A Three-Step Framework for Resolving the North Korean Nuclear Issue and Promoting Peace and Stability on the Korean Peninsula under U.S.–North Korea Summit Diplomacy

Kyung-joo Jeon

Chief,

Korean Peninsula Security Research Division,

Center for Security and Strategy, Korea Institute for Defense Analyses

Will a U.S.–North Korea summit take place this year? Will such a summit serve as a meaningful opportunity to advance peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula? To date, the Government of the Republic of Korea has devoted considerable diplomatic capital to ensuring that both questions receive affirmative answers. However, recent developments have introduced new uncertainty.

Reports indicate that U.S. President Donald Trump has postponed the U.S.–China summit until May, citing the U.S. airstrikes on Iran and the protracted nature of the Middle East conflict. This shift has weakened the momentum underpinning Seoul’s expectations and raised questions as to whether the previously observed willingness for dialogue between the United States and North Korea remains intact in the aftermath of the Iran strikes.

Will U.S.-North Korea talks resume after the airstrikes on Iran?

a. The U.S. government’s existing stance on North Korea’s nuclear program

In contrast to President Trump’s comparatively conciliatory rhetoric toward Kim Jong-un, the broader U.S. government has maintained—and in some respects strengthened—sanctions on North Korea’s nuclear program since the outset of the Trump administration.

To constrain Pyongyang’s nuclear and missile development, Washington has employed a wide array of sanctions instruments through the Departments of the Treasury, State, and Commerce. While such measures are unlikely to eliminate North Korea’s nuclear arsenal, they are intended to slow both the horizontal and vertical proliferation of its capabilities. These efforts encompass not only restrictions on the transfer of nuclear materials and technologies, but also the disruption of the financial networks and revenue streams that support its nuclear and missile programs.

For example, in May 2025, the U.S. Department of State designated North Korea as a “Not Fully Cooperating Country” for the 29th consecutive year.1)

In January 2026, the United States also imposed sanctions on six individuals and entities for their alleged involvement in the illicit transfer of WMD- and missile-related materials and technologies to North Korea, Iran, and Syria.2)

On March 12, the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) further expanded sanctions by designating six individuals and two entities accused of infiltrating U.S. companies through the deployment of IT specialists in order to exfiltrate sensitive information and channel funds to North Korea’s WMD programs.3)

Taken together, these measures suggest that, notwithstanding President Trump’s occasional remarks that could be interpreted as tacit recognition of North Korea’s nuclear status and his repeated expressions of openness to dialogue, such rhetoric does not necessarily imply substantive policy concessions.

In this regard, Kevin Kim, former Acting U.S. Ambassador to the Republic of Korea, noted on December 8, 2025, that President Trump seeks to negotiate with North Korea “from a position of overwhelming superiority,” emphasizing the continued importance of sanctions and human rights concerns as sources of leverage. In other words, even as he has pursued diplomatic engagement, President Trump has underscored the need to maintain pressure on Pyongyang.

From Pyongyang’s perspective, however, this posture constitutes the essence of what it characterizes as the United States’ “hostile policy toward the DPRK,” as articulated at the Ninth Party Congress. North Korea has consistently maintained that peaceful coexistence is possible only if Washington abandons policies aimed at denying its status as a nuclear-armed state; conversely, it has warned that continued confrontation will be met with reciprocal measures.

b. Following the Airstrikes on Iran

The U.S. airstrikes on Iran, initiated in late February and continuing at present, underscore the firm stance of both the U.S. government and President Trump against the illicit acquisition of nuclear weapons. Washington has repeatedly framed the objective of the campaign as preventing Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons capability. Should this hardline approach be applied directly to North Korea, it becomes increasingly difficult to assume that Pyongyang would be treated with the same degree of moderation observed previously.

