be addressed jointly and which common interests should be defended through sustained cooperation.In other words, policymakers must identify the broader strategic direction and institutional framework of cooperation while carefully balancing the opportunities and risks associated with deeper defense engagement. While this proposition may appear self-evident, relatively few substantive and sustained discussions have taken place between South Korea and European partners concerning these fundamental issues.From an operational perspective, cooperation at the level of the broader defense-industrial ecosystem—including technology transfer, joint research and development, local production, supply chain integration, and maintenance and sustainment infrastructure—will become increasingly important. In addition, as both South Korea and Europe accelerate investments in unmanned systems and artificial intelligence-enabled defense technologies, opportunities for technological collaboration and joint innovation are likely to expand further.The key issue is that the future trajectory of Korea–Europe cooperation will be determined not by the volume of weapons sold, but by the degree to which the two sides can integrate their industrial ecosystems in areas of mutual strategic benefit.South Korea should view Europe not merely as a defense export destination, but as a strategic partner for cooperation in industry, technology, supply chains, and the development of norms and standards. Likewise, cooperation is more likely to evolve into a sustainable long-term partnership when Europe views South Korea not simply as a supplier of defense equipment, but as a partner capable of addressing shared strategic challenges.Key Issues for Sustainable Korea–Europe CooperationSouth Korea and Europe are experiencing the same broad strategic transition. Having long benefited from the existing international order, both are increasingly becoming stakeholders responsible for helping sustain and defend that order. As the conditions that enabled security and prosperity continue to erode, both sides must identify a new equilibrium between alliance commitments and strategic autonomy, between security imperatives and economic priorities, and between openness and resilience.In this context, Korea–Europe cooperation carries significance that extends well beyond conventional defense or economic cooperation. Its value lies not merely in coordinating responses to shared threats amid intensifying geopolitical competition, but in the development of a strategic partnership capable of managing common vulnerabilities and adapting to systemic change.Moreover, the success of this partnership will be measured not by the number of defense systems exported, but by the extent to which both sides are able to cultivate sustainable resilience and meaningful strategic complementarity. Accordingly, expanding the scope of dialogue on these issues is essential.Ultimately, the future of South Korea and Europe—despite their geographic distance—will depend less on the existence of common threats than on their ability to manage shared strategic dilemmas. Their success in doing so will serve as the principal benchmark for determining the future direction and durability of Korea–Europe cooperation.

Not Nuclear Armament, but Transparent Deterrence: Korean Nuclear-Powered Submarines, International Trust, and the Future of Alliance Modernization                    Taejoon KimProfessor EmeritusKorea National Defense UniversityPrologue: Why South Korea Needs Nuclear-Powered Submarines NowThe security environment surrounding the Korean Peninsula is undergoing rapid transformation. North Korea continues to advance its nuclear and missile capabilities and has publicly declared its intention to develop nuclear-powered submarines. At the same time, strategic competition between the United States and China is intensifying throughout the Indo-Pacific region, underscoring the growing importance of maritime security and undersea operational capabilities.Against this backdrop, ongoing discussions concerning the modernization of the U.S.–ROK alliance and the transfer of wartime operational control (OPCON) are placing greater strategic responsibilities on South Korea. The central question is whether South Korea possesses the capabilities required to meet these expanding obligations.It is in this context that a Korean nuclear-powered submarine has emerged as an increasingly important policy consideration. With the capacity to remain submerged for prolonged periods and conduct persistent undersea surveillance and operations, such a platform could serve as a critical strategic asset for deterring North Korean submarine activities and enhancing maritime security.Nevertheless, concerns remain within the international community. Critics have raised questions about whether the development of nuclear-powered submarines could, over time, create conditions conducive to nuclear armament. South Korea must therefore advance a clear and credible principle: a Korean nuclear-powered submarine should be understood not as a precursor to nuclear weapons development, but as a non-nuclear strategic asset operating in full compliance with international norms, rules, and nonproliferation obligations.Despite the growing severity of North Korea’s nuclear threat, South Korea has consistently upheld its commitments under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Moving forward, it should continue to reinforce international confidence by maintaining close cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and ensuring the transparent and accountable management of nuclear fuel and related technologies.Ultimately, the issue at stake is not merely the acquisition of greater military capability. Rather, it is the development of a responsible deterrent posture that enjoys the confidence of the international community. This is the central question underlying the debate over a Korean nuclear-powered submarine.I. Alliance Modernization and South Korea’s Expanding Strategic ResponsibilitiesFor decades, the U.S.–ROK alliance has been principally oriented toward the defense of the Korean Peninsula. Today, however, the strategic environment is undergoing profound transformation. North Korea continues to advance its nuclear and missile capabilities, while intensifying strategic competition between the United States and China is reshaping the geopolitical and security dynamics of the Indo-Pacific region.At the same time, maritime security, supply-chain resilience, and emerging technologies have become increasingly important components of national security. As a result, the alliance is being called upon to assume broader roles and responsibilities that extend beyond its traditional focus on deterrence and defense on the Korean Peninsula.This evolving strategic environment has given rise to the concept of alliance modernization. Alliance modernization is not merely a matter of enhancing military capabilities; rather, it involves redefining the roles, missions, and responsibilities of alliance partners in response to changing strategic realities.Discussions regarding the transfer of wartime operational control (OPCON) should therefore be understood within this broader framework. The ultimate objective is to enable South Korea to assume greater strategic responsibilities while preserving the strength and effectiveness of the U.S.–ROK alliance.It is in this context that the strategic significance of a Korean nuclear-powered submarine becomes apparent. By enabling prolonged submerged operations and persistent undersea surveillance, a nuclear-powered submarine would significantly enhance South Korea’s capacity to monitor, track, and deter North Korean submarine activities while contributing to regional maritime stability. Such a platform should be viewed not simply as an additional military asset, but as a strategic capability that enables South Korea to fulfill its expanding responsibilities within a changing regional security environment.Ultimately, alliance modernization is not about diminishing the role of the United States; rather, it is about achieving a more effective distribution of responsibilities between allies. In this context, a Korean nuclear-powered submarine would demonstrate South Korea’s willingness and ability to make a greater contribution to collective security, thereby enhancing both the resilience and long-term sustainability of the U.S.–ROK alliance.II. Hyunmoo-V and Nuclear-Powered Submarines: The Two Pillars of Non-Nuclear DeterrenceSome critics question whether South Korea truly needs a nuclear-powered submarine when it already possesses powerful conventional strategic assets such as the Hyunmoo-V missile system. However, these capabilities should not be viewed as competitors; rather, they are complementary components of a broader non-nuclear deterrence architecture that operate across different domains.Hyunmoo-V represents a land-based strategic deterrent capable of delivering precise conventional strikes against critical targets. A nuclear-powered submarine, by contrast, provides a maritime deterrent capability through prolonged underwater operations, persistent surveillance, and the ability to detect, track, and deter hostile submarine activities.If Hyunmoo-V provides the capability to strike, a nuclear-powered submarine provides the capability to monitor, pursue, and deter beneath the sea. Together, they form two mutually reinforcing pillars of South Korea’s non-nuclear deterrence posture.What is particularly noteworthy is that South Korea has refrained from pursuing nuclear weapons despite confronting an increasingly sophisticated nuclear threat from North Korea. Rather than seeking a nuclear deterrent of its own, it has enhanced its security through advanced conventional strategic capabilities.A nuclear-powered submarine should be viewed in the same light. It is not a precursor to nuclear armament, but a non-nuclear strategic capability intended to strengthen national defense while remaining fully compatible with international norms, legal frameworks, and nonproliferation commitments.In this sense, Hyunmoo-V and a Korean nuclear-powered submarine constitute the two pillars of South Korea’s non-nuclear deterrence posture—one providing a land-based strategic deterrent and the other a maritime deterrent capability.Together, they form a complementary framework designed to strengthen national security without departing from South Korea’s longstanding nonproliferation commitments. The strategic path South Korea should pursue is therefore not nuclear armament, but the development of a credible, reliable, and internationally accepted non-nuclear deterrence architecture.III. The NPT, IAEA Cooperation, and Four Principles for Building TrustAs discussions on a Korean nuclear-powered submarine gain momentum, concerns about nuclear proliferation and nuclear fuel management inevitably arise within the international community. Therefore, the key issue is not simply capability, but whether South Korea can establish principles and verification mechanisms that inspire international confidence.Despite facing North Korea’s growing nuclear threat, South Korea has consistently refrained from pursuing nuclear weapons and remains firmly committed to its obligations under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). At the same time, Seoul must reinforce international confidence through close cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), ensuring that the use and management of nuclear fuel are conducted in a transparent manner and remain fully consistent with international safeguards, standards, and nonproliferation commitments.To build and sustain international confidence, South Korea should clearly articulate four fundamental principles: first, that it will neither develop nor possess nuclear weapons; second, that it will remain firmly committed to the NPT and the global nonproliferation regime; third, that it will actively cooperate with IAEA safeguards and verification mechanisms; and fourth, that it will ensure transparency in the management of nuclear fuel, operational practices, and nuclear safety procedures.Ultimately, the central concern of the international community is not the submarine itself, but the principles, safeguards, and strategic intentions that underpin it. For a Korean nuclear-powered submarine to secure international acceptance and support, trust must be established before military capability can be recognized. Transparency and verifiability are therefore not merely complementary measures; they constitute the foundation upon which international confidence and legitimacy must be built.IV. Korea–Europe Defense Cooperation: Expanding International Consensus and Strategic TrustFor a Korean nuclear-powered submarine program to gain international acceptance, domestic arguments alone will not suffice. South Korea must also foster greater international understanding of the principles and objectives guiding its defense and security policies.In this regard, Europe has emerged as an increasingly important partner for South Korea. Since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, European countries have renewed their emphasis on defense preparedness, industrial resilience, and military modernization. Consequently, cooperation in defense technology, defense-industrial supply chains, and advanced military capabilities has become a strategic priority across much of the continent.South Korea has emerged as a key defense partner for many European countries. Through defense exports, technology cooperation, and industrial partnerships, Seoul has demonstrated that it is not merely a supplier of military equipment, but a trusted contributor to the security of democratic nations. These growing ties provide a valuable foundation for strengthening strategic trust and expanding long-term security cooperation.This cooperation extends beyond arms sales. It reflects a broader effort among democratic states to strengthen collective security while upholding international norms and rules. A Korean nuclear-powered submarine should therefore be understood within this framework—not as a challenge to the existing non-proliferation regime, but as a defensive capability developed by a responsible state seeking to enhance transparency and international cooperation.Ultimately, the international community will assess South Korea not by the scale of its military power, but by the principles guiding the development and use of that power. As defense cooperation between South Korea and Europe continues to deepen, international confidence in South Korea’s security policies—including a future nuclear-powered submarine program—will rest on an increasingly solid foundation.Epilogue: Building a Form of Power the International Community Can TrustThe security environment surrounding the Korean Peninsula is evolving rapidly, and South Korea is being called upon to assume greater responsibilities in response to these changes. Alliance modernization, the transfer of wartime operational control, and the development of a Korean nuclear-powered submarine program are all components of this broader strategic transformation.The critical issue, however, is not the submarine itself, but the principles under which it is developed and operated. Despite North Korea’s growing nuclear threat, South Korea has deliberately chosen not to pursue nuclear weapons. Instead, it has strengthened its security through non-nuclear deterrence capabilities while maintaining its commitment to international norms, the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).Ultimately, what the international community seeks to evaluate is not the scale of military power, but the intentions and responsibilities that accompany it. Accordingly, the future of a Korean nuclear-powered submarine should be defined not by nuclear armament, but by a form of transparent and credible deterrence that commands international trust.South Korea’s strategic path forward is clear: to strengthen its ability to defend itself while remaining firmly anchored in international rules, transparency, and cooperation. In an era of alliance modernization, trust may prove to be South Korea’s most important strategic asset, with transparent deterrence serving as the foundation upon which that trust is built.

