Preparations on many levels will be required to achieve the unification of South and North Korea. But before anything can be done, people in both Koreas must be convinced that they will be able to lead better lives after reunification. Their attitudes would be the cornerstone to the possibility, method and process of rapprochement as seen in Germany`s unification experience.
I. Comparison of Expectations on Unification
In order to understand the values and attitudes toward unification in the two Koreas, this study compares and analyzes the surveys conducted by Gallup Korea at the request of the Institute for Peace and Unification Studies, Seoul National University. The surveys were done between 2007 and 2011. A total of 1,200 South Koreans aged 19 to 65 and residing across the country responded. For data on North Koreans, 296 North Korean defectors who had settled in the South were interviewed in 2008, another 370 defectors in the South in 2009, and 114 more of them in 2011.
1. Desire for Unification
The desire for reunification differed widely between North and South Koreans. Asked “Do you want reunification?” 53.7 percent of South Koreans said “yes,” while 99.1 percent of North Koreans were affirmative. The percentage of “very much so” in the affirmative category was 95.5 percent among North Koreans but a mere 28.7 percent among South Koreans. In South Korea, 21.3 percent were negative about the need for reunification and 25.0 percent were uncommitted. Among the Northerners less than 1 percent opposed reunification and none evaded definite answer. Reunification is a natural objective and there is a strong social desire for it in the North.
The above differences have been consistent during the past several years. The affirmative attitude toward reunification accounted for 51.6 percent in South Korea in 2008, 55.8 percent in 2009, and 53.7 percent in 2011. Among the North Koreans it was 95.2 percent in 2008, 97 percent in 2009, and 99.1 percent in 2011. In South Korea up until the 1990s, a much higher percentage of people (up to 91.6 percent) wanted reunification to relieve the pain of divided families (11 percent) and to make Korea whole again (59.0 percent). But from 2000, the desire for reunification declined in the South. Among South Koreans, those who wanted reunification had practical reasons such as prevention of another war (27.3 percent) and to be on a par with advanced nations (17 percent). Reunification is something that the North Koreans regard as absolutely necessary, supposedly from strong nationalistic sentiment plus a sense of inevitability.
2. Expected Time of Reunification
There was a wide difference of opinion about the timing of reunification. Most South Koreans envisioned 20-30 years. In the 2011 survey, 2.5 percent of South Koreans gave 5 years for reunification and 16.3 percent up to 10 years. Those who see it happening within 20 years accounted for 26.1 percent while 14.0 percent foresaw reunification within 30 years. Some 19.8 percent gave it more than 30 years and as many as 21.3 percent believed that reunification is impossible. In short, more than half of South Koreans believe that reunification is impossible within the next 20 years.
Throughout the Lee Myung-bak presidency, a larger number of South Koreans have expected a longer road to reunification or felt it is impossible. Those who have the latter opinion rose from 13.3 percent in 2007 to 22.3 percent in 2008, Lee`s first year in office. The “impossible” camp swelled to 29.8 percent in 2009 and then receded to 20.6 percent in 2010 and 21.3 percent in 2011. The mood appeared to be aligned with the fatal shooting of a South Korean tourist by North Korean guards at Mt. Kumgang (Geumgang) resort in late 2008 and the Northern authorities` detention of South Korean staff at the joint Kaesong (Gaeseong) Industrial Complex. However, the sinking of the South Korean patrol craft Cheonan in an unprovoked torpedo attack by North Koreans and the shelling of Yeonpyeong Island in the West Sea, both in 2010, did not particularly increase pessimism in the South about the prospects of reunification.
In contrast, North Koreans gave relatively shorter time for reunification. The 2011 survey found 18.9 percent believing in reunification within 5 years and 29.7 percent within 10 years. On the other hand, only 14.4 percent believed reunification would come within 20 years, 2.7 percent within 30 years and 7.2 percent after 30 years or more. Twenty-seven percent of North Koreans believed unification was impossible, compared to 21.3 percent in the South.
Overall, North Koreans showed a tendency of extending their prospect for unification in recent years, even with a higher percentage for impossibility than the Southerners, probably influenced by the prolonged tense relations between the two Koreas. It is apparent that conflicts between the North and South increase negative views on unification.
3. Expectations on the Benefits of Reunification
People of the two Koreas showed sharp difference in their expectations on the benefits of unification as in their desire for it. In South Korea, 50.7 percent had positive expectations while 49.3 percent had negative views. On a personal level, only 27.8 percent believed that unification would be beneficial while the rest saw no benefit to them.