In such a scenario, the United States may apply similarly stringent standards to North Korea’s nuclear program, and the possibility of considering military options—should Pyongyang show no willingness to abandon its arsenal—cannot be entirely excluded. It is well documented that President Trump seriously contemplated military options against North Korea during his first term.4)

Nevertheless, a firm stance on nuclear nonproliferation does not automatically translate into a preference for military action. It is equally plausible that President Trump could adopt a more proactive yet diplomatically oriented approach toward North Korea, distinct from his policy toward Iran. This distinction stems from the fact that North Korea already possesses operational nuclear weapons, which U.S. intelligence agencies assess to be deliverable to the U.S. mainland through intercontinental ballistic missiles.5)

Moreover, North Korea’s strategic alignment with China and Russia—both nuclear-armed states and principal competitors of the United States—further complicates the strategic calculus. Given the risks of regional escalation already demonstrated in the Middle East, it is unlikely that Washington would readily accept the prospect of a similar or even greater escalation on the Korean Peninsula.

Accordingly, once hostilities with Iran subside, the Trump administration is more likely to prioritize diplomatic engagement with North Korea over military options. Should the United States proceed with a rescheduled summit with China and secure Beijing’s cooperation, the likelihood of pursuing parallel or subsequent dialogue with Pyongyang would increase.

Such an approach would also allow President Trump to reinforce his image as a leader committed to peace. Notably, there is broad consensus among policymakers, the media, and experts in the United States that the complete denuclearization of North Korea is not a realistic near-term objective. Under these conditions, it may be politically advantageous for President Trump to attribute past shortcomings to previous administrations while demonstrating a willingness to pursue pragmatic, incremental steps toward denuclearization.

At the same time, North Korea’s receptivity to renewed dialogue may have shifted in the wake of the Iran airstrikes. Pyongyang, which previously declined U.S. overtures during the APEC summit in Gyeongju, has now observed Washington’s demonstrated willingness and capability to undertake high-risk military operations. From Kim Jong-un’s perspective, the perceived costs of misreading U.S. intentions may therefore have risen.

At the same time, however, these developments may also deepen Pyongyang’s mistrust of U.S. diplomatic overtures and reinforce its commitment to retaining its nuclear deterrent. Consequently, if the United States were to pursue dialogue through formal diplomatic channels—beyond informal signaling via the media—it is less certain that North Korea would categorically reject engagement, even if denuclearization remains on the agenda. Even in the absence of an imminent military option, Pyongyang may remain concerned about the potential for additional forms of U.S. pressure or retaliation.

In sum, the resumption of U.S.-North Korea dialogue in the post-Iran strike environment will depend primarily on President Trump’s political will. While Kim Jong-un may exhibit greater caution toward engagement than at the time of the Ninth Party Congress, a credible and good-faith diplomatic initiative from Washington would be more difficult for Pyongyang to dismiss outright, even if discussions encompass denuclearization.

Strategies for Pursuing Peace on the Korean Peninsula by Leveraging U.S.–North Korea Summit Diplomacy

Given that the prospects for U.S.–North Korea dialogue depend largely on the political will of President Trump and the support of his administration, the Republic of Korea’s policy orientation in this context should be directed primarily toward Washington rather than Pyongyang. Direct efforts by Seoul to initiate dialogue with North Korea or to independently improve inter-Korean relations are likely to prove counterproductive.

This reflects not only North Korea’s long-articulated “two hostile states” framework, but also Kim Jong-un’s consistent preference for excluding South Korea from U.S.–North Korea negotiations.6) Indeed, the more actively South Korea seeks to position itself within, or derive gains from U.S.–North Korea dialogue, the greater the risk that Pyongyang will disengage from the process.

Paradoxically, the most fundamental principle that Seoul must uphold while encouraging U.S.–North Korea dialogue is its unwavering commitment to denuclearization. Any perception that South Korea is prioritizing dialogue for its own sake risks generating suspicion in Washington that Seoul is retreating from the objective of denuclearization under the guise of reducing tensions or improving inter-Korean relations.

Such perceptions would undermine policy credibility and weaken Seoul’s ability to influence U.S. decision-making. Accordingly, while supporting renewed dialogue, South Korea must consistently emphasize that such engagement should aim to meaningfully constrain North Korea’s nuclear capabilities and, over the longer term, advance denuclearization. This position must be articulated as the only viable pathway to durable peace on the Korean Peninsula.

At the same time, the South Korean government should prioritize the institutionalization of robust prior consultation mechanisms with the United States to ensure that any bilateral U.S.–North Korea engagement does not diverge from South Korea’s core security interests. The experience of 2018 underscores the importance of maintaining strong working-level coordination, particularly in contexts where leader-level decision-making can exert disproportionate influence.