The ROK–U.S. Alliance 2.0: Forged Through Investment and SecurityHow South Korean Investment Strengthens the U.S. Economy and Reinforces the Strategic Value of the ROK–U.S. Alliance                    Chi Bum ShinProfessor of Military Science Konyang University/Director of External CooperationFuture SocietyStrategy is fundamentally the alignment of ends, ways, and means. During the Cold War, the strategic purpose of the ROK–U.S. Alliance was clear: to deter North Korean aggression against the Republic of Korea. The means consisted of U.S. Forces Korea and the U.S. nuclear umbrella, while the ways centered on forward deployment and extended deterrence.Since the inauguration of the second Trump administration in 2025, however, this strategic equation has undergone significant change. The alliance now confronts a new reality in which its purpose, instruments, and operating framework must be redefined in response to intensifying U.S.–China strategic competition, the restructuring of global supply chains, and the accelerating race for technological leadership.This article argues that South Korean corporate investment in the United States should be understood not merely as an economic activity, but as an emerging pillar of strategic deterrence. Deterrence is not derived exclusively from military capabilities. Rather, it is strengthened when potential adversaries calculate that disrupting a relationship would impose substantial costs on their own interests as well.The semiconductor fabrication facilities, battery manufacturing plants, and electric vehicle production lines that South Korean firms are establishing across the United States constitute strategic assets that embed this logic of mutual vulnerability within the economic sphere. In doing so, they reinforce the resilience of the bilateral relationship and expand the foundations of deterrence beyond the traditional military domain.The Front Lines Have Shifted: The Rise of Economic SecurityThe war in Ukraine has fundamentally reshaped prevailing assumptions about modern warfare. It has demonstrated that semiconductors, drones, communications networks, and energy infrastructure can influence battlefield outcomes as decisively as—and in some cases more decisively than—tanks and missiles. Russia, for example, has faced constraints in the production of advanced weapons systems as a result of Western semiconductor export controls, while Ukraine has sustained its asymmetric defense through access to Starlink connectivity and resilient drone supply chains.These developments compel strategists to reconsider the traditional concept of the “center of gravity” in a new strategic context. In the twenty-first century, the strategic center of gravity has increasingly shifted beyond conventional battlefields to semiconductor fabrication facilities, battery production complexes, and artificial intelligence computing infrastructure.This reality helps explain why the United States has sought to attract investment from allied firms through initiatives such as the CHIPS and Science Act and the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA). These measures are not merely instruments of industrial policy; they are also instruments of national security policy.The proposition that “without semiconductor fabrication facilities, there can be no advanced military capability” is not merely rhetorical. Modern military power is increasingly dependent on access to advanced semiconductor technologies and manufacturing capacity. A single F-35 fighter aircraft contains millions of semiconductors that enable its operational effectiveness. As a result, advanced manufacturing capabilities have become an indispensable component of national defense.South Korean Investment in the United States: Strategic Contributions in Quantifiable TermsSouth Korean firms have emerged as some of the most important foreign investors in strategically significant sectors of the U.S. economy. Samsung Electronics is constructing a $17 billion advanced semiconductor foundry in Taylor, Texas, while SK hynix is investing $3.8 billion to establish an advanced AI memory packaging facility in Indiana.Hyundai Motor Group has committed approximately $8.6 billion to its Hyundai Motor Group Metaplant America (HMGMA) project in Georgia, a development expected to generate more than 8,500 direct jobs. LG Energy Solution and SK On have likewise established large-scale battery manufacturing operations across the United States.The significance of these investments extends well beyond their immediate economic impact.First, they demonstrate that South Korea has become an indispensable production partner in semiconductors, batteries, and electric vehicles—industries that Washington has explicitly identified as strategically critical.Second, these investments create high-quality manufacturing jobs in regions such as the Rust Belt and the Sun Belt, thereby strengthening domestic political support for economic engagement with South Korea and, by extension, reinforcing public support for the ROK–U.S. Alliance. Deterrence depends not only on the calculations of potential adversaries, but also on the political sustainability of alliances themselves.Third, and perhaps most importantly, local production by South Korean companies reduces vulnerabilities in critical U.S. supply chains while simultaneously deepening South Korea’s long-term stake in the United States. Economists may describe such investments as sunk costs; strategists may view them differently. They create a form of mutual commitment in which both sides recognize that the costs of disengagement would be substantial. At its core, this constitutes a form of strategic deterrence.Is Investment in the United States Causing Industrial Hollowing-Out or Deepening Strategic Integration?Within South Korea, concerns are frequently raised that overseas investment may contribute to industrial hollowing-out. While this debate is important from a policy perspective, it is equally important to assess the underlying realities with analytical precision.The fact that Hyundai Motor manufactures electric vehicles in the United States does not imply that its production facilities in Ulsan will become obsolete. On the contrary, sustained access to the U.S. market helps preserve demand for research and development, advanced engineering, and the production of high-value components within South Korea. Likewise, while Samsung Electronics is constructing a semiconductor foundry in Texas, its cutting-edge fabrication facilities in Hwaseong and Pyeongtaek continue to push the technological frontier forward.South Korea retains competitive advantages in critical areas of semiconductor design, materials, process technologies, and advanced manufacturing expertise. Within an increasingly integrated global supply chain, overseas localization and domestic industrial upgrading are not mutually exclusive; in many cases, they are mutually reinforcing.A military analogy is instructive. The establishment of forward operating bases does not weaken homeland defense; rather, it enhances strategic depth and operational flexibility. In much the same way, the manufacturing facilities that South Korean companies operate in the United States can be understood as forward positions within the global economic landscape. The ROK–U.S. Alliance 2.0: Redefining a Community of Shared Strategic InterestsDuring the Cold War, the foundational document of the ROK–U.S. Alliance was the 1953 Mutual Defense Treaty. Its language, purpose, and institutional logic were explicitly military in nature. Today, however, the alliance is increasingly supported by a broader set of institutions and policy frameworks.Alongside the 2023 Washington Declaration, the implementation mechanisms associated with the CHIPS and Science Act, the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA), and the bilateral Economic Security Dialogue should also be understood as key pillars of the contemporary alliance architecture. The institutional foundation of the alliance has expanded beyond traditional defense cooperation to encompass economic security, technological resilience, and supply chain integration. This evolution may be understood as the emergence of the “ROK–U.S. Alliance 2.0.” If Alliance 1.0 was defined by a shared commitment to fight together in times of conflict, Alliance 2.0 is increasingly defined by a shared commitment to build together, innovate together, and prosper together. If U.S. Forces Korea represented the most visible symbol of Alliance 1.0, then Samsung’s semiconductor fabrication facility in Texas and Hyundai’s manufacturing complex in Georgia may be regarded as among the most visible symbols of Alliance 2.0. Importantly, these two dimensions of the alliance reinforce one another. As economic interdependence deepens, the credibility and sustainability of military commitments are strengthened. When debates emerge in Washington regarding the future posture of U.S. Forces Korea, the reality that South Korean firms have created tens of thousands of American jobs provides a powerful source of political support for the alliance. This is not merely diplomatic rhetoric. Rather, it constitutes a practical mechanism that enhances deterrence and strengthens alliance resilience. The Pitfall of Evaluating Alliances Through a Cost-Benefit LensThe Trump administration has frequently approached alliances through the language of cost-sharing, trade balances, and burden-sharing calculations. Questions regarding defense contributions and trade surpluses are legitimate subjects of policy debate. However, evaluating alliances primarily through a narrow cost-benefit framework risks overlooking their broader strategic value.In strategic affairs, value cannot be measured solely in terms of short-term financial returns. Rather, it is reflected in long-term positioning, influence, resilience, and risk reduction. The value of the ROK–U.S. Alliance extends well beyond deterrence against North Korean aggression. It encompasses the capacity to respond to coercive pressure from regional competitors, sustain a favorable balance of power in the Indo-Pacific, and secure trusted partnerships in critical technologies and supply chains.The same logic applies from South Korea’s perspective. The value of U.S. Forces Korea is not simply reflected in troop numbers or budgetary expenditures. Rather, its significance lies in the credibility of the United States’ extended deterrence commitment. That credibility enables South Korea to confront North Korea’s nuclear threat without pursuing an independent nuclear weapons capability. Such strategic assurance cannot be adequately measured by the figures that appear in defense cost-sharing negotiations.In many respects, an alliance is analogous to an insurance policy. Insurance premiums may appear costly in the absence of a crisis, yet their true value becomes apparent when a crisis emerges. Strategic alliances operate according to the same principle. Their worth lies not only in the contingencies they help prevent, but also in the confidence and stability they provide before those contingencies ever materialize.Conclusion: A New Front, A New StrategySouth Korean corporate investment in the United States is no longer merely a vehicle for overseas business expansion. It represents a strategic undertaking that extends the ROK–U.S. Alliance beyond the traditional military domain into the economic and technological spheres. In an era defined by intensifying U.S.–China strategic competition, such investments constitute one of South Korea’s most significant sources of non-military strategic leverage.Semiconductor fabrication facilities, battery manufacturing plants, and electric vehicle production lines have become the front lines of a new strategic environment. From the perspective of national security strategy, South Korea’s emergence as a critical economic and technological partner of the United States is not simply an economic development; it reflects a broader transformation in the nature of the alliance itself.The ROK–U.S. Alliance remains rooted in shared security commitments, but its foundations are becoming increasingly multidimensional. The alliance of the future will be sustained not only by soldiers, warships, and deterrence commitments, but also by factories, supply chains, technological innovation, and economic resilience. In this sense, South Korean investment in the United States is helping to forge the next chapter of the alliance—one built not only on security, but also on shared prosperity, technological cooperation, and strategic interdependence.An alliance should not be viewed merely as a cost. It should be understood as a long-term investment in security, prosperity, and resilience. The factories, production facilities, and industrial infrastructure that South Korean companies are building across the United States today stand as tangible manifestations of that investment and as enduring symbols of the next chapter in the ROK–U.S. Alliance.About the Author:Chi-beom Shin Professor of Military Science at Konyang University, he holds a Ph.D. in Military Science. He currently serves as a member of the Republic of Korea Army Policy Advisory Committee, Director of External Affairs at the Future Society, and Standing Director for Cyber and Network Affairs at the Future Military Society.His publications include Korean-Style Military Innovation Based on Asymmetry and The Origins of the Multi-Layered Structure of the ROK–U.S.–Japan Security Cooperation Mechanism. He is also a co-author of The Future Defense Environment and Military Innovation and Signal Korea 2026.His research and policy advisory work focus on ROK–U.S.–Japan security cooperation, the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA), future warfare, emerging technologies and national strategy, strategic autonomy, reserve force development, and the evolving security architecture of the Indo-Pacific region.

The 60 Trillion-Won CPSP Program: Advancing Economic Security Through Strategic Partnership                    Dong-soon ParkProfessorGraduate School of Defense StudiesHansung UniversityBy 2026, the Defense Industry Is Entering the “K-Defense 3.0” EraBy 2026, South Korea’s defense industry is poised to emerge as one of the world’s four leading arms exporters, solidifying its position as a major global supplier and a leading defense industrial power. Building on a record order backlog exceeding 130 trillion won, Korea is moving beyond the traditional export of finished defense products toward the “K-Defense 3.0” paradigm, which emphasizes local production, industrial cooperation, and advanced technology transfer.First, the most notable development is the record-breaking growth and scale of South Korea’s defense exports. Defense exports in 2026 are projected to reach approximately $37.7 billion (about 56 trillion won), setting a new all-time high. At the same time, both export destinations and product categories continue to diversify significantly.In terms of global competitiveness, South Korea has rapidly capitalized on Europe’s rearmament efforts and growing demand in the Middle East for integrated air and missile defense systems. Its success has been driven by a combination of cost competitiveness, proven operational performance, and a strong reputation for reliable and timely delivery.Examining South Korea’s defense export performance by region, Europe has emerged as a key market. Through large-scale exports and deliveries of K2 main battle tanks and K9 self-propelled howitzers to Poland, South Korea has demonstrated the reliability and competitiveness of K-defense products. Building on this success, its presence in the broader Eastern European defense market continues to expand.In the Middle East, South Korea has secured a leading position in the regional air and missile defense market through exports of the Cheongung-II surface-to-air missile system to the United Arab Emirates (UAE). Amid heightened regional security tensions, including those associated with U.S.–Iran rivalry, demand for advanced air defense capabilities has continued to grow. At the same time, defense cooperation in the missile sector is evolving beyond conventional export arrangements toward localized production, technology transfer, and joint venture–based industrial partnerships.In the Asia-Pacific region and North America, South Korea is likewise expanding its defense export footprint. Its market reach is broadening beyond traditional customers in Southeast Asia to include advanced defense markets such as Canada and Australia.As the international security environment increasingly shifts toward a more self-help–oriented order, demand for K-defense products—whose competitiveness has already been demonstrated in global markets—is likely to continue growing regardless of whether the Russia–Ukraine war or U.S.–Iran tensions eventually subside.Accordingly, 2026 is expected to mark a watershed moment in the evolution of K-defense, as the industry transitions from a phase of quantitative expansion to one of qualitative consolidation. In this context, South Korea’s defense industry is being redefined from a conventional arms manufacturer into a national strategic platform that simultaneously advances economic security, technological competitiveness, and diplomatic influence.This paper examines South Korea’s capabilities to secure the Canadian Patrol Submarine Project (CPSP), a mega-project valued at up to 60 trillion won. It further assesses that South Korea is structurally well positioned to emerge as the most competitive bidder, given its accumulated industrial track record, demonstrated defense-industrial performance, and sustained strategic engagement with Canada.The CPSP: The Korean Defense Industry’s Top Strategic Objective for 2026The highest priority for South Korea’s defense industry in 2026 is securing the CPSP, a procurement program valued at approximately 60 trillion won. Under the CPSP, Canada plans to acquire up to 12 submarines in the 3,000-ton class to replace its current fleet of four Victoria-class submarines (approximately 2,400 tons each).Canada has established a target delivery date of around 2035 for the lead vessel. The total value of the project is estimated at approximately 60 trillion won, including roughly 20 trillion won in submarine construction costs and an additional 40 trillion won in long-term maintenance, repair, and overhaul (MRO) expenditures. Canada’s requirement for next-generation submarines is driven by several structural factors. First, as the country with the world’s longest coastline, Canada requires persistent surveillance, deterrence, and response capabilities across three major maritime theaters—the Atlantic, Pacific, and Arctic Oceans—creating a growing need for a modern and capable submarine fleet.Second, Canada’s four Victoria-class submarines, acquired secondhand from the United Kingdom in 1998, have experienced declining operational readiness as a result of aging platforms.Third, evolving maritime security challenges, including increased Russian and Chinese naval activity in the Arctic region, have heightened the need for advanced, stealth-capable submarines capable of safeguarding maritime sovereignty and strengthening deterrence. Accordingly, the CPSP is closely linked to several core Canadian national security priorities, including the modernization of the Royal Canadian Navy, the protection of Arctic sea lines of communication, and the enhancement of maritime domain awareness. Four Key Advantages of K-Defense in the CPSPSouth Korea’s submarine development program initially emerged through technology transfer and industrial cooperation with Germany. Over the past three decades, however, South Korea has developed an indigenous submarine design and construction capability and is now widely regarded as one of the most competitive players in the global conventional submarine market. South Korean and German defense firms are currently competing for the CPSP. A Korean consortium consisting of Hanwha Ocean and HD Hyundai Heavy Industries is competing against Germany’s ThyssenKrupp Marine Systems (TKMS). The preferred bidder is expected to be selected in the coming months, making the CPSP one of the most strategically significant defense export competitions involving South Korea in recent years. South Korea’s competitive advantages relative to the German proposal can be summarized under four key categories.First, South Korea offers a combat-proven operational platform rather than a design-stage platform that remains in the development phase. South Korea’s Dosan Ahn Changho-class (KSS-III) Batch-II submarines are already in operational service with the Republic of Korea Navy. Their performance, reliability, and operational stability have been demonstrated through actual fleet operations, including extended deployments and long-range maritime missions.By contrast, TKMS’s Type 212CD submarine remains in the development and production phase and has not yet accumulated comparable operational service experience. From Canada’s perspective, where timely fleet recapitalization and risk reduction are critical procurement considerations, the Korean proposal offers a lower-risk acquisition pathway based on a platform that has already entered operational service.Second, delivery schedule credibility. K-shipbuilding offers a highly competitive and executable delivery timeline based on its established production capacity. South Korea has proposed delivering the lead vessel within six years of contract signing, with the first submarine scheduled for delivery by 2032 and all 12 units to be delivered by 2044. In contrast, Germany faces structural constraints arising from existing order backlogs for both its own navy and other European partners, including Norway. Although Berlin has indicated a willingness to adjust production priorities, its capacity to match South Korea’s accelerated delivery schedule remains limited.Third, strike capability and weapons scalability. The KSS-III is the world's first diesel-electric submarine to be equipped with both Air-Independent Propulsion（AIP) and a Vertical Launch System（VLS), enabling the deployment of Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles（SLBMs). The Batch-II variant, with a displacement exceeding 3,000 tons, offers significant growth potential for the integration of additional payloads and capabilities.German submarines, by contrast, are optimized primarily for littoral defense and stealth operations and are generally assessed as possessing more limited strike scalability. Given Canada's requirement to operate across the Atlantic, Pacific, and Arctic maritime domains, greater displacement and enhanced multi-mission capability constitute important operational advantages.Fourth, an unprecedented localization and industrial cooperation package for the Canadian economy. South Korea has proposed a comprehensive package extending beyond platform delivery to encompass long-term industrial integration and economic partnership. The proposal includes the potential establishment of torpedo production facilities in Canada, the creation of up to 40,000 jobs annually, and the development of a hydrogen-based industrial infrastructure hub.The strategy further envisions rapid submarine construction in South Korea coupled with Canada-based maintenance, repair, and overhaul (MRO) activities throughout a 30-year service life. Germany, by contrast, has promoted a more Europe-centric model that leverages its NATO-linked industrial base and integrates Canada into existing sustainment arrangements with Norway.From this perspective, the German proposal appears less consistent with Canada's stated objectives of enhancing defense-industrial autonomy and maximizing domestic economic benefits, particularly given that sustainment and logistics constitute approximately 50 percent of the overall evaluation criteria.Meanwhile, Germany’s TKMS continues to emphasize its long-standing heritage in submarine design and engineering expertise. The Type 212CD, co-developed with Norway’s Kongsberg, is designed for extended Arctic operations, making it well suited to Canada’s operational environment. While the first four units are scheduled for delivery to Norway beginning in 2029, TKMS leadership, including CEO Oliver Burkhard, has stated that production schedules can be adjusted to accommodate Canada’s requirements.The Decisive Moment Has Arrived: Winning the Race with an Economic and Security PackageMega projects between states, such as submarine programs, are not determined by price competition alone. They reflect a complex interplay of international politics, diplomatic and security relations, and alliance structures. Accordingly, by proposing a package that integrates economic and security benefits, South Korea seeks to leverage its comparative advantages while mitigating its structural constraints. The Republic of Korea’s message is clear: it presents itself as a reliable partner, prepared to respond to shared security challenges, cooperate in technology development, and pursue mutual prosperity.On October 30, 2025, President Lee Jae-myung held a summit with Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney in Gyeongju, after which the Canadian Prime Minister visited the Hanwha Ocean Geoje facility to inspect CPSP-related technologies and production sites. In February 2026, to support the CPSP bid at a pan-governmental level, the Cheongwadae and relevant ministries jointly signed a “Letter of Government Support” with “Team Korea”—comprising Hanwha Ocean and HD Hyundai Heavy Industries—and officially delivered it to the Canadian government.This marked the beginning of South Korea’s full-scale governmental engagement. In January 2026, Chief of Staff Kang Hoon-sik visited Canada in his capacity as South Korea’s Special Envoy for Strategic Economic Cooperation. In March and May 2026, Minister of Trade, Industry and Energy Kim Jeong-kwan visited Ottawa, where he met with Canadian ministers responsible for industry, energy, and natural resources to discuss bilateral industrial and resource cooperation and to seek support for the CPSP.Additionally, from May 21 to 29, Chief of Naval Operations Kim Kyung-ryul visited Canada to discuss defense and naval-industrial cooperation with senior Canadian naval officials. On May 24, Lee Yong-chul attended a reception marking the arrival of ROKS Dosan Ahn Chang-ho and a Daejeon-class frigate in Victoria, underscoring South Korea’s engagement in the final phase of the process.Not content with this, South Korea has launched a full-scale final push to secure the contract ahead of the CPSP’s final contractor selection scheduled for late June. Chief of Staff Kang Hoon-sik plans to visit Canada in early June in his capacity as Presidential Special Envoy for Strategic Economic Cooperation, leading a high-level delegation to attend the “Korea–Canada Resource Security Supply Chain Cooperation Forum.”The delegation will include representatives from the Ministry of Trade, Industry and Energy, Korea Trade-Investment Promotion Agency (KOTRA), Korea National Oil Corporation (KNOC), Korea Gas Corporation (KOGAS), Korea Resources Corporation (KORES), Export-Import Bank of Korea, and Korea Trade Insurance Corporation.From the private sector, energy and battery companies such as SK Energy, HD Hyundai Oilbank, POSCO Holdings, Hyundai Corporation, Samsung SDI, LG Energy Solution, and SK On, as well as equipment and industrial firms including Hyundai Engineering & Construction, Samsung C&T, Korea Zinc, LS MnM, and HD Hyundai Construction Equipment, are expected to participate in order to consolidate momentum.The delegation’s strategy is to integrate economic and security objectives, placing resource security and resilient supply chains at the core of the proposal. Canada is endowed with critical mineral resources such as nickel, lithium, uranium, and rare earth elements, while South Korea maintains a concentrated industrial base capable of complementary cooperation across the battery, shipbuilding, defense, nuclear power, construction, and oil and gas sectors. The CPSP thus presents an opportunity to establish a comprehensive platform for long-term industrial cooperation between the two countries.From Canada’s perspective, the objective extends beyond platform acquisition to securing a long-term partner capable of contributing to domestic industrial development and employment creation. If the CPSP contract is secured, it would evolve into a multi-decade program extending beyond defense exports to include shipbuilding, components, maintenance, financing, and localized investment, generating broad spillover effects across employment, exports, and the defense industrial ecosystem.For South Korea, securing the CPSP contract would represent not only a significant economic opportunity but also a strategic milestone for its defense and shipbuilding industries. The domestic production ripple effect is estimated to exceed 40 trillion won, involving more than 300 partner companies and creating over 20,000 jobs.The CPSP represents a watershed moment for South Korea’s defense sales diplomacy. If successful, it would position South Korea not merely as a defense exporter, but as a comprehensive strategic industrial partner spanning resources, energy, and global supply chains.K-defense has emerged as a new growth engine for the Korean economy, supporting its transition toward a broader export-oriented industrial base and enhancing its international standing. More broadly, the development of South Korea’s defense industry will contribute to national prestige and reinforce its role as a contributor to global peace an stability.With the end of June approaching, South Korea anticipates a positive outcome in securing the CPSP contract, supported by its demonstrated capabilities and sustained efforts to date. The outcome will be closely watched by all stakeholders.

