The Significance and Necessity of Halting North Korea’s Nuclear Program
Yong-hwan Choi
Institute for National Security Strategy
The Current Status of the North Korean Nuclear Issue and the Need to Halt North Korea’s Nuclear Program
North Korea’s development of strategic weapons, including nuclear weapons and missiles, is accelerating. Since the Eighth Party Congress, North Korea has pursued the full-scale development of tactical nuclear weapons designed to target the Korean Peninsula and surrounding regions, alongside strategic nuclear weapons capable of reaching the U.S. mainland. In 2022, it enacted the Nuclear Forces Policy Act, which institutionalized an offensive nuclear doctrine, and in 2023, it amended its constitution to explicitly codify its status as a nuclear-armed state. Furthermore, North Korea has demonstrated both its determination and its capacity to expand its nuclear arsenal, most recently by unveiling a newly established nuclear-material production facility in June 2026.
Despite the continued expansion of North Korea’s nuclear capabilities and its ongoing violations of UN Security Council resolutions, no additional UN sanctions have been imposed on North Korea. In 2019, China and Russia jointly submitted a draft resolution to the UN Security Council calling for the easing of sanctions against North Korea. In 2024, Russia vetoed a resolution to extend the mandate of the Security Council’s Panel of Experts, effectively bringing its operations to an end in April of that year. China and Russia have also repeatedly expressed opposition to the imposition of additional sanctions against North Korea at their respective summit meetings in 2025 and 2026.
Not only has it become increasingly difficult to impose additional sanctions on North Korea, but the effectiveness of existing sanctions is also difficult to ensure without meaningful cooperation from China and Russia. Russia, which has faced extensive Western sanctions since the outbreak of the Russia-Ukraine war, has continued to expand its cooperation with North Korea despite the existing international sanctions regime. China, too, has taken steps to improve relations with North Korea, as demonstrated by President Xi Jinping’s visit to Pyongyang—the first visit by a Chinese president to North Korea in seven years, since 2019. Although China has not openly or systematically violated international sanctions against North Korea, its enforcement of those sanctions may nevertheless be insufficient to prevent North Korea from deriving indirect economic benefits.
In June 2024, North Korea and Russia signed the Treaty on Comprehensive and Strategic Partnership (hereinafter, the “New North Korea-Russia Treaty”), which includes provisions for mutual military assistance in the event of war and has been widely characterized as having alliance-like features. North Korea’s subsequent decision to participate in the Russia-Ukraine war provided further evidence that the North Korea-Russia relationship had evolved into an increasingly close military partnership. Following the signing of the New North Korea-Russia Treaty, the security architecture of the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia has increasingly reflected an interlocking structure involving the U.S.-South Korea alliance and North Korea’s relationships with China and Russia. Amid intensifying great-power competition, particularly the strategic rivalry between the United States and China, the Korean Peninsula has become a point of intersection among the security relationships of the three major nuclear powers—the United States, Russia, and China. Consequently, while the international dimensions of the Korean Peninsula issue have become increasingly pronounced, the space for international cooperation in addressing the North Korean nuclear issue has narrowed further.
North Korea is now openly declaring that it will no longer engage in negotiations aimed at nuclear disarmament and that it has no intention of halting the development of strategic weapons, including nuclear weapons and missiles. The North Korean nuclear issue has therefore entered a fundamentally different phase. Yet there are currently few effective external mechanisms capable of constraining the continued expansion of North Korea’s nuclear capabilities. If this trajectory continues, the North Korean nuclear issue could pose a serious threat not only to the security of the Korean Peninsula and East Asia but also to the integrity of the global nuclear nonproliferation regime.
The deepening of the North Korean nuclear problem is also likely to reinforce Japan’s military buildup, which has already accelerated in recent years. If South Korea and Japan, both of which continue to rely on U.S. extended deterrence, further deepen their security dependence on the United States, a more pronounced Cold War–like security dynamic could emerge around the Korean Peninsula. Moreover, if declining confidence in U.S. extended deterrence coincides with further advances in North Korea’s nuclear capabilities, neighboring countries could face growing domestic pressure to consider developing their own nuclear capabilities.
