The Resumption of U.S.-North Korea Summit Talks and the Three Principles of Peaceful Coexistence

Hee-soo Yoon

Institute for Unification and Peace Studies

Seoul National University

The Window of Opportunity for Summit Diplomacy and the Lessons from Hanoi

The possibility of resuming U.S.-North Korea summit diplomacy is once again being discussed. Discussions about scaling back U.S.-South Korea joint military exercises are being interpreted as a signal of openness to dialogue with North Korea, and with major diplomatic events such as a U.S.-China summit and the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Leaders’ Meeting on the horizon, expectations are growing that a meeting between the U.S. and North Korean leaders could materialize. Given the prolonged breakdown in U.S.-North Korea and inter-Korean relations, the need to resume U.S.-North Korea summit diplomacy is clear, as only direct engagement at the highest level can create a meaningful diplomatic breakthrough.

However, holding such a summit does not, in itself, guarantee peace. While the 2018 Singapore Joint Statement pledged to establish a new U.S.-North Korea relationship and build a lasting peace regime on the Korean Peninsula, that momentum quickly dissipated after the 2019 Hanoi summit broke down. Differences over denuclearization and corresponding measures were the immediate cause. However, we cannot overlook the fact that an adequate framework for translating leaders’ agreements into institutional changes in inter-Korean relations and the broader order on the Korean Peninsula had not been established. If summit diplomacy serves as a “catalyst,” a durable “framework” is needed to seize that opportunity and translate it into a sustainable regional order.

If U.S.-North Korea summit talks resume, they must not be limited to agreements between leaders, as was the case in the past. The objectives of the talks should also extend beyond simply restarting denuclearization negotiations to include reducing military tensions on the Korean Peninsula and establishing an institutional foundation for peaceful coexistence.

In this regard, what is needed now is not to focus first on the ultimate form of unification, but to establish a structure for sustainable peaceful coexistence while managing the current division and confrontation in a stable manner. I argue that the most realistic principle South Korea can advance in the context of resuming U.S.-North Korea summit talks is precisely “peaceful coexistence.”

Why “Peaceful Coexistence” Now?

North Korea has strengthened the foundations of regime survival by advancing its de facto nuclear capabilities and establishing a comprehensive strategic partnership with Russia. In late 2023, North Korea defined inter-Korean relations as a “hostile relationship between two states” and effectively abandoned its previous approach to unification.

Domestic public opinion in South Korea has also shifted significantly. According to the “2026 Survey on Perceptions of Unification,” conducted by Seoul National University’s Institute for Unification and Peace Studies, the percentage of respondents who said unification was “necessary” fell from 63.8% in 2007, when the survey began, to 39.0% in 2026. Conversely, the percentage of respondents who said “the status quo is fine”—meaning that the Korean Peninsula remains effectively divided into two states—rose from 11.8% to 31.5% over the same period, reaching its highest level since the survey began.

Regarding the most important objective of the government’s policy toward North Korea, “peaceful coexistence and the establishment of peace” (61.6%) significantly outpaced “inter-Korean unification” (15.3%). Therefore, while maintaining the overall direction of South Korea’s Korean Peninsula peace policy, it is time to redesign its pathways and priorities to reflect current realities. The possibility of resuming U.S.-North Korea summit talks provides a catalyst that makes further postponement of this policy recalibration increasingly difficult.

Given this reality, it is difficult to manage the current security crisis by focusing solely on assumptions about the ultimate form of inter-Korean relations. What is needed now is a pragmatic approach that recognizes that the two Koreas operate under different political systems and institutions while working to prevent military conflict, restore dialogue, and gradually expand economic and social exchanges.

Therefore, peaceful coexistence should be understood not as a concept intended to abandon unification, but as a pragmatic starting point for managing the current structure of confrontation and creating conditions for future changes in inter-Korean relations.

Three Principles of Peaceful Coexistence

In the context of resuming U.S.-North Korea summit diplomacy, peaceful coexistence—which underpins South Korea’s policy toward the Korean Peninsula—needs to be translated into concrete policy through three principles.

The first is the principle of mutual respect and the cessation of hostile acts.

The most fundamental condition for peaceful coexistence is to refrain from denying the other side’s political system or right to exist. Unless confidence can be established that neither side will seek to forcibly change or absorb the other, it will be difficult to sustain economic cooperation or other forms of exchange.

Particularly in light of North Korea’s advancing nuclear and missile capabilities and recurring military tensions between the two Koreas, preventing inadvertent military clashes is of paramount importance. Practical risk-reduction measures are needed, including preventing accidental clashes along the Military Demarcation Line, restoring military hotlines, establishing mutual notification mechanisms, and maintaining communication regarding military exercises and activities. This principle does not imply acceptance of North Korea’s nuclear weapons program. Rather, it means that—even as we work to resolve the nuclear issue—we must reduce the risk of military conflict and create conditions in which sustained dialogue remains possible.