The Potential Role of K-Submarines in Revitalizing Canada’s Maritime Capabilities                    Beom-jin ParkProfessor, Graduate School of Business, Kyung Hee University/(Retire)ROK Navy CaptainCanada’s next-generation patrol submarine program, known as the Canadian Patrol Submarine Project (CPSP), is not merely a submarine procurement initiative. Rather, it represents a critical test of how Canada—a maritime nation bordering the Arctic, Pacific, and Atlantic Oceans—will redesign its national defense strategy amid a rapidly shifting international security environment following the inauguration of the second Donald Trump administration in the United States. This evolving environment is characterized by an “America First” foreign policy and an increasingly explicit “might makes right” approach aimed at consolidating U.S. dominance over the Western Hemisphere.Against this backdrop, Canada has begun to recognize the need to restore greater autonomous defense capabilities and strengthen its domestic defense industrial base. Since the end of the Cold War, Canada’s security policy has remained relatively stable within a broad framework centered on reliance on U.S. security guarantees through integration into the North American missile defense system, the maintenance of the NATO alliance, and participation in United Nations peacekeeping operations.However, today’s strategic environment differs fundamentally from that of the past. Russia is intensifying its military activities as Arctic sea ice recedes, while China is expanding its influence by increasing its presence in the Arctic through cooperation with Russia on Arctic shipping routes and by advancing its Maritime Silk Road strategy to strengthen maritime influence in the Indo-Pacific region.As climate change improves access to Arctic shipping lanes, the Arctic Ocean is being transformed from a remote, ice-bound region into a new strategic domain where resources, logistics, and military considerations converge.These changes raise uncomfortable questions for Canada. Does the country with the world’s longest coastline truly possess sufficient maritime surveillance and undersea operational capabilities? Does it have a naval force robust enough to respond to both military and non-military threats that could emerge simultaneously in the Arctic, Pacific, and Atlantic Oceans?If Canada enters the 2030s without addressing the aging of its Victoria-class submarines, which have a displacement of 2,400 tons, it will inevitably face the strategic risk of an underwater capability gap. Although submarines are rarely visible in peacetime, they are national strategic assets that demonstrate a nation’s resolve most quietly yet most powerfully in times of crisis. A gap in underwater capabilities is tantamount to a gap in deterrence.It is precisely for this reason that the capabilities of K-submarines are attracting growing attention. South Korea’s submarine force is not merely a showcase for defense exhibitions, but a core military capability developed under the harsh realities of a highly challenging security environment.Faced with complex threats—including North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs, submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) threats, and the naval expansion of neighboring states—South Korea has steadily accumulated the expertise required to design, build, and operate submarines ranging from the Jangbogo-class to the Jangbogo-III-class.In particular, the KSS-III Batch-II submarine represents a flagship platform that integrates South Korea’s advanced shipbuilding industry, maritime defense technologies, combat system integration capabilities, and precision manufacturing expertise.South Korean submarines have evolved to meet demands for stealth, survivability, and sustained operational capability in the narrow and complex underwater environment surrounding the Korean Peninsula. In this respect, they share important operational characteristics with the emerging maritime security challenges facing Canada.The K-submarine proposed for Canada’s CPSP program is widely assessed as possessing several core competitive advantages, including superior performance and cost-effectiveness, adherence to delivery schedules, plans to establish a local MRO (maintenance, repair, and overhaul) center, and a comprehensive industrial cooperation package encompassing defense investment partnerships within Canada and joint entry into third-country markets.What the Canadian Navy needs is not simply a few new submarines. What it truly requires is the capability to operate effectively in the Arctic Ocean, maintain a continuous presence in the Pacific and Atlantic Oceans, ensure interoperability with NATO and the United States, and establish a long-term partnership model that strengthens Canada’s domestic defense industrial base.This is why the Canadian government places such importance on operational support, training, infrastructure development, and lifecycle cooperation with Canadian industry in pursuing the CPSP program. Ultimately, success in securing the contract will be determined not only by the submarines themselves, but also by the ability to provide maintenance, performance upgrades, crew training, supply-chain stability, and sustained technical cooperation over more than 30 years of operation.In this regard, K-submarines can offer Canada a practical alternative.First, South Korea possesses rapid construction capabilities and a stable shipbuilding industrial base. In the submarine sector, delivery timelines are critical. No matter how advanced a submarine may be, if it cannot be deployed when needed, it cannot fill a strategic capability gap.Given Canada’s concerns over the aging of its existing Victoria-class submarines and the possibility of an underwater capability gap emerging in the 2030s, South Korea’s submarine construction capacity and project management expertise constitute major competitive advantages. In the defense industry, it is not enough to say that something “may be possible someday.” True capability lies in the ability to deliver systems on schedule and sustain reliable long-term support.Second, K-submarines can contribute to strengthening Canada’s Arctic surveillance and deterrence capabilities. The Arctic is a region where climate change and strategic competition are unfolding simultaneously. As shipping routes become more accessible, it is not only commercial vessels that will enter the region. Naval surface ships and submarines will also expand their presence, accompanied inevitably by intensified intelligence-gathering activities.There are clear limits to monitoring the vast Arctic Ocean using only surface ships and aircraft. Submarines, capable of operating covertly underwater for extended periods, provide a decisive deterrent by tracking hostile submarines and surface vessels while complicating an adversary’s strategic calculations during times of crisis.For Canada, moving beyond merely declaring Arctic sovereignty to actually exercising sovereign rights in the Arctic Ocean requires credible undersea capabilities. In this sense, securing a modern submarine force is not simply an option, but a strategic necessity.Third, K-submarines could serve as a new link in Indo-Pacific security cooperation. Canada has already declared its intention to expand its engagement in the region through its Indo-Pacific Strategy. South Korea, likewise, is establishing itself as a key partner in promoting a free and open Indo-Pacific order.The two countries share a number of common strategic challenges, including responding to North Korea’s nuclear and missile threats, enforcing sanctions against North Korea, strengthening maritime security, expanding defense industrial cooperation, and ensuring supply-chain resilience. As a member of the United Nations Command, Canada has long contributed to security on the Korean Peninsula and has participated in efforts to monitor North Korea’s illicit ship-to-ship transfers at sea.From South Korea’s perspective, Canada is not a distant country, but a responsible security partner that has consistently contributed to maintaining stability on the Korean Peninsula and throughout the Indo-Pacific region.Recent developments in South Korea–Canada relations are bringing this potential for cooperation to a more tangible level. Through reciprocal visits by their respective heads of state, the bilateral relationship has been elevated to a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership, while the institutional framework for security cooperation is being strengthened through Foreign and Defense 2+2 Ministerial Meetings.The Korea–Canada Security and Defense Cooperation Partnership, announced in 2025, is particularly significant in that it represents the first security and defense cooperation framework of its kind that Canada has established in the Indo-Pacific region.The partnership encompasses military exchanges, joint exercises, maritime security, defense industrial cooperation, joint research and development, supply-chain resilience, cybersecurity, space cooperation, and responses to hybrid threats. In other words, the bilateral relationship is evolving beyond traditional friendship and economic cooperation into a future-oriented strategic partnership that integrates security, technology, and industry.In particular, at the second Korea–Canada Foreign and Defense 2+2 Ministerial Meeting in 2026, the two countries discussed Indo-Pacific maritime security, the protection of marine resources, peaceful and sustainable cooperation in the Arctic, the launch of a space security dialogue, and cooperation in cybersecurity and artificial intelligence. In addition, the two sides agreed to sign a General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA) and to begin negotiations on a broader defense cooperation agreement.This goes beyond mere diplomatic rhetoric. The establishment of an institutional framework enabling the sharing of sensitive technical and operational information in the defense sector represents a qualitative advancement in bilateral cooperation. Such a framework is particularly important for weapons systems—such as submarines—that require exceptionally high levels of security, interoperability, and technical reliability.The entry of K-submarines into the Canadian market could therefore become not merely a defense export project, but a symbolic undertaking in bilateral security cooperation between South Korea and Canada. The South Korean defense industry has already expanded its presence in the global market in the fields of ground systems, aerospace, and surface naval vessels.Submarines, however, are strategic platforms through which a nation’s shipbuilding capabilities, acoustic detection and stealth technologies, propulsion systems, combat systems, maintenance infrastructure, and crew training systems are comprehensively tested and verified.For this reason, submarine exports go beyond the simple sale of defense products; they represent the export of long-term strategic trust between nations. If Canada ultimately selects the K-submarine, it would constitute not only recognition of the technological capabilities of South Korea’s defense industry, but also a political and strategic decision to embrace South Korea as a long-term partner in maritime security cooperation.However, optimism alone is not enough. Canada’s submarine program is a competition not only in technology, but also in diplomacy and industrial policy. To compete effectively against established European submarine manufacturers—such as Germany’s TKMS with its Type 212CD submarine—South Korea cannot rely solely on price competitiveness and platform performance.What Canada seeks extends beyond simply acquiring “a good submarine.” It seeks a sustainable submarine operational ecosystem that can be maintained over the long term. Accordingly, South Korea must present a comprehensive proposal that includes the establishment of local maintenance and repair facilities, cooperation with Canadian shipbuilding, machinery, and materials industries, the training of submarine crews and maintenance personnel, long-term modernization and performance upgrade programs, supply chain resilience, and the adaptation of technologies to Arctic operational conditions. In this sense, what is required is not merely package-style defense cooperation, but a broader form of “industrial alliance–based” defense cooperation.From Canada’s perspective, K-submarines could represent an attractive option. While Canada must continue to maintain close security cooperation with the United States, it also faces the challenge of strengthening its own defense industrial base and independent operational capabilities. South Korea, as a U.S. ally with advanced indigenous shipbuilding and defense manufacturing capabilities, is well positioned to meet both requirements.From Canada’s standpoint, this makes South Korea a partner capable of providing an effective balance between alliance interoperability and strategic autonomy. By working with South Korea, Canada could diversify its defense partnerships beyond its traditional reliance on Europe while still maintaining interoperability with the United States. At the same time, Canada would gain a reliable Indo-Pacific defense partner with proven industrial and technological capabilities.This project is also of considerable significance for South Korea. Canada’s CPSP is not merely a large-scale defense procurement program. For the South Korean defense industry, it represents a strategic bridgehead for entry into the North American security market—beyond its existing presence in Europe and the Middle East—and, more importantly, into the broader defense industrial ecosystem associated with the Five Eyes and NATO.Canada is both a member of the Five Eyes intelligence-sharing network and a core NATO ally, as well as a key stakeholder in Arctic security. If South Korean submarines were to be incorporated into the Royal Canadian Navy fleet, it would mark a major milestone that elevates the credibility and international standing of South Korea’s defense industry to a new level. In this sense, the Canadian market is not simply a single export destination, but a gateway to a broader network of security and defense cooperation.Another important dimension is economic security. As the strategic importance of Arctic shipping routes increases, the protection of sea lines of communication (SLOCs), the assurance of stable energy transportation, the defense of undersea infrastructure against submarine threats, and the resilience of critical mineral supply chains are all becoming matters of national security.Canada possesses abundant reserves of critical minerals—including nickel, lithium, and rare earth elements—as well as significant energy resources, while South Korea has established strengths in advanced manufacturing and supply chains related to shipbuilding, batteries, and the defense industry. As a result, cooperation between the two countries extends far beyond the submarine sector alone.It has the potential to encompass defense industrial cooperation, critical minerals, shipbuilding, artificial intelligence, space, cybersecurity, and the protection of undersea infrastructure. Indeed, the Korea–Canada Security and Defense Cooperation Partnership identifies defense industrial supply chains, critical minerals and materials, and responses to cyber, space, and hybrid threats as key areas of bilateral cooperation.Therefore, the South Korean government and defense industry must not approach this opportunity merely as competition among individual firms for contracts. The submarine project is unlikely to succeed if defense companies take the lead while the government remains on the sidelines.Instead, the government, the Defense Acquisition Program Administration (DAPA), the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Trade, Industry and Energy, and the Navy must operate as a unified team. The government-to-government (G2G) cooperation framework, local industrial participation, job creation, technological cooperation, supply-chain collaboration, and long-term maintenance models sought by Canada must all be designed and coordinated at the national level.Defense exports are not a sprint. They are a long-term strategic undertaking—more akin to a sustained maritime operation that requires navigating changing tides and currents all the way to the destination.The true strength of the K-submarine lies not merely in its ability to operate deep underwater. Its real value stems from South Korea’s capacity to integrate its security experience, advanced manufacturing capabilities, shipbuilding technology, defense industrial ecosystem, and alliance cooperation expertise into a single strategic package. This is precisely the kind of capability Canada requires at this moment.While Arctic ice is melting, the international security environment is, paradoxically, becoming increasingly rigid and competitive. In this era of contradiction, Canada can no longer view the ocean merely as a vast geographical buffer. The ocean is both a conduit of opportunity and a pathway for emerging threats. And the strategic asset that safeguards the maritime domain is the submarine.In conclusion, the K-submarine could serve as a strategic catalyst for Canada’s maritime and defense transformation. Canada urgently needs a realistic solution to close its emerging submarine capability gap, while South Korea is presented with a historic opportunity to enter the defense markets of the Arctic and North America.Moving beyond their traditional relationship as allies and partners under the United Nations Command during the Korean War, the two countries now have an opportunity to build a future-oriented strategic partnership centered on maritime security and defense industrial cooperation.If the day comes when K-submarines help safeguard Canadian waters, it will signify far more than a successful defense export. It will stand as a symbol of strategic solidarity among democratic maritime nations linking the Arctic and the Indo-Pacific.The sea is vast, and the threats beneath it run deep. Yet a prepared nation does not fear those depths. K-submarines can provide Canada with the maritime security capabilities it requires. What remains now is the national-level commitment, diplomatic persuasiveness, and strategic imagination necessary to translate this potential into reality through comprehensive defense cooperation.The K-submarine already possesses more than sufficient potential to help transform Canada’s maritime capabilities. What is needed now is the ability to translate that potential into tangible strategic outcomes in the Arctic.