From this perspective, it is critically important to halt North Korea’s nuclear program at its current stage and prevent further deterioration of the situation. The argument that prioritizing a halt to North Korea’s nuclear program amounts to accepting or legitimizing its status as a nuclear-armed state is disconnected from the realities of the current situation. Even if the ultimate objective remains the complete dismantlement of North Korea’s nuclear program, any realistic process toward that goal would necessarily have to begin by suspending further nuclear development. Past experience also demonstrates that subsequent steps toward nuclear reduction and dismantlement would be exceptionally difficult. Nevertheless, if meaningful progress is to be made on the North Korean nuclear issue, the immediate priority must be to prevent further expansion of North Korea’s nuclear capabilities and contain the deterioration of the nuclear threat.
The Prospects for a U.S.-North Korea Summit and Key Issues
North Korea has repeatedly declared that it has no intention of engaging in negotiations over its nuclear program and has shown strong resistance to inter-Korean dialogue. At the same time, U.S. President Donald Trump has repeatedly expressed his willingness to meet with North Korean leader Kim Jong Un and has referred to North Korea as a “nuclear power” since shortly after taking office. For its part, North Korea has left open the possibility of dialogue with the United States, indicating that relations between the leaders of the two countries are not necessarily hostile. Nevertheless, Pyongyang has remained cautious about resuming negotiations, while Washington has yet to take concrete steps to bring North Korea back to the negotiating table. In August, however, President Trump ordered a reduction in the scale of previously scheduled U.S.-South Korea joint military exercises, renewing attention to the possibility of a U.S.-North Korea summit.
While some have interpreted the U.S. decision to scale back the joint exercises as a retaliatory measure in response to South Korea’s refusal to deploy troops to the Middle East, recent developments nevertheless suggest subtle changes in the U.S.-North Korea relationship. In particular, unlike previous calls for dialogue, the latest move represents a tangible policy step initiated by Washington. Other developments may also indicate the possibility of renewed U.S.-North Korea dialogue. Among them is the recent announcement by the U.S. Department of Defense’s Defense POW/MIA Accounting Agency (DPAA) that it is prepared to resume efforts to recover the remains of U.S. service members in North Korea.
In a statement issued by Kim Yo-jong, North Korea claimed that it attached no particular significance to the scaling back of the U.S.-South Korea joint military exercises. Nevertheless, the timing and content of the statement are noteworthy. Issued shortly after the decision was announced, the statement specifically emphasized that relations between the leaders of the two countries were not hostile and rejected Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s claim that North Korean troops had been deployed to the Russia-Ukraine war. Taken together, these elements may suggest that North Korea interpreted Washington’s decision to scale back the exercises as a potential signal of its willingness to resume U.S.-North Korea dialogue.
That said, while President Trump, with the U.S. midterm elections approaching, appears relatively eager to advance diplomacy, North Korea seems to be keeping the door open to dialogue with the United States without rushing to resume negotiations. Given the experience of the “no deal” outcome at the Hanoi Summit, Pyongyang may be waiting for concrete reciprocal measures from Washington before reengaging in talks. In particular, compared with the circumstances of 2018–19, North Korea may perceive its bargaining position as having strengthened significantly. Rather than returning to the negotiating table immediately, therefore, Pyongyang appears to be carefully assessing the situation while awaiting further steps from Washington.
