Realizing the Three Major Goals of the Korean Peninsula Peace Initiative: Addressing North Korea’s Denuclearization Evasion and U.S. Strategic Indifference
Jin-Ha Kim
Research Fellow, K-Policy Platform
Adjunct Professor, Hallym University of Graduate Studies
In September 2025, President Lee Jae-myung articulated a vision for peace on the Korean Peninsula in his keynote address to the 80th United Nations General Assembly. His vision aimed to move beyond decades of hostility and confrontation toward peaceful coexistence and shared prosperity. To this end, he outlined three core goals and pathways—exchange, normalization, and denuclearization—as the foundation of the Korean Peninsula peace initiative.
Advancing these objectives in engagement with North Korea, which has embraced a “hostile two-state theory” and categorically rejected inter-Korean cooperation, presents a formidable challenge. Since the first North Korean nuclear crisis in 1994, Pyongyang’s pursuit of nuclear weapons has served as a structural impediment to peace, undermining stability on the peninsula for more than three decades.
Given that denuclearization will decisively shape the feasibility of the peace initiative, this paper examines North Korea’s strategy of entrenching its nuclear status while evading denuclearization pressures and explores potential countermeasures.
North Korea regards nuclear weapons as an indispensable and absolute instrument for altering the status quo on the Korean Peninsula. Accordingly, it has consistently expanded and institutionalized its nuclear forces. In future negotiations with the United States, the international community, and South Korea, Pyongyang is likely to seek the irreversible consolidation of its nuclear status as an established fact, thereby neutralizing denuclearization demands.
Currently, North Korea portrays the United States and South Korea as actors trapped in a “delusion of denuclearization,” while focusing on cementing nuclear possession as an immutable reality. This stance was reaffirmed by Kim Jong Un in his policy address at the 13th Session of the 14th Supreme People’s Assembly in September 2025, where he asserted that “the concept of denuclearization has already lost its meaning.”
To provide an institutional and material foundation for this strategy, North Korea has pursued its second nuclear force enhancement plan since the Eighth Party Congress. This initiative has involved the accelerated expansion, diversification, and operationalization of its nuclear forces, accompanied by a rapid increase in the number of warheads.
An emboldened North Korea is therefore likely to adopt a more assertive external posture and a hardened negotiating stance aimed at reshaping the strategic environment of the Korean Peninsula. Leveraging its expanded nuclear capabilities, Pyongyang is expected to prioritize objectives such as ending what it perceives as U.S. hostile policies and halting pressures related to human rights issues.
Ultimately, it will seek to undermine the credibility of U.S. extended deterrence commitments to South Korea by pressing for reductions or withdrawal of U.S. forces, curtailment of strategic asset deployments, downsizing of ROK-U.S. combined exercises, neutralization of the Nuclear Consultative Group (NCG), and removal of the THAAD missile defense system.
At the same time, North Korea is likely to pursue greater strategic autonomy by expanding its nuclear arsenal, to emphasize its geopolitical relevance while maintaining equidistance among major powers, including the United States, China, and Russia. Pyongyang is expected to leverage this positioning to generate momentum for altering the status quo on the Korean Peninsula.
Domestically, nuclear force enhancement and the coercive diplomacy it enables are likely to be instrumentalized to reinforce regime stability and bolster Kim Jong Un’s leadership legitimacy. The normalization and expansion of nuclear forces will be presented as a milestone in North Korea’s transformation into a “strong and prosperous nation” and, ultimately, a “strategic nuclear power,” reinforcing the leader’s image as a figure of military and diplomatic authority.
North Korea is also likely to intensify efforts to marginalize South Korea by maintaining its nuclear posture. In its dealings with the United States, Pyongyang is expected to insist on direct negotiations and, if dialogue resumes—particularly under an arms-management framework that diverges from denuclearization—it will demand the exclusion of South Korea as a non-nuclear participant.
This intent was explicitly articulated by Kim Yo-jong at an August 20 meeting of senior foreign ministry officials, where she emphasized a “regional diplomatic arena centered on our state.” Kim Jong Un reaffirmed this position in September 2025, stating unequivocally that North Korea has “no reason” to engage with South Korea.
Over time, this exclusionary approach could develop into a broader marginalization strategy aimed at undermining South Korea’s position in East Asian regional politics. If reinforced by pressure from China and Russia and accompanied by reduced U.S. engagement, such dynamics could push South Korea toward strategic isolation and de facto Finlandization, potentially challenging the foundations of its sovereign autonomy.
To advance these objectives while evading U.S. denuclearization pressure and extracting maximum concessions, North Korea is likely to employ a multifaceted tactical approach. Central to this strategy is a “pressure first, negotiations later” approach, whereby Pyongyang delays engagement in order to shape negotiations from a position of accumulated strength. During this period, North Korea will continue expanding its nuclear capabilities while Washington remains focused on maintaining stability on the Korean Peninsula and prioritizing its strategic attention on China.
The deepening Russia–North Korea partnership further complicates this landscape. Enhanced military cooperation partially mitigates the effects of sanctions, provides North Korea with resources for regime maintenance, and raises the prospect of advanced technology transfers.
Against the backdrop of intensifying bloc dynamics and alignment with revisionist powers, Pyongyang has little incentive to accelerate negotiations with a U.S. administration preoccupied with crises in Ukraine and the Middle East. Instead, North Korea is likely to strengthen coordination with China and Russia, gradually increasing strategic pressure on Washington.
Nuclear advancement and heightened provocations will also function as instruments of coercion. By significantly expanding its arsenal and sustaining provocations, North Korea seeks to normalize international acceptance of the “failure of denuclearization” and influence U.S. domestic discourse toward de facto recognition or acceptance of a nuclear freeze.