The Need to Include South Korea’s Proposal on the North Korean Nuclear Issue in the Agenda of the U.S.–China Summit                    Yui Haeng ChoProfessorSeoul Theological UniversityThe recent international landscape has been undergoing rapid change amid a complex crisis marked by intensifying strategic competition between the United States and China, the protracted war in Ukraine, instability in the Middle East, and the restructuring of global supply chains.Amid a flood of news surrounding new international conflicts and economic developments, the issue of North Korea and its nuclear program appears to have receded somewhat from the global spotlight. Nevertheless, North Korea continues to advance its nuclear and missile capabilities, and the North Korean nuclear issue remains a key variable threatening the security order in Northeast Asia.Amid these circumstances, the U.S.–China summit (May 14–15), which had been postponed due to the Iran issue, will be held in Beijing. The two countries are expected to place a wide range of international issues on the agenda, including the Taiwan issue, tariff disputes, and the Iranian nuclear issue. Although not an official agenda item, issues related to the Korean Peninsula, including North Korea’s nuclear issue, are also expected to be discussed at the summit.U.S.–North Korea dialogue has been suspended for an extended period, and the existing approach has effectively reached an impasse. Therefore, while maintaining “complete denuclearization” as the ultimate objective, it is necessary to propose a “freeze-first” approach as a realistic starting point.Of course, as demonstrated by the case of the U.S.–Iran nuclear negotiations, even freezing nuclear activities is far from an easy task. Nevertheless, it is important to note that China shares, to some extent, the U.S. assessment that North Korea’s nuclear program poses a threat to stability in Northeast Asia.The greatest obstacle to resolving the North Korean nuclear issue is Pyongyang’s intransigent stance. North Korea is already attempting to establish its status as a nuclear-armed state as a fait accompli and is institutionalizing this position through its constitution and foreign policy discourse.Recently, at the NPT Review Conference, North Korea’s ambassador to the United Nations asserted that “the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea is not bound by the NPT under any circumstances.” This demonstrates that North Korea defines itself as an independent nuclear-armed state operating outside the existing non-proliferation regime.The reason North Korea refuses to abandon its nuclear program is that it views nuclear weapons as a key instrument for regime survival. North Korea has consistently maintained that it cannot relinquish its nuclear program as long as U.S. hostile policies and military pressure persist.By citing the cases of Libya and Iraq, it has also reinforced the perception that abandoning nuclear weapons could directly lead to regime collapse. For North Korea, nuclear weapons are not merely military assets, but strategic instruments that guarantee regime security and provide bargaining leverage in negotiations with the United States.In contrast, South Korea and the international community have made clear that they cannot recognize North Korea as a nuclear-weapon state. The international nuclear non-proliferation regime recognizes only the United States, Russia, China, the United Kingdom, and France as official nuclear-weapon states, and recognition of North Korea could undermine the international non-proliferation order itself.The United States also officially maintains its commitment to “the complete denuclearization of North Korea.” Although former President Donald Trump once referred to North Korea as a “nuclear-weapon state,” this was largely political rhetoric employed in the context of negotiations.It is particularly significant that the United States has recently maintained a hardline stance on the Iranian nuclear issue. The United States has identified Iran’s production of enriched uranium and expansion of nuclear capabilities as threats to international security, demanding stringent verification measures and the dismantlement of its nuclear capabilities. In this context, if the United States were to effectively recognize North Korea’s nuclear arsenal, the consistency of international nuclear policy would inevitably be undermined. Therefore, the likelihood of the United States officially recognizing North Korea as a nuclear-weapon state remains low.Ultimately, North Korea seeks “disarmament negotiations,” whereas the United States seeks “denuclearization negotiations.” The two sides therefore begin from fundamentally different premises. This is precisely why U.S.–North Korea negotiations have remained in a prolonged stalemate since the collapse of the Hanoi Summit. Given China’s limited influence over North Korea, it is unlikely that a breakthrough on the North Korean nuclear issue will emerge from the upcoming U.S.–China summit.This makes South Korea’s role all the more crucial. South Korea must go beyond merely conveying its position and present realistic alternatives for negotiation. One such alternative is the “three-step solution to the North Korean nuclear issue,” based on a phased approach of “freezing nuclear activities, reducing nuclear capabilities, and achieving final dismantlement.” The key is to maintain the goal of complete denuclearization while beginning with steps that are realistically achievable.The first step is the “immediate suspension of North Korea’s nuclear program,” namely, a freeze on nuclear activities. This would initially involve halting additional North Korean nuclear tests, the production of highly enriched uranium, and the advancement of its ICBM capabilities, while in return considering limited sanctions relief or measures aimed at improving bilateral relations. Although this would not constitute a complete solution, it is realistic in that it could at least prevent further deterioration of the situation and create space for negotiations.During the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union did not pursue complete disarmament from the outset. Instead, they gradually built trust through phased arms-control measures such as the SALT agreements and the INF Treaty. Likewise, the North Korean nuclear issue requires a realistic approach that prioritizes halting the expansion of nuclear capabilities rather than seeking a complete resolution in the short term.North Korea’s recent shift in its stance toward South Korea also warrants attention. By incorporating the so-called “two-state clause” into its constitution, North Korea is attempting to define the two Koreas as separate and hostile states.Although this represents a retreat from the previous discourse of a “national community,” there also appears to be a tendency toward greater restraint compared to the extreme rhetoric of military provocation seen in the past. It appears that North Korea is likewise aware that excessive escalation of tensions places a burden on regime stability and economic management.In particular, while North Korea has secured a certain degree of strategic and economic latitude by strengthening its ties with Russia, this does not mean that the need to improve relations with the United States has disappeared. The burden imposed by prolonged international sanctions continues to accumulate. From North Korea’s perspective, having long pursued a diplomatic balancing strategy between Russia and China, excessive dependence on any single country inevitably constitutes a burden.Therefore, South Korea’s proposal for the “prior suspension of North Korea’s nuclear program” could represent an option that North Korea would find difficult to reject outright. This is because North Korea could expect a certain degree of sanctions relief and diplomatic breathing room without immediately abandoning its nuclear program, while the United States could curb the advancement of North Korea’s nuclear capabilities without officially recognizing North Korea as a nuclear-weapon state.Of course, such an approach also entails risks. There are concerns that a phased approach could ultimately lead to the de facto recognition of North Korea’s nuclear status. Critics likewise argue that it is difficult to trust North Korea, given that it continued to develop its nuclear program even after the Agreed Framework and the September 19 Joint Statement.However, allowing the current stalemate to persist would be even more dangerous. North Korea’s nuclear and missile capabilities continue to advance, and the longer negotiations remain suspended, the greater the risk of escalating military tensions. Ultimately, the choice lies between an “imperfect but manageable phased approach” and the “deepening of an uncontrolled nuclear crisis.”This U.S.–China summit is not merely a diplomatic event for South Korea. It must serve as a critical opportunity to address the North Korean nuclear issue and secure greater diplomatic space for South Korea. Rather than passively observing developments between the United States and China, the South Korean government must actively present a realistic and phased approach to resolving the North Korean nuclear issue as part of the international agenda. In particular, it is necessary to strengthen diplomatic efforts to bridge the gap in perceptions between the United States and North Korea, centered on the principle of “first halting North Korea’s nuclear activities.”At the same time, the commitment to restoring inter-Korean relations must also be emphasized. The North Korean nuclear issue is not merely a military and security matter, but also an issue directly tied to inter-Korean relations. With communication channels between the two Koreas completely severed, the risk of accidental conflict inevitably increases. Accordingly, efforts to establish at least a minimum level of mutual trust for easing tensions and resuming dialogue must proceed in parallel.Thirty years have passed since the Agreed Framework, yet a complete resolution of the North Korean nuclear issue remains elusive. What is needed now is a flexible approach that upholds fundamental principles while taking geopolitical realities into account. Although a ‘freeze-first’ approach to North Korea’s nuclear activities may not constitute a complete solution, it can serve as the most realistic starting point for preventing the crisis from escalating further and reopening the door to negotiations.

The Excellence of K-DefenseSeong-hyun HanFormer Diplomat1. IntroductionPresident Lee Jae-myung’s state visit to India in April served as an important demonstration of the Republic of Korea’s efforts to strengthen security and economic solidarity with key partner nations. In a written interview with local media, President Lee cited the K-9 Self-Propelled Howitzer project (known as “Vajra” in India) as a model example of defense cooperation between the two countries.The Vajra project, under which more than 60% of the manufacturing process is carried out locally in India, represents a customized partnership that closely aligns with India’s “Make in India” policy aimed at promoting domestic manufacturing. By utilizing the defense industry as a powerful catalyst, South Korea–India relations have gained momentum toward evolving into a strategic partnership capable of jointly addressing shared security challenges, such as ensuring freedom of navigation in the Strait of Hormuz and securing critical mineral supply chains.This demonstrates the inherent value of defense exports. As of the end of 2025, the combined order backlog of South Korea’s four major defense companies exceeded 103 trillion won for the first time in history. This amount represents approximately four to five years’ worth of production for the domestic defense industry, and K-defense has effectively filled gaps in the existing defense supply chains centered on the United States and Europe. This development serves as an indicator that South Korea has firmly established itself as a major player in the global security supply chain.Attention is now shifting to even larger markets. A prime example is the Canadian Patrol Submarine Project (CPSP), valued at approximately 60 trillion won—the largest overseas defense project ever pursued by South Korea. Currently, South Korea is engaged in intense competition with Germany’s TKMS for the contract. If this mega-project, whose details are expected to be finalized in 2027, is successfully secured,K-defense could establish itself as a new and durable pillar of South Korea’s long-term economic growth.2. Large-Scale Defense Exports and South Korea’s Long-Term National InterestsThe structural ripple effects of large-scale defense exports are directly linked to South Korea’s long-term national interests.First, they involve securing a dominant position in the Maintenance, Repair, and Overhaul (MRO) market, which generates revenue for decades following the initial export. Typically, the MRO costs incurred over the 30- to 50-year operational lifespan of advanced weapon systems amount to two to three times the initial acquisition cost.This is comparable to the case of the F-35 Lightning II stealth fighter, which is expected to generate substantial additional revenue through upgrades and maintenance over the coming decades, far exceeding the initial proceeds from aircraft sales. Once a platform is exported, it can continuously generate national wealth through parts replacement, maintenance services, and sustained performance enhancements.Second, there is the spillover effect of technological diffusion throughout the broader industrial ecosystem. Large-scale arms exports signify the establishment of a stable, long-term export pipeline for domestic small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) and mid-sized firms that supply tens of thousands of components.Furthermore, such exports help activate a “spin-off” ecosystem, in which high-performance radar technologies accumulated in the defense sector are transferred to autonomous driving sensors and aviation technologies are applied to Urban Air Mobility (UAM). At the same time, they also promote a “spin-on” ecosystem, whereby cutting-edge civilian AI and advanced manufacturing technologies are integrated into weapons systems, thereby enhancing the overall competitiveness of the nation’s manufacturing base.Third, it involves securing interoperability in military operations and institutionalizing security partnerships. The adoption of a particular country’s weapons systems often leads the purchasing state to adopt that country’s military support framework as well. This creates one of the strongest and most practical foundations for long-term security cooperation, enabling a durable partnership with the supplier nation that can endure for decades. K-defense may therefore be regarded as an irreplaceable strategic national asset that positions South Korea at the center of the global security supply chain.3. Structural Transformation Reflected in the NumbersOf course, segments of South Korea’s financial investment community initially viewed the success of defense exports as a temporary boom driven by the external shock of the war in Ukraine. In fact, when export figures for 2023 declined to $13.5 billion from the previous year’s $17.3 billion, some securities firms raised concerns about a so-called “defense industry peak-out,” arguing that export momentum would weaken once the Ukraine-driven surge subsided.A similar perception existed within the global defense industry. Major U.S. defense contractors such as Lockheed Martin and RTX (Raytheon), despite declines in their stock prices, maintained that their weapons systems remained the most sought-after products in the global market. They underestimated the competitiveness of K-defense, asserting that Western defense products would once again dominate the market once the conflict stabilized.However, the reality demonstrated by accumulated data and historical experience is clear. According to the recently published “Analysis of Global Arms Exports, 2021–2025” by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), South Korea accounted for 3.0% of the global defense export market, firmly securing its position as the world’s ninth-largest arms exporter.South Korea’s defense exports, which amounted to only approximately $250 million annually in 2006, increased more than seventy-fold to reach $17.3 billion in 2022. Even today, through export diversification, the country continues to maintain a substantial export volume of around $15 billion annually.But has this merely been a rise in export rankings and scale? As recently as the early 2010s—just over a decade ago—South Korea’s defense export structure was centered on low-value-added items such as ammunition, components, and small tactical vehicles.Today, however, it has undergone a fundamental transformation toward exports focused on advanced core military capabilities, including tanks, self-propelled howitzers, supersonic fighter aircraft, and interceptor missiles. The success of K-defense demonstrates through concrete data that South Korea has achieved a structural transformation and established itself as a global security supplier amid the realignment of the previously Western-dominated and highly concentrated global weapons supply chain.3. The Three Core Competitive Advantages Behind the K-Defense Renaissance① Western Production Bottleneck and South Korea’s Superior Mass Production CapacityFollowing the end of the Cold War, major European countries sharply reduced their defense budgets and drastically scaled back their domestic defense production lines. The consequences were significant. Even Germany, traditionally regarded as a leading tank-producing nation, experienced acute supply bottlenecks, with the maximum annual production capacity of the Leopard 2 amounting to only a few dozen units.Even the United States, the world’s leading military power, is currently facing delays of several years in the construction schedules for naval vessels and submarines due to chronic labor shortages at shipyards and disruptions in defense supply chains.By contrast, South Korea, which has long faced the persistent threat posed by North Korea, has maintained large-scale production lines for core ground systems such as the K9 Thunder self-propelled howitzer and the K2 Black Panther tank. As a result, it has achieved significant economies of scale, reducing component costs and maximizing production efficiency.This prepared production capability was most clearly demonstrated in delivery times. While European countries required waiting periods of several years after contracts were signed, South Korea delivered the initial batch of K2 Black Panther and K9 Thunder systems to Poland just four months after the export agreement was concluded. The widely noted image of Polish President Andrzej Duda personally greeting the shipment at the port and praising the rapid delivery firmly established South Korea’s overwhelming “fast delivery” capability in the global defense market.② Combat-Proven Performance and Technology TransferDuring Iran’s large-scale missile and drone attack last April, a battery of South Korea’s Cheongung II interceptor missiles deployed in the United Arab Emirates was reportedly able to intercept incoming targets with a 96% success rate. This demonstrated top-tier interception performance in actual combat conditions at an acquisition cost of approximately one-third that of the U.S.-made MIM-104 Patriot PAC-3 missile system—around 1.5 billion won per interceptor compared to roughly 5 billion won for the PAC-3.Furthermore, South Korea’s weapons systems are developed with ROK–U.S. combined operations in mind and are fully compatible with the stringent NATO Standardization Agreement (STANAG) specifications. This enables Western countries to continue utilizing their existing ammunition, communications, and command-and-control systems, thereby reducing substantial transition costs and time.Above all, the “open partnership strategy”—under which South Korea actively transfers manufacturing technology to purchasing countries and supports the development of their independent industrial ecosystems, as demonstrated in the cases of Poland and Australia—may be regarded as the key factor that has opened the door to advanced markets.③ The Emergence of South Korea as an “Arsenal of the Free World” Beyond Ideological BarriersThe reach of South Korea’s defense industry is expanding beyond Eastern Europe and the Middle East to encompass the broader ASEAN region. Last April, the Haegung ship-to-air missile developed by LIG Nex1 secured a 140 billion won export contract for deployment on Malaysian Navy patrol vessels being built by the Turkish defense firm STM. This marks the first time that a domestically produced guided weapon system has been adopted as an air-defense solution for a foreign naval vessel.Negotiations are also reportedly in the final stages for the first-ever export of approximately 20 K9 Thunder self-propelled howitzers—valued at around 300–400 billion won—to Vietnam, a country with a different political system.Why is the world turning to South Korea? Since the end of the Cold War, most Western countries have reduced defense spending and focused primarily on asymmetric high-technology capabilities, creating a significant gap in conventional heavy-armament forces—the backbone of modern warfare. By contrast, South Korea has steadily refined its capabilities in this area in response to persistent security threats.At a time when countries around the world are accelerating rearmament efforts, South Korea has emerged as an indispensable supplier supporting the security of the free world and its allies, thereby acquiring substantial diplomatic leverage.4. Challenges Facing the K-Defense IndustryOf course, the Korean defense industry faces a wide range of challenges. The global defense market is an intensely competitive arena in which the winner often takes all. Take the AS21 Redback armored vehicle program exported to Australia as an example: the initial plan for 450 units by the Australian government was significantly reduced to 129 during a defense budget restructuring, leaving the local subsidiary struggling to identify new avenues for growth.This case offers a stark lesson: securing an order cannot be the end of the effort, and stakeholders must remain prepared to manage the constantly evolving political and fiscal risks of partner countries.First, South Korea must overcome formidable protectionist barriers in major global markets. A symbolic example is the recent withdrawal of the Lockheed Martin–KAI consortium from the U.S. Navy’s Next-Generation Advanced Trainer program, valued at approximately $10 billion.This outcome was largely attributed to the consortium’s difficulty in overcoming protectionist policy constraints in the United States—such as the requirement for a high proportion of U.S.-made components under the “Buy American Act (BAA)”—which undermined the price competitiveness that is one of the core strengths of Korean-made platforms.This challenge is not unique to the United States. The European Union has likewise embarked on a process of reorganizing its supply chains around domestic interests, including significantly increasing the proportion of defense procurement within the region through the European Defence Industrial Strategy (EDIS).To remain competitive amid the growing formation of large-scale blocs in the global defense market, it is essential first to reduce institutional barriers among allies—for example, through Reciprocal Defense Procurement (RDP) agreements—and to further refine localization strategies.Second, South Korea must remain vigilant regarding the steady rise of Japan, often described as a “sleeping giant.” Having revised its Three Principles on Defense Equipment Exports for the first time in 60 years to ease long-standing restrictions, Japan has emerged as a formidable competitor to the Korean defense industry.Japan’s Mogami-class frigate, which recently outcompeted South Korea to secure Australia’s next-generation frigate program valued at approximately 10 trillion won, features a significantly reduced crew size of roughly 90 personnel—about half that of conventional vessels—achieved through advanced automation. This capability effectively addressed a key vulnerability of the Royal Australian Navy, which faces challenges related to demographic decline and recruitment shortages.Even more concerning is Japan’s substantial financial capacity. In addition to its existing Official Development Assistance (ODA), Japan has introduced the Official Security Assistance (OSA) framework, through which it provides defense equipment to Southeast Asia and other regions on a grant or low-cost basis.The new foreign policy direction recently announced by Japanese Prime Minister Takaichi during her visit to Vietnam may likewise be understood as part of a broader strategy to leverage OSA in order to expand Japan’s influence within the security architecture of the Global South.Third, there is a paradigm shift from hardware-centric approaches to artificial intelligence (AI). The mainstay of the K-defense industry, which has secured orders worth 100 trillion won, consists of conventional hardware platforms such as the K2 Black Panther and K9 Thunder, many of which were developed 10 to 20 years ago.However, the nature of future battlefields is being fundamentally reshaped around Manned–Unmanned Teaming (MUM-T) systems that integrate artificial intelligence, drones, and robotics. In line with the AX (AI Transformation) policy recently established as a core national agenda, the Ministry of Planning and Budget has also announced that it will prioritize investment in securing advanced capabilities—including manned–unmanned systems involving drones and robots—in next year’s budget. Unless South Korea can rapidly integrate AI software capabilities and digital-based MRO solutions into existing hardware platforms, the structural advantages of K-defense on future battlefields may not be sustainable.5. ConclusionThe true test for K-defense begins now. Industrial capabilities alone—such as cost-effectiveness and rapid delivery—are insufficient to navigate the turbulent waters of major global markets, where political, diplomatic, and financial considerations often prevail. Nor is this the time to become mired in administrative rhetoric, such as the “establishment of a new control tower,” the substance of which remains unclear. The central question is whether sustainability can be secured through the dismantling of outdated regulations and the effective integration of national capabilities.South Korea must boldly dismantle the Defense Acquisition Program Administration’s outdated procurement regulations—originally designed for domestic procurement two decades ago—as well as unnecessary barriers to entry. Now that the defense industry has firmly established itself as a national strategic industry in both name and substance, the Export-Import Bank’s unprecedented financial support, the Ministry of Trade, Industry and Energy’s establishment of a technology cooperation framework, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ security package negotiations must operate seamlessly as a single integrated system.At every diplomatic opportunity, including summit diplomacy, defense companies, the government, and the military must function as a coordinated team in order to proactively and consistently present attractive, government-led package deals to partner countries.The 103 trillion won in order backlog, secured through proven capability, is not merely a symbol of national pride. It is an irreplaceable asset essential to South Korea’s economic and strategic resilience, and one that must be further strengthened through rigorous industrial strategy and sober geopolitical calculation. The real contest facing the advancing K-defense industry will not be decided on a weapons testing ground, but at a carefully designed and strategically coordinated policy table.