North Koreans had strong expectations on the benefits of unification. Questioned about benefits from unification, 91.1 percent responded positively and 8.9 percent negatively. About individual benefits, 95.6 percent were positive and the rest negative. While South Koreans believed that unification would be more beneficial to the overall situation than individuals, North Koreans saw big gains both on the individual and collective levels.
Generally, North Koreans expect that unification will bring bigger economic aid from the South to enrich both individuals and the society. For the Northerners, unification is the great common task which will bring about national revival and individual prosperity. South Koreans, on the other hand, believe that unification will create burdens.
II. Mutual Perception between the North and the South
1. Awareness of the Other Side
Relations between any two sides can range from hostility to apprehension, competition, cooperation and support (engagement). The 2011 survey showed that both South and North Koreans regarded each other mainly as partners for cooperation (47 percent and 50.5 percent, respectively). Those who viewed the other side as a competitor were the lowest group (2.3 percent in the South and 1.9 percent in the North). The levels of support, apprehension and hostility were 16.7 percent, 17.2 percent and 16.8 percent, respectively, in the South, and 11.4 percent, 21.0 percent and 15.2 percent, respectively, in the North.
2. Possibility of Armed Provocation
In 2011, 78.3 percent of South Koreans believed North Korean military provocation against the South was possible. Over the past years, the rate of concerns about the North`s military action changed from 59.7 percent in 2007 to 52.2 percent in 2008, 63.6 percent in 2009 and 67.3 percent in 2010. The figure jumped in 2009 when North Korea conducted its second nuclear test.
North Koreans similarly were concerned deeply about military attack from the South. North Korean defectors were asked if they thought an attack from the South was possible when they lived in the North. In the 2008 survey, 31.4 percent said they had thought the possibility was high and in 2009, 39.1 percent felt likewise. Concerns about military provocation from the South rose sharply to 61.1 percent in 2011. North Korea conducted its second nuclear test on May 25, 2009, and staged the “150-day combat” and “100-day combat” aimed at residents` thought control during the year. These events could have aroused security concerns of the North Koreans. In addition, the North`s propaganda after the sinking of the Cheonan patrol craft and the shelling of Yeonpyeong Island in 2010 may have fed the apprehension.
3. Nuclear Threat
As for North Korean nuclear arsenal, 35.3 percent of South Koreans feel “seriously threatened” and 45.4 percent “considerably threatened.” The aggregate level of apprehension was 68.2 percent in 2007, 61.3 percent in 2008, 74.3 percent in 2009, 73.8 percent in 2010, and 80.7 percent in 2011. The North`s nuclear test in 2009 accounted for the 13 percentage point increase that year and likewise, the shelling on Yeonpyeong Island in 2010 added 7 percentage points. The defectors from the North also said while in the North they believed that their nuclear arms must pose a threat to South Koreans; the percentage of people with such belief was 80.7 percent in 2008, 82.8 percent in 2009 and 89.3 percent in 2011. Thus, the figures indicate that North Koreans believe their nuclear arms are a bigger threat than South Koreans perceive. In other words, most North Koreans believe that their nuclear arsenal effectively protect them from South Korea and other powers.
As observed above, perceptions of North and South Koreans have been quite similar and have changed in similar patterns. Despite continuing conflicts, they regard each other as possible partners of cooperation and very few on either side consider they are competing against each other.
III. Awareness of Cultural Difference
1. Cultural Gap and Mutual Sense of Difference
An overwhelming majority of South Koreans believe that there are great gaps between the two Koreas in election systems (93.9 percent), standard of living (96.6 percent), legal systems (88.3 percent), current language (90.7 percent), way of life (88.3 percent) and sense of values (93.6 percent). South Koreans` sense of identity with North Koreans dropped sharply in 2009 on various aspects and then rose slightly the next two years.
North Koreans are aware of wide differences in elections (96.2 percent), living standards (97.3 percent), language (94.4 percent), lifestyle (95.3 percent), historical perception (93.4 percent) and sense of values (93.2 percent). No remarkable changes were detected in time-series observation. Both North and South Koreans are acutely aware of the cultural differences between them, which poses a serious problem in their readiness for reunification and internal social integration.
Increased material exchanges and visits between the two sides do not guarantee mitigation of political, economic and cultural differences. In fact, more exchanges could possibly cause more troubles.
2. Cultural Contacts
The surveys found that only 31.5 percent of South Koreans have been exposed to North Korean broadcasts, films or novels. This rate represents a significant decline from 42.6 percent in 2009 and 37.4 percent in 2010. The decline was attributable to the severing of contacts and official control of Internet communication between the two sides in the past few years. Not many people in the South had the opportunities to visit the North, participate in any humanitarian missions, or meet North Korean defectors. The number of South Koreans who have met North Korean defectors grew steadily as more and more North Koreans are arriving in the South these years.
