South Korea’s Approach to the North Korean Nuclear Issue in the Context of the U.S.–China Summit: The Need to Place a Freeze on North Korea’s Nuclear Activities on the Agenda

Eui lim Jin

Associate Research Fellow

Korea Institute for Defense Analyses (KIDA) 

Former Second Vice Minister

Ministry of Foreign Affairs

1. Introduction

According to a March announcement by the White House, a U.S.–China summit is highly likely to take place in mid-May.1) At present, U.S.–China working-level negotiations are reportedly proceeding separately from issues related to U.S. sanctions on Iran and other Middle East variables.2)

Accordingly, barring unforeseen developments, the likelihood that the summit will take place appears high. The principal agenda items are expected to include a U.S.–China compromise on the Taiwan issue, matters related to Iran’s compliance with sanctions, and coordination on strengthening regulations associated with technological competition.3) These are complex issues that will not be easily resolved.

Against this backdrop, the key security-related issues on the Korean Peninsula are the possibility of U.S.–North Korea talks in connection with the upcoming U.S.–China summit and the potential for progress on the North Korean nuclear issue through such dialogue. However, the international environment remains highly unstable, shaped by overlapping challenges including conflict in the Middle East, divisions within NATO, and volatility in global oil prices. In East Asia as well, numerous variables persist, including the deepening cooperation between North Korea and Russia, which is exacerbating regional security concerns.

This paper examines the prospects for U.S.–North Korea dialogue and possible progress in negotiations in the context of the forthcoming U.S.–China summit, and discusses the policy options available to the South Korean government.

2. The Possibility of Addressing the North Korean Nuclear Issue at the U.S.–China Summit

Assuming that the U.S.–China summit takes place, two principal questions arise regarding security on the Korean Peninsula. First, is there a possibility that a U.S.–North Korea summit could be held on the sidelines of the U.S.–China summit? Second, if a U.S.–North Korea summit or other form of contact does occur, would it lead to substantive progress toward resolving the North Korean nuclear issue?

Regarding the first question, considering past precedents and the current international environment, the likelihood of a U.S.-North Korea summit does not appear high. 2026 Korea Institute for Defense Analyses (KIDA) study “Prospects and Considerations for the Resumption of North Korean Denuclearization Negotiations” by Park Yong-han et al. (2026). “Prospects and Considerations for the Resumption of North Korean Denuclearization Negotiations,” Defense Forum. Korea Institute for Defense Analyses.

Regarding the first question, considering past precedents and the current international environment, the likelihood of a U.S.–North Korea summit does not appear high.4)

This research method employs Delphi analysis to collect expert opinions and derive rational judgments. Meaningful results are generally obtained when the survey sample includes at least 30 participants and the survey is conducted in no fewer than three rounds. For the survey findings, see the above-mentioned study by Park Yong-han et al.

According to the article, domestic experts assessed that there is a meaningful possibility that a U.S.–North Korea summit could be held in conjunction with the U.S.–China summit. However, following U.S. military actions against Iran and the naval blockade of the Strait of Hormuz since March, the current U.S. administration appears constrained in its ability to devote sufficient diplomatic attention to issues on the Korean Peninsula.

Furthermore, given the significance and complexity of the agenda in talks with China, Washington may seek to avoid dispersing its strategic focus. In addition, because summit meetings are typically preceded by informal senior-level working-level consultations or other forms of contact, it is reasonable to conclude that the remaining timeframe is insufficient to meet the conditions necessary for summit preparation.

However, even if an official U.S.–North Korea summit does not take place, the possibility of informal contacts remains considerable. This becomes clearer when viewed from the perspectives of both North Korea and the United States.

North Korea, having adopted a more aggressive nuclear doctrine and participated in the Russia–Ukraine war, requires additional resources to develop into a military power possessing independent strategic capabilities. Although Pyongyang appears to have partially alleviated its economic difficulties through cooperation with Russia, it may nevertheless seek diplomatic recognition as a nuclear-armed state while simultaneously using its nuclear capabilities as leverage to pursue relief from international economic sanctions.

Meanwhile, the U.S. government appears to have limited capacity to devote additional diplomatic resources to the North Korean issue, given domestic concerns over immigration and instability in the Middle East. Nevertheless, in light of President Trump’s considerable personal influence over policy decisions, the possibility cannot be ruled out that he may seek a diplomatic breakthrough through informal contacts with North Korea in response to criticism surrounding Iran sanctions, domestic political pressures, and the approaching midterm elections.

In conclusion, while the likelihood of a U.S.–North Korea summit or formal U.S.–North Korea talks in May arising from the U.S.–China dialogue currently appears low, the possibility of informal contacts remains. In particular, there is a meaningful possibility that the Trump administration could utilize such contacts as a political instrument to reshape the domestic political landscape.

3. South Korea’s Approach to the North Korean Nuclear Issue

Given these circumstances, what efforts should the South Korean government undertake to prepare for potential U.S.–North Korea contacts before and after the U.S.–China summit? First, this issue must be approached on the premise that the current international environment has become less favorable than the conditions that existed during the negotiations in 2018.

First, North Korea has secured a dependable partner in Russia, thereby reducing the relative necessity of engaging with the United States or South Korea as a means of escaping economic isolation. Second, from the U.S. perspective, military and diplomatic efforts related to the Russia–Ukraine conflict, tensions in the Middle East involving Iran, and, more fundamentally, strategic competition with China take precedence.