The Deterioration of Sino-Japanese Relations and Its Implications for the Korean PeninsulaOH Seung HeeKorea National Diplomatic Academy1. Introduction: The Intensification of Sino-Japanese Strategic CompetitionRecently, relations between China and Japan have deteriorated to their most serious level since the normalization of diplomatic relations. Although Japanese Prime Minister Takaichi’s remarks regarding a Taiwan contingency served as the immediate trigger for the dispute, the current situation cannot be explained by a single incident alone. Rather, recent Sino-Japanese relations have shifted from episodic diplomatic friction to a structural confrontation characterized by simultaneous tensions across the economic, security, and military domains.This conflict can be understood as strategic competition intertwined with broader shifts in the East Asian regional order. Japan is seeking a more proactive security posture by expanding the scope of its defense policy through increased defense spending and the acquisition of counterstrike capabilities.Conversely, China views these developments as destabilizing to the regional security environment and strongly opposes them. Thus, the tensions between the two countries stem not from a simple clash of policies, but from fundamentally different perceptions of the regional order itself.In particular, the Taiwan issue is emerging as a key variable in Sino-Japanese tensions. While Japan views stability in the Taiwan Strait as directly linked to its own security, China regards such positions as a challenge to its sovereignty and territorial integrity. Consequently, Sino-Japanese tensions are evolving beyond historical grievances or territorial disputes and are increasingly becoming a central arena of strategic competition.2. Military Buildup and Intensifying Military Competition in Northeast AsiaThe Sino-Japanese rivalry is becoming increasingly tangible in the military domain. China is ranked as the world’s third-strongest military power according to Global Firepower (GFP) in 2026, with approximately 2 million personnel and a navy of around 370 vessels—the largest in the world. Centered on three aircraft carriers (Liaoning, Shandong, and Fujian), China is expanding its blue-water naval capabilities, while also rapidly modernizing advanced systems such as the Chengdu J-20 and missile forces.Meanwhile, Japan maintains its position as the world’s seventh-ranked military power and is developing a technology-driven force based on a Self-Defense Forces personnel strength of approximately 240,000 to 250,000. The Maritime Self-Defense Force possesses advanced capabilities centered on Aegis combat system destroyers, state-of-the-art submarines, and F-35 Lightning II, and is pursuing the acquisition of counterstrike capabilities through the introduction of long-range missiles. This military buildup by both countries is notable in that it reflects an expansion of their operational scope and strategic roles.Recently, this competition has also translated into observable military activities. The Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force’s transit through the Taiwan Strait and Chinese naval exercises in the Western Pacific are increasingly viewed as mutually responsive actions, heightening regional tensions. Meanwhile, maritime operations and aerial encounters continue around the Senkaku Islands.Furthermore, the expansion of joint military exercises among the United States, Japan, and the Philippines, coupled with an increase in China’s corresponding military activities, is reinforcing the reciprocal nature of military competition in the region and further complicating the regional security environment. These trends indicate that tensions are extending beyond bilateral dynamics into a more layered structure of regional military competition.Consequently, the parallel processes of military buildup and mutual deterrence are increasing the risk of unintended incidents while intensifying strategic competition across Northeast Asia.3. Economic Security Competition and the Restructuring of InterdependenceThe Sino-Japanese rivalry is rapidly extending beyond the military sphere into the economic domain. In particular, control over strategic resources is emerging as a key instrument of competition. China is applying pressure on Japan through export restrictions on dual-use goods with potential military applications, while Japan is responding through supply chain diversification and the strengthening of economic security policies.This trend is further deepening the integration of economics and security. Whereas economic interdependence once served as a stabilizing factor that helped mitigate conflict, it is increasingly viewed as a potential vulnerability that can amplify the impact of disputes when they arise. Competition in key industrial sectors such as semiconductors, batteries, and rare earth elements, when combined with technological rivalry, is further enhancing their strategic significance.Furthermore, the deterioration of mutual perceptions is a factor that is structurally entrenching the conflict. Public sentiment toward China in Japan and toward Japan in China has already been relatively low, and recent disputes are further intensifying these negative perceptions. The interaction of historical issues, the Fukushima treated water release issue, and the Taiwan issue is deepening emotional confrontation, which in turn undermines the sustainability of policy compromise.4. Implications for the Korean PeninsulaAs demonstrated by the First Sino-Japanese War and the Russo-Japanese War, competition among East Asian great powers has been closely linked to the fate of the Korean Peninsula. The deepening Sino-Japanese tensions continue to carry complex implications for the Korean Peninsula today.The most notable change is the growing interconnectedness and uncertainty of the regional security environment. The Taiwan Strait and the East China Sea are linked to South Korea’s principal maritime transport routes, and tensions in these areas could impose economic costs. At the same time, rising military tensions across the region are contributing to greater uncertainty in the security environment surrounding the Korean Peninsula.In particular, the strengthening of the U.S.–Japan alliance and the expansion of Japan’s security role are accelerating these changes. Military cooperation between the United States and Japan could affect not only the Taiwan Strait but also the security environment of the Korean Peninsula, potentially leading to adjustments in the role and operational scope of U.S. Forces Korea. These developments further increase the complexity of South Korea’s security environment.Furthermore, if military tensions between China and Japan escalate, there is a risk of unintended incidents, and the ripple effects could extend to the Korean Peninsula. These risks could become more pronounced if regional crisis management mechanisms fail to function effectively.The economic implications are also clear. The Taiwan Strait and the Western Pacific are major maritime routes for South Korea’s trade, and instability in these areas could lead to higher logistics costs and disruptions in supply chains. Furthermore, economic tensions between China and Japan are closely linked to South Korea’s industrial structure, making it highly likely that specific regulations or export controls would have a direct impact.In addition, these changes in the diplomatic and security environment could also influence the domestic policy landscape. If differences in perceptions regarding policies toward China and Japan widen, policy implementation may become more contentious, potentially placing a burden on the consistency and continuity of foreign policy.5. Conclusion: The Importance of Conflict Deterrence and Conflict ManagementRecent Sino-Japanese tensions are deepening instability in the broader East Asian security environment, and the Korean Peninsula is not immune to these effects. In particular, the growing interconnectedness of the regional security landscape and shifts in economic interdependence are expected to have a lasting impact on the Korean Peninsula.If military tensions between China and Japan persist, there is a risk that unintended incidents or misunderstandings could escalate into broader conflict dynamics. If heightened military activity is accompanied by limited diplomatic communication, it may become increasingly difficult to manage the situation in a stable manner.In this regard, the importance of conflict management is further underscored. Diplomatic communication and confidence-building measures aimed at reducing misunderstandings and preventing unintended incidents are essential, and sustained dialogue through regional cooperation frameworks can also play a critical role in easing tensions.Ultimately, the trajectory of strategic competition between China and Japan is a key variable shaping the future direction of the East Asian security order, and the Korean Peninsula is also likely to undergo continuous change within this structural environment. In this context, South Korea likewise faces a growing need to continuously refine its situational awareness and response capabilities in order to adapt to evolving strategic conditions.

South Korea’s Approach to the North Korean Nuclear Issue in the Context of the U.S.–China Summit: The Need to Place a Freeze on North Korea’s Nuclear Activities on the AgendaEui lim JinAssociate Research FellowKorea Institute for Defense Analyses (KIDA) Former Second Vice MinisterMinistry of Foreign Affairs1. IntroductionAccording to a March announcement by the White House, a U.S.–China summit is highly likely to take place in mid-May.1) At present, U.S.–China working-level negotiations are reportedly proceeding separately from issues related to U.S. sanctions on Iran and other Middle East variables.2)Accordingly, barring unforeseen developments, the likelihood that the summit will take place appears high. The principal agenda items are expected to include a U.S.–China compromise on the Taiwan issue, matters related to Iran’s compliance with sanctions, and coordination on strengthening regulations associated with technological competition.3) These are complex issues that will not be easily resolved.Against this backdrop, the key security-related issues on the Korean Peninsula are the possibility of U.S.–North Korea talks in connection with the upcoming U.S.–China summit and the potential for progress on the North Korean nuclear issue through such dialogue. However, the international environment remains highly unstable, shaped by overlapping challenges including conflict in the Middle East, divisions within NATO, and volatility in global oil prices. In East Asia as well, numerous variables persist, including the deepening cooperation between North Korea and Russia, which is exacerbating regional security concerns.This paper examines the prospects for U.S.–North Korea dialogue and possible progress in negotiations in the context of the forthcoming U.S.–China summit, and discusses the policy options available to the South Korean government.2. The Possibility of Addressing the North Korean Nuclear Issue at the U.S.–China SummitAssuming that the U.S.–China summit takes place, two principal questions arise regarding security on the Korean Peninsula. First, is there a possibility that a U.S.–North Korea summit could be held on the sidelines of the U.S.–China summit? Second, if a U.S.–North Korea summit or other form of contact does occur, would it lead to substantive progress toward resolving the North Korean nuclear issue?Regarding the first question, considering past precedents and the current international environment, the likelihood of a U.S.-North Korea summit does not appear high. 2026 Korea Institute for Defense Analyses (KIDA) study “Prospects and Considerations for the Resumption of North Korean Denuclearization Negotiations” by Park Yong-han et al. (2026). “Prospects and Considerations for the Resumption of North Korean Denuclearization Negotiations,” Defense Forum. Korea Institute for Defense Analyses.Regarding the first question, considering past precedents and the current international environment, the likelihood of a U.S.–North Korea summit does not appear high.4)This research method employs Delphi analysis to collect expert opinions and derive rational judgments. Meaningful results are generally obtained when the survey sample includes at least 30 participants and the survey is conducted in no fewer than three rounds. For the survey findings, see the above-mentioned study by Park Yong-han et al.According to the article, domestic experts assessed that there is a meaningful possibility that a U.S.–North Korea summit could be held in conjunction with the U.S.–China summit. However, following U.S. military actions against Iran and the naval blockade of the Strait of Hormuz since March, the current U.S. administration appears constrained in its ability to devote sufficient diplomatic attention to issues on the Korean Peninsula.Furthermore, given the significance and complexity of the agenda in talks with China, Washington may seek to avoid dispersing its strategic focus. In addition, because summit meetings are typically preceded by informal senior-level working-level consultations or other forms of contact, it is reasonable to conclude that the remaining timeframe is insufficient to meet the conditions necessary for summit preparation.However, even if an official U.S.–North Korea summit does not take place, the possibility of informal contacts remains considerable. This becomes clearer when viewed from the perspectives of both North Korea and the United States.North Korea, having adopted a more aggressive nuclear doctrine and participated in the Russia–Ukraine war, requires additional resources to develop into a military power possessing independent strategic capabilities. Although Pyongyang appears to have partially alleviated its economic difficulties through cooperation with Russia, it may nevertheless seek diplomatic recognition as a nuclear-armed state while simultaneously using its nuclear capabilities as leverage to pursue relief from international economic sanctions.Meanwhile, the U.S. government appears to have limited capacity to devote additional diplomatic resources to the North Korean issue, given domestic concerns over immigration and instability in the Middle East. Nevertheless, in light of President Trump’s considerable personal influence over policy decisions, the possibility cannot be ruled out that he may seek a diplomatic breakthrough through informal contacts with North Korea in response to criticism surrounding Iran sanctions, domestic political pressures, and the approaching midterm elections.In conclusion, while the likelihood of a U.S.–North Korea summit or formal U.S.–North Korea talks in May arising from the U.S.–China dialogue currently appears low, the possibility of informal contacts remains. In particular, there is a meaningful possibility that the Trump administration could utilize such contacts as a political instrument to reshape the domestic political landscape.3. South Korea’s Approach to the North Korean Nuclear IssueGiven these circumstances, what efforts should the South Korean government undertake to prepare for potential U.S.–North Korea contacts before and after the U.S.–China summit? First, this issue must be approached on the premise that the current international environment has become less favorable than the conditions that existed during the negotiations in 2018.First, North Korea has secured a dependable partner in Russia, thereby reducing the relative necessity of engaging with the United States or South Korea as a means of escaping economic isolation. Second, from the U.S. perspective, military and diplomatic efforts related to the Russia–Ukraine conflict, tensions in the Middle East involving Iran, and, more fundamentally, strategic competition with China take precedence.While there remains room for active diplomatic engagement if short-term gains can be achieved, past precedents suggest that more complex strategic calculations are likely to shape policy decisions. Furthermore, because North Korea continues to maintain a confrontational posture rather than engage in dialogue with the United States and South Korea, it is difficult to formulate either a clear assessment of the situation or an effective policy response.Therefore, what the South Korean government needs to do at this stage is identify feasible agenda items for addressing the North Korean nuclear issue and make sustained efforts to promote and share such proposals with the international community—including the United States and China—through multiple diplomatic channels.Referring to the results of a Delphi survey of experts conducted in 2025, “comprehensive agreement and implementation” was identified as the desirable outcome for North Korean denuclearization negotiations, whereas “phased agreement and implementation” was viewed as the more realistic framework for achieving a settlement.Among the key findings, the following points are particularly noteworthy. First, respondents assessed that initial negotiations could lead to an agreement on freezing North Korea’s nuclear program or reducing related risks. Second, it was assessed that a reciprocal arrangement involving the suspension or reduction of ROK–U.S. joint military exercises could be negotiated in exchange for such a freeze. Third, respondents strongly projected that specific UN sanctions could be eased upon the conclusion of an agreement.5)In summary, if an ambitious denuclearization objective is insisted upon from the outset, the likelihood of acceptance will remain low. However, the prospects for reaching an agreement are expected to improve if the scope of the denuclearization objective is adjusted. This assessment is also consistent with recent analyses suggesting that changing strategic realities on the Korean Peninsula require a more flexible approach to negotiations.6)I pointed out that the North Korean nuclear issue is likely to be discussed in the U.S.–China talks with an emphasis on preserving the status quo and preventing conflict, and proposed an interim agreement centered on a nuclear freeze as a practical alternative. In light of this assessment, while maintaining the principle of denuclearization as a long-term objective, a more flexible approach will be required in future negotiations.First, the negotiation strategy should be operationalized as a phased process—building preliminary trust → freeze → reduction → management or elimination (denuclearization)—and incorporated into the negotiating agenda. However, even if an initial U.S.–North Korea agreement takes the form of substantive arms control, the ultimate objective must remain complete denuclearization.Second, reciprocal and phased exchanges are essential at each stage of the process. Interim measures should be clearly specified as provisional arrangements while being presented in a manner that is both verifiable and politically acceptable.This phased negotiation strategy must be supported by sustained efforts to place it on the international agenda at multiple levels. First, efforts should be made to elevate the North Korean nuclear issue through summit-level and other high-level diplomatic channels. Just as South Korea requested President Xi Jinping to play a mediating role in promoting peace on the Korean Peninsula during the South Korea–China summit in January 2026, it is necessary to clearly communicate the South Korean government’s phased approach to resolving the North Korean nuclear issue during future senior-level meetings.South Korea should also utilize bilateral diplomatic opportunities—not only with China, but also with the United States, the EU, and other relevant actors—to explain this approach and build broader international consensus.Third, through diplomatic working-level channels, South Korea should gather concrete views from various countries on how best to place the North Korean nuclear issue on the international agenda and identify areas in which South Korea’s mediating role can be most effective. In particular, practical efforts should proceed in parallel to secure support from like-minded countries—such as Japan, Australia, Canada, and the EU—that have participated in discussions concerning North Korean denuclearization.Fourth, South Korea should secure channels for dialogue with North Korea by expanding humanitarian assistance within the bounds of compliance with UN and unilateral sanctions. At the same time, while clearly signaling its willingness to pursue military confidence-building measures, Seoul must exercise caution against adopting unconditional confidence-building initiatives in the absence of reciprocal actions by North Korea.As negotiations between the United States and Iran enter an increasingly unpredictable phase, the prospects for U.S.–North Korea dialogue—once regarded as highly likely—are also becoming more uncertain. Under current conditions, in which international and regional instability overlap, what is required of the South Korean government is not the pursuit of a single solution, but rather the flexibility to identify policy options from multiple perspectives and implement them appropriately in response to changing circumstances.In particular, for South Korea to function effectively as an agenda-setter, strategic thinking is required to strengthen the credibility of the ROK–U.S. alliance, restore South Korea–China relations, and maximize the utilization of South Korea’s strategic assets—such as shipbuilding and semiconductors—as diplomatic leverage.※ Please note that this document reflects the personal views of the author and does not represent the official position of the Korea Institute for Defense Analyses (KIDA).1) Yonhap News, “U.S.-China Summit in May Confirmed... Will the Iran War Be Resolved by Then?” (March 26, 2026).2) Newsis, “U.S.–China Foreign Ministers Hold Phone Call Ahead of Summit...  Economic Leaders Also Hold Video Conference.” (May 1, 2026).3) MBC News, “Full-scale Preparations for U.S.–China Summit... Coordinating ‘Tariff and Middle East’ Agenda.” (May 1, 2026).4) Park Yong-han et al. 2026, “Prospects and Considerations for the Resumption of North Korean Denuclearization Negotiations,” Defense Forum, Korea Institute for Defense Analyses.5) Ibid; for detailed survey findings and key issues, see the relevant article.6) Jiyong Zheng, “China Is Confronting New Realities on the Korean Peninsula,” Brookings Commentary, April 30, 2026.