North Koreans reported higher rates of exposure to South Korean culture. Among the defectors, 64.7 percent said they had “frequent” or “infrequent” exposure to South Korean culture in the 2008 survey, followed by 57.9 percent in 2009 and 77.7 percent in 2011. These high rates could be due to the fact that surveys were conducted only with those defectors who left the North recently. Still, they reflect the reality that South Korean culture is flowing into the North on a wide scale through various channels.
It is noteworthy that there are generational differences in the rate of exposure to South Korean culture. The younger generation of ages between 20 and 30 showed the highest exposure rate; 60 percent among those in their 30s, 47.3 percent in the 20s, 37.5 percent in the 40s, and significantly lower rates in the 50s and 60s. Those highly educated had more opportunities to come into contact with South Korean culture; 75 percent of college graduates, 66.6 percent of junior college graduates and 32 percent of high school graduates.
The figures indicate that the rates of exposure to South Korean culture grew steadily in the North while South Koreans` exposure to North Korean culture declined from 77.6 percent in 2009 to 31.5 percent in 2011. In view of the closed system in the North, the survey results are hard to understand even if we consider the fact that samples were North Korean defectors settling down in the South. It may be due to recent restrictions in the South applied to North Korean broadcasts and other media. More fundamentally, it may be because South Koreans are not attracted to the ideologically inclined, pre-modern styles of North Korean culture, while the open, commercially entertaining South Korean pop culture has strong appeal to North Koreans.
3. Mutual Awareness
The South Korean public has fairly good knowledge of current affairs in the North: 58.8 percent knew about the “military-first” policy, 83.2 percent about juche ideology, 73.8 percent about Chollima Movement, 59.7 percent about the “March of Tribulation” of the 1990s, 39.1 percent about unofficial jangmadang markets, and 64.4 percent about the Arirang Festival. These figures went down a little in 2009 and rose again in 2010-2011, probably because the Unification Ministry`s programs for unification preparation had certain effects in raising public interest in North Korean affairs.
North Korean defectors were asked about five major events which took place in the South over the past several decades. Of them, 87.6 percent knew about the Gwangju Democratic Movement of May 18, 1980; 75.0 percent about the Student Revolution of April 19, 1960; 73.7 percent about the 1988 Seoul Olympics; 65.3 percent about the 2002 Korea-Japan World Cup; and 59.8 percent about the candlelit protests in Seoul against U.S. beef imports in the summer of 2008. The high percentages of awareness of the May 18 Gwangju Democratic Movement and the April 19 Student Revolution may be due to the Pyongyang regime`s emphasis on these popular uprisings in people`s education to antagonize the South Korean government. Conversely, the relatively lower awareness of the 1988 Olympics and the 2002 World Cup indicates restricted information on these events which proved economic affluence of the South.
Some 61 percent of the South Koreans were aware of events in the North and 72.3 of the North Koreans reported their knowledge of events in the South. These results contradict the general assumption that South Koreans should be more informed about North Korean affairs than the Northerners about South Korean affairs because of the abundant flow of information in the South. However, South Korean media allots little attention to North Korean affairs. On the other hand, the North Korean party organ Rodong Sinmun devotes one-sixth of its space to news and commentaries on South Korea.
IV. Comparison of Inter-Korean Exchange Policies
1. South Korean Attitude on Aid to the North
In the 2011 survey with South Koreans, 39.8 percent of respondents preferred less aid to the North, compared to 22.3 percent in favor of more aid. There were similar results in 2010, the year that saw the North Korean attacks on the naval vessel Cheonan and Yeonpyeong Island. As to the effect of aid to the North, 56.4 percent were skeptical about the aid improving the livelihood of North Korean people while 43.4 percent believed it would benefit them.
Sixty-seven percent of the North Korean respondents had a positive opinion about South Korean aid to the North. Only 10 percent expressed negative views. Asked about their opinion on the scale of South Korean aid to the North, 71.2 percent said they wanted an increase in the amount of aid while 16.3 percent preferred a reduction and 12.5 percent asked for an end to it. Thus, it is obvious that an overwhelming majority of North Koreans want more aid from the South.
In regard to South Korean investment in the North, an even higher percentage of North Korean respondents (79.3 percent) said North Koreans would welcome it while a small percentage (4.5 percent) expressed a negative view. Positive opinions accounted for 82 percent in 2008 and 75.7 percent in 2009. North Koreans are generally eager for aid and investment from the South while South Koreans are becoming more reluctant about helping the North; 39.8 percent preferred reduction and 38.0 percent advocated maintaining the present level. North Koreans` desire for aid from the South is associated with their positive image about the South.