The second is the principle of easing tensions through dialogue and exchange.

If dialogue between North Korea and the United States resumes, South Korea must also restore channels of communication in inter-Korean relations. We must not repeat a pattern in which U.S.-North Korea dialogue takes the lead on issues affecting the Korean Peninsula while South Korea merely accepts the outcome afterward.

Inter-Korean contacts can be expanded not only through political and military dialogue but also through areas of relatively low political sensitivity, including humanitarian assistance, disaster response, public health, separated families, forestry, agriculture, culture, and sports.

In particular, if military tensions ease, it will be important to gradually expand the scope of inter-Korean exchanges and cooperation. Peaceful coexistence is not achieved through declarations alone; rather, it is a process of increasing predictability and reducing uncertainty through repeated contact, communication, and practical cooperation.

The third is the principle of phased and parallel progress toward denuclearization and a peace regime.

North Korea’s denuclearization remains a core objective for achieving lasting peace on the Korean Peninsula. However, there is no need to frame denuclearization and peaceful coexistence as mutually exclusive objectives. Rather, a phased approach that links the suspension and reduction of nuclear and missile activities with the easing of military tensions, the addressing of regime-security concerns, and economic and humanitarian cooperation may be more realistic.

Given that North Korea is unlikely to completely dismantle its nuclear arsenal in the short term, emphasizing only the ultimate objective of denuclearization without recognizing intermediate steps could result in a prolonged suspension of dialogue. Conversely, it would also be inappropriate to provide economic benefits while effectively accepting North Korea as a permanent nuclear-weapon state. Therefore, it is necessary to pursue a phased denuclearization process—suspension of nuclear and missile activities → reduction of capabilities → verifiable dismantlement—in parallel with the establishment of a peace regime.

These three principles are not independent of one another. Mutual respect and the cessation of hostile acts create a stable environment; dialogue and exchanges build confidence; and the phased and parallel pursuit of denuclearization and a peace regime institutionalizes that confidence.

A U.S.-North Korea Summit Could Serve as a Starting Point for Peaceful Coexistence

If a U.S.-North Korea summit is held again, the most important task is not simply to replicate past summits, but to connect agreements between the leaders to a process of sustainable peaceful coexistence. The 2018 Singapore summit established the broad direction of building a new U.S.-North Korea relationship and a peace regime. However, at the Hanoi summit, the two sides failed to bridge their differences over the scope and sequencing of denuclearization measures and sanctions relief.

If the summit process resumes this time, a realistic approach beginning with smaller, achievable agreements is needed. This would involve first agreeing on measures that can strengthen mutual confidence—such as suspending nuclear and missile tests and activities associated with the production of fissile material, reducing military tensions, restoring communication channels, and expanding humanitarian cooperation—and then building on those measures in stages. In particular, any summit agreement should include not only denuclearization but also measures to reduce military tensions and strengthen crisis-management mechanisms. This is essential because political commitments made by leaders must be linked to follow-up consultations and implementation at the military and diplomatic working levels.

South Korea’s role is also critical. Even if a U.S.-North Korea summit proceeds as a bilateral negotiation between Washington and Pyongyang, South Korea—as a direct stakeholder in peace and security on the Korean Peninsula—must actively facilitate follow-up measures aimed at reducing inter-Korean tensions and advancing peaceful coexistence.

The ROK-U.S. Alliance and Peaceful Coexistence Are Compatible Emphasizing peaceful coexistence does not mean weakening the ROK-U.S. alliance or extended deterrence. On the contrary, sustainable peaceful coexistence requires a credible security foundation capable of deterring war on the Korean Peninsula. For South Korea, the ROK-U.S. alliance remains a core pillar of national security and a critical component of the response to North Korea’s nuclear and missile threats. At the same time, credible deterrence creates the strategic space necessary for diplomacy and dialogue.

Therefore, deterrence and dialogue are not mutually exclusive policies. Maintaining credible military deterrence while keeping channels for dialogue open is a realistic approach to building sustainable peace on the Korean Peninsula. Even if U.S.-North Korea dialogue resumes, policy coordination between South Korea and the United States must remain firm. It is essential that the two countries closely coordinate their messages to North Korea and their negotiating strategies, and that any necessary military adjustments be subject to prior consultation within the alliance. Peaceful coexistence must not come at the expense of security; rather, it should enable dialogue and negotiation from a position of credible deterrence.

Institutional Foundations for Peaceful Coexistence

To ensure that the three principles of peaceful coexistence do not remain merely declaratory commitments, institutional mechanisms are needed to support and implement them.