Advancing South Korea’s Role as a Diplomatic Powerhouse Through Defense Diplomacy— Leveraging Expanded Defense Cooperation to Broaden Diplomatic Horizons —Jae duk ChoiProfessorSeoul School of Integrated Science and TechnologyA succession of geopolitical crises—including the Russia–Ukraine war, the Israel–Hamas conflict, and escalating tensions between the United States and Iran—has begun to destabilize the international order that remained relatively stable in the post–Cold War era.Long-dormant geopolitical rivalries are reemerging, and states are responding to heightened security uncertainty by increasing defense expenditures and strengthening military capabilities. These developments are driving a surge in global demand for defense assets and elevating the defense industry as a central pillar of South Korea’s diplomatic strategy.In particular, these shifts in the international environment merit close attention, as they present an opportunity to expand the scope of South Korean diplomacy beyond the mere promotion of defense exports. Unlike conventional industrial cooperation, defense cooperation inherently facilitates the development of long-term military and security partnerships. The acquisition of weapons systems requires sustained collaboration in areas such as training, maintenance, and capability upgrades, thereby fostering enduring strategic relationships between partner states.Accordingly, defense cooperation should be understood not simply as a transactional export activity, but as a critical instrument for expanding diplomatic influence.Since the onset of the Russia–Ukraine war, European countries have increased their defense budgets and accelerated military modernization efforts. In this context, the competitiveness of South Korean defense products is well established in the international market.South Korea’s defense industry combines high performance with cost efficiency and maintains a manufacturing base capable of meeting demanding delivery schedules. Notably, its ability to supply large volumes within short timeframes constitutes a significant competitive advantage in the global defense market.This competitiveness is once again drawing heightened attention amid rising instability in the Middle East, particularly in the context of recent U.S.–Iran tensions. As the threat of missile and drone attacks intensifies, demand for missile defense systems to protect energy infrastructure and other critical facilities is increasing, leading to growing interest in South Korea’s air and missile defense capabilities. In addition, the need to replenish air defense assets depleted during recent conflicts is expected to further drive demand in the near to medium term.At the same time, as the concept of economic security has gained prominence, the scope of defense cooperation has expanded beyond traditional weapons systems. Whereas such cooperation historically centered on platforms such as tanks, fighter aircraft, and self-propelled artillery, it is now increasingly extending into sectors including shipbuilding, energy, and advanced technologies.For example, icebreakers supporting Arctic shipping routes, LNG carriers facilitating energy transport, and military support vessels represent emerging areas of defense cooperation that integrate security and economic interests. These trends underscore the evolution of defense cooperation into a domain closely linked to a nation’s broader strategic industries.South Korea, in particular, possesses competitive strengths across a range of industrial sectors, including shipbuilding, nuclear energy, semiconductors, hydrogen, and construction. When integrated with defense cooperation, these capabilities can generate substantial synergies. Combining defense cooperation with energy and infrastructure projects offers a strategic advantage in expanding partnerships with counterpart countries and in establishing durable, long-term frameworks for cooperation.Defense cooperation also plays a critical role in South Korea’s economic security. As an export-driven economy with a high dependence on imported energy, South Korea is particularly vulnerable to disruptions in energy supply. In this context, strategies that integrate defense and energy cooperation can contribute meaningfully to strengthening economic resilience. In particular, the parallel pursuit of defense and energy cooperation with Middle Eastern countries can enhance mutual interdependence and support the development of stable, long-term partnerships.Given these dynamics, the South Korean government should leverage defense cooperation as a core instrument of its diplomatic strategy. By expanding both economic and security cooperation with a diverse set of partner countries through defense collaboration, South Korea can position itself as a strategically significant actor in the international system. Countries that develop cooperative relationships with South Korea are likely to recognize that its stability and security are directly linked to their own interests, thereby reinforcing its diplomatic standing.However, realizing these opportunities will require robust diplomatic support. Defense cooperation extends beyond commercial transactions and depends heavily on intergovernmental coordination, with political trust and strong diplomatic relations playing particularly critical roles. Accordingly, a more systematic approach to defense diplomacy is needed—one that effectively leverages overseas diplomatic missions and established channels.Moreover, because defense cooperation inherently involves long-term commitments, it should be pursued within a strategic and forward-looking framework. Defense diplomacy should be oriented toward the establishment of enduring partnerships, with particular emphasis on integrating defense cooperation with industrial and energy collaboration.In sum, ongoing transformations in the international order present a significant opportunity for South Korea to expand its diplomatic influence through defense cooperation. Such efforts can contribute not only to strengthening industrial competitiveness but also to enhancing diplomatic reach. By broadening both economic and security cooperation with a diverse range of partners, South Korea can lay the foundation to emerge as both a technological leader and a diplomatic powerhouse.Accordingly, defense industry cooperation should be recognized as a strategic opportunity to expand the horizons of South Korean diplomacy. By advancing a diplomatic strategy centered on defense cooperation in response to shifting global dynamics, South Korea can establish itself as a key partner in international security cooperation. The present moment represents a critical inflection point for South Korea to advance as a diplomatic powerhouse through the effective use of defense diplomacy.

The April 27 Panmunjom Declaration and the DMZ Peace Trail: Toward Peaceful Coexistence on the Korean Peninsula                    Deok haeng LeeFormer Presidential Secretary for Unification AffairsApril 27 marked the eighth anniversary of the 2018 Inter-Korean summit. In retrospect, the Panmunjom Declaration—the agreement reached at that summit—represented a significant breakthrough, helping to alleviate the persistent frustration arising from the intractable North Korean nuclear issue and the prolonged stagnation of inter-Korean relations.Following its first nuclear test in 2006, North Korea accelerated its nuclear development program. In particular, during the two-year period from 2016 to 2017, it conducted three nuclear tests and multiple long-range missile launches, culminating in its declaration on November 29, 2017, of the “completion of its nuclear force.”In response, the international community—including the United States and the United Nations—intensified pressure on North Korea through economic sanctions, while South Korea adopted stringent measures such as the closure of the Gaeseong Industrial Complex in February 2016. However, these actions largely resulted in the severance of inter-Korean ties and failed to produce tangible outcomes.The Push for the 2018 Inter-Korean Summit and Its AftermathInter-Korean relations, which had remained at an impasse through 2017, began to shift in early January 2018. Following North Korean leader Kim Jong-un’s New Year’s address, dialogue resumed with high-level talks on January 9, 2018.This process was accompanied by a series of exchanges, including visits by senior North Korean officials such as Kim Yo-jong and Kim Yong-nam, as well as cultural delegations. Momentum for dialogue was further reinforced by North Korea’s participation in the PyeongChang Winter Olympics in February 2018, ultimately leading to the third inter-Korean summit at Panmunjom on April 27, 2018.Ahead of the planned U.S.–North Korea summit in June 2018, an additional inter-Korean summit was convened at Panmunjom on May 26. Subsequently, in September 2018, the leaders of North and South Korea met again in Pyongyang and adopted the September Pyongyang Joint Declaration.At the U.S.–North Korea level, the first-ever summit between the two countries was held in Singapore on June 12, 2018, resulting in a joint statement outlining commitments to establish a peace regime on the Korean Peninsula and to pursue complete denuclearization. A second summit, held in Hanoi, Vietnam, on February 27–28, 2019, failed to produce an agreement or joint statement.On June 30, 2019, President Donald Trump and Chairman Kim Jong-un held an impromptu meeting at Panmunjom during Trump’s visit to South Korea; however, this encounter likewise failed to yield substantive results.As U.S.–North Korea relations failed to produce meaningful progress, inter-Korean relations subsequently deteriorated. The Inter-Korean Liaison Office—established just prior to the September 2018 summit—was later demolished, and both official and unofficial communication channels between the two Koreas were severed. Since advancing the “two hostile states” doctrine in late 2023, North Korea has consistently reaffirmed this position, including at the Ninth Congress of the Korea Workers’ Party and during sessions of the Supreme People’s Assembly in 2026.The broader international environment has also proven unfavorable to improving inter-Korean and U.S.–North Korea relations. North Korea and Russia signed a Russia–North Korea Alliance Treaty in June 2024, followed by the deployment of North Korean troops to Russia in November of the same year. Additionally, the conflict involving the United States and Israel against Iran, which began in February, has further complicated efforts to address issues on the Korean Peninsula.The Significance of the April 27 Inter-Korean SummitAmong the five inter-Korean summits held to date, the June 15, 2000 summit marked a “transition from hostility to reconciliation” and represented the true beginning of substantive inter-Korean engagement, while the October 2007 summit expanded relations into the realm of comprehensive economic cooperation. The April 2018 summit further advanced these efforts by addressing denuclearization and military issues in a more comprehensive manner.In the Panmunjom Declaration, the two Koreas agreed on: (1) the complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and the establishment of a peace regime; (2) the easing of military tensions and a commitment to mutual non-aggression; and (3) the comprehensive and forward-looking development of inter-Korean relations.Notably, the agreement to pursue the establishment of a peace regime—including a declaration to formally end the Korean War within the year—and the shared commitment to “gradual denuclearization” established an important precedent for subsequent discussions among relevant stakeholders, particularly in the context of U.S.–North Korea dialogue.The Panmunjom Declaration is particularly significant in that it consolidated the core issues of military tension reduction, the transition to a peace regime, and denuclearization within a single framework. It also outlined relatively concrete implementation measures in the military domain. Measures such as the cessation of hostile acts, the restoration of military communication channels, and the establishment of mechanisms to prevent armed clashes were partially implemented through the September Pyongyang Joint Declaration and the September 19 Military Agreement.Although the objectives set forth in the declaration have yet to be fully realized, its significance remains intact. First, it established a policy framework that treats denuclearization and the establishment of a peace regime as a unified package. Second, it provided a practical model and experiential foundation for reducing military tensions between the two Koreas. Third, it serves as a reference point for future negotiations should inter-Korean dialogue resume.Whenever the need for tension reduction and cooperation reemerges, the Panmunjom Declaration is likely to be revisited. In this regard, the April 27 Summit retains enduring relevance as a mid- to long-term roadmap for addressing the North Korean nuclear issue and shaping the future trajectory of inter-Korean relations.Recommendations for Restoring Inter-Korean RelationsIt can be argued that North Korea’s primary objectives in engaging in the April 27 inter-Korean summit and subsequent U.S.–North Korea summits included securing regime survival through resolving the nuclear issue, ending international isolation, and overcoming economic challenges. In particular, improving relations with the United States as a pathway to achieving normalized statehood appears to have been a central strategic objective.In light of these considerations, several policy measures merit consideration.First, it is necessary to create conditions conducive to the resumption of U.S.–North Korea dialogue, which remains a priority for Pyongyang. Efforts should be made to elevate the urgency of engagement so that issues on the Korean Peninsula are not marginalized amid competing global crises, including the ongoing Russia–Ukraine war and tensions involving the United States, Israel, and Iran.At the same time, achieving a durable resolution of the North Korean nuclear issue will require progress toward normalizing North Korea’s external relations—including with the United States—as well as integrating the country into the international community.Second, establishing a permanent and sustainable peace structure on the Korean Peninsula is essential. Recent global conflicts underscore the urgency of transitioning from the current armistice system to a formal peace regime.The inter-Korean summit agreements explicitly refer to the need to replace the Armistice Agreement with a peace treaty and call for the convening of trilateral (South–North–U.S.) or quadrilateral (South–North–U.S.–China) negotiations. Accordingly, close coordination with neighboring countries will be critical to advancing a peace regime in parallel with improvements in inter-Korean relations.Third, it is essential to secure sufficient policy flexibility to pursue inter-Korean cooperation projects with a degree of autonomy. Under the current sanctions regime imposed by the international community—including the United States and the United Nations—it remains extremely difficult to implement exchange and cooperation initiatives, including humanitarian assistance.As a result, agreements reached at the September 2018 Pyongyang summit—such as the normalization of the Gaeseong Industrial Complex and the resumption of Mount Geumgang tourism—have not been implemented, contributing significantly to the current stalemate in inter-Korean relations. Addressing this issue will require measures such as negotiating sanctions exemptions, in coordination with the United States and other relevant stakeholders, for projects agreed upon by the two Koreas.In addition, continued efforts to transform the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) into a peace zone are essential for institutionalizing peaceful coexistence. Successive South Korean administrations have pursued this objective, and in 2018, meaningful progress was made through inter-Korean agreements and related follow-up measures. Notably, the April 27 Panmunjom Declaration included a commitment to transform the DMZ into a “substantive peace zone.”In this context, the South Korean government is advancing the “DMZ Peace Trail” initiative to promote peace in the DMZ and support the development of border regions. From April 17 to November 30, twelve themed routes across border areas in Incheon Metropolitan City, Gangwon Special Self-Governing Province, and Gyeonggi Province have been fully opened and are now in operation.Finally, in order to reopen channels of communication with North Korea, South Korea’s policy approach must consistently convey that its objectives are not driven by abrupt shifts in the security environment, but rather reflect a sustained commitment to maintaining peace and stability while pursuing a future of shared prosperity.The government should continue to pursue a range of diplomatic efforts, including advocating for improvements in inter-Korean relations at every available opportunity and communicating its policy positions through U.S.–North Korea diplomatic channels, as well as through countries that maintain close ties with North Korea, such as China and Russia.