2. Possible Effect of Aid on the Prospect of Unification
The 2011 survey disclosed high percentages of positive response on the reconciliation process toward reunification: regular inter-Korean political talks (71.3 percent), economic cooperation (61.5 percent), social and cultural exchanges (64.8 percent) and humanitarian assistance (50.7 percent). The relatively low support for humanitarian aid (i.e. rice, fertilizer and medicine) implied that South Koreans have taken note of the lack of transparency in aid distribution in the North and the Pyongyang regime`s steadfast belligerence toward the South.
North Korean defectors showed higher rates of support for inter-Korean exchange and cooperation programs as factors conducive to reunification; 76.4 percent in favor of inter-Korean political meetings, 80.2 percent for economic cooperation, 83.7 percent for social and cultural exchanges and 70.3 percent for humanitarian aid.
Survey results revealed that while North Koreans believed non-political projects such as economic cooperation and social and cultural exchanges can better help promote reunification, South Koreans have greater expectations on political dialogue. Humanitarian aid is regarded to be the least helpful by both South and North Koreans, probably because of the continuing political controversies over aid provision between the two Koreas and in the international community.
V. Conclusion
South and North Koreans showed substantial differences in their thoughts about the necessity of reunification, expectations on its benefit and policies of inter-Korean exchanges but exhibited considerable similarity in their awareness of various aspects of national division. North Koreans have stronger desire for unification and greater expectations on its benefits. Therefore, they have stronger belief than South Koreans that inter-Korean economic cooperation and political dialogue as well as humanitarian aid projects will help achieve unification. Although people of the two Koreas accept each other as possible partners of cooperation, they also recognize the great cultural gap between the two sides, which can add to distrust and discomfort in their interactions.
The two Koreas should prepare unification policies on the basis of the differences in public awareness. Only 50 to 60 percent of South Koreans desire unification compared to the overwhelming 95 to 99 percent consensus among North Korean residents. As for the arrival of unification, South Koreans give 20 to 30 years against North Koreans` generally shorter vision of 5 to 10 years. Nearly all North Koreans believe unification will be a blessing ― both individually and collectively ― but South Koreans increasingly feel it will be burdensome. In order to overcome this wide gap in opinion, efforts are needed to make an objective and scientific analysis of the cost and effect of unification and broadly disseminate the result.
A shift of policy paradigm is vitally needed to ease mutual distrust and discomfort fomented between the peoples of the two Koreas. It is fortunate that, despite continuing conflicts and confrontation, positive notions regarding the other side as partners of cooperation still exist in the minds of at least 47 percent of South Koreans and 50.5 percent of North Koreans.
On the other hand, the incessant incidents of conflict over the past few years have raised the sense of hostility and apprehension toward the North among South Koreans to the 16 to 17 percent level from the previous 6 to12 percent. North Korean antipathy toward the South has also risen from 6.8 percent to 21 percent between 2009 and 2011. Most worrisome is the mutual perception of the possibility of armed provocation which was 78.35 percent and 61.1 percent, respectively, in South and North Korea. Under these circumstances, an increasing number of people on both parts feel reunification is impossible, with more of the younger generation joining the pessimists. It is a most undesirable development, considering that the younger people will have to shoulder the practical tasks attached to reunification. Special steps should be taken to infuse the new generation with a greater sense of mission while efforts are made to improve inter-Korean relations and provide a clearer vision of reunification.
A closer analysis of the changing awareness of people in the North and South is needed for the formulation of unification policies. Surveys have determined that North Koreans have greater exposure to South Korean culture than Southerners to Northern culture. It was also found that North Koreans know more about major events in South Korea than South Koreans do about the North. South Korean pop culture spreads to the North rapidly, shattering the common notion of the North`s isolation. Keener scrutiny of social changes is vitally needed.
Lastly, policy makers should explore ways to promote exchanges between the two Koreas on the basis of the differences and similarities in the people`s thoughts about unification. South Koreans tend to have greater expectations from regular political dialogue while the Northerners believe that economic cooperation and social and cultural exchanges will contribute more to unification. Based on the above findings, utmost efforts should be made to promote inter-Korean dialogue to meet South Korean people`s expectations and develop economic cooperation and aid programs in order to ameliorate North Korean people`s sentiment toward the South.
Kim Philo (Kim Byeong-ro)Research Fellow
Institute for Peace and Unification Studies
Seoul National University
Choi Kyong-hui
Ph.D. Candidate
Graduate School of Arts and Sciences
University of Tokyo
[ Unification and Peace, Volume 4, No. 1, 2012, published by the Institute of Peace and Unification Studies, Seoul National University ]
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