While there remains room for active diplomatic engagement if short-term gains can be achieved, past precedents suggest that more complex strategic calculations are likely to shape policy decisions. Furthermore, because North Korea continues to maintain a confrontational posture rather than engage in dialogue with the United States and South Korea, it is difficult to formulate either a clear assessment of the situation or an effective policy response.

Therefore, what the South Korean government needs to do at this stage is identify feasible agenda items for addressing the North Korean nuclear issue and make sustained efforts to promote and share such proposals with the international community—including the United States and China—through multiple diplomatic channels.

Referring to the results of a Delphi survey of experts conducted in 2025, “comprehensive agreement and implementation” was identified as the desirable outcome for North Korean denuclearization negotiations, whereas “phased agreement and implementation” was viewed as the more realistic framework for achieving a settlement.

Among the key findings, the following points are particularly noteworthy. First, respondents assessed that initial negotiations could lead to an agreement on freezing North Korea’s nuclear program or reducing related risks. Second, it was assessed that a reciprocal arrangement involving the suspension or reduction of ROK–U.S. joint military exercises could be negotiated in exchange for such a freeze. Third, respondents strongly projected that specific UN sanctions could be eased upon the conclusion of an agreement.5)

In summary, if an ambitious denuclearization objective is insisted upon from the outset, the likelihood of acceptance will remain low. However, the prospects for reaching an agreement are expected to improve if the scope of the denuclearization objective is adjusted. This assessment is also consistent with recent analyses suggesting that changing strategic realities on the Korean Peninsula require a more flexible approach to negotiations.6)

I pointed out that the North Korean nuclear issue is likely to be discussed in the U.S.–China talks with an emphasis on preserving the status quo and preventing conflict, and proposed an interim agreement centered on a nuclear freeze as a practical alternative. In light of this assessment, while maintaining the principle of denuclearization as a long-term objective, a more flexible approach will be required in future negotiations.

First, the negotiation strategy should be operationalized as a phased process—building preliminary trust → freeze → reduction → management or elimination (denuclearization)—and incorporated into the negotiating agenda. However, even if an initial U.S.–North Korea agreement takes the form of substantive arms control, the ultimate objective must remain complete denuclearization.

Second, reciprocal and phased exchanges are essential at each stage of the process. Interim measures should be clearly specified as provisional arrangements while being presented in a manner that is both verifiable and politically acceptable.

This phased negotiation strategy must be supported by sustained efforts to place it on the international agenda at multiple levels. First, efforts should be made to elevate the North Korean nuclear issue through summit-level and other high-level diplomatic channels. Just as South Korea requested President Xi Jinping to play a mediating role in promoting peace on the Korean Peninsula during the South Korea–China summit in January 2026, it is necessary to clearly communicate the South Korean government’s phased approach to resolving the North Korean nuclear issue during future senior-level meetings.

South Korea should also utilize bilateral diplomatic opportunities—not only with China, but also with the United States, the EU, and other relevant actors—to explain this approach and build broader international consensus.

Third, through diplomatic working-level channels, South Korea should gather concrete views from various countries on how best to place the North Korean nuclear issue on the international agenda and identify areas in which South Korea’s mediating role can be most effective. In particular, practical efforts should proceed in parallel to secure support from like-minded countries—such as Japan, Australia, Canada, and the EU—that have participated in discussions concerning North Korean denuclearization.

Fourth, South Korea should secure channels for dialogue with North Korea by expanding humanitarian assistance within the bounds of compliance with UN and unilateral sanctions. At the same time, while clearly signaling its willingness to pursue military confidence-building measures, Seoul must exercise caution against adopting unconditional confidence-building initiatives in the absence of reciprocal actions by North Korea.

As negotiations between the United States and Iran enter an increasingly unpredictable phase, the prospects for U.S.–North Korea dialogue—once regarded as highly likely—are also becoming more uncertain. Under current conditions, in which international and regional instability overlap, what is required of the South Korean government is not the pursuit of a single solution, but rather the flexibility to identify policy options from multiple perspectives and implement them appropriately in response to changing circumstances.

In particular, for South Korea to function effectively as an agenda-setter, strategic thinking is required to strengthen the credibility of the ROK–U.S. alliance, restore South Korea–China relations, and maximize the utilization of South Korea’s strategic assets—such as shipbuilding and semiconductors—as diplomatic leverage.

※ Please note that this document reflects the personal views of the author and does not represent the official position of the Korea Institute for Defense Analyses (KIDA).

1) Yonhap News, “U.S.-China Summit in May Confirmed... Will the Iran War Be Resolved by Then?” (March 26, 2026).

2) Newsis, “U.S.–China Foreign Ministers Hold Phone Call Ahead of Summit...  Economic Leaders Also Hold Video Conference.” (May 1, 2026).

3) MBC News, “Full-scale Preparations for U.S.–China Summit... Coordinating ‘Tariff and Middle East’ Agenda.” (May 1, 2026).

4) Park Yong-han et al. 2026, “Prospects and Considerations for the Resumption of North Korean Denuclearization Negotiations,” Defense Forum, Korea Institute for Defense Analyses.

5) Ibid; for detailed survey findings and key issues, see the relevant article.

6) Jiyong Zheng, “China Is Confronting New Realities on the Korean Peninsula,” Brookings Commentary, April 30, 2026.