The Past and Present of Inter-Korean Relations

Koh Yu-hwan

Professor Emeritus, Dongguk University;

Former Director, Korea Institute for National Unification

1. Division, War, and the Entrenchment of the Divided System

Korea gained liberation from Japanese imperial rule on August 15, 1945, but unity proved elusive. Instead, the peninsula was divided, and two states were established under competing ideologies and systems. The Korean War soon followed, culminating in an armistice in 1953. That armistice has endured for more than seven decades, preventing renewed war but leaving in place only a “passive peace.”

Seventy-two years after the signing of the Armistice Agreement, the task of constructing a durable peace regime—one that addresses the structural causes of conflict—remains unfinished. The persistence of the “armistice regime” and the “division regime” has shaped daily life on the peninsula.

Today, amid intensifying U.S.–China strategic competition, the peninsula again finds itself in an era of heightened uncertainty, vulnerable to great-power rivalry. The absence of a formal peace settlement and the institutionalization of division have produced a complex and enduring set of conflicts surrounding Korea.

2. Breaking Down Barriers—and Rebuilding Them

Unification remains a national aspiration precisely because division was externally imposed. While both Koreas have at times articulated visions of coexistence, their actual strategies—Seoul’s “absorption unification” and Pyongyang’s “red unification”—deepened confrontation. Prior to the July 4, 1972 Joint Statement, which outlined the principles of independence, peace, and national unity, inter-Korean relations were defined by confrontation without dialogue.

The 1960s saw Pyongyang propose a federation and cross-border exchanges even as it dispatched armed infiltrators, while Seoul’s Park Chung-hee government pursued “development before unification,” prioritizing industrialization over reconciliation. The détente between Washington and Beijing in the early 1970s created openings for dialogue, but sustained progress proved elusive.

A fundamental shift began in 1988, when the Roh Tae-woo administration, leveraging the spirit of the Seoul Olympics, advanced the July 7 Declaration and redefined North Korea as a partner for reconciliation. This vision was codified in the 1989 Korean National Community Unification Formula, which envisioned a phased process: reconciliation and cooperation, a North–South confederation, and ultimately full unification.

This framework acknowledged North Korea’s political reality and proposed an “inter-Korean union” as an interim step, effectively a two-state solution for the peninsula.

On this basis, the 1991 Basic Agreement and the 2000 June 15 Joint Declaration marked watershed moments. Both recognized the special nature of inter-Korean ties—not simply relations between two states but a “temporary special relationship” on the path to unification.

By simultaneously joining the United Nations, Seoul and Pyongyang entered a coexistence framework, while agreeing to pursue economic cooperation projects such as Mount Kumgang tourism and the Kaesong Industrial Complex. These initiatives represented tangible steps toward “de-bordering.”

Yet progress proved fragile. The suspension of Mount Kumgang tourism in 2008 and the closure of Kaesong in 2016 effectively halted inter-Korean exchange. The Moon Jae-in administration later sought to revive cooperation through the 2018 Panmunjom and Pyongyang Declarations, advancing commitments on denuclearization, liaison offices, and infrastructure linkages.

But the failure of the 2019 Hanoi summit between Washington and Pyongyang derailed this momentum, ushering in a period of renewed hostility.

By 2020, North Korea had downgraded relations to an “enemy relationship,” and since December 2023 has defined inter-Korean ties as relations “between hostile states at war.” Pyongyang has taken steps to reframe the military demarcation line as a sovereign border, initiating a process of “re-bordering” the peninsula.

3. President Lee Jae-myung: “Cutting Off Dialogue Is Foolish”

In his Liberation Day address, President Lee Jae-myung pledged respect for the current North Korean regime, renounced absorption unification, and promised to refrain from hostile acts. He emphasized restoring the September 19 Military Agreement, rebuilding trust to prevent accidental clashes, and implementing feasible past agreements.

His agenda stresses restoring the foundations of exchange and cooperation, improving livelihoods on both sides, and fostering conditions for joint growth based on mutual benefit.

President Lee has framed 2025, the 80th anniversary of Korea’s liberation, as a watershed moment for ending confrontation and opening an era of peaceful coexistence. His policy builds on the legacies of the Kim Dae-jung, Roh Moo-hyun, and Moon Jae-in administrations: rejecting force and absorption, and pursuing peace first.

Yet North Korea has categorically dismissed these overtures. Kim Yo-jong declared Seoul’s hopes “foolish dreams” and reaffirmed the North’s two-state, hostile posture. The Kim Jong-un regime has abandoned the concept of a “special inter-Korean relationship,” reframing ties as strictly interstate. Absent a fundamental shift in Pyongyang’s position, restoring relations under earlier frameworks will be difficult.

Still, the case for dialogue remains strong. Cutting off communication risks perpetuating a cycle of hostility that serves neither side’s long-term interests. Dialogue is not only a means to reduce the risk of accidental conflict; it can also create conditions for regional stability and broader cooperation.

For Seoul, this means maintaining unilateral confidence-building measures, preparing patiently for future openings, and leveraging potential shifts in U.S.–North Korea relations or regional dynamics. Flexibility and persistence are essential. The ultimate task is to prevent the peninsula from sliding into permanent hostility and to keep alive the prospect of peaceful coexistence and eventual unification.