North Korea’s Growing Frustration with Russia: “Putin Stabbed Us in the Back”

Kim Dong-soo

Former North Korean Diplomat

Mounting evidence suggests that discontent is deepening within North Korea over Chairman Kim Jong-un’s decision to dispatch troops to Ukraine—a move intended to highlight Pyongyang’s so-called “blood alliance” with Moscow. Instead, the decision increasingly appears to have backfired.

Russia has reportedly scaled back, delayed, or outright failed to deliver on its initial commitments regarding financial compensation and defense-technology transfers. As funding channels constrict, internal frustration—captured in expressions such as “Putin stabbed us in the back”—is rising sharply within the regime.

According to multiple North Korean sources and intelligence assessments dated December 8, Russia has so far provided only about 20 percent of the compensation originally promised for the troop deployment. Intelligence officials assess that the deployment was initiated by Kim Jong-un and accepted by President Putin, with Pyongyang securing pledges of monthly payments averaging roughly $2,000 per soldier, in addition to separate compensation packages. The North Korean leadership intended to claim more than 80 percent of these payments for state coffers.

Reports indicate Russia initially promised monthly salaries of $5,000 for commanding officers, $3,500 for technical specialists, $3,000 for non-commissioned officers, and $2,000 for enlisted personnel. Moscow also pledged approximately $30,000 in compensation for each soldier killed in action and committed to providing medical treatment to the wounded.

In the early phase of the deployment, North Korea reportedly received in-kind compensation from Russia—including air-defense missiles, military technologies, grain, and crude oil. Russia is also said to have transferred advanced systems such as R-27 and S-300 air-defense components, satellite-related technologies, and space-launch vehicle engines.

In addition to grain and fuel deliveries, North Korea is believed to have obtained roughly 25 trillion won in cash through the provision of munitions and other military supplies. North Korean military units have also taken part in weapons-production cooperation, including artillery and drone manufacturing.

Russia’s “20 Percent Payment” Problem

A major source of growing internal anger is Russia’s failure to pay the promised monthly salaries. Moscow is reportedly insisting that North Korean troops “did not fight effectively” and that their “performance was lacking,” a characterization many experts view as an excuse to avoid fulfilling its financial commitments. This has placed Pyongyang in a difficult position, forcing the regime to reconsider national economic plans that assumed substantial revenue from the deployment.

Russia has likewise backtracked on its commitments to provide advanced military technology. According to intelligence reporting, Moscow rejected Pyongyang’s expectations for transfers of high-end air-defense systems and reconnaissance satellite capabilities, stating that “core technologies” could not be shared. Weapons provided to North Korean soldiers on the battlefield were reported to be outdated or otherwise unsuitable.

Worsening Conditions and Desertion Attempts

Conditions for North Korean troops appear dire. Local reporting suggests Russia is failing to provide adequate medical care, including basic surgery, for wounded North Korean soldiers. A source stated that Russian military hospitals “administer little more than painkillers and antibiotics before telling wounded North Koreans to return home.”

There is also evidence of desertion attempts. Intelligence sources report that approximately seven injured North Korean soldiers fled a Russian military hospital and attempted to contact UN agencies to seek asylum.

Rumors are circulating within North Korea that more than one million young Russian men have been killed or wounded in the conflict, leaving “only women behind.” Similar reports claim that thousands of North Korean troops deployed to Russia have been killed or injured.

Economic Fallout and Market Signals

Jeong Seong-hak, Director of the Image Analysis Center at the Korea Institute for National Security Strategy, stated in a recent interview on the security-focused YouTube channel Code-Q that the anticipated “war windfall” for North Korea has proven illusory. Despite heavy battlefield casualties and what Jeong described as a substantial “blood price,” the actual flow of food aid and other promised economic benefits from Russia has been minimal. Satellite imagery has shown no observable movement of large-scale grain shipments at border logistics facilities.

The economic repercussions are visible in North Korean markets. Jeong reported that rice prices surged by more than 50 percent in just two weeks in major cities such as Pyongyang, Hamhung, and Sinuiju. He assessed the spike not as a temporary market fluctuation but as “an indication of systemic economic failure.” As goods fail to reach local markets, increasing numbers of residents are turning to high-interest private loans simply to secure food supplies—signaling severe dysfunction in distribution networks.

The psychological impact is equally significant. Initial public optimism that Russia would provide substantial compensation has faded. Jeong explained that sentiments among residents have shifted from “Russia will help us” to “next year will be even worse.” Such perceptions, combined with deepening material hardship, may undermine internal regime stability.

Outlook: 2026 as a Critical Year

Analysts broadly agree that 2026 will be pivotal for the North Korean economy. Jeong warns that if authorities impose strict administrative controls to suppress rising prices and exchange rates, market functions could collapse entirely. In a worst-case scenario, Pyongyang may attempt to revive limited forms of the rationing system used during the “Arduous March” of the 1990s.

Key policy initiatives—such as Kim Jong-un’s “20×10” regional development plan and conventional military modernization—are reportedly encountering setbacks, as Russia’s failure to deliver expected compensation undermines financing assumptions. Diplomatic calculations have also faltered. Pyongyang’s decision to lean toward Moscow has strained ties with China, its traditional patron. North Korean workers sent from China to Russia to earn foreign currency are said to be returning home empty-handed due to unpaid wages.

In response, internal control measures appear to be intensifying. A source reports an “unusual generational reshuffle” within the leadership in Pyongyang, with officials older than 42 being replaced. This move is seen as an effort to preempt criticism from older cadres over the failed deployment decision and mounting economic challenges, while reinforcing Kim Jong-un’s centralized authority.

Overall, North Korea’s troop deployment to Russia increasingly appears to be a strategic miscalculation—one that has produced minimal financial gain while exacerbating human losses, economic fragility, diplomatic isolation, and internal instability.