Concurrently, Pyongyang may aim to stimulate debate within the United States over weakening extended deterrence commitments to South Korea or reducing the U.S. military presence there. Ultimately, North Korea seeks to position itself to propose a coercive bargain: stability on the Korean Peninsula in exchange for a reduction in U.S. “hostile policies.”
On the U.S. side, denuclearization and renewed dialogue with North Korea do not currently appear to be among the highest strategic priorities. U.S.–North Korea relations are characterized by prolonged stagnation, accompanied by exploratory efforts to preserve the possibility of engagement. The U.S. administration remains primarily focused on higher-priority challenges, including managing the war in Ukraine and shaping long-term strategic competition with China.
Nevertheless, it cannot be ruled out that informal confidence-building measures—such as a temporary suspension of ROK-U.S. joint exercises or strategic asset deployments in exchange for a moratorium on North Korean nuclear and missile tests—might be considered preparatory steps toward reopening a dialogue channel.
North Korea, meanwhile, is likely to prioritize completing its second five-year plan for nuclear force advancement, which is approaching its final phase, rather than entering premature negotiations with the United States. Pyongyang is expected to leverage the Ninth Party Congress, scheduled for 2026, as a platform to showcase these achievements both domestically and on the international stage.
Despite initiating preparatory steps—such as the December plenary meeting—North Korea does not appear to be accelerating the timing of the party congress, contrary to earlier expectations. This suggests that Pyongyang is closely monitoring potential shifts in U.S. policy and rapid changes in the international environment, waiting for a strategic window more favorable to its interests.
From North Korea’s perspective, aligning with revisionist powers and advancing its objective of altering the status quo on the Korean Peninsula may be considered a more reliable path to regime survival than engaging in uncertain negotiations with Washington.
The U.S. midterm elections scheduled for November 2026 could serve as an inflection point for both U.S.–North Korea dialogue and inter-Korean relations. Mounting domestic and international pressures on the United States—including challenges in managing the wars in Ukraine and the Middle East, frictions with traditional allies over currency and trade disputes, and deepening domestic political polarization amid economic stagnation—are likely to intensify demands on the Trump administration to deliver tangible diplomatic outcomes.
This environment could incentivize Washington to pursue expedited negotiations with North Korea. Pyongyang, in turn, is highly likely to calculate that such conditions would enable it to extract greater concessions.
Kim Jong Un’s September 2025 address to the Supreme People’s Assembly illustrates this strategic calculus. While strongly condemning ROK–U.S. joint military exercises and reiterating the impossibility of denuclearization, he simultaneously signaled conditional openness to dialogue, stating that “if we desire peaceful coexistence, there is no reason we cannot sit down with the United States.” Under such circumstances, if negotiations were to resume, denuclearization would likely no longer be the central agenda item.
Given Washington’s heightened sense of urgency to reinitiate dialogue and demonstrate diplomatic progress, there is an increasing risk that the existing denuclearization framework could be supplanted by a politically driven negotiation centered on “peaceful coexistence.”
Such an approach might involve accepting elements of North Korea’s demands—such as the rollback of so-called hostile policies or reductions in U.S. forces on the Korean Peninsula—in exchange for limits on Pyongyang’s ability to strike the U.S. homeland or caps on its nuclear warhead inventory. This outcome would carry significantly adverse implications for South Korea’s security and long-term viability.
In response, several policy measures should be considered. First, the ROK–U.S.–Japan trilateral cooperation framework must be revitalized and strengthened to reaffirm allied and international consensus around the principle of North Korean denuclearization.
At the bilateral level, Seoul and Washington should work to institutionalize and codify the denuclearization principle in a manner that is politically and strategically irreversible. Reasserting denuclearization as a core international norm would increase pressure on North Korea to respond strategically to South Korea’s peace initiatives, rather than pursue unilateral alternatives.
U.S.–North Korea negotiations must avoid resulting in the normalization of North Korea’s nuclear status or the erosion of U.S. extended deterrence commitments. Achieving this requires simultaneously enhancing the credibility of U.S. extended deterrence and strengthening South Korea’s indigenous deterrence capabilities.
Seoul should continue to press Washington to regularize the deployment of U.S. strategic assets, reinforce institutional linkages between the ROK–U.S. Extended Deterrence Strategy and Consultation Group (EDSCG) and the Nuclear Consultative Group (NCG), and fully operationalize the Conventional Nuclear Integration (CNI) framework. In parallel, South Korea should expand its independent deterrence and retaliatory capabilities through further development of the Korean-style three-axis system, which would also serve as a minimum hedge against the risk of unilateral U.S. retrenchment.
Third, diplomatic efforts must be intensified to preempt North Korea’s strategy of excluding and marginalizing South Korea from negotiations, as well as the potential for U.S. acquiescence to such exclusion. While continuing to reestablish denuclearization as an irreversible international principle, Seoul should apply early and sustained pressure to secure firm U.S. commitments—either to reinforce extended deterrence or, if denuclearization is effectively abandoned, to support South Korea’s pursuit of an independent nuclear deterrent.
Finally, by strengthening its own defense capabilities and deepening ROK–U.S. defense-industrial cooperation, South Korea must reinforce the perception within U.S. policy circles that it is an indispensable geopolitical asset in the broader strategy of balancing China. In practical terms, this requires firmly embedding the principle that maintaining the alliance with South Korea takes strategic precedence over transactional compromises with North Korea.
Concurrently, both governments should work to heighten awareness of the strategic costs associated with alliance weakening, including the risk of a nuclear domino effect in East Asia. Paradoxically, a steadfast commitment to denuclearization, coupled with a credible deterrence posture, may serve as a catalyst that ultimately compels North Korea to engage more constructively with South Korea’s peace initiatives.