The ultimate objective of dialogue is sustainable peace, and Seoul must therefore communicate clearly that the agenda, sequencing, incentive structures, and consultation principles governing U.S.–North Korea talks should be established in advance through close coordination. In essence, South Korea must ensure that its strategic interests are reflected not merely in whether dialogue occurs, but in shaping the substance and structure of that dialogue.

To this end, three policy priorities merit particular emphasis.

First, in making the case for U.S.–North Korea dialogue, South Korea should focus on the medium- to long-term strategic costs of allowing North Korea’s nuclear capabilities to advance unchecked, rather than relying on abstract notions such as “tension reduction” or “relationship improvement.” North Korea continues to make steady progress in nuclear warhead development, delivery systems, command and control, and survivability.

In this context, the absence of dialogue does not preserve the status quo; rather, it enables a gradual shift in the strategic balance in Pyongyang’s favor. It is therefore important to underscore the limitations of past “strategic patience” approaches, as even President Trump has acknowledged, and to frame dialogue not as a concession, but as a risk-management instrument designed to prevent a more adverse security environment.

Second, South Korea should play a constructive role in identifying realistic and actionable negotiation agendas that are politically and strategically acceptable to the United States. While the long-term objective of complete denuclearization must remain intact, it is impractical to expect a comprehensive agreement at the outset.

Instead, an incremental approach should be pursued, including measures such as a moratorium on nuclear and long-range missile tests, a freeze on fissile material production, limited inspections of designated facilities, and confidence-building mechanisms to reduce the risk of inadvertent military escalation. These interim steps should be framed not as a departure from denuclearization, but as pragmatic and necessary stages toward achieving that objective.

Third, while seeking to shape North Korea’s strategic intent through engagement, South Korea must simultaneously strengthen its deterrence posture in response to the continued advancement of North Korea’s capabilities. As Pyongyang modernizes both its nuclear and conventional forces, diplomatic outreach must not be interpreted as a relaxation of defense readiness.

On the contrary, Seoul should make clear to Washington that efforts to facilitate dialogue must be accompanied by the sustained reinforcement of deterrence measures, including the enhancement of extended deterrence, the maintenance of the ROK–U.S. combined defense posture, the consistent enforcement of sanctions, and the deepening of trilateral security cooperation among South Korea, the United States, and Japan. Such a dual-track approach is essential to preventing North Korea from misinterpreting diplomatic engagement—particularly if it proves unsuccessful—as a strategic opportunity.

Ultimately, establishing the necessary conditions—most notably, close and sustained coordination with the United States—to promote peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula and facilitate a potential U.S.–North Korea summit will provide the foundation for implementing the Lee Jae-myung administration’s three-stage process of “freeze–reduction–denuclearization” with respect to nuclear weapons and delivery systems.

※ This article is a revised and expanded version of a discussion paper presented at the 77th Unification Strategy Forum, titled “Seeking a New Paradigm for the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula” (March 26, 2025), which was hosted by the Institute for Far Eastern Studies at the request of the SAND Institute.

1) RFA Staff, “U.S. Designates North Korea and Five Other Countries as ‘Not Fully Cooperating Countries’ on Counterterrorism,” Radio Free Asia, May 13, 2025.

2) Min-hee Park, “U.S. State Department Sanctions Six Entities for Violating Nonproliferation Laws… Including South Korean Firm ‘JS Research,’” Hankyoreh, January 28, 2026.

3) Tae-hwa Kang, “Amid the Iran War… U.S. Imposes Additional Sanctions on North Korean IT Firm ‘Amnokgang’ and Others,” JoongAng Ilbo, March 13, 2026.

4) Fred M. Kaplan, The Bomb: Presidents, Generals, and the Secret History of Nuclear War (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2020).

5) “U.S. Director of National Intelligence: ‘North Korean ICBMs Capable of Reaching U.S. Mainland… Source of Concern Both Within and Outside the Region,’” VOA, March 19, 2026.

6) Jong-il Ra, Dong-soo Kim, and Young-jong Lee, The Road to Hanoi: The Divergent Choices of the ROK, North Korea, and the U.S. (Seoul: Param Books, 2022).