The Need for and Challenges of Institutionalizing Peaceful Coexistence on the Korean Peninsula                    Eunjoo ParkResearch FellowKorea Institute for National UnificationRecently, North Korea has simultaneously exhibited two sharply contrasting tendencies. On the one hand, it is institutionalizing the severance of inter-Korean relations through its declaration of “two hostile states”; on the other hand, it appears to be modulating tensions by offering an unusually positive response to South Korea’s expression of regret over the drone incursion incident.These contradictory dynamics should not be interpreted as mere shifts in posture or temporary reactions. Rather, they suggest that North Korea is pursuing a dual-track strategy: structurally entrenching hostility while seeking to manage and contain the escalation of localized tensions.Under these conditions, how should peace on the Korean Peninsula be conceptualized? This paper examines the “logic of management” that persists even amid institutionalized hostility, taking North Korea’s recent responses as its analytical point of departure. On this basis, it argues for redefining peace on the Korean Peninsula not as the improvement of inter-Korean relations, but as the institutionalization of coexistence.The Structuring of Hostility: A Shift in Inter-Korean RelationsNorth Korea’s policy of hostility toward the South is no longer merely rhetorical. Pyongyang is recalibrating its strategy to redefine the fundamental nature of inter-Korean relations. This shift is clearly reflected in its recent characterization of inter-Korean relations as a “relationship between two hostile states,” accompanied by the effective abandonment of longstanding discourses such as unification, reconciliation, and cooperation. This development represents more than a rhetorical adjustment. Rather, North Korea is recasting inter-Korean relations from a “special relationship” into an “external security variable” requiring continuous management.This transformation is further evidenced by recent major political developments. Following the formal designation of South Korea as one of the “two hostile states” at the plenary meeting of the Central Committee of the Workers’ Party of Korea in late 2023, the 2024 State of the Nation Address at the Supreme People’s Assembly explicitly identified South Korea as the “primary hostile state” and announced the removal of unification-related concepts.At the recent First Session of the 15th Supreme People’s Assembly, inter-Korean policy was no longer articulated as an independent policy domain but was instead subsumed within the broader framework of national security and foreign policy.Institutional changes further reinforce this shift. The reorganization and downsizing of inter-Korean agencies, along with the contraction of related policy areas, indicate that inter-Korean relations are no longer treated as a distinct policy agenda. Rather than serving as a flexible strategic instrument, these issues are increasingly functioning as a structural condition underpinning regime operations, while the relationship itself is evolving into a fixed strategic environment.Taken together, these developments signal a fundamental transformation in the nature of inter-Korean relations. As a result, the traditional approach centered on “improving relations” is becoming increasingly disconnected from current realities. The central question is no longer how to restore relations, but rather how to manage tensions in a stable and sustainable manner under these altered conditions.Limited Signals: North Korea’s Calculated FlexibilityEven within this broader structural transformation, North Korea’s response to the recent drone incident carries implications that extend beyond the immediate episode. On April 6, South Korean President Lee Jae-myung formally expressed regret over the drone incursion into North Korea during a Cabinet meeting and emergency economic review session at the presidential office. He stated, “Although this was not an act by our government, I express regret to the North Korean side over the unnecessary military tension caused by such reckless behavior,” and directed the establishment of preventive measures.Within hours, Kim Yo-jong, director of a department of the Workers’ Party of Korea, issued an unusually conciliatory response. She remarked that it was “a very fortunate and wise behavior” for the president personally to express regret and refer to preventive measures, and further noted that Kim Jong-un had characterized the response as reflecting a “frank and broad-minded” attitude.In general, North Korea has maintained a consistently hardline posture in response to perceived infringements on its sovereignty or military provocations. Moreover, since designating South Korea as its “primary hostile state,” it has further reinforced this posture. Against this backdrop, its prompt and relatively positive response to South Korea’s statement constitutes a notable departure from recent patterns.However, it would be premature to interpret this response as a signal of improving relations. Kim Yo-jong simultaneously foreclosed prospects for engagement by stating that the South should “abandon any attempts at contact,” while demanding a cessation of further provocations. This response should therefore be understood not as a simple conciliatory gesture, but as a calibrated strategy that combines acceptance of de-escalatory signals with the imposition of conditions on future interaction.This behavior suggests that North Korea is pursuing a strategy of selectively managing both the level and direction of tension, rather than allowing tensions to escalate indiscriminately. While hostility remains the underlying strategic premise, there appears to be a clear recognition that uncontrolled escalation into military conflict is neither desirable nor strategically advantageous.Notably, this case demonstrates that North Korea retains the capacity to selectively absorb and utilize external signals in ways that serve its interests, rather than categorically rejecting them. This reflects an approach focused on maintaining tensions within manageable limits, rather than pursuing escalation as an end in itself.This pattern can also be understood in the context of broader foreign policy considerations. Even as it structurally distances itself from inter-Korean engagement, North Korea appears to be seeking to avoid unnecessary escalation by factoring in its relations with the United States, the sanctions environment, and domestic economic conditions.Ultimately, North Korea’s response reflects less an intention to improve relations than a strategic decision to treat tensions as a controllable variable. In other words, it is maintaining a posture of hostility while calibrating its intensity and trajectory. This provides an important indication that, although inter-Korean relations are structurally constrained, a limited and managed space for interaction persists.Rethinking Peace: From Engagement to CoexistenceThis evolving context highlights the limitations of traditional approaches that conceptualize peace on the Korean Peninsula primarily in terms of tension reduction or the improvement of relations. Historically, peace has been understood as a process of building trust through dialogue and cooperation, ultimately aimed at restoring national homogeneity and normalizing relations. Under current conditions of institutionalized hostility, however, this framework is becoming increasingly difficult to operationalize.As discussed, North Korea is maintaining a structurally fixed posture of hostility while simultaneously demonstrating an interest in managing the escalation of tensions. This suggests that peace is increasingly defined not as an outcome of improved relations, but rather as a set of conditions designed to prevent conflict and maintain stability within a context of persistent hostility.This shift necessitates a reconceptualization of peace from the perspective of “coexistence,” moving beyond the traditional engagement-based paradigm. In this context, coexistence does not presuppose the restoration of trust or the normalization of relations. Rather, it assumes the persistence of mutual hostility and focuses on minimizing conflict and maintaining stability within that framework.Accordingly, the meaning of peace is shifting from “restoring national homogeneity” to “managing stable division and preventing conflict.” This implies that peace should be understood not as the result of changing relations, but rather as a mechanism for managing risks within relatively fixed relations. In this sense, peace is no longer a static condition, but an object of active management that requires deliberate institutional design. The central challenge, therefore, lies in how to stabilize this management framework through institutional means.The Era of Adversarial Coexistence and the Tasks for PeaceThe Korean Peninsula is entering a new phase of “adversarial coexistence,” within which the management and design of peace have emerged as central policy challenges. Recent developments should not be interpreted solely as a period of heightened tension or a temporary crisis. Rather, they indicate the emergence of a new pattern in which conflict is actively managed even within a structurally adversarial context. This suggests that the Korean Peninsula is undergoing a broader transitional phase.This transformation implies that both the meaning of peace and the approaches to achieving it are being fundamentally reshaped. Peace is no longer a condition gradually built through improved relations or expanded cooperation. Instead, it is increasingly understood as a condition sustained through the management of conflict under adversarial circumstances.In this respect, the current situation should not be viewed solely as a crisis, but rather as an early stage in the formation of a new equilibrium characterized by “hostile coexistence.” North Korea’s limited yet calibrated responses can be interpreted as initial indicators of this shift. The Korean Peninsula appears to be moving toward a new form of stability defined by “managed tension within persistent hostility.”What is critical is to avoid interpreting these changes through outdated frameworks or dismissing them as temporary phenomena. The task at hand is not to transform the relationship in the near term, but rather to develop realistic approaches for managing conflict within a fundamentally unchanged relationship.Peace on the Korean Peninsula can no longer be understood solely as an aspirational end state. Instead, it must be approached as a continuous process of management and institutional design. The era of “adversarial coexistence” is already underway, and the manner in which peace is constructed within this framework will depend on future policy innovation and strategic adaptability.

Peaceful Coexistence Must Be Redesigned as a Multi-Layered Framework for Cooperation, Including the Health and Medical Sectors— The Necessity and Challenges of International Cooperation for Peaceful Coexistence on the Korean Peninsula —                    Seon-taek WangAdjunct ProfessorCollege of Media, Arts, and Science Sogang UniversityThe concept of peaceful coexistence on the Korean Peninsula has been raised repeatedly over the past several decades. However, it has rarely been treated as a substantive policy priority. While its importance has consistently been acknowledged, sustained discussion and concrete implementation strategies have rarely followed. Underlying this persistent gap is a deeply rooted perception of the Korean Peninsula issue.Until now, South Korea has approached inter-Korean relations not through the lens of “peaceful coexistence,” but rather through the dual paradigms of “division” and “unification.” There is no question that overcoming division and achieving unification remain important objectives and ultimate national goals. However, the predominance of unification-centered discourse has, paradoxically, pushed practical discussions of peaceful coexistence to the periphery.The challenge is that this perception is becoming increasingly misaligned with evolving realities. Recent shifts in the domestic and international environment—such as North Korea’s articulation of “hostile relations between two states” and intensifying U.S.–China strategic competition—raise fundamental questions about the viability of a unification-first approach. In practical terms, peaceful coexistence has emerged not as a discretionary option, but as a minimum safeguard against mutual destruction and an existential necessity.Under these conditions, treating unification as a short-term policy objective is increasingly untenable. It is therefore necessary to re conceptualize unification as a long-term, comprehensive endeavor while developing a strategy to manage the intervening period. At this juncture, peaceful coexistence is emerging not as a secondary consideration, but as an urgent and actionable policy priority.Accordingly, what is required is a shift in perspective that moves peaceful coexistence from a declaratory concept to the center of operational policy. Peaceful coexistence is not a substitute for unification, but rather the foundational order of the Korean Peninsula that must be effectively managed within a broader unification framework.Envisioning unification without a parallel process to prevent conflict and build trust is difficult to justify from both practical and strategic standpoints. Ultimately, the design and implementation of peaceful coexistence constitute the most viable pathway toward unification and the central task of Korean Peninsula policy.To sustainably realize peaceful coexistence, domestic public support, the cultivation of an inter-Korean cooperative environment, and robust international cooperation are essential. In particular, international cooperation presents unique challenges, as it requires coordination with external actors whose national interests may diverge from those of South Korea, thereby limiting Seoul’s degree of control. While it is both natural and necessary for South Korea to seek a leading role in addressing these issues, the division of the Korean Peninsula is inextricably linked to broader international dynamics.It is therefore a geopolitical reality that the issue cannot be resolved through unilateral approaches that exclude cooperation with external stakeholders. International cooperation is thus not optional, but a prerequisite for the effective functioning of peaceful coexistence. The development of sophisticated diplomatic strategies, coupled with effective implementation, will be a critical variable.Only by fostering a conducive environment within a multi-layered framework of international cooperation—encompassing neighboring states such as the United States, China, Japan, and Russia, as well as international organizations and civil society networks—can the sustainability and credibility of peaceful coexistence be ensured.Furthermore, peaceful coexistence must be redesigned as a multi-layered cooperative architecture in which collaboration across diverse sectors is mutually reinforcing, rather than dependent on a single policy initiative or agreement. The first layer consists of health cooperation and humanitarian medical assistance.Joint responses to infectious diseases, the prevention of tuberculosis and malaria, support for essential medicines and medical equipment, cooperation on maternal and child health and nutrition, and emergency medical coordination during disasters are areas that carry relatively low political sensitivity while directly enhancing human security. Such initiatives can serve as practical entry points for peaceful coexistence by restoring working-level engagement, building trust, and establishing cooperative platforms that enable participation by international organizations and third countries.The second layer involves climate response and cooperation in the environmental and forestry sectors. Climate change represents a structural challenge requiring collective action irrespective of political or military tensions, and the Korean Peninsula faces a range of environmental risks, including floods, droughts, heatwaves, air pollution, and deforestation. In particular, deforestation in North Korea constitutes an urgent area for cooperation, given its implications for ecosystem degradation, food insecurity, and disaster vulnerability.Inter-Korean forest restoration initiatives, joint water resource management, disaster response coordination, and climate data sharing can generate tangible outcomes even under relatively constrained political conditions. Such environmental cooperation is also likely to attract broad international support and serves as a critical pillar for enhancing the sustainability of peaceful coexistence.The third layer entails cooperation in religion, culture, and education aimed at fostering social trust. Peaceful coexistence cannot be sustained solely through intergovernmental agreements; it requires the gradual accumulation of societal engagement and interpersonal exchange. Religious organizations can serve as important channels for expanding inter-Korean contact through the promotion of humanitarian and reconciliation-oriented values.Joint preservation of cultural heritage, exchanges in the arts and performing arts, and cooperation in traditional culture can help mitigate entrenched hostility. In addition, educational exchanges, academic collaboration, and youth engagement programs represent long-term investments in shaping future perceptions. The cumulative effect of such non-political cooperation is essential for embedding peaceful coexistence as a lived social reality rather than a purely policy-driven construct.These initial layers of cooperation involve relatively low political risk and are more conducive to securing international support, thereby playing a critical role in establishing the foundations of peaceful coexistence. However, peaceful coexistence cannot be sustained if it remains confined to these levels. For cooperation to become durable, it must evolve toward the integration of mutual interests. Once a baseline level of trust has been established, cooperation should expand into more structurally and strategically significant domains.Accordingly, economic cooperation is most appropriately positioned as the fourth layer. Economic engagement extends beyond functional cooperation to generate interdependencies that increase the costs of conflict for both parties. Infrastructure development, energy cooperation, industrial collaboration, and the operation of special economic zones can produce tangible mutual benefits. As economic interdependence deepens, incentives for military confrontation decline correspondingly. This stage is essential for establishing the material foundations of peaceful coexistence.The fifth layer encompasses military cooperation. While inherently sensitive, the military domain is indispensable for managing tensions and preventing escalation. Measures such as the restoration of military communication channels, the establishment of mechanisms to prevent accidental clashes, and enhanced transparency can serve as practical confidence-building measures. Military cooperation thus functions not only as a mechanism for tension reduction but also as a structured framework for risk management that reduces the probability of conflict to manageable levels.The sixth layer involves political coexistence. This stage focuses on establishing institutional frameworks for mutual recognition and conflict management. Key elements include refraining from mutual defamation, institutionalizing sustained dialogue mechanisms, and developing crisis management frameworks. Over time, such measures may contribute to the establishment of a durable peace regime. Although political cooperation requires a high degree of political commitment, it remains an essential step in consolidating peaceful coexistence as a stable and institutionalized order.In sum, peaceful coexistence on the Korean Peninsula should be understood as a multi-layered cooperative architecture in which diverse domains operate both sequentially and, at times, concurrently. As the scope and density of cooperation expand, the system becomes more resilient to shocks in any single domain.If the process is narrowly concentrated on military or political issues at the outset, progress may remain fragile and vulnerable to disruption from shifts in the political environment. Ultimately, the sustainability of peaceful coexistence depends not only on deterrence, but also on the density of social linkages, the institutionalization of cooperative mechanisms, and the breadth of international support.The task ahead is to institutionalize this cooperation not as a series of ad hoc initiatives, but as a sustainable system. This requires securing flexible pathways for engagement while maintaining alignment with the broader international system. It also requires elevating cooperation beyond assistance-based models toward frameworks that enhance joint response capacity and mutual trust.Ultimately, the success or failure of peaceful coexistence on the Korean Peninsula will depend on both a transformation in strategic thinking and the effectiveness of institutional design. Peaceful coexistence cannot be sustained through declarations alone; it must be constructed through the cumulative development of multi-layered international cooperation. In an era in which unification is appropriately framed as a long-term objective, the design and implementation of peaceful coexistence constitute the central strategic task shaping the future of the Korean Peninsula.