First, inter-Korean military hotlines and communication channels must be restored. The primary objective is to manage accidental clashes that could occur along the Military Demarcation Line and in the West Sea. Second, military confidence-building measures should be expanded in stages. Mutual notification of military exercises and the movement of troops and equipment, agreements to prevent accidental clashes, and regular meetings between military authorities can provide a practical starting point.

Third, humanitarian cooperation should be insulated, to the greatest extent possible, from political and military disputes. Areas such as separated families, public health and medical care, and disaster response are areas of cooperation that can continue regardless of the broader political environment. Fourth, institutional mechanisms should be established to connect agreements between the United States and North Korea with agreements between the two Koreas. A peace regime on the Korean Peninsula cannot be achieved through a U.S.-North Korea agreement alone, nor through an inter-Korean agreement alone.

A Virtuous Cycle of Denuclearization and Peaceful Coexistence

Peaceful coexistence should not be viewed as an alternative to denuclearization. Achieving sustainable peace on the Korean Peninsula ultimately requires addressing North Korea’s nuclear and missile threats. However, suspending all dialogue and exchanges solely on the premise of denuclearization is also unlikely to provide a realistic path forward. Given the extent to which North Korea’s nuclear capabilities have already advanced, the ultimate objective of denuclearization must be pursued alongside interim measures to reduce risks.

A halt to nuclear and missile activities can lead to verifiable reductions in nuclear and missile capabilities, while this process can facilitate the easing of military tensions and the expansion of economic and humanitarian cooperation. In turn, expanded cooperation can increase the tangible benefits North Korea can derive from the denuclearization process, ultimately strengthening the prospects for sustained negotiations. In other words, we must establish a virtuous cycle: peaceful coexistence → easing of tensions → building confidence → progress toward denuclearization → institutionalization of a peace regime. This approach does not entail trading denuclearization for peace; rather, it links the two objectives through a phased and mutually reinforcing process.

What Happens After the U.S.-North Korea Summit Is More Important

The mere occurrence of a U.S.-North Korea summit should not be regarded as a diplomatic achievement in itself. What happens after the summit is more consequential. Agreements reached by the leaders must lead to working-level negotiations, which must in turn produce concrete military and diplomatic measures; those measures must then contribute to reducing tensions in inter-Korean relations. In particular, a permanent consultative mechanism is needed to implement and monitor summit agreements. Separate channels could be established: one between the United States and North Korea to address denuclearization, sanctions, and regime-security guarantees, and another between the two Koreas to address military tension reduction and inter-Korean exchanges and cooperation.

Furthermore, the roles of neighboring countries, including China and Russia, should not be overlooked. A peace regime on the Korean Peninsula is also linked to the security interests of these neighboring states. For North Korea’s denuclearization and peaceful coexistence to advance in a sustained manner, neighboring countries should contribute to a multilateral environment conducive to reducing tensions on the Korean Peninsula and establishing a durable peace regime.

The possibility of resuming U.S.-North Korea summit talks could provide a new opportunity for diplomacy on the Korean Peninsula. However, as past experience demonstrates, summit meetings alone do not produce peace. Concrete principles and institutional mechanisms are necessary to transform the diplomatic space created by summit diplomacy into a durable framework for peace.

The starting point for this effort is peaceful coexistence. Peaceful coexistence does not mean recognizing North Korea as a legitimate nuclear-weapon state or abandoning the goal of unification. Rather, it is a pragmatic approach that begins with the reality that the two Koreas currently operate under different political systems and institutions, with the aim of preventing war and conflict, restoring dialogue and exchanges, and ultimately achieving denuclearization and a peace regime through a phased process.

The three principles of peaceful coexistence neither unconditionally accept North Korea’s demands nor weaken the ROK-U.S. alliance. Rather, they constitute a pragmatic peace strategy that creates space for dialogue on the basis of credible security and deterrence, reduces military tensions through sustained communication, and links these efforts to progress toward denuclearization and a peace regime.

If a U.S.-North Korea summit is held again, South Korea must not stop at simply welcoming the summit itself. It must work to translate and institutionalize the leaders’ agreement so that it produces meaningful reductions in tensions and advances peaceful coexistence on the Korean Peninsula.

Ultimately, what the Korean Peninsula needs now is not a debate over the ultimate form of unification decades into the future, but immediate efforts to reduce the risk of war and institutionalize peace. Only when peace is institutionalized can dialogue be sustained, and only when dialogue is sustained can meaningful progress toward denuclearization become possible. And only when the experience of peaceful coexistence accumulates can a broader range of options for the future of the Korean Peninsula emerge.

If the resumption of U.S.-North Korea summit diplomacy can provide a new opportunity, the most realistic way to seize that opportunity is to establish the three principles of peaceful coexistence as practical guidelines for South Korea’s policy toward the Korean Peninsula.