Nevertheless, given that a future U.S. president may be less inclined to pursue direct engagement with North Korea at the same level as President Trump, Pyongyang is unlikely to allow the remainder of his term to pass without exploring potential diplomatic opportunities. Although China and Russia remain important supporters of North Korea, Pyongyang cannot completely disregard the continuing effects of U.S.-led international sanctions. North Korea therefore has incentives to make use of the strategic space created by its closer relations with China and Russia, where U.S. influence is relatively constrained, while also seeking to improve relations with the United States in pursuit of sustained economic and diplomatic opportunities and greater international normalization. Accordingly, although the timing of renewed U.S.-North Korea talks remains difficult to predict, current circumstances leave open the possibility of renewed dialogue in the foreseeable future.
Of course, even if U.S.-North Korea talks take place, significant challenges will remain. There is a possibility that the leaders of both countries, influenced by their respective political considerations, could reduce a summit to a one-time political event. In other words, even if a summit is held, it remains uncertain whether fundamental issues, including North Korea’s nuclear program, would be addressed in a substantive manner. Nevertheless, U.S.-North Korea dialogue remains important because it offers one of the most plausible avenues for breaking the current diplomatic impasse. As in previous instances, a U.S.-North Korea summit is more likely to serve as a forum for identifying potential breakthroughs and generating momentum for subsequent negotiations than as a venue for simply formalizing the results of discussions accumulated beforehand.
Challenges to Halting North Korea’s Nuclear Program
Given North Korea’s resistance to nuclear disarmament, President Trump would ultimately need to place the nuclear issue on the negotiating agenda. From his perspective, simply creating an opportunity to discuss the nuclear issue directly with Chairman Kim Jong-un could itself represent a significant diplomatic achievement. Moreover, if he were able to secure an agreement to halt the further expansion of North Korea’s nuclear capabilities, such an outcome could provide an opportunity to demonstrate a contribution to strengthening the international nonproliferation regime and reducing instability in Northeast Asia.
The challenge is that it will likely be difficult to negotiate the North Korean nuclear issue as the sole item on the agenda. The starting point, therefore, should be a comprehensive agenda linking the “establishment of a new U.S.-North Korea relationship,” as pledged by the leaders of the two countries in Singapore, with the “reduction of military risks” on the Korean Peninsula. What distinguishes this approach from previous efforts is its greater emphasis on establishing a peace regime and using progress toward that goal as a catalyst for addressing the North Korean nuclear issue. In other words, rather than seeking to resolve the nuclear issue first, this approach would prioritize the establishment of a peace regime while simultaneously pursuing a gradual reduction of nuclear risks.
To create a more favorable environment for dialogue on the Korean Peninsula, it is also important to pursue a parallel diplomatic effort through South Korea’s relations with China and Russia. If North Korea’s key partners, China and Russia, demonstrate a shared commitment to peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula, as well as to the long-term goal of a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula, North Korea may face greater incentives to engage more seriously with the nuclear issue.
Given the fluid international political environment and the numerous obstacles to progress on the North Korean nuclear issue, the role of the South Korean government is particularly important. As a key stakeholder in Korean Peninsula affairs, South Korea should play an active role in shaping the agenda, developing policy options, and devising strategies for their implementation. North Korea’s rejection of inter-Korean negotiations, as well as the possibility of direct U.S.-North Korea talks, does not diminish the need for South Korean engagement, including through behind-the-scenes diplomacy. Each country has different interests, threat perceptions, and strategic calculations regarding the North Korean nuclear issue. If South Korea is to shape developments in ways consistent with its interests and achieve meaningful outcomes, it must actively consult with the United States, engage and persuade China and Russia, and encourage changes in North Korea’s strategic calculations.
It is widely recognized that the current environment makes it extremely difficult to address the North Korean nuclear issue or for South Korea to take the lead in shaping the broader strategic environment. However, simply waiting for circumstances to improve is likely to allow the situation to deteriorate further. Historical opportunities rarely arise under favorable conditions; they often emerge only through narrow openings, and meaningful outcomes can be achieved only when those openings are seized. If a more favorable environment cannot be expected to emerge on its own, proactive efforts to overcome the current impasse and create greater diplomatic space are essential.