Envisioning Peaceful Coexistence in an Era of Complex Crises on the Korean Peninsula                    Jong-cheol ParkVisiting ProfessorDaejeon University1. Complex Crises on the Korean Peninsula and the Two-Hostile-States TheoryThe Korean Peninsula is facing a new form of complex crisis. The simultaneous unfolding of international order realignment, climate-driven ecological challenges, shifts in the economic and security environment due to technological transformation, and the North Korean nuclear threat has placed the Peninsula within a multi-layered, compound crisis environment.These crises are mutually reinforcing, generating amplifying and multiplicative effects. Global, regional, and Peninsula-level dynamics are deeply interconnected, with security, economic, ecological, and science-and-technology domains increasingly overlapping.The international order is exhibiting characteristics of fragmented multipolarity. Following the end of the Cold War and the period of U.S. unipolar dominance, an unstable multipolar dynamic has emerged amid intensifying U.S.-China strategic competition. In the military domain, competition between the United States and China is unfolding alongside regional conflicts—including the Russia–Ukraine war and crises in the Middle East—which are contributing to the erosion of the international order.Economically, the weakening of the free trade system has accelerated a restructuring of the global economic order, driven in part by tariff-based policies. The Korean Peninsula lies at the center of these transformations. From both geopolitical and geoeconomic perspectives, it functions as a critical node linking developments across military, economic, and technological domains.Climate change represents a global-scale crisis that extends beyond environmental concerns to encompass fundamental issues of human survival, including food, water, energy, and industrial systems, and it is exerting direct effects on the Korean Peninsula. It is reshaping South Korea’s ecosystems, economic structure, and energy policy, while North Korea’s structural vulnerabilities—manifested in recurring floods and droughts—are intensifying food insecurity and economic hardship.The Fourth Industrial Revolution represents an unprecedented wave of transformative change. In particular, technological advances associated with artificial intelligence are generating structural shifts not only in economic and social systems but also in the military domain.As demonstrated by the Russia–Ukraine war and conflicts in the Middle East, developments in artificial intelligence, unmanned systems, and cyber warfare are redefining military capabilities and operational concepts. These advancements are expected to significantly reshape the future security environment of the Korean Peninsula.At the apex of this complex crisis lies the enduring challenge of the North Korean nuclear issue. After more than three decades of intermittent negotiations and setbacks, North Korea has effectively established itself as a de facto nuclear-armed state.From a practical standpoint, the issue is unlikely to be resolved in the short term. For North Korea, nuclear weapons are no longer merely a bargaining instrument; they have become a central pillar of regime survival. Pyongyang seeks to leverage its nuclear status to consolidate its identity, enhance its international standing, and assert dominance over the Korean Peninsula.Furthermore, since advancing the “two hostile states” theory in 2023, North Korea has taken a series of steps to institutionalize this stance. It has dismantled symbolic remnants of inter-Korean exchange and cooperation and implemented legal and institutional measures to formalize adversarial relations. The Ninth Workers’ Party Congress, held in February of this year, reaffirmed this “two hostile states” framework.North Korea now defines South Korea as a separate and hostile state, effectively excluding inter-Korean dialogue and cooperation from its policy options. This doctrinal shift has exacerbated instability on the Peninsula. The breakdown of inter-Korean relations has weakened crisis-management mechanisms, increasing the risk that accidental incidents could escalate into military confrontation. Moreover, by prioritizing U.S.–North Korea relations in its diplomatic strategy, Pyongyang has further diminished the role of inter-Korean engagement.2. A Multi-Layered Strategy for Peaceful CoexistenceAddressing the complex crisis on the Korean Peninsula requires a fundamental paradigm shift. This new paradigm entails expanding the domain of coexistence through peace, adopting a long-term strategic perspective, and reconstructing the discourse on unification.It calls for a strategy that simultaneously counters pressure-centric approaches toward North Korea and manages the risks associated with the “two hostile states” framework. In this context, it is necessary to redefine the concept of peaceful coexistence and to systematize the strategies for its implementation.Peaceful coexistence entails managing conflicts where they arise to prevent escalation while simultaneously creating interconnected networks of cooperation. It requires establishing cooperative linkages across multiple levels and integrating them into a broader framework that facilitates dialogue and institutionalizes coexistence.The first pillar of peaceful coexistence is the establishment of a robust crisis-management system for the Korean Peninsula. With arms competition and military signaling becoming increasingly routine, the Peninsula’s crisis index remains elevated.Accordingly, measures are needed to prevent accidental clashes and reduce military tensions. The phased restoration of the September 19 Military Agreement is essential in this regard. Reestablishing military hotlines, restricting military activities within the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ), and reinstating mechanisms to prevent accidental incidents in maritime and aerial domains can serve as critical safety nets for crisis management.The second pillar is the phased resolution of the North Korean nuclear issue in parallel with the establishment of a peace regime. Given the complexity of the issue and North Korea’s de facto nuclear status, a short-term resolution is unlikely.A more realistic approach involves the gradual reduction of nuclear risks alongside the development of a comprehensive peace-management framework. This requires the formulation of a phased roadmap encompassing a freeze on nuclear and missile testing, constraints on fissile material production, incremental reductions, and eventual dismantlement.A key variable in this process is the trajectory of U.S.–North Korea relations. Without progress in bilateral dialogue, achieving breakthroughs on both denuclearization and broader peace efforts will be difficult. U.S.–North Korea dialogue should serve as an entry point for peace-building on the Peninsula, while inter-Korean dialogue functions as a complementary mechanism for expanding cooperation. South Korea should play a facilitative role in creating conditions conducive to U.S.–North Korea engagement, while simultaneously pursuing initiatives to broaden inter-Korean collaboration.The resolution of the North Korean nuclear issue must proceed in tandem with the transition to a peace regime. These two processes are mutually reinforcing: progress on denuclearization can generate momentum for peace regime formation, while the establishment of a peace regime can provide incentives and pathways for nuclear resolution. Throughout this transition, phased arms-control measures will be necessary to mitigate military risks.The third pillar is the promotion of cooperative projects linked to climate change and technological transformation. Inter-Korean collaboration in disaster prevention related to climate change represents an urgent priority. This includes sharing hydrological data, providing advance notification of dam discharges, and establishing joint water-resource management systems for shared river basins.Cooperation in forestry and agriculture is also critical, with pilot initiatives—such as reforestation projects in North Korea and the introduction of smart agriculture systems—offering potential entry points. Additionally, collaboration in renewable energy, including solar and wind power, could generate new momentum for inter-Korean economic engagement.At the same time, the emergence of the AI era calls for new modalities of inter-Korean cooperation. Initiatives such as establishing data centers in North Korea and jointly operating AI-based early warning systems for disasters and emergencies could advance both technological collaboration and ecological security.3. Building Domestic and International Infrastructure for Peaceful CoexistenceFor a strategy of peaceful coexistence to be effective, several enabling conditions must be met. First, sustained coordination between South Korea and the United States regarding policy objectives and the division of roles is essential. In parallel, establishing a framework for international cooperation that includes China and Russia remains a critical requirement.Additionally, the strategy for peaceful coexistence must be institutionalized as a medium- to long-term national strategy, supported by coordination across foreign, defense, and unification policy domains to ensure effective implementation. Securing a degree of policy continuity through bipartisan consensus is equally important, as changes in government can undermine international credibility and reduce policy effectiveness.The vision of peaceful coexistence represents a form of practical strategic wisdom for navigating an era of complex crises. Peace on the Korean Peninsula is unlikely to be achieved in the short term, nor will it result from a single agreement or sudden transformation. Instead, it requires the sustained implementation of a coherent strategy and institutional framework grounded in a medium- to long-term perspective.It is therefore necessary to design policies that are feasible within realistic constraints and to pursue them consistently. Within the framework of peaceful coexistence, priority should be given to crisis management and tension reduction, while gradually expanding the scope and depth of cooperative initiatives.

Why U.S.–North Korea Talks Must Resume for Peace on the Korean Peninsula During Trump’s Visit to China                    Sang-man LeeVisiting ProfessorKyungnam University and Shandong University1. The Korean Peninsula in the Context of U.S.–China Strategic Competition: Structural Implications of the SummitU.S. President Trump’s visit to China, along with the U.S.-China summit, is likely to mark an inflection point, redefining the Korean Peninsula issue as a central element of U.S.-China strategic competition—extending beyond the bounds of regional security. U.S.-China relations constitute a foundational determinant of regional stability, and the intensity and scope of this competition structurally shape North Korea’s strategic calculus, as well as the complexity of crisis management on the Peninsula.Within this context, North Korea—perceiving an emerging multipolar order and a relative decline in U.S. hegemony—is prioritizing closer cooperation with Russia and stronger ties with China over engagement with South Korea and the United States. Although a shift may occur after the conclusion of the war in Ukraine, it remains difficult for South Korea and the United States to secure favorable negotiating conditions in the near term.In particular, the Trump administration’s second-term concept of a “decent peace” and Xi Jinping’s third-term principle of “fighting without breaking” can be understood as strategic efforts to reshape U.S.-China relations toward a framework of “managed coexistence” rather than “comprehensive confrontation.” If such a framework takes hold, the North Korean issue is likely to be treated not as an independent variable, but as a dependent factor within the broader architecture of U.S.-China order formation.Furthermore, if the United States and China pursue a “grand bargain” on the Korean Peninsula, the summit is likely to serve not merely as a bilateral consultation but as a platform for shaping international norms that define the Peninsula’s future order. At the same time, exogenous factors—such as developments in the Middle East—may introduce additional uncertainty into this structural realignment.Ultimately, while a U.S.-North Korea summit could function as a mechanism for President Trump to achieve tangible negotiation outcomes and as a strategic tool for Xi Jinping to manage regional order through calibrated buffering, there remains a persistent risk that South Korea’s national interests may be marginalized or subordinated in the process.2. North Korea’s Strategic Shift Amid the Stalemate in U.S.-North Korea Dialogue: Learning from Conflict and Institutionalizing Nuclear Deterrence”The current situation on the Korean Peninsula is marked by deepening structural instability amid a prolonged stalemate in dialogue that has persisted since the 2019 Hanoi U.S.-North Korea summit. Mutual distrust over denuclearization and sanctions relief has effectively stalled negotiations, while simultaneously accelerating the development of North Korea’s nuclear and missile capabilities. This stalemate has grown beyond a mere diplomatic impasse, serving instead as a catalyst for a fundamental transformation in North Korea’s security perceptions and strategic orientation.Recent military conflicts in the international system have provided North Korea with important lessons for its strategic calculus. The Russia–Ukraine war has underscored the vulnerability of non-nuclear states to external military intervention, while simultaneously reinforcing the deterrent value of nuclear weapons in preventing direct attacks.In addition, patterns of U.S. military engagement abroad have reinforced the perception that denuclearization—absent institutional guarantees of regime security—could increase regime vulnerability. Together, these experiences have led North Korea to reconceptualize its nuclear arsenal not as a negotiable asset, but as an indispensable pillar of regime survival.This shift in perception was subsequently institutionalized following the Eighth Party Congress. North Korea formally designated South Korea as a “hostile state,” placed responsibility for the U.S.-North Korea impasse on the United States, and codified its nuclear status as an essential strategic asset.As a result, denuclearization has evolved from a negotiable objective into a precondition, significantly increasing the structural challenges of resuming dialogue. Consequently, North Korea has moved from being a “participant in denuclearization negotiations” to an “agenda-setting actor” that treats its nuclear status as a fait accompli, further entrenching barriers to renewed negotiations.3. U.S.-China Strategic Calculations and Approaches to the North Korean Nuclear Issue: CVID, Dual-Track Strategy, and Disarmament PathwaysAmid intensifying U.S.-China strategic competition, the North Korean nuclear issue has emerged as a central point of contention, reflecting divergent approaches to order-building that extend beyond the domain of nonproliferation. The United States has raised the threshold for negotiations by insisting on North Korea’s complete abandonment of its nuclear deterrent under the CVID framework (Complete, Verifiable, and Irreversible Dismantlement).In contrast, China has promoted a phased, reciprocal approach centered on “dual suspension” and “dual-track parallelism,” emphasizing de-escalation and the creation of conditions conducive to dialogue. However, this approach carries the inherent limitation of potentially diluting the ultimate objective of denuclearization.The central challenge is that North Korea has effectively become an “independent variable,” shaping negotiation parameters based on its nuclear deterrent. In this context, the pathway toward resolving the nuclear issue is likely to evolve incrementally within an arms control–oriented framework.Practically speaking, while denuclearization may remain the stated ultimate goal, the operational structure of negotiations is expected to follow a phased disarmament trajectory—beginning with a freeze on nuclear testing, followed by the establishment of caps on nuclear stockpiles, and culminating in the gradual reduction of nuclear arsenals.Accordingly, resolving the North Korean nuclear issue requires a composite strategy that distinguishes between objectives and pathways, rather than relying on a binary choice between CVID and the dual-track approach. A framework that maintains denuclearization as the ultimate objective, while employing arms control as a pragmatic pathway, represents the most viable strategy for managing the North Korean nuclear challenge under prevailing constraints. Such a framework can guide North Korea toward long-term denuclearization and facilitate peaceful coexistence on the Korean Peninsula.4. China’s Role and Influence on North Korea: Balancing Tacit Acceptance and Control”On the Korean Peninsula, China serves as a pivotal structural actor whose role extends beyond that of a conventional stakeholder, contributing both to crisis moderation and the shaping of the negotiation environment. While some assessments suggest that China is tacitly acquiescing to North Korea’s nuclear status amid recent geopolitical developments, a more nuanced reading characterizes Beijing’s approach as a calibrated combination of strategic management and limited acceptance, aimed at preventing instability.Although China does not formally endorse North Korea’s nuclear development, it recognizes the constraints on immediate denuclearization and has adopted a crisis-management–oriented posture.While China’s direct leverage over North Korea remains limited, it exerts significant indirect influence by addressing, to a degree, the regime’s “legitimate” security concerns. Specifically, China retains the capacity to calibrate pressure and relief through its role as North Korea’s primary provider of food, energy, and essential goods, as well as its position as Pyongyang’s largest trading partner. In addition, China shapes North Korea’s external operating environment by modulating the implementation and enforcement intensity of UN sanctions. High-level exchanges and summit meetings between North Korea and China serve not merely symbolic purposes but function as strategic signaling mechanisms linked to U.S.-North Korea dynamics, contributing to the partial alignment of North Korea’s external strategy.China’s influence operates not through direct coercion, but via a mechanism of “structured inducement of choice.” In other words, while China cannot dictate North Korea’s actions, it shapes the strategic environment in ways that constrain the range of available options and guide behavior in preferred directions. Accordingly, China’s North Korea policy should be understood as a calibrated strategy situated between “full control” and “complete laissez-faire,” aimed at simultaneously preventing crisis escalation and preserving influence.5. A Shift in South Korean Diplomacy: From ‘Pace Maker’ to ‘Peacemaker’South Korea must transition from serving merely as a facilitator of negotiations—or even as a “pace maker” that manages sequencing and tempo—to becoming a “peacemaker” that actively shapes both the direction and outcomes of talks. To achieve this, Seoul should pursue a dual-track strategy that combines the maintenance of credible deterrence and crisis-management capabilities anchored in the ROK-U.S. alliance with the expansion of diplomatic maneuvering space through engagement with China.Furthermore, in light of President Trump’s “results-oriented, direct deal-making” approach, South Korea must mitigate the risk of marginalization by institutionalizing prior coordination mechanisms with the United States, particularly regarding the structure of negotiation exchanges and the delineation of red lines.At the same time, South Korea must prevent North Korea’s demand for recognition as a nuclear-armed state from becoming an entrenched baseline for negotiations. To achieve peaceful coexistence on the Korean Peninsula, Seoul should also maintain pragmatic flexibility by adopting a dual framework in which “denuclearization constitutes the objective, and arms control serves as the pathway.”At the inter-Korean level, given near-term structural constraints, priority should be placed on low-intensity tension management and incremental confidence-building measures, including preventing accidental clashes in border areas, restoring military communication channels, and the phased restoration of the September 19 Military Agreement.Moreover, by situating the North Korean nuclear issue within a broader multilateral framework—rather than limiting it to a strictly bilateral U.S.-North Korea context—South Korea should aim to promote the institutionalization of a security order that links denuclearization with a sustainable framework for peaceful coexistence between the two Koreas.In conclusion, peace on the Korean Peninsula is not an automatic byproduct of great power negotiations; it is a political outcome that must be actively constructed through deliberate strategic design and proactive diplomacy. Accordingly, South Korea must move beyond the role of a passive intermediary to assume the position of a “peacemaker”—a central actor that shapes negotiation structures and guides outcomes. This is not merely a matter of choice, but a strategic imperative within the broader context of U.S.-China strategic competition.